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This  thesis  offers  an  immanent  critique  and  reconstruction  of  green  moral  and  political 
theory.  In  chapter  1,  the  critical-rcconstructivc  approach  and  spirit  of  the  thesis  is 
outlined  in  terms  of  contributing  to  the  process  of  developing  a  green  political  theory  that 
is  different  rrom,  'ccologism'  or  ideological  accounts  of  green  politics.  In  chapter  2,  deep 
ecology  is  critically  interrogated  in  terms  of  its  metaphysical  (2.3)  and  psychological 
claims  (2.4).  Its  view  of  the  'ecological  crisis"  as  a  'crisis'  of  western  culture  is  criticiscd, 
as  is  its  apriorl  defence  of  environmental  preservation  over  the  human  productive  use  of 
nature.  While  its  ecoccntrism  is  rejected  as  the  normative  basis  for  green  politics,  its 
concern  with  virtue  ethics  is  held  to  be  an  important  contribution.  In  chapter  3,  a  self- 
rcflcxivc  version  of  anthropoccntdsm  is  developed  as  the  most  appropriate  moral  basis  for 
green  politics.  Some  naturalistic  arguments  arc  presented  in  order  to  support  'spccicsism, 
and  defend  it  from  claims  of  arbitrariness  and  as  being  akin  to  sexism  or  racism. 
Arguments  ccntring  on  demonstrating  the  tenuous  character  of  the  differelices  between 
humans  and  nonhumans  arc  argued  to  neglect  the  fundamental  moral  significance  of  the 
differetice  between  'human'  and  'nonhuman'.  I  argue  that  an  ethic  of  use,  understood  as  a 
rcflcxivc  modc  of  interaction  with  the  nonhuman  world,  is  a  defensible  form  of 
anthropoccntrism  for  green  political  purposes.  The  basis  of  this  rcflcxivc 
anthropoccntdsm  turns  on  the  claim  that  while  human  interests  arc  a  necessary  condition 
for  justifying  a  particular  human  use  of  nature,  it  is  not  a  satisfactory  one.  Issues 
pertaining  to  the  'seriousness'  of  the  human  interest  which  is  fulfillcd  are  held  to  be 
important  in  distinguishing  'use'  from  'abuse. 
In  chapters  4  to  7,1  outline  a  particular  conception  of  green  political  theory.  In 
chapter  4,  the  cco-anarchist  position  is  examined  by  focusing  on  two  versions: 
biorcgionalism  (4.3)  and  social  ecology  (4.4).  While  rqJccting  the  cco-anarchist  position,  I 
conclude  that  it  be  thought  of  as  a  constitutive  rather  than  a  regulative  ideal  of  green 
politics,  on  the  basis  that  the  transformation  rather  than  the  abolition  of  the  state  is 
consistent  with  green  values  and  principles.  Chapter  5  builds  on  the  latter  and  presents  an 
institutional  version  of  grccn  politics,  which  I  call  collective  ecological  management.  This 
understanding  of  green  politics,  in  which  both  the  "nation'  and  the  'state'  have  key  roles,  is 
developed  from  a  critique  of  ecological  modcmisation  (5.5),  and  Leopold's  'land  ethic' 
(5.8).  In  chapter  6,1  outline  a  theory  of  green  political  economy.  Criticising  both 
neoclassical  environmental  economics  and  free  market  environmentalism,  I  present  an 
alternative  green  political  economy  which  sees  the  'rc-cmbcdding'  of  the  economy  in 
society  as  a  necessary  part  of  the  process  of  harmonising  the  human  and  natural 
economics.  Issues  around  the  'formal'  and  'informal'  economy,  local  and  global  markets, 
self-sufficiency  and  self-reliance  arc  discussed  as  well  the  relationship  between 
consumption,  production  and  ecological  virtue.  In  chapter  7,  the  democratic  dimensions 
of  green  political  theory  arc  examined.  I  Icrc,  green  democratic  theory  and  practice  is  held 
to  ccntrc  on  a  view  or  democracy  as  a  form  of  society  in  which  'green  citizenship"  as  an 
integrative  modc  of  action  and  identity  is  central  to  the  cultivation  of  'ecological 
stewardship".  Chapter  8  concludes  with  a  discussion  of  'progress',  virtue  and  ecological 
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Introduction 
1.1  Introduction 
Although  it  would  not  be  completely  accurate  to  proclaim  that  we  are  all  greens  now,  it  is 
true  to  say  that  green  politics  has  become  an  established  perspective  in  political  and  moral 
debates,  both  within  the  academy  and  within  society  at  large.  Green  politics  in  this  sense 
is  no  longer  'green'.  As  I  write,  the  'mad  cow'  disease  crisis  has  erupted,  the  latest  in  a 
long  line  of  social-environmental  problems  which  has  provided  further  evidence  (if 
evidence  were  needed)  to  demonstrate  the  increasing  sensitivity  of  democratic  populations 
to  environmental  risks.  Such  dilemmasY  their  occurrence,  frequency  and  public  perception 
also  consolidate  green  politics,  its  values,  principles  and  concerns  as  an  established 
analytical  perspective  on  contemporary  democratic  politics.  A  critical  analysis  of  the 
political  theory  underpinning  this  perspective  is  the  aim  of  this  thesis. 
This  thesis  sets  out  to  examine  current  conceptualisations  of  green  political  theory, 
and  presents  an  alternative  conceptualisation  of  green  political  theory,  one  which,  I  argue, 
accords  better  with  its  central  informing  principles  and  values.  To  a  large  extent  this  thesis 
attempts  to  focus  more  on  green  political  theory  rather  than  green  political  ideology.  That 
is,  it  tries  to  develop  an  alternative  understanding  of  green  politics  which  is,  at  times, 
markedly  at  odds  with  dominant  views  of  green  ideology.  For  example,  the  conception  of 
green  political  theory  outlined  and  defended  in  this  thesis  takes  issue  with  the  ecocentric 
and  anarchistic  tendencies  which  are  often  taken  as  central  in  defining  green  ideology. 
Instead  a  naturalistic  anthropocentric  moral  base  (chapter  3)  is  argued  to  underpin  an 
ecological  political  arrangement  termed  collective  ecological  management  (chapter  5),  a 
central  component  of  which  involves  the  transformation  as  opposed  to  the  abolition  of  the 
nation-state.  A  major  difference  between  green  political  theory  and  green  political 
ideology  is  the  modesty  of  the  former.  While  both  green  ideology  and  theory  share  a 
common  critical  stance,  they  differ  in  that  green  political  theory  is  less  marked  by  a 2 
utopian  style  of  critique.  Instead  an  immanent  critique  characterises  green  political  theory. 
The  immanence  of  green  political  theory  is  in  two  respects.  On  the  one  hand,  the 
conceptualisation  of  green  theory  which  is  offered  in  this  thesis  is  itself  the  product  of  an 
immanent  critique  and  reconstruction  of  existing  conceptualisations  of  green  ideology  and 
theory.  On  the  other  the  particular  conceptualisation  of  green  political  theory  defended  is 
one  for  which  the  resolution  of  social-environmental  problems  must  at  least  start  from  an 
immanent  (as  opposed  from  an  'external')  critique  of  existing  patterns  and  modes  of 
social-environmental  interaction. 
The  critical  aspects  of  the  thesis  are  not  ends  in  themselves,  but  ought  to  be  read  as  a 
necessary  part  of  the  process  to  develop  a  more  coherent,  plausible  and  attractive  version 
of  green  political  theory.  These  critical  aspects  are  to  be  understood  as  part  of  the  general 
strategy  of  the  thesis  which  attempts  to  reconstruct  green  political  theory  via  a  process  of 
immanent  critique.  The  alternative  understanding  of  green  politics  developed  in  the  thesis 
comes  from  within  green  political  theory,  broadly  understood.  Thus,  throughout  the  thesis 
I  take  issue  with  many  'sacred  cows'  of  green  political  theory,  such  as  ecocentrism 
(chapters  2  and  3),  eco-anarchism  (chapters  4  and  5),  post-materialism  (chapter  6),  anti- 
urbanism  (chapter  4),  anti-market  (chapter  6),  and  direct  democracy  (chapter  7).  My 
concern  is  not  to  dispose  of  these  sacred  cows  (an  act  that  would  be  singularly 
problematic  given  the  vegetarian  and  vegan  predilections  of  many  greensl),  but  rather  by 
critically  interrogating  them  to  extract  a  defensible  kernel,  and  to  integrate  the  latter  into  a 
alternative  understanding  of  green  political  theory.  This  critical-reconstructive  aim  is  part 
and  parcel  of  developing  a  green  political  theory  from  within  the  various  discourses  of 
green  political  ideology.  This  aim  is  to  critically  assess  the  main  understandings  and 
accounts  of  green  ideology  and  translate  the  principles  and  values  they  embody  into  an 
alternative  political  idiom.  For  example,  deep  ecology's  ecocentrism  is  understood  as  an 
argument  concerning  the  necessity  to  regulate  and  reformulate  anthropocentric  moral 
reasoning.  Ecocentrism,  on  this  gloss,  is  a  warning  against  a  complacent  and  potentially 
arrogant  anthropocentrism.  As  argued  in  chapters  2  and  3,  the  normative  claims  of  green 
political  theory  do  not  require  the  rejection  of  anthropocentric  moral  reasoning  in  favour 
of  a  putative  non-anthropocentric  ecocentrism.  Likewise  eco-anarchism  (chapter  4)  is 3 
viewed  as  a  'regulative'  as  opposed  to  a  'constitutive'  ideal  of  green  politics.  That  is,  eco- 
anarchism  expresses  the  green  concern  for  democratisation,  decentralisation  and 
appropriate  scale,  and  acts  as  a  reminder  of  the  ecological  and  democratic  dangers  of 
centralised  and  hierarchical  political  authority  and  economic  organisation. 
While  this  translation  of  dominant  understandings  of  green  moral  and  political  theory 
will  doubtless  be  criticised  and/or  rejected  by  those  who  conceive  of  green  politics  in 
terms  of  'deep/radical'  versus  'shallow/reformist"  (that  is  a  profoundly  ideological 
perspective),  the  alternative  understanding  of  green  political  theory  which  emerges  from 
this  thesis  cannot  be  rejected  on  the  grounds  that  the  political  theory  it  defends  is  not 
cgreen'  in  a  generic  sense.  The  argument  of  the  thesis  is  thus  premised  on  a  rejection  of 
understandings  of  green  politics  based  around  distinguishing  'deep'  from  'shallow'  green 
thinking,  or  'ecologism'  from  'environmentalism'.  These  accounts  of  green  politics,  while 
of  course  important  and  valuable,  often  obscure  as  much  as  they  reveal.  This  ideological 
approach  tends  to  highlight  the  differences  rather  than  the  connections,  overlapping 
principles  and  themes  between  various  conceptualisations  of  normative  green  theory.  As 
suggested  in  chapter  4  (4.5),  such  ideological  views  of  green  politics  were  perhaps  an 
inevitable  and  positive  aspect  of  its  early  development.  Looking  back  on  the  development 
of  green  politics  since  the  1960s,  one  is  keenly  aware  of  how  its  critical,  radical  and  often 
uncompromising  character  underpins  this  ideological  account. 
Ideological  accounts  of  green  politics  are  also  characterised  by  a  tendency  to  neglect 
the  difficult  task  of  working  out  the  theoretical  and  practical  implications  of  green 
principles  and  values.  Green  ideology,  in  common  with  most  other  ideologies,  assumes 
the  harmony  of  its  principles  by  positing  a  future  social  order  in  which  these  principles  are 
realised.  In  the  case  of  green  theory,  ideological  accounts  of  'ecologism'  focus  on 
describing  the  'sustainable  society'  to  the  neglect  of  working  out  the  implications  of  the 
principle  of  sustainability,  for  example.  Working  out,  and  through,  the  principles  and 
values  of  green  politics  is  a  primary  aim  of  this  thesis.  As  such,  it  seeks  to  establish  the 
rationality  and  persuasiveness  of  the  green  case  independently  of  the  attractiveness  of 
green  visions  of  the  sustainable  society.  The  problem  with  ideological  interpretations  of 
green  politics  is  the  'external'  quality  of  their  diagnostic  and  prescriptive  elements.  They 4 
offer  a  'view  from  nowhere'  as  a  guide  to  get  from  'here'  (the  unsustainable  present)  to 
'there'  (the  'sustainable  society').  Thus  for  example,  deep  ecology's  (ideological)  view  of 
the  'ecological  crisis'  as  a  crisis  of  western  culture  is  contrasted  with  a  view  of  ecological 
problems  as  a  contradiction  within  culture  (chapter  2).  As  a  crisis  of  western  culture,  the 
deep  ecological  'solution'  is  premised  on  an  external  critique:  the  rejection  of 
anthropocentrism  and  the  adoption  of  ecocentrism.  If  anthropoccntrism,  which  is  a  core 
cultural  orientation  of  western  societiesP  is  the  cause  of  the  'ecological  crisis',  then  an 
immanent  critique  of  anthropocentrism  is  insufficient.  Nothing  short  of  a  cultural 
'paradigm-shift'  and  a  'new  ethic'  is  required,  since  western  culture  and  anthropocentrism 
are  insufficient  to  resolve  the  crisis  they  have  caused.  This  understanding  I  argue  is  a 
major  reason  why  deep  ecology  is  to  be  viewed  as  a  'redemptive  politics',  for  which  an 
ecocentric  'reverence  for  nature'  as  opposed  to  a  'respect  for  nature',  is  a  necessary 
condition  for  the  resolution  of  the  ecological  crisis  (2.3.1).  This  ideological  view  is 
rejected  on  the  grounds  that  the  ecological  crisis  is  not  a  crisis  of  civilisation  in  the  way 
some  radical  greens  think,  but  is  better  viewed  as  a  cultural  contradiction  which  is 
resolvable  from  within  the  resources  of  western,  anthropocentric  culture.  Hence  the 
adoption  of  an  immanent  style  of  critique  throughout  the  thesis.  That  is,  to  adequately 
understand  the  ensemble  of  social-environmental  problems,  dilemmas  and  risks  faced  by 
contemporary  western  societies,  one  must  analyse  this  ensemble  in  terms  of  its  causes 
rather  than  just  its  effects.  In  short,  one  must  look  for  the  causes  of  social-envirorunental 
problems  within  society  and  culture  first,  in  order  to  properly  address  their  effects  as 
manifested  in  problematic  relations  between  the  human  and  the  nonhuman  worlds. 
Recent  developments  within  green  political  thought,  to  which  this  thesis  is  intended  to 
be  a  contribution,  indicate  a  certain  'maturing'  of  green  politics,  or  what  Hayward  has 
termed  "theoretical  consolidation7  (1995:  6).  This  has  been  marked  by  a  shift  from 
criticising  the  status  quo  and  advocating  a  moral  'paradigm  shift'  and/or  a  vision  of  the 
future  'sustainable  society',  to  a  concern  with  formulating  feasible  and  attractive  solutions, 
policies  and  institutional  designs  to  present  social-environmental  dilemmas.  One  of  the 
aims  of  this  thesis  is  to  demonstrate  that  translating  green  normative  and  political 
principles  into  policies,  does  not  necessarily  rob  green  politics  of  its  radical  and 5 
transformative  character.  While  utopian  visions  of  a  better  society  and  ecocentric  forms  of 
moral  reasoning  are  transgressive  and  contribute  enormously  to  the  imaginative  and 
innovative  spirit  of  green  thinking,  it  is  a  mistake  to  think  that  only  these  forms  of  thinking 
are  'radical'.  It  is  just  as  radical  (if  not  more)  to  transcend  the  dualistic  and  dichotomous 
grammar  of  conventional  understandings  of  green  politics.  One  of  the  reasons  behind  the 
tcritical-reconstructive'  approach  adopted  in  the  thesis  is  a  belief  that  the  theoretical 
consolidation  and  development  of  green  thought,  is  now  as  much  about  getting  rid  of  the 
unnecessary  as  it  is  about  developing  additional  insights.  The  critical-reconstructive 
approach  can  be  viewed  as  an  attempt  to  get  the  green  theoretical  house  in  order,  as  it 
were.  My  starting  point  is  that  the  elaboration  of  an  alternative  conceptualisation  of  green 
theory  is  a  necessary  prelude  in  order  that  it  take  its  proper  place  within  contemporary 
debates  within  political  theory.  Part  of  this  immanent  critique  involves  elaborating  key 
terms  and  pfin6lpxes  used  in  POYWICA  theoty  fcom  a  uten  perspedive.  '11ftus  21ringil6e, 
ffiscussiing  "greee  pfinelples  such  as  sustainaVIVIty,  and  %reen  concerns  Vhth  estabyls'Eln% 
ý'Ory 
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characterised  by  its  understanding  of  'standard'  political  theory  terms  such  as  'liberty' 
(chapter  6),  'interests'  and  'preferences'  (chapters  3,5,6,7),  'the  state'  (chapters  4,5,7), 
tprogress'  (chapters  7,8)  and  'democracy'  (chapter  7). 
One  approach  to  this  in  the  thesis  is  to  focus  on  the  types  of  policies  greens,  of  various 
hues,  do  or  would,  endorse,  given  their  values  and  principles.  This  is  in  keeping  with  the 
aim  suggested  above  which  focuses  on  areas  of  overlap.  Often,  in  practice,  the  difference 
between  'radicals',  'ecocentrics'  and  so-called  'shallow  ecologists,  or  'reformists',  is  one 
of  degree  rather  than  kind.  This  is  particularly  the  case  with  Policy  Proposals  concerning 
environmental  protection  and  preservation.  What  one  often  finds  is  substantive  agreement 
on  policies  or  institutional  reform  but  disagreement  on  the  reasons  given  for  supporting 
policies.  Thus  one  of  the  major  arguments  of  the  thesis  is  that  there  is  a  large  area  of 
agreement  between  different  conceptualisations  of  green  ideology.  For  example,  in 
respect  to  the  'ecocentric-anthropocentric'  dichotomy,  following  Norton's  'convergence 
hypothesis'  (1991);  1  argue  that  a  reformed  'naturalistic  humanism'  (chapter  3)  can 
support  a  'stewardship  ethic'  (chapters  3,5,7),  which  can  integrate  green  demands  for 6 
symbiotic  and  sustainable  relations  between  human  societies  and  their  environments 
(chapter  3).  This  stewardship  position,  based  on  an  'ethics  of  use'  for  the  environment  in 
which  human  interests  and  nonhuman  interests  can  be  harmonised  to  some  extent  (3.5), 
can  also  be  developed  from  contemporary  discourses  around  'ecological  modernisation' 
(5.5),  and  a  less  eccentric  (mis)interpretation  of  Leopold's  'land  ethic'  (5.8).  This 
stewardship  position  can  be  understood  as  suggesting  a  mode  of  human  interaction  within 
which  the  human  interest  in  managing  and  transforming  the  environment,  which  is  vital  to 
the  fulfilling  of  other  human  interests,  is  characterised  by  moral  and  ecological  concerns. 
The  advantage  of  the  stewardship  position  is  that  it  is  politically  (as  well  as 
philosophicafly)  superior  to  ecocentrism,  since  it  holds  that  care  for  the  environment 
cannot  be  independent  from  human  interests.  Indeed,  stewardship  is  interpreted  as  an 
ecologically  rational  mode  of  individual  and  collective  behaviour  and  interaction,  in  which 
long-term  human  interests  are  secured.  Ecological  stewardship,  unlike  ecocentrism,  seeks 
to  emphasise  that  a  self-reflexive,  long-term,  anthropocentrism,  as  opposed  to  an 
carrogant'  or  'strong'  anthropocentrism,  can  secure  many  of  the  policy  objectives  of 
ecocentrism,  in  terms  of  environmental  preservation  and  conservation.  A  central  aspect  of 
this  is  that  the  concern  for  the  nonhuman  world  which  underpins  stewardship  is  not 
disinterested  or  impartial  (chapter  3).  As  argued  in  chapter  3  (3.5.1,3.6),  this  reformed, 
reflexive  anthropocentrism.  is  premised  on  critically  evaluating  human  uses  of  the 
nonhuman  world,  and  distinguishing  'permissible'  from  'impermissible'  uses.  That  is,  an 
'ethics  of  use',  though  anthropocentric  and  rooted  in  human  interests,  seeks  to  regulate 
human  interaction  with  the  environment  in  terms  of  'use'  and  'abuse'.  The  premise  for 
this  defence  of  anthropocentric  moral  reasoning  is  that  an  immanent  critique  of  'arrogant 
humanism'  is  a  much  more  defensible  way  to  express  green  moral  concerns,  than  rejecting 
anthropocentrism  and  developing  a  'new  ecocentric  ethic'.  As  discussed  in  chapters  2  and 
3,  ecocentric  demands  are  premised  on  an  over-hasty  dismissal  of  anthropocentrism  which 
precludes  a  recognition  of  the  positive  resources  within  anthropocentrism  for  developing 
an  appropriate  and  practicable  moral  idiom  to  cover  social-environmental  interaction. 
Anthropocentric  moral  reasoning  has  never  sanctioned  a  purely  instrumental  view  of  this 
interaction.  The  history  of  western  philosophy  and  culture  is  testament  to  the  various 7 
ways  in  which  the  moral  dimensions  of  the  relationship  between  the  human  and  the 
nonhuman  worlds  have  been  analysed,  recoosed  and  created. 
A  central  part  of  developing  an  alternative  language  for  green  political  theory  involves 
a  concern  with  'virtue'  and  'progress'.  Although  there  are  no  specific  chapters  devoted  to 
either  of  these,  they  are  constant  points  of  reference  throughout  the  thesis.  The  concern 
with  ecological  virtue  is  a  recurrent  theme  throughout  the  thesis  from  chapter  2  where  it  is 
suggested  as  an  alternative  ethical  idiom  by  which  to  express  ecocentric  moral  concerns, 
to  chapter  7  (7.8)  where  it  is  used  to  integrate  green  democratic  concerns  of  citizenship 
with  ecological  stewardship.  Picking  up  on  the  deep  ecological  point  about  the  centrality 
of  character  to  morality  in  chapter  2,  a  virtue  ethics  approach  is  used  throughout  the  thesis 
as  a  way  to  establish  the  connection  between  green  moral  and  political  theory.  As 
developed  in  chapter  3  (3.6),  a  virtue  ethics  approach  views  the  moral  dimension  of  green 
concerns  as  having  less  to  do  with  finding  the  correct  set  of  moral  rules  by  which  we  are 
to  interact  with  nature,  than  with  cultivating  respectful,  less  'arrogant'  modes  of 
interaction  with  the  nonhuman  world.  Another  advantage  of  a  virtue  ethics  approach  to 
green  moral  and  political  theory  is  that  central  to  virtue  is  the  idea  of  flourishing,  or  well- 
being,  rather  than  'welfare'.  Virtue  ethics  can  furnish  a  much  needed  sense  of  proportion 
and  humility  to  guard  against  the  constant  vice  of  hubris,  indifference  and  disrespect  to  the 
nonhuman  world.  By  cultivating  ecologically  sensitive  modes  of  relating  to  the  world, 
particularly  human  transformative  relations  and  practices,  the  normative  change  that 
greens  argue  for  acquires  a  cultural  as  well  as  a  political  character.  This  cultural 
dimension  is  stressed  throughout  the  thesis  as  another  way  in  which  the  green  political 
theory  I  defend  is  to  be  distinguished  from  other  forms.  Thus  throughout  the  thesis 
reference  is  made  to  human  modes  of  action  and  interaction  such  as  'production', 
cconsumption',  and  'citizenship'  which  are  central  to  social-environmental  affairs.  Green 
political  theory,  centred  on  the  cultivation  of  'ecological  stewardship'  becomes  a  matter  of 
integrating  these  modes  of  interaction  so  that  together  they  constitute  a  stewardship  mode. 
Taking  a  virtue-orientated  position  implies  that  a  concern  of  green  politics  is  to  create 
modes  of  human  interaction  with  the  nonhuman  world  which  are  ecologically  sustainable 
and  morally  symbiotic.  The  latter  refers  to  fostering  self-reflexive  modes  of  human 8 
behaviour  in  which  human  interests,  for  which  particular  human  uses  of  the  nonhuman 
world  are  carried  out,  are  considered  as  necessary  but  not  sufficient  to  justify  that  use. 
Green  political  theory  thus  becomes  concerned  with  discriminating  legitimate,  worthy,  or 
serious  human  interests  from  illegitimate,  unworthy  or  trivial  ones.  The  concern  with 
virtue  is  thus  related  to  discriminating  'symbiotic'  from  'parasitic'  human  modes  of 
interaction,  and  to  foster  the  former  as  a  (ecologically)  virtuous  mode.  At  the  same  time, 
the  classical  view  of  virtue  as  a  mean  between  extremes,,  is  also  evident  in  the  reflexive 
form  of  anthropocentrism  developed  in  chapter  3.  This  reformed  anthropocentrism  is  a 
mean  between  the  extremes  (vices)  of  deep  ecological  'submissiveness'  in  respect  to 
nature,  and  the  'arrogance'  of  'strong  anthropocentrism'. 
In  a  similar  fashion  the  discussion  of  'progress'  also  shadows  the  thesis.  While  specific 
issues  around  progress  understood  as  'economic  development'  and  'modemisation'  are 
directly  addressed  in  chapters  6  (6.8)  and  7  (7.5)  respectively,  the  force  of  the  term 
progress  in  the  title  of  the  thesis  is  intended  to  guide  how  it  should  be  read.  This  focus  on 
progress  is  in  keeping  with  the  reconstructive  intention  of  the  thesis,  namely  that  green 
political  theory  is  not  anti-progress,  anti-modem  or  anti-Enlightenment.  Rather  green 
political  theory  is  to  be  understood  as  an  immanent  critique  of  progress,  suggesting  an 
alternative  understanding  of  it  based  on  its  view  of  social  and  social-environmental 
relations.  A  reason  why  progress  is  chosen  as  a  pivotal  issue  through  which  green 
political  theory  is  discussed,  is  a  conviction  that  what  green  politics  represents  is 
analogous  to  the  challenges  and  opportunities  that  marked  the  Enlightenment  or  the 
advent  of  'modernity'.  In  common  with  recent  writers  on  green  politics,  I  argue  that  the 
central  aims  of  green  politics  coalesce  around  the  necessity  and  desirability  of  'ecological 
enlightenment'  (Beck,  1995a;  Hayward,  1995).  Thus  the  debate  around  ecological 
modernisation  (5.5)  and  its  extension  to  what  I  call  collective  ecological  management 
(5.6),  should  be  read  as  a  debate  concerning  the  basis,  form  and  meaning  of  'ecological 
enlightenment'  and  what  constitutes  progress  within  this  debate. 9 
1.2  Thesis  Structure  and  Overview  of  Chapters 
The  thesis  is  broadly  structured  into  two  parts:  the  first  focusing  on  the  moral  and  the 
other  on  the  political  dimensions  of  green  political  theory.  Chapters  2  and  3  focus  on  the 
former,  while  4  through  to  7  examine  the  latter. 
In  chapter  2,  a  critique  of  deep  ecology  is  outlined.  Although  deep  ecology,  its  values, 
principles  and  positions  are  criticised,  the  main  focus  of  chapter  2  is  on  its  shortcomings  as 
a  moral  basis  for  a  political  theory.  Its  appeal  to  the  necessity  for  the  widespread  adoption 
of  an  'ecological  consciousness',  to  replace  anthropocentrism,  is  argued  to  be  both 
unnecessary  (since  as  argued  in  chapter  3,  anthropocentrism  or  humanism  is  sufficient  to 
furnish  an  adequate  ethic  to  govern  social-environmental  relations)  and  undesirable  since 
its  ecocentric  moral  base  is  insufficient  to  support  a  political  theory  of  social- 
environmental  relations.  Its  appeal  to  metaphysical  (2.3)  and  psychological  change  (2.4) 
as  the  only  way  for  the  'ecological  crisis'  to  be  resolved  are  internally  problematic  and 
insufficient  to  provide  a  normative  basis  for  political  agreement  (2.5).  Deep  ecology  as 
the  moral  basis  for  green  politics  compromiseSthe  connection  between  its  political  and 
ethical  dimensions.  Deep  ecology  is  argued  to  be  largely  a  matter  of  faith,  based  on  an 
assumption  that  political  and  institutional  change  will  somehow  'follow  on'  from  the 
'deeper'  level  metaphysical/psychological  changes  it  proposes.  Since  for  deep  ecology  the 
causet  of  the  ecological  crisis  is  'anthropocentrism',  deep  ecology  proposes  an  alternative 
non-anthropocentric  worldview.  Deep  ecology  'dissolves'  the  distinctly  political  problems 
of  social-environmental  relations  by  reducing  those  problems  to  metaphysical  and 
psychological  ones.  At  the  same  time  deep  ecology's  ecocentrism  is  argued  to  be 
premised  on  privileging  the  protection  or  preservation  of  the  environment  over  human  use 
of  the  environment.  Deep  ecology's  ecocentrism  attempts  to  reverse  the  situation  where 
the  case  for  environmental  preservation  has  to  be  justified  or  proved,  while  human  use  of 
the  environment  goes  unquestioned.  It  seeks  to  replace  an  anthropocentric  a  priori  which 
is  held  to  justify  any  human  use  of  the  environment  (which  follows  from  deep  ecology's 
(false)  view  of  anthropocentrism),  with  an  ecocentric  apriori  in  favour  of  the  preservation 
of  the  environment  from  human  use.  This  chapter,  partly  with  an  eye  to  the  democratic 10 
credentials  of  green  politics  discussed  in  chapter  7,  argues  against  the  assumption  of  either 
an  a  priori  disposition  in  favour  of  any  human  use  of  the  environment  or  preservation. 
The  point  is  that  the  normative  status  of  social-environmental  relations  cannot  be 
determined  a  priori.  However,  having  said  that,  the  discussion  in  this  chapter  does 
indicate  that  any  normative  account  of  social-environmental  relations  must  include  human 
productive  and  transformative  relations  with  the  environment.  That  is,  how  we  ought  to 
treat  nature  must  start  from  and  be  consistent  with  a  recognition  of  the  fact  that  humans 
must  use  nature  to  survive  and  flourish  and  that  this  is  part  of  what  it  means  to  be  human. 
This  is  related  to  the  argument  in  the  next  chapter  where  the  'environment'  with  which 
human  societies  interact  is  argued  to  be  a  'humanised  one'  (3.4.1). 
However,  in  keeping  with  the  reconstructive  aim  of  the  thesis,  I  argue  that  there  is  a 
notion  of  'ecological  virtue'  within  deep  ecology  which  can  be  integrated  within  a  more 
defensible  version  of  green  political  theory.  In  2.7,1  use  deep  ecology's  focus  on  moral 
character  and  the  cultivation  of  ecological  habits  and  disposition  as  a  more  defensible  way 
in  which  to  present  its  key  ethical  contribution  to  green  moral  theory.  The  moral  idiom  of 
'virtue  ethics'  is  a  more  appropriate  way  to  understand  deep  ecology,  particularly  its 
emphasis  on  the  self  In  2.7.1,1  discuss  the  advantages  of  this  virtue  approach  in  terms  of 
a  view  of  virtues  as  moral  traits  which  are  indispensable  for  dealing  with  the  contingency, 
uncertainty  and  ever-changing  character  of  the  'environments',  social,  social- 
x  environmental  and  natural,  humans  inhabit.  Unlikej  deep  ecology  which  I  argue  seeks  to 
find  a  detenninate  and  final  answer  to  the  'truth'  of  human-nature  relations,  a  virtue-ethics 
approach  can  be  viewed  as  an  attempt  not  to  eradicate  or  'solve'  the  problems  and 
challenges  of  the  'human  condition'  (2.7.2).  Rather  a  virtue-ethics  approach  is  to  be  seen 
as  cultivating  a  mode  of  being  and  behaviour  which  helps  us  to  cope  and  adapt  to,  rather 
than  eliminate,  the  contingencies  and  uncertainties  of  the  human  condition  in  relation  to 
our  environment.  At  the  same  time,  virtue  understood  as  a  mean  between  extremes, 
suggests  a  conception  of  green  moral  theory  which  is  a  mean  between  an  'arrogant' 
anthropocentrism  and  an  equally  problematic  'naive'  ecocentrism.  The  'quietism'  or 
submergence  of  human  interests  within  the  natural  order,  just  as  much  as  an  arrogant 
anthropocentrism,  is  argued  to  be  an  ecological  'vice'  to  be  avoided. 11 
In  chapter  3,  this  recognition  of  the  centrality  of  human  use  of  the  environment  is 
developed  within  the  context  of  a  broadly  naturalistic  ethical  understanding  of  social- 
environmental  relations.  While  there  is  a  recognition  that  any  normative  theory  of  social- 
environmental  relations  must  be  consistent  with  human  productive  use,  this  does  not  mean 
that  any  tuid  all  human  transformations  or  uses  of  the  environment  are  morally  justifiable 
or  equally  justifiable.  This  chapter  seeks  to  demonstrate  that  an  immanent  critique  of 
anthropocentrism  can  furnish  an  'ethics  of  use'  for  social-environmental  affairs  which  can 
underpin  green  political  theory.  It  is  also  aimed  at  demonstrating  that  in  terms  of  practical 
policies  and  actual  social-environmental  interaction,  an  ethics  of  use  can  achieve  many  of 
the  ends  desired  by  ecocentrics.  This  ethics  of  use  is  used  as  one  way  in  which  the 
interests  of  the  nonhuman  and  the  human  worlds  can  be  compatible,  or  that  an  ethical 
concern  for  the  world  is  consistent  with  our  productive  use  of  it.  In  short,  the  problem  is 
not  with  humanism  but  the  arrogance  and  narrowness  that  the  latter  may  express.  The 
problem  is  with  a  particular  conception  of  anthropocentrism,  which  is  usually  understood 
as  'strong'  anthropocentrism,  not  anthropocentrism  per  se  (3.5).  In  this  chapter  a  middle 
path  between  the  extremes  of  strong  anthropocentrism  and  ecocentrism  is  outlined.  This 
middle  path,  or  virtue,  between  these  two  'ecological  vices,  denotes  a  mode  of  human 
interaction  with  the  nonhuman  world  such  that  the  social  metabolism  with  nature  is 
morally  symbiotic  as  well  as  ecologically  sustainable.  The  point  about  an  ethics  of  use  is 
to  allow  us  to  distinguish  parasitic  or  morally  unworthy  or  unjustifiable  uses  of  nature 
from  permissible  forms  of  interaction  and  transformation.  Chief  amongst  these  parasitic 
forms  include  factory  farming  and  industrialised  forms  of  agriculture  and  animal  husbandry 
(3.5).  Anticipating  the  critique  of  economic  rationality  and  econornistic  conceptions  of 
social-environmental  relations  discussed  later  in  chapter  5  and  6,  a  conclusion  of  this 
chapter  is  that  underlying  the  strong  and  arrogant  anthropocentrism  criticised  by  deep 
ecology  and  other  forms  of  ecocentric  environmental  ethics,  is  a  particular  economic  view 
of  social-environmental  relations  which  systematically  narrows  human  interests  in  the 
world.  One  way  of  looking  at  this  is  to  argue  that  such  narrow  economic  relations  with 
the  world  'crowd  out'  ethical  considerations  with  regard  to  productive  social- 
environmental  relations.  The  distinction  between  'consumer'  and  'citizen'  (3.6.1)  is 12 
employed  to  examine  the  issue  of  productive  relations  being  regulated  purely  by  economic 
considerations  of  efficiency  or  profit.  On  this  gloss,  green  politics  is  about  providing  a 
wider  political-normative  context  within  which  human  productive  relations  with  nature  are 
not  governed  solely  by  human  economic  interests.  In  keeping  with  this  chapter's  defence 
of  a  reformulated  anthropocentrism,  an  ethics  of  use  can  be  viewed  as  arguing  that  not  all 
human  interests,  simply  because  they  are  human,  are  sufficient  to  justify  any  social- 
environmental  relation.  When  viewed  as  a  virtue  ethics  position  (3.6),  green  moral  theory 
becomes  a  matter  of  determining  'worthy'  from  'unworthy',  'serious'  from  'trivial'  human 
productive  interests  in  the  world. 
In  chapter  4,1  critically  examine  the  common  view  of  green  political  theory  as  a 
modem  version  of  anarchism  or  'anarchistic'  in  some  constitutive  sense.  While  taking 
issue  with  the  assumed  pre-eminence  of  eco-anarchism  within  green  political  theory,  this 
chapter  seeks  to  understand  its  place  within  green  theory  in  terms  of  its  positive 
contributions.  That  is,  while  eco-anarchism  is  rejected  as  a  feasible  or  desirable  view  of 
green  politics,  the  values  and  concerns  that  underpin  it  are  taken  seriously.  Two  eco- 
anarchist  political  theories  are  examined,  bioregionalism  (4.3)  and  social  ecology  (4.4). 
Bioregionalism,  which  is  understood  as  the  closest  political  complement  to  deep  ecology, 
is  criticised  as  insufficient  to  work  as  an  adequate  political  theory  for  social-environmental 
relations.  However,  its  distinction  between  'ecosphere'  and  'biosphere'  is  an  important 
contribution  to  green  politics,  and  something  that  both  the  institutional  arrangements  of 
green  politics  (chapter  5)  and  green  political  economy  (chapter  6)  can  incorporate.  The 
aims  of  social  ecology's  'libertarian  municipalism'  (4.4)  is  argued  to  be  more  coherently 
expressed  as  an  argument  for  the  democratisation  and  decentralisation,  rather  than  the 
abolition,  of  the  state.  In  4.5  the  notion  of  the  "sustainable  society'  is  used  as  a  way  in 
which  we  can  understand  the  pre-eminence  accorded  to  the  eco-anarchist  vision  within 
green  political  debate.  The  chapter  concludes  with  the  argument  that  eco-anarchism  is 
best  seen  as  a  regulative  rather  than  a  constitutive  ideal  of  green  politics,  that  is  infonning 
and  influencing,  but  not  determining  its  aims,  policies  and  institutional  theory. 
Chapter  5  builds  on  the  critique  of  eco-anarchism  by  developing  a  conception  of  green 
politics  in  which  there  is  a  positive  and  key  role  to  be  played  by  the  nation-state  in  the 13 
creation  of  sustainable  and  symbiotic  social-environmental  relations.  The  central  aim  of 
this  chapter  is  to  provide  the  institutional  basis  that  coheres  with  green  moral  and  political 
values.  5.2  discusses  green  political  theory  in  terms  of  its  principles  and  proposals  relating 
to  structural  and  agent-level  change.  5.3  introduces  'ecological  rationality'  as  a  criteriA 
and  way  of  expressing  the  argument  in  the  last  chapter  concerning  the  idea  of  sustainable 
and  symbiotic  social-environmental  relations.  5.4  gives  a  brief  overview  of  the  centrality 
of  the  state  within  the  literature.  In  5.5,1  offer  a  critical-reconstructive  analysis  of 
ecological  modernisation,  with  a  view  to  using  it  as  a  basis  for  developing  a  view  of  green 
politics  as  collective  ecological  management.  Although  ecological  modernisation  is 
criticised,  particularly  with  regard  to  its  statist,  corporatist,  and  rather  'minimalist' 
democratic  character,  it  does  provide  a  starting  point  for  a  more  radical  politics  of 
ecological  management.  For  example,  when  ecological  modernisation  moves  from  dealing 
with  the  effects  of  social-environmental  problems  (pollution  for  example),  to  the  causes  of 
these  problems,  there  is  an  opportunity  for  a  different  institutional  response  and  policy- 
process,  which  I  term  collective  ecological  management  (5.6).  Distinguishing  features  of 
collective  ecological  management  include  its  explicitly  normative  dimension,  its  focus  on 
the  cultural  context  as  central  in  dealing  with  the  causes  of  social-environmental  problems, 
and  its  concern  with  finding  symbiotic  as  well  as  sustainable  social-environmental 
relations.  One  way  of  looking  at  ecological  modernisation  is  to  see  it  as  going  some  way 
towards  integrating  economy  and  ecology,  particularly  the  role  of  the  state  in  creating  and 
maintaining  a  more  ecologically  sustainable  metabolism  between  the  two.  However,  the 
main  criticism  of  it  comes  from  its  lack  of  concern  with  symbiotic  concerns,  its  democratic 
character,  and  its  focus  on  the  means  rather  than  the  ends  of  the  economy-ecology 
metabolism.  While  it  does  represent  an  institutional  move  towards  responsible 
stewardship,  particularly  with  its  stress  on  citizenship  and  environmental 
planning/govemance,  it  does  not  go  far  enough  from  a  green  point  of  view.  in  part,  this  is 
due  to  its  focus  on  economy-ecology  interaction  rather  than  placing  the  latter  within  a 
broader  social-environmental  perspective.  Collective  ecological  management  is  thus  to  be 
understood  as  a  development  or  radicalisation  of  ecological  modernisation.  In  this  sense 
collective  ecological  management  stresses  cultural  as  well  as  institutional  factors.  The 14 
cultural  aspects  of  collective  ecological  management  are  discussed  in  5.7.  on  'nationhood" 
and  the  'land  ethic'  as  a  culturally-informed  theory  of  environmental  management  in  5.8. 
5.9  examines  the  issue  of  planning  and  'governance'  within  collective  ecological 
management. 
Whereas  chapter  3  sought  to  highlight  the  issue  of  what  parts  of  nature  are  permissible 
and  impermissible,  chapters  5  and  6  are  concerned  partly  with  the  related  issue  of 
conceptualising  how  social-environmental  interaction  can  be  carried  out.  The  concern  of 
these  chapters  is  with  outlining  the  issue  of  distinguishing  permissible  and  impermissible  as 
well  as  sustainable  and  unsustainable  forms  of  social-environmental  interaction.  Chapter  6 
develops  a  green  political  economy  compatible  with  green  political  theory.  It  begins  with 
a  critique  of  the  two  dominant  orthodox  economic  approaches  to  environmental  problems, 
namely  neoclassical  environmental  economics  (6.2.1)  and  free  market  environmentalism 
(6-2-2).  Both  are  criticised  on  the  grounds  that,  inter  alia,  they  ignore  or  systematically 
preclude  the  intersubjective  context  of  environmental  valuation,  assume  preferences  to  be 
exogenous  and  fixed,  and  crowd  out  the  public  goods  dimension  of  social-environmental 
issues.  However,  it  is  not  the  case  that  these  approaches  are  rejected  completely.  In 
keeping  with  the  reconstructive  aim  of  the  thesis  as  a  whole,  the  positive  elements  of  both 
are  also  acknowledged.  In  the  next  section  (6.3),  the  positive  elements  of  both  orthodox 
economic  approaches  are  incorporated  and  integrated  within  an  alternative  green  political 
economy.  One  of  the  distinguishing  features  of  this  green  political  economy  is  its 
explicitly  normative  character.  Further  developing  the  'ethics  of  use'  position  developed 
in  chapters  3  and  5,  green  political  economy  is  argued  to  be  concerned  with  the  moral 
issue  of  distinguishing  'proscribed  resources'  from  'permissible  resources'  (63).  This  is 
particularly  the  case  with  regard  to  the  ability  of  technology  to  expand  the  range  of 
gresourcesil  potentially  available  to  the  human  economy.  Green  political  economy  is  thus 
concerned  with  the  issue  of  whether  potential  resources  ought  to  be  considered 
permissible  or  not.  In  this  respect  green  political  economy  is  concerned  with  the  problems 
of  human  technology  in  terms  of  human  material  use  of  the  nonhuman  world.  It  is 
explicitly  moral  in  that  it  is  concerned  with  establishing  a  symbiotic  as  well  as  a  sustainable 
economy-ecology  metabolism.  I  also  outline  the  green  economic  critique  of  the  categories 15 
of  orthodox  economic  thinking,  especially  with  regard  to  what  counts  as  an  Ceconomic 
activity',  measurements  of  welfare,  and  the  more  general  green  argument  that  the  'formal 
economy'  is  parasitic  (in  the  sense  outlined  in  chapter  3)  on  the  'informal  human 
economy'  and  'nature's  economy'.  6.4  argues  that  while  green  political  economy  may  be 
anti-capitalist,  this  should  be  distinguished  from  being  anti-market.  Building  on  this 
distinction  6.5  presents  green  political  economy  in  terms  of  its  emphasis  on  what  I  call  the 
'local  market  economy'.  In  this  section  I  discuss  LETS  (Local  Employment  and  Trading 
Systems),  and  Agenda  21  initiatives,  as  ways  in  which  local  ecological  stewardship  can  be 
institutionalised.  This  emphasis  on  the  local  economy  is  argued  to  represent  one  way  of 
understanding  the  'ecosystem'  as  opposed  to  'biosphere'  context  for  economy-ecology 
relations.  Green  political  economy  is  argued  to  emphasise  self-reliance  (as  opposed  to 
self-sufficiency),  and  to  limit  trade  where  possible,  while  not  ruling  out  trading  relations. 
A  central  distinction  green  political  economy  'deconstructs'  is  that  between  'production' 
and  'reproduction'.  At  the  same  time,  green  political  economy  is  concerned  with  'social 
limits  to  growth'  (Mrsch,  1977),  and  it  suggests  a  view  of  ecological  problems  in  which 
excess  demand,  and  not  just  limited  supplies  ('physical  limits  to  growth'  in  terms  of 
shortages  of  resources  and  sinks)  are  central.  6.6  examines  the  relationship  between 
money  and  economy-ecology  interaction.  It  is  argued  that  the  centrality  of  money  within 
the  modem  economy,  disembeds  it  from  its  social  context  and  also  disembeds  it  from  its 
ecological  context.  In  6.7  there  is  a  discussion  of  the  relationship  between  'production' 
and  'consumption'  within  green  political  economy  in  terms  of  the  character  of  'producer' 
and  'consumer. 
The  relationship  between  green  politics  and  democracy  in  general,  and  what  are  the 
features  of  a  green  theory  of  democracy  in  particular,  are  the  focus  of  chapter  7.  In  7.2,1 
offer  a  critique  of  the  most  developed  and  infamous  account  of  non-democratic  green 
pol-itics:  eco-authoritarianism.  Eco-authoritarianism  is  argued  to  be  presaged  on  a 
particular  understanding  of  the  relationship  between  material  economic  growth  and 
political  stability  and  a  democratic  polity.  Simply  put,  the  eco-authoritarian  argument  is 
premised  on  a  view  that  'material  scarcity',  which  is  held  to  be  a  key  implication  of  green 
politics,  is  incompatible  with  a  stable  democratic  political  order.  This  connection  between 16 
material  affluence  and  democratic  politics  is  questioned.  On  the  one  hand  it  is  traced  back 
to  Tocqueville  and  his  view  of  the  early  development  of  democracy  in  America.  On  the 
other,  I  suggest  that  it  is  'liberal'  democratic  practice  which  is  the  real  object  of  the  eco- 
authoritarian  critique.  That  is,  it  is  a  particular  conception  of  democracy  not  democracy 
per  se  that  underwrites  the  eco-authoritarian  position.  In  7.3  the  relationship  between 
science,  as  a  central  form  of  knowledge  within  environmental  decision-making,  and 
democracy  is  examined.  Here  the  claims  of  green  politics  for  a  new  'science-policy' 
relationship  is  discussed,  as  well  as  the  democratic  dangers  of  leaving  environmental 
decision-making  to  'experts'.  In  7.4.  a  distinction  is  drawn  between  'democratic 
institutions'  and  a  'democratic  society',  as  a  way  to  elaborate  the  institutional  and  extra- 
institutional,  cultural  dimension  of  green  democratic  theory.  Green  democracy  is  viewed 
as  concerned  with  creating  a  democratic  culture  as  much  as  a  democratic  system  to  deal 
with  social-environmental  problems.  In  7.5,  the  issue  of  modernisation  and  development 
which  was  raised  in  chapter  6,  is  examined.  The  green  argument  for  a  less  complex 
society  is  cashed  out  in  terms  of  a  desire  for  increasing  opportunities  for  democratic 
accountability  and  participation.  At  the  same  time,  green  scepticism  of  modernisation  in 
terms  of  demands  for  and  justifications  of  increasing  economic  growth,  are  argued  to  be 
premised  on  a  desire  to  decrease  socio-economic  inequalities,  which  are  often  defended  on 
the  grounds  that  they  are  necessary  to  produce  economic  growth.  A  related  argument  is 
that  the  green  democratic  position  implies  that  the  end  of  'social  progress'  or 
modernisation,  and  not  just  the  means  to  secure  some  'given'  conceptualisation  of  that 
end,  be  open  to  democratic  debate  and  accountability.  7.6  introduces  discursive  or 
deliberative  democracy  as  the  most  appropriate  form  of  democracy  for  green  politics. 
Deliberative  democratic  institutions,  which  are  regarded  as  supplements  to  rather  than 
substitutions  for,  existing  representative  democratic  forms,  are  presented  as  more  suitable 
than  aggregative  democratic  institutions  for  environmental  decision-making.  The  reason 
for  this  is  the  public  goods  character  of  environmental  issues,  and  the  claim  that 
environmental  preferences  therefore  require  a  public,  deliberative  rather  than  a  private, 
aggregative  context.  Following  on  from  the  latter,  7.7  focuses  on  the  institutions  and 
principles  for  collective  ecological  management.  Against  the  common  assumption  that 17 
green  democracy  must  be  some  form  of  direct  democracy,  I  argue  that  representative 
institutions  have  much  to  commend  them.  The  advantage  of  representative  institutions  for 
green  politics  is  discussed  by  looking  at  three  classes  of  'non-citizens'  which  are 
commonly  held  to  be  central  to  the  green  position  concerning  the  appropriate  approach  to 
environmental  decision-making.  These  classes  and  interests  are  affected  foreigners,  future 
generations,  and  nonhumans.  In  all  three  cases,  but  particularly  the  latter  two, 
representative  institutions  are  argued  to  be  indispensable  to  the  green  democratic  cause. 
in  this  section  the  precautionary  principle  and  the  importance  of  openness  and  reflexivity 
in  environmental  decision-making  are  discussed  as  decision-making  principles  which  green 
politics  contributes  to  democratic  environmental  decision-making.  7.8  represents  the  core 
green  democratic  theory.  Here  I  present  'green  citizenship'  as  a  key  social  practice  for 
ecological  stewardship.  Set  within  the  context  of  state-citizen  nexus  of  rights  and  duties, 
green  citizenship  is  argued  to  be  the  dominant  manner  in  which  the  virtues  of  stewardship 
may  be  realised  in  the  absence  of  actual  ownership  of  or  transformative  relationship  to  'the 
land'.  Green  citizenship  qua  stewardship  is  understood  as  not  only  the  necessary 
counterpart  to  a  'green'  state,  but  also  as  the  most  appropriate  social  practice  by  which 
urban  populations  can  cultivate  the  ecological  virtues  of  prudent,  long-term  environrnental 
management.  Green  citizenship  is  argued  to  present  a  way  in  which  roles  of  producer, 
consumer  and  parent  can  be  integrated  in  an  ecologically  rational  manner.  In  7.9  the  part 
of  civil  society  within  green  democratic  theory  and  practice  is  examined.  Starting  from  a 
view  of  democracy  as  requiring  the  separation  of  state  and  civil  society,  I  argue  that  green 
democracy  can  be  viewed  as  a  demand  for  decision-making  spheres  which  are  independent 
of  both  state  and  market.  Another  way  of  looking  at  this  is  to  argue  that  green  political 
theory  is  premised  on  an  instrumental  view  of  both  state  and  market.  In  7.9.1,1  examine 
work  as  a  key  policy-making  area  for  the  'greening  of  society'.  Work  as  a  social  practice, 
with  an  emphasis  on  its  internal  goods,  is  argued  to  be  a  necessary  part  of  the  realisation 
of  green  aims. Chapter  Two 
A  Critique  and  Reinterpretation  of  Deep  Ecology 
2.1.  Introduction 
This  chapter  looks  at  deep  ecology  as  the  pre-eminent  ecocentric  moral  theory  within 
green  moral  theory.  The  aim  is  not  to  offer  an  in-depth  and  comprehensive  overview  of 
deep  ecology,  but  to  argue  that  as  it  stands  deep  ecology  is  insufficient  to  ground  green 
political  claims  and  policy  prescriptions.  My  basic  argument  is  that  deep  ecology  is  unable 
to  provide  the  necessary  moral  basis  for  green  political  theory.  A  central  reason  for  this  is 
that  deep  ecology's  non-anthropocentrism  is  premised  on  a  false  understanding  of 
anthropocentrism.  Allied  to  this  is  the  particular  understanding  of  morality  and  ethics 
within  deep  ecology,  an  understanding  which  gives  little  attention  to  the  collective, 
intersubjective  character  of  the  ethical  as  a  sphere  of  human  action.  This  chapter  clears 
the  ground  for  the  defence  of  anthropocentrism  in  the  next  chapter. 
The  starting  point  for  this  critique  of  deep  ecology  is  given  by  Dobson  who  points  out 
that  there  is  a  rupture  between  ecophilosophy  (by  which  he  means  deep  ecology)  and 
green  politics,  concluding  that,  "the  politics  of  ecology  does  not  follow  the  same  ground 
rules  as  its  philosophy"  (1990:  68).  That  is,  to  all  intents  and  purposes  they  seem  to  be 
two  independent  discourses  which  are  contingently  rather  than  inherently  connected.  This 
lack  of  internal  normative  coherence  between  the  political  and  the  moral  level  is  of  course 
a  serious  deficiency.  So  long  as  deep  ecology  is  considered  as  the  moral  basis  of  green 
politics,  this  unhelpful  and  unnecessary  separation  will  continue,  and  that  anthropocentric 
moral  reasoning  is  not  only  perfectly  legitimate  but  fiindamentally  necessary  to  green 
politics  if  that  gap  is  to  be  overcome.  This  chapter  will  seek  to  provide  reasons  why  we 
must  seriously  question  the  view  that,  "There  must  be  no  doubt  that  Deep  Ecology  is 
indeed  the  Green  Movement's  philosophical  basie'  (Dobson,  1989:  41)  or  that 
Gecocentrism'  is  the  normative  underpinning  for  green  politics  (Eckersley,  1992a:  26-3  1). 19 
That  deep  ecology  does  provide  the  normative  basis  of  certain  strands  of  green  politics, 
such  as  that  associated  with  such  radical  ecological  movements  stwh  as  Earth  First!  and 
bioregional  theory  (4.3),  is  not  in  question.  This  however,  should  not  be  taken  to  mean 
that  the  general  principles  of  green  political  theory  are  underwritten  by  deep  ecology.  As 
suggested  in  the  following  chapter,  a  reformed  anthropocentrism  better  ensures  that  green 
claims  relating  to  the  moral  considerability  of  the  nonhuman  world  will  not  undermine  or 
be  at  odds  with  green  political  principles.  Such  an  alternative  moral  foundation  allows  for 
a  more  mutually  supportive  coupling  of  green  moral  and  political  principles.  What  I  want 
to  demonstrate  is  that  ultimately  the  ecocentric/anthropocentric  division  is  a  false  and 
damaging  dichotomy  which  severs  the  continuity  between  green  moral  and  political 
theory.  Part  of  this  discontinuity  has  to  do  with  the  difficulty  of  securing  political 
agreement  on  the  basis  of  the  substantive  metaphysical  commitments  that  characterise 
deep  ecology.  In  other  words,  if  deep  ecology  is  the  normative  core  of  green  political 
theory  then  it  may  actually  undermine  the  political  relevance  of  green  politics,  in  terms  of 
securing  general  agreement  for  green  policies. 
In  section  2.2,1  sketch  the  development  and  principal  dimensions  of  deep  ecology. 
Following  Dobson  (1989),  particular  emphasis  is laid  on  the  shift  within  deep  ecology 
from  attempting  to  formulate  an  environmental  ethics  based  on  the  intrinsic  value  of  nature 
to  ontological  concerns.  This  ontological  shift  is  then  broken  down  into  two  inter-related 
aspects  of  contemporary  deep  ecology,  the  metaphysical  and  the  psychological  dimensions 
of  its  non-anthropocentrism.  The  metaphysical  component  is discussed  in  sections  2.3, 
where  deep  ecology  is  argued  to  focus  on  a  metaphysical  critique  to  the  detriment  of  a 
normative  critique  of  anthropocentrism.  It  is  metaphysical  ecocentrism  that  is  the  real 
focus  of  the  deep  ecology  position,  which  partly  explains  the  emphasis  many  deep  ecology 
writers  place  on  're-enchanting  nature'  as  the  way  to  remoralise  human-nature  relations  in 
favour  of  nature  (2.3.1).  In  2.4,  the  other  component  of  deep  ecology's  ontological  turn, 
its  understanding  of  the  ontology  of  the  self,  is  discussed.  Taken  together,  the 
metaphysical  and  the  psychological  dimensions  of  deep  ecology's  ontological  turn  are 
argued  to  'erase'  or  'dissolve'  the  distinctly  'ethical'  problem  of  nature,  by  displacing  the 20 
normative  question  of  social-environmental  relations  into  the  metaphysical  and 
psychological  realms.  In  2.5,  the  distinction  between  a  'metaphysical'  and  'political'  base 
for  widespread  normative  agreement  is  used  both  to  criticise  deep  ecology  as  the 
normative  grounding  for  green  politics,  as  well  as  to  indicate  the  general  outlines  of  an 
alternative  normative  basis.  2.6  presents  a  summary  of  the  critique. 
However,  deep  ecology  does  offer  something  which  green  political  theory  can  use. 
This  is  the  reconstructive  aim  of  this  chapter,  which  focuses  on  an  interpretation  of  deep 
ecology  as  virtue-ethics  (2.7).  Here  it  is  argued  that  a  moral  theory  sufficient  to  ground 
green  politics  should  start  from  an  understanding  of  morality  which  sees  morality  as  a 
praclical  human  affair.  Deep  ecology  as  a  theory  of  ecological  virtue  emphasising  moral 
character  may  go  some  way  to  fleshing  out  a  green  theory  of  the  good  and  the  extent  to 
which  green  political  theory  is  dependent  upon  this  view  of  the  good.  The  importance  of 
making  character  and  dispositions  central  to  moral  theorising  is  that  it  allows  a  strong 
connection  between  ethics  and  politics.  In  this  way  aspects  of  deep  ecology  can  be 
incorporated  within  a  reformulated  green  normative  position.  ' 
The  overall  aim  then  of  this  chapter  is  to  highlight  the  fact  that  the  normative  basis  of 
green  political  theory  consists  of  two  'moral  spheres:  one  relating  to  intrahuman  relations  ; 7-  - 
and  the  other  concerning  human-nature  interaction.  What  needs  to  be  ascertained  is  the 
relationship  between  these  two  distinct  but  related  spheres  of  moral  action.  Establishing 
this  would  go  some  way  in  bringing  out  the  composite  moral  basis  upon  which  green 
political  theory  prescribes  particular  ways  in  which  human  social  life  ought  to  be 
organised.  2  While  the  novelty  of  green  political  theory  may  lie  in  its  concern  with  social- 
environmental  issues,  as  a  normative  political  theory  it  is  social  relations  which  are  primary 
and  from  which  the  character  of  the  former  can  be  determined.  Thus  the  critique  of  deep 
I  Of  particular  significance  is  that  this  interpretation  of  deep  ecology  highlights  the  notion  of  'ecological 
culture'  and  its  place  within  green  political  theory,  as  the  mediating  context  between  political  institutions 
and  individuals,  an  issue  developed  in  more  detail  in  chapters  5  and  7. 
2  Both  Goodin  (1992)  and  Eckerslcy  (1992a)  overstate  the  case  by  privileging  the  ecoccntric  agenda 
relating  to  the  regulation  of  human-nature  affairs  over  the  social  one  relating  to  intrahuman  relations. 
Starting  from  these  premises,  it  is  little  wonder  that  values  and  practices  such  as  democracy  are  regarded 
by  some  as  contingent  rather  than  necessary  features  of  green  politics,  despite  the  latter's  sclf-pcrccption 
as  being  radically  democratic. 21 
ecology  in  the  chapter  suggests  that  gap  between  green  philosophy  and  green  politics  can 
be  overcome  by  focusing  on  the  composite  moral  basis  of  green  politics. 
2.2.  Overview  of  Deep  ECology 
In  his  critical  overview  Dobson  (1989),  describes  the  development  of  deep  ecology  in 
terms  of  two  'turns'.  The  first  turn  refers  to  the  fact  that  in  its  initial  stages  of 
development  deep  ecology  was  an  environmental  ethical  theory  concerned  with  the  notion 
of  'intrinsic  value'  of  the  nonhuman  world  (ibid:  42).  Its  second  turn  was  a  movement 
away  from  axiology  to  ontology  (ibid:  44-6).  Both  are  different  aspects  of  the  enduring 
deep  ecology  goal  of  replacing  anthropocentric  moral  reasoning  with  an  ecocentric  moral 
sensibility.  It  is  worth  noting  that  in  its  second  turn,  deep  ecology  not  only  reaffirmed  and 
deepened  its  critique  of  anthropocentrism,  but  also  broke  with  those  environmental 
philosophers  attempting  to  develop  an  environmental  ethics  based  on  the  intrinsic  value  of 
nature,  such  as  Rolston  (1979,1982),  Callicott  (1982),  and  Taylor  (1981,1986). 
The  basic  aims  of  deep  ecology  are  spelt  out  in  greater  detail  in  the  'eight  point 
platform'. 
The  eight  point  platform  of  deep  ecology 
(1)  the  well-being  and  flourishing  of  nonhuman  life  has  intrinsic  value,  independent 
of  human  usefulness, 
(2)  richness  and  diversity  of  fife  contribute  to  the  realisation  of  these  values  and  are 
values  in  themselves, 
(3)  humans  have  no  right  to  reduce  this  diversity  except  to  satisfy  vital  needs, 
3  Deep  ecology  as  used  here  denotes  not  just  those  who  self-consciously  call  themselves  deep  ecologists 
but  others,  such  as  SkolimowsId  (1981,1988,1993)  whose  'cco-philosophy'  is  almost  identical  to  the 
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(4)  the  flourishing  of  human  life  and  culture  is  compatible  with  a  substantial 
decrease  in  the  human  population,  while  the  flourishing  of  nonhuman  life  requires 
this  decrease, 
(5)  present  human  interference  in  the  world  is  excessive,  and  the  situation  is 
worsening, 
(6)  policies  affecting  basic  economic,  technological  and  ideological  structures  must 
change, 
(7)  the  ideological  change  is  mainly  that  of  appreciating  life  quality  (dwelling  in 
situations  of  inherent  value)  rather  than  adhering  to  an  increasingly  higher  standard 
of  living, 
(8)  those  who  subscribe  to  the  above  have  an  obligation  to  implement  the 
necessary  changes.  (Devall  and  Sessions,  1985:  70). 
The  general  goals  of  deep  ecology  can  be  stated  as  the  preservation  of  nature  'wild  and 
free'  and  to  limit  the  human  impact  on  nature  as  the  way  to  achieve  this.  Breaking  this 
down  we  can  group  deep  ecology  proposals  under  three  broad  headings;  (a)  wilderness 
preservation,  (b)  human  population  control,  and  (c)  simple  living.  These  concerns  are 
echoed  by  others  seeking  to  defend  an  'ecocentric'  green  pofitiCS.  4  These  three  general 
concerns  can  thus  be  taken  as  the  hall  mark  of  deep  ecology. 
This  ontological  shift  away  from  environmental  ethics  within  deep  ecology  has  been 
described  by  Naess.  According  to  him,  "The  attempt  to  shift  the  primwy  focus  of 
environmental  philosophical  concern  from  ethics  to  ontology  clearly  constitutes  a 
fundamental  or  revolutionary  challenge  to  normal  environmental  philosophy.  It  is  (and 
should  be)  deep  ecology's  guiding  star"  (1984:  204;  emphasis  in  original).  Environmental 
ethics  qua  axiology  was  viewed  as  the  search  for  a  convincing  theory  of  the  intrinsic  value 
of  nature.  While  worthy  in  its  own  way,  deep  ecologists  felt  it  was  not  radical  enough  or 
sufficient  to  effect  the  types  of  change  they  thought  were  necessary.  Leading  deep 
4  For  example,  Eckersley  claims  that  responses  to  two  salient  litmus'  issues  distinguishes  anthropocentric 
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ecologists  argued  that  it  was  more  effective  to  work  on  the  way  people  conceive  of  their 
identity  and  their  understanding  of  themselves  in  the  greater  scheme  of  things.  For 
Sessions,  "The  search  then,  as  I  understand  it,  is  not  for  environmental  ethics  but 
ecological  consciousness"  (in  Fox,  1990:  225),  or  "cosmological  consciousness"  (Fox, 
1990:  255). 
A  central  part  in  this  shift  from  axiology  and  environmental  ethics  to  wider  issues 
concerning  consciousness  reflects  deep  ecology's  contention  that  the  'ecological  crisis'  is, 
at  root,  a  crisis  of  self-understanding  and  culture.  One  of  the  reasons  given  as  to  why 
deep  ecology  is  deeper  than  other  green  moral  positions  is  that  it  claims  to  deal  with  the 
root  causes  of  the  crisis  rather  than  its  effects.  The  root  causes  for  deep  ecology  are 
located  in  the  uninformed  moral  ontology  of  the  self  and  a  related  anthropocentric  culture 
which  sees  the  world  as  dead,  valueless  and  there  for  human  consumption.  From  this 
ecocentric  perspective  the  ecological  crisis  is  first  and  foremost  a  crisis  of  culture  and  self 
(Eckersley,  1992a:  29).  References  to  the  need  for  a  cultural  'paradigm  shift"  (Capra, 
1983),  based  on  alternative  world-views  which  affirm  the  unity  of  humans  with  and 
dependence  upon  nature,  are  part  and  parcel  of  the  deep  ecology  claim  that  only  a 
widespread  change  in  consciousness  will  solve  the  ecological  crisis. 
Part  of  this  shift  from  axiology  to  ontology  can  be  argued  to  be  due  to  the  problem  of 
motivation  or  a  perceived  moral  'implementation  deficit'.  Following  O'Neill  (1993),  one 
can  ask  in  what  way  does  the  intrinsic  value  in  nature  compel  us  to  act  in  a  certain  manner 
towards  it.  According  to  him,  "while  it  is  the  case  that  natural  entities  have  intrinsic  value 
in  the  strongest  sense  of  the  terni,  i.  e.  in  the  sense  of  value  that  exists  independent  of 
human  valuations,  such  value  does  not  entail  any  obligations  on  the  part  of  human  beinge' 
(1993:  8).  In  this  way  the  'ontological  turn'  can  be  seen  as  deep  ecology's  attempt  to 
couple  motivation  and  'right  action'  by  basing  the  latter  on  ecological  consciousness 
rather  than  the  moral  discourse  of  the  intrinsic  value  of  nature.  To  appeal  to  hearts  rather 
than  minds,  as  it  were. 
Various  other  reasons  can  be  found  for  this  shift  to  ontological  questions.  For  some 
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the  crisis  we  face  is  too  severe  and  deep.  For  Devall,  "Our  ontological  crisis  is  so  severe 
that  we  cannot  wait  for  the  perfect  intellectual  theory  to  provide  us  with  the  answers.  We 
need  earth-bonding  experiences"  (1988:  57).  In  other  words,  the  shift  from  environmental 
ethics  to  ecological  consciousness  is  partly  driven  by  its  perception  of  the  causes  and 
severity  of  the  'ecological  crisis'.  Deep  ecology's  evolution  into  an  informing  framework 
for  'living  simply',  and  'walking  lighter  on  the  earth,  can  be  seen  as  a  central  aspect  of  its 
shift  from  environmental  ethics  to  ontology,  both  at  the  level  of  an  alternative 
understanding  of  the  self  and  an  ecological  way  of  'being  in  the  world'  (Zimmerman, 
1993).  Another  reason  for  this  lack  of  concern  with  environmental  ethics  is  the  non- 
academic  nature  of  much  of  deep  ecology  writing  and  concerns  (McLaughlin,  1995).  For 
many,  deep  ecology  is  an  activist-orientated  theory  as  exhibited  in  the  relationship  between 
it  and  the  radical  environmentalist  group  Earth  First!  Perhaps  a  more  telling  explanation 
of  the  shift  concerns  the  common  perception  within  deep  ecology  that  'ethics',  including 
environmental  ethics,  is  understood  as  primarily  concerned  with  moral  prohibitions,  duties 
and  obligations  (Naess,  1989;  Fox,  1990).  For  deep  ecologists,  duty  is  equated  with 
sacrifice  which  is  understood  as  the  opposite  to  self-interest  and  action  based  on 
inclination. 
Thus  deep  ecology  as  it  presently  stands  concerns  itself  with  the  articulation  of  an 
alternative  ontology  of  the  self,  and  its  place  in  the  order  of  nature  as  given  by  an 
alternative  cosmology  (discussed  in  section  2.3).  A  clear  example  of  this  is  Mathews' 
contention  that,  'Deep  ecology  is  concerned  with  the  metaphysics  of  nature,  and  of  the 
relation  of  self  to  nature.  Its  sets  up  ecology  as  a  model  for  the  basic  metaphysical 
structure  of  the  world"  (in  Fox.  1990:  236).  It  is  to  the  metaphysics  of  deep  ecology  that 
we  turn  to  next. 
2.3  Deep  Ecology  as  Metaphysics 
In  many  respects  it  is  unsurprising  that  deep  ecology  often  comes  across  as  a  metaphysical 
theory,  given  its  concerns  with  shifting  paradigms  and  tying  its  critique  of 25 
anthropocentrism  closely  to  the  historical  emergence  of  particular  forms  of  rationality, 
knowledge  and  practices  in  the  west.  The  latter  refer  generally  to  the  change  in  human- 
nature  relations  as  a  result  of  the  Enlightenment.  Thus,  deep  ecology's  critique  of 
anthropocentrism  is  sometimes  an  expression  of  its  more  general  critique  of  'modernity' 
(Zimmerman,  1993;  Oelschlaeger,  1991,1993).  Within  deep  ecology  therefore  it  is  often 
difficult  to  separate  out  the  critique  of  anthropocentric  moral  reasoning  from  this  different, 
and  in  many  ways  more  contentious  critique,  of  modernity.  This  equation  of  modernity 
with  anthropocentrism  can  be  readily  seen  in  deep  ecology's  standard  historical  account  of 
the  'disenchantment  of  nature';  the  transformation  of  nature  from  a  realm  of  meaningful 
normative  significance,  into  a  collection  of  resources  for  human  instrumental  use  and 
exploitation  (Barry,  1993a;  Fox,  1990).  The  historical  shift  to  a  mechanistic,  reductionist, 
instrumentalist  worldview  concerning  human-nature  relations  is  what  deep  ecology  means 
by  'anthropocentrism',  as  suggested  later  (2.4.1).  Anthropocentrism  thus  refers  to  a 
complete  metaphysical  worldview,  a  worldview  deep  ecologists  claim  as  the  root  of  the 
ecological  crisis.  This  worldview  is  held  to  underpin  all  dominant  moral  theories  and 
political  ideologies,  apart  from  the  deep  ecological  one.  From  this  deep  ecological 
viewpoint,  "the  Green  movement  ... 
is  self-consciously  seeking  to  call  into  question  an 
entire  world  view  rather  than  tinker  with  one  that  already  exists"  (Dobson,  1990:  8). 
Hence  the  necessity  for  a  'new  metaphysics'  to  underpin  human-nature  relations,  premised 
on  transcending  anthropocentrism  and  replacing  it  with  'ecocentrism'.  However,  as 
argued  in  2.6,  this  rules  out  the  politically  powerful  strategy  of  basing  green  politics  on 
the  immanent  critique  and  reformulation  of  anthropocentrism  (and  by  implication 
'modernity').  5  Thus  while  a  reformulated  anthropocentrism  is  more  defensible 
philosophically  as  argued  in  the  next  chapter,  it  is,  afortiori,  more  defensible  politically  as 
suggested  in  2.5. 
5  This  idea  of  immanent  critique  is  further  developed  in  chapters  3  and  4  where  it  is  used  as  the  basis  for  a 
green  critique  and  reformulation  of  anthropocentrism  and  the  nation-state,  respectively.  In  chapters  5,6 
and  7,  green  politics  as  collective  ecological  management  and  stewardship  is  explicitly  premised  on  such 
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2.3.1.  Deep  Ecology  and  the  6Re-enchantment  of  Nature' 
This  section  looks  at  some  salient  aspects  of  deep  ecology  metaphysics  understood  as  the 
re-enchantment  of  nature.  There  are  three  main  issues  that  this  re-enchantment  theme 
highlights.  The  first  is  the  role  of  re-enchantment  within  deep  ecology's  critique  of 
modernity,  based  on  deep  ecology's  diagnosis  of  the  'ecological  crisis'.  The  second  is  the 
spiritual  complexion  this  concern  with  re-enchanting  nature  lends  to  deep  ecology.  The 
third  issue  relates  to  deep  ecology  as  a  'politics  of  redemption',  related  to  the  need  for 
'enchanting  cosmologies'. 
One  way  to  understand  deep  ecology  can  be  found  in  a  seminal  essay  by  Lynn  White 
on  'The  Historical  Roots  of  our  Ecologic  Crisis'.  He  concluded  that,  "Since  the  roots  of 
our  trouble  are  so  largely  religious,  the  remedy  must  also  be  essentially  religious,  whether 
we  call  it  that  or  not.  We  must  rethink  and  re-feel  our  nature  and  destiny"  (1967:  1207).  6 
This  demand  for  a  metaphysical  'paradigm-shift'  is  one  of  the  enduring  features  of  deep 
ecology  (Capra,  1983,1995;  Mathews,  1991:  40-1,  Naess,  1989:  20),  which  can  be  seen 
as  a  critical  reaction  to  the  'disenchantment'  of  nature.  Deep  ecology  follows  Horkheimer 
and  Adomo's  argument  that,  "the  program  of  the  Enlightenment  was  the  disenchantment 
of  the  world,  the  dissolution  of  myths  and  the  substitution  of  knowledge  for  fancy"  (1973: 
3).  In  short,  science  and  technology,  as  the  'modem'  and  dominant  ways  of  understanding 
and  interacting  with  the  world,  disenchanted  and  desacralised  nature.  7  In  setting  its  face 
against  this  disenchantment,  deep  ecology  rejects  the  idea  that  it  was  either  an  inevitable 
6  Snyder  echoes  White,  but  locates  the  problem  much  ftu-thcr  back  than  the  Enlightenment,  stating  that, 
"our  troubles  began  with  the  invention  of  male  deities  located  off  the  plancf'  (in  Eckersley,  1992a:  64). 
Others  such  as  Shepard  (1993)  locate  the  'second  fall'  in  the  transition  from  hunter-gathercr  society  to 
settled,  agricultural  society.  For  a  critique  of  this  'paleo-<=Iogism',  see  Barry  (1995b). 
7  Ilic  tension  between  scientific  forms  of  knowledge  and  those  forms  necessary  for  're-cnchantmcnt'  is 
often  resolved  by  rejecting  science  in  favour  of  more  enchanting  forms  of  knowledge.  Hence  the  common 
misperception  of  green  politics  as  anti-scicnce  (Yearley,  1991;  O'Neill,  1993:  148-55).  Mathews'  (1991) 
theory  of  deep  ecology  is  interesting  because  she  argues,  following  Capra  (1983),  that  there  is  a  scientific 
basis  for  an  enchanting  cosmology.  Recognising  that,  "if  a  cosmology  is  to  gain  currency  at  all  within  our 
culture  it  must  possess  scientific  credibility"  (1991:  50),  she  argues  that  'geomctrodynamics'  offers  a 
scientific  basis  for  a  deep  ecological  cosmology  of  the  ultimate  oneness  of  everything.  Science  as  a  basis 
for  metaphysical  agreement  is  discussed  in  2.5.1. 27 
or  a  worthwhile  cost  to  be  paid  for  the  'benefits'  of  modernity.  The  thrust  of  deep 
ecology  follows  the  logic  of  White's  argument  suggesting  that  if  the  cause  of  the 
ecological  crisis  is  to  be  found  in  the  disenchantment  of  nature  then  the  solution  lies  in  its 
re-enchantment. 
A  common  interpretation  of  deep  ecology  is  that  its  solution  to  the  ecological  crisis  lies 
in  a  widespread  quasi-religious  conversion  along  the  fines  suggested  by  Clark  for  whom 
"Only  a  'religious  spirit,  a  willed  and  eager  commitment  to  a  larger  whole,  can  easily 
sustain  us  through  adversity  let  alone  through  prosperity"  (1994:  114).  Seen  from  this 
general  framework  deep  ecology  is  a  spiritual/religious  answer  to  the  ecological  dilemmas 
facing  humanity  as  a  result  of  modernity  and  its  attendant  world-view.  If  this  is  the  case 
then  deep  ecology  renders  green  politics  as  spirituality  by  other  means.  That  is,  concerned 
not  with  coping  with  the  ensemble  of  ecological  problems  facing  us,  but  with  discovering 
the  'truth'  of  our  metaphysical  relation  to  the  nonhuman  world  as  the  normative  basis  for 
resolving  the  'ecological  crisis'.  Rather  than  elaborating  the  context  within  which 
agreement  on  the  normative  rightness  of  social-environmental  affairs  can  be  created,  deep 
ecology  appears  to  seek  a  determinate  answer  to  the  existentialist  riddle  of  the  'human 
condition'.  8  The  importance  of  this  spiritual  self-understanding  within  deep  ecology  is  that 
this  has  been  taken  to  excuse  its  lack  of  a  political  dimension.  For  example,  according  to 
Devall,  "The  deep,  long-range  ecology  movement  ... 
is  only  partly  political.  It  is  primarily  a 
spiritual-religious  movement"  (1988:  160).  9  The  'ecological  crisis'  for  deep  ecology  is 
thus  a  'crisis  of  civilisation',,  rather  than  a  contradiction  within  present  cultures  that  can  be 
potentially  resolved  within  those  cultures. 
One  way  of  highlighting  this  aspect  of  deep  ecology  is  to  ask  what  does  the  resolution 
of  the  ecological  crisis  mean  for  it?  Within  its  terms  of  reference,  it  seems  that  only  a  final 
9  These  related  distinctions  between  'truth'  and  'agreement',  discovery,  and  'creation'  will  be  central 
themes  of  this  thesis,  used  as  an  ovcr-arching  analytical  guide  to  assessing  the  moral  and  political 
dimensions  of  green  politics.  This  analytical  distinction  is  most  prominent  in  the  next  chapter  where  it  is 
used  to  flesh  out  the  difference  between  'proprictarian'  and  'relational'  accounts  of  morality  (section  3.3) 
and  in  chapter  7  on  some  democratic  implications  of  green  politics. 
9  Naess  offers  the  fact  that  many  deep  ecologists  find  "politics  boring  and  distasteful"  (1995a:  261)  as  a 
possible  reason  for  their  lack  of  interest  in  the  political  implications  of  deep  ecology. 28 
solving  of  the  relationship  between  humanity  and  the  world  constitutes  a  solution.  From 
the  deep  ecology  position  any  solution  to  the  ecological  crisis  must  be  premised  on  "re- 
enchanting'  the  world.  Solutions  which  prevent  the  destruction  of  the  natural  world  but 
are  not  motivated  by  a  reverence  for  nature  fall  short  of  a  real  and  lasting  solution  to  the 
ever-worsening  crisis.  This  is  clear  from  Seed's  contention  that,  "Deep  ecology 
recognises  that  nothing  short  of  a  total  revolution  in  consciousness  will  be  of  lasting  use  in 
preserving  the  life-support  systems  of  our  planet"  (1988:  9).  To  paraphrase  Dobson,  for 
deep  ecology  the  reasons  for  care  for  the  world  are  as  important  as  the  care  itself  (1989: 
46).  Care  motivated  by  anthropocentric  reasons  falls  short  of  the  deep  ecology  ideal,  and 
does  not  constitute  a  'proper'  or  lasting  solution  to  the  crisis.  However,  this  'solution' 
goes  well  beyond  that  needed  to  function  as  a  normative  agreement  for  the  achievement  of 
green  social  and  political  values  and  environmental  policies.  In  conceiving  of  the  problem 
in  this  light,  deep  ecology  prioritises  discovering  some  putative  philosophical  truth  of  the 
'human  condition',  over  the  political  task  of  constructing  a  public  and  normative  basis  for 
social  co-operation  to  achieve  ecological  sustainability  within  a  moral  framework  for 
human-nonhuman  affairs. 
In  part,  one  may  say  that  deep  ecology  seeks  a  permanent  solution  to  human-nature 
relations,  which  may  account  for  the  frequency  with  which  a  return  to  the  values  (if  not 
the  practices)  of  hunter-gatherers  can  be  found  in  some  deep  ecology  writing  (Shepard, 
1993).  Thus  the  argument  for  wilderness  protection,  population  control  and  simple  living 
mentioned  above  as  litmus  areas  for  deep  ecology  (2.2),  can  be  explained,  at  least  in  part, 
by  a  sense  that  hunter-gatherer  society  represents  the  'ideal'  form  of  human  society  which 
we  modems  must  emulate.  A  good  example  of  this  type  of  thinking  is  Gowdy's  claim 
that,  "a  strong  case  can  be  made  that  the  most  ethical  societies,  both  environmentally  and 
socially,  were  hunting  and  gathering  societies,  the  kind  humans  lived  in  for  the  first  99  per 
cent  of  their  existence  on  Earth.  In  terms  of  social  equality  and  environmental 
sustainability,  we  seem  to  be  getting  further  and  further  away  from  the  standard  set  by 
these  societiee'  (1994:  5  1).  Hunter-gatherer,  and  aboriginal  societies  in  general,  fascinate 
the  deep  ecological  imagination  as  'proof  or  'living  proof  of  the  feasibility,  necessity  or 29 
desirability  of  the  societal-wide  'paradigm  shift'  for  which  they  argue.  In  such  low-impact 
societies,  a  sustainable  relationship  emerges  'naturally'  as  a  constitutive  feature.  In 
hunter-gatherer  societies,  therefore,  we  have  a  permanent  and  lasting  resolution  of  the 
'ecological  crisis'.  10  However  in  opposition  to  this,  green  politics  as  I  understand  it,  is  not 
committed  to  such  a  perspective.  As  will  become  clearer  later  on  in  the  discussion  of 
cecological  virtue'  (2.7),  green  theory  is  not  motivated  by  a  desire  to  find  a  permanent  and 
lasting  solution  to  social-environmental  relations.  Rather,  its  focus  is  on  finding  'coping 
strategies',  'correctives',  'adaptive  strategies'  and  modes  of  behaviour  for  social- 
environmental  interaction.  Against  the  deep  ecology  notion  of  finding  a  permanent 
solution,  green  politics,  I  argue,  accepts  that  social-environmental  relations  will  always  be 
characterised  by  uncertainty,  contingency  and  possible  catastrophe,  partly  as  a  result  of 
human  transformative  interests,  and  partly  because  of  the  limits  to  human  knowledge  of 
the  world  used  in  fulfilling  those  interests.  If  the  term  'ecological  crisis'  is  to  be  used,  then 
I  would  suggest  that  green  politics  is  in  the  business  of  'ecological  crisis  management', 
rather  than  'ecological  crisis  solution'.  Green  politics  as  a  form  'environmental 
management'  is  a  constant  theme  in  this  thesis  and  is  discussed  later  (chapters  3,5,6,7). 
One  implication  of  deep  ecology's  search  for  a  permanent  solution  is  that  normative 
agreement  sought  by  deep  ecology  goes  beyond  a  shared  respect  for  nature  to  a  much 
stronger  argument  concerning  the  necessity  for  a  shared  reverence  for  nature.  That  deep 
ecology  is  more  concerned  with  reverence  than  respect,  can  be  seen  in  Mathews' 
statement  that,  'Vhen  our  culturally-endorsed  cosmology  represents  the  world  as  inert, 
blind,  bereft  of  worth  or  purpose,  indifferent  to  our  attitudes  towards  it,  then  our  natural 
urge  to  celebrate  Nature  may  be  thwarted'  (1991:  162-3,  emphasis  added).  This  idea  of  a 
10  Such  a  permanent  solution  is  captured  by  Arendt's  view  of  the  ideal  of  human  'labour'  in  which  we  can 
"swing  contentedly  in  nature's  prescribed  cycle,  toiling  and  resting,  labouring  and  consumingr  (1959: 
92),  based  on  the  idea  of  nature  as  the  "great  provider"  (ibid.:  116).  However,  as  suggested  below,  a 
major  problem  with  this  view  is  that  it  tends  to  downplay  the  uniqueness  of  humanity  and  the  'human 
condition',  and  often  lapses  into  a  position  where  social  relations  arc  simply  'read  oir  from  nature.  One 
consequence  of  this  is  the  erosion  of  the  distinction  between  the  two  moral  spheres  mentioned  in  the 
introduction;  the  human-only  and  the  social-cnvironmental  one.  In  the  next  chapter  I  defend  the  idea  that 
while  the  differences  between  humans  and  (some)  nonhumans  may  not  be  as  great  as  sometimes  thought, 
it  still  remains  the  case  that  the  diflerence  betwccn  'human'  and  'nonhuman'  is  of  fundamental  moral 
significance  (3.4). 30 
cnatural  urge  to  celebrate  Nature'  is  also  tied  up  with  the  pathology  of  the  modem  self 
which  becomes  'ill'  when  such  'natural'  urges  are  repressed.  This  is dealt  with  in  section 
2.4.  The  deep  ecology  aim  to  re-enchant  the  world  is  understood  as  a  return  to  a  'natural' 
(sic)  harmony  between  humans  and  nature.  It  would  not  be  out  of  place  to  claim  that 
clarifying  deep  ecology  along  this  line  highlights  its  character  as  a  'politics  of  redemption'. 
As  a  redemptive  politics  deep  ecology  can  be  seen  as  a  critique  of  modernity  which  views 
the  Enlightemnent  as  humanity's  'second  falling'.  This  would  certainly  tie  in  with  the  view 
that  the  ecological  crisis  is  nothing  short  of  a  total  crisis  for  humanity,  and  it  would  also 
go  some  way  to  explaining  the  spiritual  overtones  of  much  deep  ecology  writing  as  well  as 
its  anti-urban,  pastoralism.  11  Finding  normative  agreement  for  saving  the  planet  does  not 
demand  that  green  politics  tie  this  to  saving  souls  or  finding  the  answer  to  the  meaning  of 
human  life  written  in  the  text  of  nature,  or  a  permanent  solution  to  social-environmental 
relations  to  be  equally  'read  off  from  nature.  A  final  interpretation  of  the  re-enchantment 
theme  is  that  it  refers  to  the  resolution  of  the  alienation  of  humans  from  natureP  that  is  the 
result  of  a  worldview  which  stresses  the  separation  of  humans  from  nature.  Re- 
enchantment  is  here  related  to  a  therapeutic,  healing  concern  for  the  damaged  or  immature 
modem  self  This  will  be  dealt  with  in  the  next  section. 
The  ontological  re-orientation  of  deep  ecology  is  thus  largely  to  do  with  a  qualitatively 
different  metaphysical  understanding  of  the  world  (and  the  cosmos),  and  the  place  of 
humans  within  it.  Despite  the  claims  of  Naess  and  others  who  claim  that  there  are  many 
dfferent  metaphysical  and  cosmological  'ultimate  premises'  that  are  compatible  with  the 
'deep  ecology  platform'  (Naess,  1988:  129;  McLaughlin,  1995),  it  is  clear  that  deep 
ecology  is  committed  to  'enchanting"  rather  than  disenchanting  cosmologies  (Mathews, 
1991).  A  good  example  of  this  is  Fox's  claim  that,  "deep  ecology  recognizes  that  an 
ecologically  effective  ethics  can  only  arise  within  the  context  of  a  more  persuasive  and 
more  enchanting  cosmology  than  that  of  mechanistic  materialism7'  (1984:  195).  On  this 
"  Apart  from  its  clear  metaphysical  disposition,  other  examples  of  this  quasi-rcligious  character  include 
the  importance  of  ritual  for  many  leading  deep  ecologists  such  as  LaChapellc  (1995),  Seed  et  al  (1988). 
According  to  Lucardie,  "In  the  end...  ecological  consciousness  requires  a  religious  or  (at  least)  a 
transpersonal  perspective"  (1993:  33). 31 
account,  we  abuse  nature,  take  it  for  granted,  and  conceive  of  ourselves  as  above  it,  not 
because  of  any  wilful  wrongdoing.  Rather,  having  no  direct  contact  with  nature  or  a 
culture-wide  'ecological  cosmology',  we  have  'forgotten'  that  we  too  are  natural  and  are 
subject  to,  rather  than  outside,  the  order  of  nature.  12  WIthin  deep  ecology,  metaphysical 
reconstruction  provides  a  standard  by  which  to  judge  'beautiful  actions"  of  the  'ecological 
self  ,  the  other  major  dimension  of  deep  ecology's  ontological  turn  discussed  in  the  next 
section. 
2.4.  Deep  Ecology  and  Psychological  Health 
Consonant  with  its  general  drift,  for  deep  ecology  the  ecological  crisis  is  tied  up  with 
western  culture's  pathological  understanding  of  the  self  as  a  result  of  its  disenchanting, 
anthropocentric  worldview  (Naess,  1989;  Fox,  1990;  Kidner,  1994).  For  deep  ecology 
the  ecological  crisis  is  due,  in  part,  to  a  misconceived  notion  of  the  'self%  which 
unnecessarily  limits  the  scope  of  moral  concern  and  care.  The  anthropocentrism  inherent 
within  dominant  western  conceptions  of  the  self  is  held  to  set  up  a  subject/object  dualism 
which  both  reduces  subjecthood  to  a  narrowly  conceived  human  self,  and  reduces 
nonhuman  nature  to  the  status  of  pure  object.  For  Naess  (1989),  a  reconceptualisation  of 
the  human  self  is  a  necessary  precondition  for  a  less  anthropocentric  perspective.  In 
psychological  terms,  the  modem,  unecological  self  is  viewed  as  immature,,  sick  or 
underdeveloped.  Warwick  Fox  goes  much  further  in  his  criticism  and  asserts  that, 
"Anthropocentrism  represents  not  only  a  deluded  but  also  a  dangerous  orientation  toward 
the  world"  (1990:  13);  dangerous  in  terms  of  the  health  of  the  self  as  well  as  the  health  of 
the  planet. 
12  Given  this  overarching  theme  within  deep  ecology  it  is  not  surprising  that  many  deep  ecologists  have 
embraced  Heidegger's  notion  of  'forgetfulness  of  Being'  or  Huxley's  'perennial  philosophy'  as  capturing 
the  spirit  of  what  they  are  about  (Zimmerman,  1993;  Koh,  *  1993;  Devall,  1988).  Deep  ecology 
expresses  a  desire  to  return  to  those  'perennial',  more  'natural'  modes  of  human  metabolism  with  nature 
which  modernity  destroyed.  This  explains  why  deep  ecology  cites  laboriginal'  modes  of  thought  and 
action  as  living  examples  of  what  it  is  about.  For  a  critique  of  the  disenchantment  of  nature  theme  within 
deep  ecology  on  the  grounds  that  it  gives  rise  to  an  anti-science  position  see  O'Neill  (1993:  15  1). 32 
The  psychological  turn  of  deep  ecology  can  be  expressed  in  the  following  schema: 
(1)  The  'self  within  western  moral  thinking  is  narrowly  conceived,  it  is  not  false  but 
incompleterimmature/unhealthy. 
(2)  This  view  of  the  self  expresses  an  anthropocentric  view  of  the  world  and  our  place  in 
it,  and  is  one  of  the  main  causes  of  the  ecological  crisis. 
(3)  What  is  needed  is  a  more  expansive  notion  of  the  'self,  an  understanding  that  is 
premised  on  the  inclusion  as  opposed  to  the  exclusion  of  the  nonhuman  world. 
(4)  This  ecocentric  'sense  of  self'  can  be  cultivated  by  a  process  of  'identification'  with 
the  nonhuman  world. 
(5)  This  sense  of  self  involves  an  orientation  of  care  to  the  nonhuman  world. 
(6)  Injunctions,  rules  and  principles,  i.  e.  deontological  ethics,  become  superfluous  to 
ensure  moray  appropriate  human  interaction  with  the  nonhuman  world. 
The  Kantian  distinction  between  'beautiful'  and  'moral'  actions  is  used  by  Naess  (1989)  to 
explain  the  consequences  once  the  'ecological'  self  has  been  realised.  For  him,  this  means 
that, 
Moral  actions  are  motivated  by  acceptance  of  a  moral  law,  and  manifest 
themselves  clearly  when  acting  against  inclination.  A  person  acts  beautifully  when 
acting  benevolently  from  inclination.  Environment  is  then  not  felt  to  be  something 
strange  or  hostile  which  we  must  unfortunately  adapt  ourselves  to,  but  something 
valuable  which  we  are  inclined  to  treat  with  joy  and  respect.  (1989:  85) 
The  solution  of  the  moral  dilemma  consists  not  in  the  formulation  of  'environmental 
ethics'  (understood  as  a  system  of  moral  "oughts'  coming  from  an  environmentally- 
informed  axiology).  Although  acknowledged  as  having  a  role  to  play,  the  latter  is 
regarded  as  inferior  to  encouraging  ecocentric  habits  and  dispositions  so  that  'beautiful' 
ecological  actions  follow  'naturally'.  This  process  of  'ecological  identification'  (point  4) 
is  part  of  the  'maturing'  of  the  self  according  to  Naess  (1989:  86).  It  is  the  'immaturity' 
of  the  self  and  the  type  of  ethics  associated  with  that  view  of  the  self,  which  results  in  a 33 
dis-valuing  of  nature  and  a  simultaneous  underestimation  of  the  individual.  In  treating 
nature  disrespectfiiffy  we  simply  reveal  our  misunderstanding  of  what  it  means  to  be  a 
cmature'  self  We  treat  nature  as  we  do  because  we  have  'forgotten'  our  place  in  nature, 
"we  do  not  understand  who  we  are'  (Dodson-Gray,  1981:  84).  13 
This  psychological  theme  and  concern  with  the  ontology  of  the  self  will  be  looked  at 
through  an  examination  of  the  work  of  Naess  and  Fox.  For  Fox,  the  central  ideas  of  deep 
ecology  are  to  be  understood  within  a  psychological  framework.  His  'transpersonal 
ecology'  is  an  extension  of  Maslow's  work  on  'transpersonal  psychology'  (Indeed, 
Maslow's  theory  of  a  'hierarchy  of  needs'  which  culminates  in  'self-realisation'  is  another 
key  aspect  of  the  psychological  perspective  of  deep  ecology  (1990:  appendix  B;  Naess, 
19891,1995b)).  For  Fox,  "the  response  of  being  inclined  to  care  for  the  unfolding  of  the 
world  in  all  its  aspects  follows  'naturally'-not  as  a  logical  consequence  but  as  a 
psychological  consequence;  as  an  expression  of  the  spontaneous  unfolding  (developing, 
maturing)  of  the  self'  (1990:  247).  Echoing  Naess,  he  states  that  this  view  of  the  self  has 
the, 
highly  interesting,  even  startling,  consequence  that  ethics  (conceived  as  being 
concerned  with  moral  'oughts')  is  rendered  superfluous!  The  reason  for  this  is  that 
if  one  has  a  wide,  expansive,  field-Eke  sense  of  self  then  ...  one  will  naturally  (i.  e. 
spontaneously)  protect  the  natural  (spontaneous)  unfolding  of  the  expansive  self 
(the  ecosphere,  the  cosmos)  in  all  its  aspects.  (ihid:  217). 
Basically,  ecological  selves  do  not  harm  their  environment  because  the  process  of 
identification  with  it  highlights  their  continuity  with  the  environment.  This  sets  up  an 
13  This  touches  on  the  theme  raised  in  the  previous  section  that  for  deep  ecology  it  is  through  "ignorance' 
rather  than  innate  'sinfulness'  that  we  treat  the  nonhuman  world  as  we  do.  This  ignorance  can  be  taken 
to  include  both  scientific  and  metaphysical  dimensions.  For  example,  for  some  green  ethicists,  an 
increased  knowledge  of  the  natural  world,  our  continuity  with  and  dependence  upon  it,  is  a  necessary 
prerequisite  for  any  'environmental  ethic'  (Rolston,  1982;  Callicott,  1982).  For  deep  greens,  our 
ignorance  needs  to  be  remedied  by  returning  to  'The  Way,  a  form  of  knowing  and  acting  which  is  the 
,  natural,,  perennial,  harmonious  path  of  human-nonhuman  interaction  (Goldsmith,  1992). 34 
expanded  conception  of  the  self  such  that  the  environment  is  constitutive  of  their 
ecological  sense  of  self  To  diminish  or  degrade  the  environment  with  which  they  identify 
would  be  to  diminish  or  degrade  themselves.  Consonant  with  an  expanded  notion  of  self, 
there  is  an  equally  expanded  notion  of  self-interest  such  that  acting  in  one's  self-interest, 
from  desire  and  inclination  will  not  result  in  the  disrespectful  treatment  of  nature.  Behind 
the  stress  on  'identification'  and  the  ecological  self  is  a  belief  that  "natural'  self-interest  can 
be  suitably  altered  so  that  positive  ecological  benefits  result  from  this  ecological  way  of 
'being  the  world'.  14 
However,  there  is  a  potentially  unresolvable  tension  within  this  approach,  that  between 
means  (beautiful  actions  of  the  ecological  self)  and  ends  (the  preservation  and  protection 
of  wilderness  for  example).  Behind  the  stress  on  'beautiful  action'  there  is  an  objectivist 
assumption  that  all  will  think  and  act  in  the  same  way.  We  can  ask  why  beautiful  action  in 
regard  to  the  environment  is  not  simply  in  the  eye  of  the  beholder?  Extending  selfhood  to 
include  the  nonhuman  world  and  encouraging  action  based  on  inclination  and  desire  rather 
than  self-sacrifice  and  obeying  the  'moral  law',  is  equally  compatible  with  the  preservation 
of  nature  or  its  development  depending  on  how  the  'ecological  self  views  its  self-interest. 
What  guarantees  that  the  ecological  self  will  absorb  the  needs  of  nature,  and  thereby 
incorporate  them  as  its  own,  is  the  deep  ecology  metaphysic,  which  is  unlikely  to 
command  widespread  support.  One  can  conclude  by  saying  say  that  focusing  on  the 
cecological  self  is  insufficient  to  understand  the  deep  ecology  position.  Ultimately  it  is  its 
metaphysics  which  is  the  final  arbiter  of  what  constitutes  'beautiful  actions'.  Re- 
enchantment  of  nature  goes  hand  in  hand  with  psychological  re-connection  and  the 
overcoming  of  the  self  s  alienated  state.  It  is  the  metaphysical  vision  of  deep  ecology 
which  furnishes  the  objective  criteria  by  which  ecological  selves  are  to  be  judged. 
14  A  similar  idea  whereby  individuals  are  encouraged  to  take  the  interests  of  others  into  account  when 
making  environmental  decisions  is  presented  in  chapter  7  (7.8). 35 
2.4.1  Knowledge,  Ontology  and  Metaphysics 
Deep  ecology's  general  frame  of  reference  is  the  restoration  of  something  that  has  been 
lost,  a  return  to  the  true  path  from  which  we  have  diverged.  For  example,  aboriginal 
cultures  are  often  held  up  as  the  exemplars  of  good  ecological  behaviour  for  deep  ecology. 
'Wilderness  experience'  and  the  adoption  of  the  insights  of  ecology  are  regarded  as  close 
approximations  to  these  ancient  and  'true'  human  ways  of  'being  in  the  world'.  This  can 
explain  much  about  deep  ecology.  For  one,  it  explains  the  stress  placed  on  the  direct 
experience  of  nature,  rather  than  reasoning  about  nature.  Via  the  direct  apprehension  of 
the  natural  world,  either  by  living  close  to  nature  or  by  wilderness  experience,  we  may 
relearn  and  recover  our  place  in  the  natural  order  of  things,  rediscover  the  perennial 
rhythms  of  the  earth,  and  once  again  be  in  harmony  with  the  world  (LaChapelle,  1993; 
KohAk,  1984). 
The  use  of  such  terms  'health,  'well-being',  and  'maturity'  within  deep  ecology 
writing  indicates  that  there  is  an  'objective'  standard  against  which  we  can  assess  the 
development  of  the  self  For  example,  the  emphasis  on  the  'maturing  of  the  self'  implies 
that  Fox  (1990)  has  some  conception  of  the  self  and  its  'proper'  development.  From  the 
deep  ecology  point  of  view  those  who  do  not  adopt  its  position  (or  rather  have  yet  to 
adopt  it)  are  'immature'  or  'undeveloped.  Another  interpretation,  and  one  more 
consonant  with  the  'psychological'  component  of  deep  ecology's  'ontological  turn,  is  the 
idea  that  for  deep  ecology  the  ecological  crisis  is  an  expression  of  a  deep-seated 
'pathology',  that  must  be  overcome  "if  we  are  to  develop  a  healthier  relation  to  the  natural 
world"  (Kidner,  1994:  45).  Within  this  'therapeutic  discourse',  the  resolution  of  the 
ecological  crisis  is  intimately  tied  up  with  the  simultaneous  resolution  of  the  'psychological 
crisis'  induced  by  the  'modem  worldview',  or  'dominant  paradigim'.  15  This  is  of  course 
15  This  'psychological  turn'  of  deep  ecology  is  marked  by  an  increased  use  of  psychological  terminology 
and  theories.  Although  more  explicit  in  Fox's  writings,  the  use  of  gestalt  theory  by  Nacss  (1989:  57-63) 
demonstrates  this  general  movement  within  deep  ecology  as  a  whole.  Within  deep  ecology  this  turn  has 
also  had  the  effect  of  rendering  the  'ecological  crisis'  into  a  'total  crisis'  in  which  nothing  is  unaffected, 
as  discussed  earlier  in  section  2.3.  Evidence  of  the  ecological  crisis  as  a  crisis  of  the  self,  according  to 
Kidner  (1994),  relates  to  the  increase  in  mental  illness,  drug  addiction,  family  break-up  etc.,  which  can,  in 36 
related  to  the  deep  ecological  view  of  the  ecological  crisis  as  a  'total  crisis';  a  constitutive 
part  of  this  'total  crisis'  is  a  crisis  of  self-understanding. 
The  problem  with  this  'psychological'  turn  of  deep  ecology  is  the  objectivism  and 
essentialism  associated  with  its  theory  of  the  self  What  deep  ecology  attempts  to  provide 
is  a  classificatory  schema  by  which  to  judge  and  rank  self-understandings.  Self- 
understandings  that  depart  from  its  standards  are  misconceived,  incomplete  or  'sick'.  My 
point  is  not  that  there  are  no  standards  by  which  we  can  judge  understandings  of  the  self, 
but  rather  that  such  standards  are  not  'given'  or  'discovered'  in  some  objective  fashion  to 
be  'read  off  from  some  metaphysical-cum-spiritual  schema.  They  are  the  product  of  an 
ongoing  process  of  intersub  ective  negotiation  and  discourse,  premised  on  the  shared  j 
activities  of  human  beings.  As  Taylor  notes,  the  self  is  "a  being  who  exists  in  a  space  of 
concerne'  (1992:  51),  and  this  space  is  created  with  others  within  a  particular  moral 
community.  He  goes  on  to  state  that  "To  know  who  I  am  is  a  species  of  knowing  where  I 
stand.  My  identity  is  defined  by  the  commitments  and  identifications  which  provide  me 
with  the  frame  or  horizon  within  which  I  can  try  to  determine  from  case  to  case  what  is 
good"  (ibid:  27).  In  other  words,  one's  sense  of  self  as  a  moral  agent  is  formed  against  a 
background  of  intersubjective  activity,  a  collectively  created  narrative  which  furnishes  one 
with  the  moral  language  and  set  of  meanings  with  which  to  understand  oneself  and  one's 
relations  to  others,,  whether  these  others  be  human  or  nonhuman.  Morality,  on  this  view 
can  be  seen  as  an  on-going  collective  discourse  of  meanings,  values  and  discernment  of 
what  is  'serious'  and  what  is  not  in  human  affairs,  a  point  taken  up  in  the  next  chapter. 
By  construing  the  issue  as  one  of  'moral  health  and  development',  the  implication  is 
that  there  are  discernible  qualities  that  'healthy'  and  'mature'  selves  exhibit.  The  paradigm 
case  of  this  is  'wilderness  experience':  a  transformative  act  which  simultaneously  'reveals', 
in  a  manner  that  is  not  always  clear,  a  mode  of  human  experience  and  moral  reasoning 
'superior'  to  anthropocentrism.  Such  earth-bonding  experiences  are  at  the  heart  of  deep 
ecology.  Communing  with  nature  by  working  one's  allotment  does  not  carry  the  same 
part  at  least,  be  traced  to  the  separation  of  humans  from  nature,  and  the  'unnatural'  (read  'unhealthy) 
character  of  modem  urban  life. 37 
transformative  power.  'Unhumanised'  nature  i.  e.  wilderness  alone  has  this  capacity. 
Selves  which  do  not  identify  with  the  nonhuman  world  are  alienated,  unhappy  selves. 
Thus,  deep  ecology's  view  of  the  'unhealthy  self  fits  with  its  view  of  modernity  as  the 
'disenchantment  of  nature",  and  Fox's  (1990)  view  of  anthropocentrism.  as  a  'dangerous 
orientation  to  the  world'  mentioned  in  2.4.16 
Deep  ecology,  in  articulating  its  proposals  within  a  psychological  theory  of  moral 
development,  reformulates  the  normative  'ought'  in  respect  to  nature  to  become  a  matter 
of  discerning  what  'is'  in  the  enlightened  interest  of  the  ecologically  expanded  self.  And 
this  is  discovered  metaphysically  in  an  a  pfiori  fashion,  rather  as  an  outcome  of 
intersubjective  discourse.  The  displacement  of  'moral  action'  by  'beautiful  action'  could 
never  be  anything  more  than  temporary  or  apparent,  given  the  irreducibly  plural  (and  thus 
confEct-prone)  nature  of  the  'moral  sphere'  as  a  generic  space  of  human  action,  and  mode 
of  being.  17  Within  deep  ecology  we  '(re)-discover'  the  'ecological  self  rather  than 
intersubjectively  'create'  it  through  a  shared  ethical  discourse.  It  is  discovered  either  by 
reference  to  the  metaphysic  of  oneness  and/or  by  reference  to  the  practices  and  belief- 
systems  of  surviving  human  societies  which  express  the  deep  ecology  metaphysical 
sensibility.  One  example  of  the  problems  created  by  this  mode  of  reasoning  is  the  critique 
of  anthropocentrism. 
16  The  paradox  of  modernity  from  a  deep  ecological  Point  Of  view  is  that  the  lonely,  alienated  modern  self 
has  lost  touch  with  the  one  source  of  guidance  she  needs  for  'true'  well-bring.  Instead  she  comforts 
herself  with  the  temporary  relief  to  be  gained  from  the  consumption  of  material  goods  and  services.  Yet 
the  more  she  engages  in  the  latter  the  faster  is  this  eternal  realm  of  meaning  destroyed.  This  relates  to  a 
view  of  deep  ecology  in  which  its  main  aim  is  to  preserve  a  particular  meaning  of  nature,  rather  than 
nature  per  se  (Barry,  1995b).  An  example  of  this  is  McKibben's  (1989)  lament  for  the  'end  of  nature', 
understood  as  a  natural  context  outside  human  control  and  manipulation.  For  him,  the  advent  of  global 
warming  has  destroyed  the  meaning  and  idea  of  nature's  independence.  This  idea  of  nature's  dependence 
on  humans,  the  reverse  of  the  usual  way  greens  see  the  issue,  is  examined  in  5.9.1  where  I  discuss 
'ecological  restoration'. 
17  In  deep  ecology  the  social  as  a  constitutive  aspect  of  morality  is  often  undcrtheorised,  and  may  explain 
why  it  seems  to  favour  a  'quietist'  non-interference  position  vis-A-vis  nature  (Wissenbarg,  1993)  and 
displays  more  concern  with  individual  relations  in  regard  to  the  world  than  collective  relations.  'Quietist' 
human-nature  relations  is  thus  another  way  to  understand  the  appeal  of  huntcr-gatherer  social  forms 
within  deep  ecology.  This  desire  to  submerge  human  interests  in  nature,  to  deduce  social  life  from  the 
natural  order,  is  also  found  in  bioregionalism,  discussed  in  4.3. 38 
Sensitivity  to  the  various  gradations  within  anthropocentrism.  is  blunted  by  the 
definition  of  anthropocentrism  used  by  deep  ecologists.  Eckersley  defines  it  as  "the  belief 
that  there  is  a  clear  and  morally  relevant  dividing  line  between  humankind  and  the  rest  of 
nature,  that  humankind  is  the  only  or  principal  source  of  value  and  meaning  in  the  world, 
and  that  nonhuman  nature  is  therefor  no  otherpurpose  but  to  serve  humankind'  (I  992a: 
5  1:  emphasis  added).  Breaking  this  statement  down  into  three  propositions,  we  can 
discern  different  views  of  the  ecocentric  critique  of  anthropocentrism. 
First,  that  there  is  a  morally  relevant  divide  between  humans  and  nonhumans  is  a 
statement  that  all  except  committed  biospheric  egalitarians  would  agree  with.  As 
explained  in  the  next  chapter  (3.4.1),  being  human  counts  for  something  in  a  way  which 
the  charge  that  anthropocentrism  is  simply  'ungrounded  speciesism'  fails  to  register 
(Routley  and  Routley,  1979).  There  is  nothing  inherently  ecologically  unfiiendly  about  the 
fact  that  humans,  as  far  as  we  know,  are  the  only  species  with  a  moral  sense.  That  this 
may  be  a  Merence  of  degree  rather  than  kind  does  not  deflate  the  importance  of  this  basic 
distinction  between  how  humans  interact  with  each  other  and  how  they  interact  with  the 
rest  of  the  world.  As  will  be  recalled,  in  the  introduction  I  argued  that  the  moral  basis  of 
green  political  theory  is  a  composite  one,  made  up  of  two  moral  spheres,  one  human  only 
and  the  other  concerning  social-environmental  relations.  The  second  statement,  that 
humans  are  the  only  morally  relevant  beings  in  the  world,  does  not  follow  from  the  first. 
Accepting  our  status  as  the  only  or  main  source  of  value  and  meaning  in  the  world  can 
ground  widely  different  attitudes  to  the  world.  From  this  perspective  anything  from  the 
complete  and  unhindered  exploitation  of  the  world  (the  third  statement)  to  the  widespread 
protection  of  vast  tracts  of  nature  from  human  interference  can  be  forthcoming.  For 
purely  human  reasons,  informed  by  the  idea  that  we  produce  and  attribute  value  in  an 
otherwise  valueless  world,  our  action  in  the  world  can  be  either  extensive  or  minimaL  and 
is  not  incompatible  with  extending  moral  considerations  to  cover  human  interaction  with 
the  nonhuman  world. 
it  is  the  third  statement  that  goes  to  the  heart  of  the  deep  ecology  position,  where 
anthropocentrism  is  understood  as  expressing  a  strong  instrumentalist  conception  of  the 39 
world.  However,  it  does  not  follow,  either  logically  or  in  practice,  that  the  first  two 
positions  lead  to  this  instrumentalist  position.  This  hypothesis  is  a  metaphysical  claim,  one 
that  resonates  more  with  the  idea  of  the  'great  chain  of  being',  than  with  any  ethical  claims 
about  the  nonhuman  world.  Without  such  a  metaphysical  context  it  is  difficult  to  see  how 
this  statement  can  be  meaningful.  Unlike  the  previous  two  arguments  which  can  be 
thought  of  as  expressing  general  features  about  the  ethical  experience,  the  presumption 
that  the  nonhuman  world  is  there  purely  for  human  use  is  a  meta-ethical  claim.  The 
problem  with  anthropocentrism  is  not  how  it  operates  as  an  ethical  theory,  since  ethics  is 
meaningless  outside  an  anthropocentric  context,  but  as  a  metaphysical  position  about  the 
place  of  humans  in  nature.  The  real  reason  why  deep  ecologists  are  suspicious  of 
reformed  anthropocentrism  is  that  the  status  of  the  nonhuman  world  remains  contingent:  it 
does  not  enjoy  a  pennanently  protected  status.  This  suspicion  rests  on  the  fact  that  deep 
ecology  has  at  its  heart  an  a  priori  which  privileges  the  preservation  of  nature  over  the 
human  use  of  nature  (see  below).  18 
2.5  The  Normative  Basis  for  Political  Agreement 
A  strong  argument  against  deep  ecology  is  that  it  is  much  easier  to  secure  agreement 
about  the  normative  rightness  of  an  action  or  practice  at  the  level  of  applied  ethics,  than  at 
the  metaphysical  or  philosophical  level,  which  is  the  main  focus  of  deep  ecology.  At  the 
applied  ethics  level  agents  may  have  different  reasons  for  agreeing  to  the  same  policies. 
And  ultimately  we  must  ask  which  is  more  important,  achieving  social  agreement  around 
green  policies  and  practices,  or  seeking  consensus  on  the  reasons  for  those  changes? 
Is  While  obliged  to  recognise  that  humans  must  use,  consume  and  transform  the  nonhuman  world  to 
survive  and  flourish,  points  4,5  and  7  of  the  deep  ecology  platform  (2.3)  are  clearly  aimed  at  maximising 
preservation  and  minimising  human  impact,  based,  as  argued,  on  the  a  pfiofi  status  of  the  former.  An 
alternative  view  is  to  maximise  human  well-being  compatible  with  maximum  environmental  protection  or 
minimal  environmental  impact.  It  is  perfectly  reasonable  to  ask  as  Young  does  "how  much  industrial 
growth  can  our  natural  surrounding  survive?  Or,  conversely,  how  much  environmental  protection  can  our 
economy  affordT'  (1979:  242).  The  point,  as  suggested  in  the  next  chapter,  is  that  there  should  be  no  a 
pfiofi  privileging  of  either  development  or  preservation,  but  that  social-cnvironmental  relations  have  to  be 
worked  out  in  practice. 40 
Dryzek  (1987)  notes  that  environmental  issues  are  such  that  it  is  often  the  case  that 
agreement  on  the  policies  for  pollution  abatement  or  sustainability  can  be  achieved,  despite 
different  reasons  that  may  be  advanced  for  those  policies.  In  a  later  work  he  argues  that, 
"disagreement  on  the  fundamental  principles  of  morality  (pure  ethics)  often  proves 
compatible  with  consensus  on  the  moral  side  of  practical  issues  (applied  ethics).  In  other 
words,  prudential,  context-specific  moral  reasoning  can  overcome  differences  in  abstract 
commitments7'  (1990:  17;  emphasis  added).  Agreement  around  what  should  be  done  can 
be  independent  from  why  it  should  be  done.  This  is  also  echoed  in  Norton's  (1991) 
'convergence  hypothesis'  which  will  be  mentioned  throughout  the  thesis.  According  to 
him,  the  fact  that  greens  (of  whatever  hue)  increasingly  agree  on  policy,  while  disagreeing 
on  ultimate  principles  is  a  positive  advancement,  and  one  that  can  be  used  to  overcome  the 
ecocentric-anthropocentric  dichotomy  beyond  the  environmental  movement.  That  is, 
green  arguments  and  policy  proposals  would  receive  a  better  hearing  by  the  public  if 
environmental  policies  were  cast  in  terms  of  extended  human  interests,  rather  than 
emphasising  nonhuman  interests.  A  clear  example  of  this  is  envirorunental  policy  based  on 
a  concern  for  future  generations,  which  will  be  discussed  in  the  next  chapter  (3.4.3)  and  in 
chapter  7  (7.7). 
However,  deep  ecology's  demand  that  "the  reasons  for  the  care  of  the  nonhuman 
world  are  at  least  as  important  as  the  care  itself'  (Dobson,  1989:  46)  greatly  diminishes 
the  probability  of  deep  ecology  securing  sufficient  normative  agreement  publicly  for  green 
principles.  The  question  that  needs  to  be  asked  is:  can  deep  ecology  function  as  the 
shared  political  basis  of  normative  agreement  between  citizens  upon  whom  such  policies 
will  be  binding?  Will  deep  ecology  secure  public  agreement  for  green  policy 
prescriptions?  Given  the  major  changes  that  the  resolution  of  ecological  problems  may 
require  and  the  consequent  disruption  of  citizens'  lives,  the  issue  of  securing  agreement 
for  such  change  is  obviously  crucial.  19  The  problem  is  that  it  is  unlikely  that  deep  ecology 
can  perform  this  fiinction  for  green  political  theory. 
19  It  is  also  important  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  democratic  credentials  of  green  politics  as  discussed  in 
chapter  7. 41 
Employing  Rawls'  distinction  between  'political'  and  'metaphysical'  bases  of  political 
morality,  deep  ecology  is  'metaphysical'  not  'political',  and  as  such  cannot  underwrite  a 
political  agreement  around  green  political  ends.  According  to  Rawls,  "as  a  practical 
political  matter  no  general  moral  conception  can  provide  a  publicly  recognized  basis  for  a 
conception  of  justice  in  a  modem  democratic  state'  (1985:  225).  20  But  this  is  precisely 
what  deep  ecology  attempts  to  do.  It  seeks  to  secure  agreement  and  support  for  green 
principles  and  policies  on  the  basis  of  its  particular  philosophical  understanding  of  the  self, 
the  world  and  the  relation  between  the  two.  And  what  is  more  it  states  that  social 
restructuring  aimed  at  securing  ecological  sustainability  Will  fail  if  not  based  on  its 
prescriptions.  'Fail'  in  the  sense  that  political  prescriptions  and  policies  that  have  not 
come  out  of  a  process  of  'metaphysical  reconstruction'  will  be  'unworthy',  or  fall  short  of 
deep  ecology  ideals,  even  if  successful  by  other  criteria,  such  as  ecological  sustainabifity. 
Deep  ecological  arguments  for  altering  the  basic  institutions  of  society  will  not  succeed  in 
gaining  sufficient  normative  support.  The  point  is  that  it  is  unlikely  that  deep  ecology  win 
succeed  as  a  stable  basis  for  normative  agreement.  It  is  perhaps  an  awareness  of  this  that 
accounts  for  the  non-  or  even  anti-political  character  of  some  deep  ecological  writing.  It 
knows  that  its  position  is  simply  too  demanding,  too  radical  to  stand  a  chance  in  the  public 
sphere  or  it  is  convinced  that  such  political  argument  is  beside  the  point  and  the  real  battle 
is  for  hearts  rather  than  votes.  If,  as  Dobson  notes,  this  leads  to  a  view  of  green  politics  in 
which  the  "changes  that  need  to  take  place  are  too  profound  to  be  dealt  with  in  the 
political  arena,  and  that  the  proper  territory  for  action  is  the  psyche  rather  than  the 
parliamentary  chamber"  (1990:  143),  then  green  politics  is  a  means  at  best,  or  simply  an 
add-on,  to  its  spiritual  project.  Alternatively,  it  can  be  a  combination  of  both  political  and 
spiritual  elements-  green  politics  as  an  'eco-theology'  (Spretnak  and  Capra,  1986; 
Skofimowski,  1993;  Bahro,  1994).  A  clear  example  of  this  is  Skolimowski's  conviction 
that, 
20  Here  We  can  understand  justice  as  the  normative  agreement  upon  which  social  harmony  and  social  co- 
operation  is  based.  See  Rawls  (1972:  2). 42 
the  Greens  have  not  yet  reached  maturity  ... 
Political  maturity  means  the  realization 
that  a  true  alternative  to  the  present  decaying  political  system  fies 
... 
in  evolving  new 
spiritual  structures  as  the  foundation  for  a  new  politics.  It  is  a  condition  sine  epla 
non  for  Green  politics  to  acquire  a  spiritual  dimension.  Green  politics  to  be  a 
genuine  alternative,  must  see  in  politics  a  spiritual  pursuit  ... 
2-he  shadow  of 
secularism  still  clouds  the  thinking  and  ariology  of  Green  politicians  (1993:  434; 
emphasis  in  original). 
The  problem  with  deep  ecology  is  that  it  brings  green  politics  into  irresolvable  conflict 
with  settled  convictions,  giving  it  a  'fundamentalist'  complexion  which  is  a  hindrance  to 
convincing  people  to  support  its  political  aims.  This  does  not  imply  that  green  politics 
must  simply  accept  the  prevailing  anthropocentrism  as  'given'  and  beyond  change.  Far 
from  it.  7he  definingfeature  of  green  moral  theory  is  not  the  acceptance  of  ecocentrism 
but  a  critical  attitude  to  anthropocentrism.  However,  the  process  by  which  such  change 
is  secured  is  a  political  matter,  doing  moral  theory  in  public,  accepting  that  persuasion 
must  start  from  some  degree  of  underlying  agreement.  That  such  activity  is  purely  human- 
centred  does  not  mean  that  it  is  purely  concerned  with  human  welfare  or  interests.  As 
argued  in  the  next  chapter,  an  acceptance  of  the  appropriateness  of  an  anthropocentric 
cmoral  extensionism'  (3.3)  is  a  more  secure  basis  upon  which  to  argue  for  green  politics, 
not  only  because  it  is  conceptually  a  more  defensible  moral  position,  but  because 
politically  it  seeks  to  persuade  within  a  generally  accepted  discourse.  Its  strength  lies  in  its 
immanent  character  as  opposed  to  the  external  nature  of  non-anthropocentrism.  If  the 
public  justification  of  green  politics  is  derived  from  deep  ecology,  it  is  unlikely  to  be 
accepted  by  a  majority  of  the  audience  to  whom  it  is  addressed.  And  while  there  may  be 
some  psychological  satisfaction  to  be  gained  from  being  lone  but  sane  'voices  in  the 
wilderness',  this  is  unlikely  to  advance  politically  the  cause  of  preserving  actual 
wilderness. 
If  deep  ecology  is  correct  and  the  ecological  crisis  cannot  be  resolved  without  a 
reconceptualisation  of  the  self  along  the  lines  of  the  'ecological  self  within  a  more 43 
widespread  change  in  cultural  self-understanding  then  green  politics  is  in  trouble  (or  from 
the  deep  ecology  perspective  superfluous  or  not  a  priority).  This  is  because  as  understood 
here,  green  political  theory  does  not  see  the  ecological  crisis  as  fundamentally  an  'ego- 
crisis  of  humanity',  as  opposed  to  presenting  a  constellation  of  moral  and  material 
contradictions  which  can  be  resolved  within  the  present  culture  and  its  forms  of  normative 
reasoning.  Rather  than  demanding  *k  a  "change  in  the  context  in  which  the  [ethical  rule] 
book  is  writteif'  (Dobson,  1989:  44),  my  supposition  is  that  an  immanent  critique  of 
conventional  (i.  e.  anthropocentric)  moral  reasoning  is  sufficient  to  establish  the  normative 
claims  of  green  politics.  This  is  a  basic  dfference  between  deep  ecology  and  other 
environmental  theories.  Deep  ecology  is  premised  on  viewing  the  ecological  crisis  as  a 
'total  crisis',  a  fundamental  'crisis  of  civilisation'  (Bahro,  1994).  From  this  perspective,  it 
is  only  by  transcending  anthropocentrism  (as  a  form  of  moral  reasoning  and  culture)  that 
this  'total  crisis'  can  be  resolved.  Ethical  theory  is  accordingly  viewed  as  so  embedded 
within  the  prevailing  'modernist'  or  'industrial'  anthropocentric  culture  that  it  simply 
cannot  escape  and  formulate  sufficient  alternative  ethical  guidelines  and  modes  of 
interaction.  McLaughlin  (1994),  in  a  chapter  tellingly  entitled  'Beyond  Ethics  to  Deep 
Ecology',  highlights  this  aspect  of  deep  ecology.  According  to  him, 
The  social  dependency  of  ethical  theory  is  a  serious  problem  for  any  attempt  to 
develop  a  non-anthropocentric  environmental  ethic.  If  the  issues  posed  by 
edological  crises  go  to  the  very  roots  of  industrial  society,  then  it  is  unlikely  that 
any  ethical  theory  that  is  grounded  in  reflection  on  current  social  practice  will 
penetrate  deeply  enough  ... 
Thus,  the  possibility  of  grounding  ethical  argument  for 
any  radical  transformation  of  humanity's  relations  with  the  rest  of  nature  requires 
going  far  beyond  ordinary  ethical  discourse  (1994:  169). 
McLaughlin's  claim  that  an  immanent  critique  of  anthropocentrism  and  its  cultural 
manifestation  'will  not  penetrate  deeply  enough'  is  premised  on  a  presumption  that  the 44 
only  solution  must  be  an  ecocentric  one.  21  Alternatives,.  both  from  non-anthropocentric 
environmental  ethics,  and  more  importantly,  from  within  anthropocentrism,  are  dismissed. 
This,  as  suggested  in  the  next  chapter,  is  to  throw  the  baby  out  with  the  bathwater.  The 
argument  that  ethical  reflection  is  constrained  by  contemporary  social  practices  is  both 
misleading  and self-serving.  That  conventional  ethical  theory  may  be  grounded  in 
reflecting  on  those  social  practices  does  not  prove  that  the  former  is  determined  by  the 
latter  or  that  it  cannot  radically  change  practices.  One  has  only  to  survey  the  recent 
history  of  moral  and  legal  theory  to  see  the  effect  it  has  had  on  social  practices  from 
women's  rights  to  the  legal  protection  of  some  nonhumans,  including  most  famously  trees 
having  'standing'  in  the  US  (Stone,  1974).  In  common  with  radical  theories,  deep  ecology 
is  simply  too  impatient  to  work  within  the  conventional  moral  discourse  on  human-nature 
relations.  Thus  its  ontological  turn  is  motivated  partly  by  a  desire  for  rapid  cultural 
change.  Ethical  debate  and  discussion  as  to  the  proper  treatment  of  nonhuman  nature  is 
simply  fiddling  while  Rome  bums. 
It  is  more  likely  that  agreement  will  be  reached  concerning  an  ethics  of  use  for  social- 
environmental  relations  rather  than  agreement  on  a  metaphysical  truth  of  the  place  of 
humans  in  the  wider  natural  order.  In  this  sense  Rawls  is  wrong  when  he  claims  that,  "A 
correct  conception  of  our  relations  to  animals  and  to  nature  would  seem  to  depend  upon  a 
theory  of  the  natural  order  and  our  place  in  it.  One  of  the  tasks  of  metaphysics  is  to  work 
out  a  view  of  world  suited  for  this  purpose;  it  should  identify  and  systematize  the  truths 
decisive  for  these  questions"  (1972:  512).  From  the  point  of  view  of  green  politics,  Rawls 
can  be  criticised  for  viewing  social-environmental  relations  as  a  metaphysical  issue,  which 
seems  to  rule  out  agreement  on  environmental  matters  as  part  of  a  wider  normative 
agreement  on  social  co-operation,  given  the  quote  from  him  earlier.  The  green  argument 
is  that  these  relations  can  be  viewed  as  a  normative  issue  upon  which  it  is  possible  to  find 
some  degree  of  political  agreement  at  the  level  of  applied  ethics  and  policy.  In  conclusion, 
green  political  theory  ought  to  r6ect  the  conversion  of  large  sections  of  the  population  to 
21  This  is  the  same  logic  which  argues  that  an  'authentic'  or  genuine  moral  principle  to  govern  social- 
environmental  relations  is  one  which,  a  priori,  accords  independent  moral  standing  or  intrinsic  value  to 
the  environment  (Regan,  1982:  chapter  9). 45 
a  deep  ecological  worldview  as  a  key  political  aim.  However,  if  some  level  of 
metaphysical  agreement  is  needed,  then  science  offers  the  best  basis  for  that  agreement. 
2.5.1  Science  as  a  Basis  for  Metaphysical  Agreement 
if  green  politics  is  to  base  itself  upon  some  metaphysical  footing,  then  science  rather  than 
an  earth-centred  spirituality  may  be  a  much  better  way  of  going  about  it.  As  Grey  notes, 
"A  purely  secular,  scientific  naturalism  can  provide  a  thoroughly  satisfying  way  of 
realizing  our  unity  with  the  non-human  world"  (1986:  212).  Thus  modem  science,  itself  a 
product  of  modernity,  can  help  to  contextualise  the  difference  between  humans  and  nature. 
That  is,  modem  forms  of  scientific  knowledge  can  help  displace  the  arrogance  of 
humanism,  without  rejecting  anthropocentrism.  One  way  in  which  science,  including 
ecological  science,  can  do  this  is  by  demonstrating  that  the  relationship  between  'human' 
and  'nonhuman'  is  characterised  by  both  difference  and  differentiation.  That  is,  science 
can  promote  a  worldview  in  which  the  human  condition  is  marked  by  being  apart  of  yet 
partfrom  the  natural  order  (Barry,  1995c).  a 
Norton  in  his  plea  for  unity  among  environmentalists  demonstrates  the  significance  of 
science  within  green  politics.  According  to  him,  "Environmentalists'  emerging  consensus, 
it  will  turn  out,  is  based  more  on  scientific  principles  than  on  shared  metaphysical  and 
moral  axiome'  (1991:  92).  He  then  goes  on  to  point  out  that, 
The  attack  on  human  arrogance,  which  was  mounted  as  a  response  to 
anthropocentrism,  was  well  motivated  but  badly  directed.  One  need  not  posit 
interests  contrary  to  human  ones  in  order  to  recognize  our  finitude.  If  the  target  is 
arrogance,  a  scientifically  informed  contextualism  that  sees  us  as  one animal 
species  existing  derivatively,  even  parasitically,  as  part  of  a  larger,  awesomely 
wonderful  whole  should  cut  us  down  to  size  (1991:  237). 46 
Within  contemporary  western  society  it  is  more  likely  that  a  non-spiritualised  scientific 
understanding  of  the  world  and  our  species'  place  in  it  can  provide  basic  metaphysical 
agreement.  Scientific  knowledge  can  contextualise  anthropocentrism,  lessening  its 
tendencies  to  hubris  and  pride.  It  can  also  demonstrate  our  dependence  upon  the 
environment,,  which  as  argued  later  is  vital  for  underpinning  the  virtues  of  ecological 
stewardship  (chapters  3,6  and  7).  It  is  also  obvious  that,  "Scientific  theory  and  evidence 
are  a  necessary  condition  for  a  rational  ecological  policy"  (O'Neill,  1993:  145).  By  this  he 
means  that  scientific  verification  of  ecological  problems  will  be  a  necessary,  though  not 
sufficient,  condition  for  social  recognition  that  there  is  a  problern.  22  At  the  same  time 
agreement  on  the  scientific  nature  of  ecological  problems  can  be  useful  in  forging  a 
politically  workable  normative  agreement  on  social-environmental  issues.  The  place  of 
scientific  knowledge  within  green  moral  and  political  theory  will  be  further  developed  in 
the  next  chapter  and  chapters  5  and  7.  All  I  wish  to  note  here  is  that  a  possible 
metaphysical  basis  for  green  political  theory  can  be  found  within  a  secular  scientific 
naturalism. 
2.6  Summary  of  the  Critique 
A  major  problem  with  deep  ecology  is  its  conception  of  morality.  Quite  apart  from  its 
professed  non-anthropocentrism,  what  makes  it  unsuitable  as  a  normative  basis  for  green 
politics  is  that  between  its  metaphysical  concerns  with  're-enchanting  the  world'  on  the 
one  hand,  and  its  psychological  concerns  with  the  'ecological  self,  there  is  no  space  for  an 
understanding  of  ethics  as  a  discursively  created  and  contested  realm. 
The  metaphysical  drift  of  much  of  deep  ecology  makes  it  very  abstract  since  its  concern 
is  with  the  general  philosophical  question  as  to  the  relationship  between  'humanity'  and 
'nature'.  Deep  ecology  tends  to  have  little  to  say  about  ethical  guidance  or  actual 
22  However,  as  I  argue  later  in  chapter  7  (7.3),  while  science  can  identify  environmental  problems,  the 
political  response  to,  and  normative  characterisation  of,  environmental  problems  cannot  be  lcft  to  science 
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interactions  between  human  societies  and  their  environments.  As  Sylvan  notes,  "The 
guidelines  as  regards  day-to-day  living  and  action  for  a  follower  of  deep  ecology  remain 
unduly  and  unfortunately  obscure'  (1984:  13).  To  the  extent  that  it  does  offer  guidance, 
for  example,  when  human  and  nonhuman  interests  conflict,  what  it  has  to  offer  is  often 
little  different  from  that  given  by  a  reformed  and  enlightened  anthropocentrism  (Naess, 
1979). 
Related  to  this  is  the  psychological  aspect  of  deep  ecology.  This  has  had  the 
unfortunate  effect  of  construing  the  normative  issue  as  a  matter  of  individual  not  collective 
concern.  In  other  words,  the  ethics  associated  with  ecological  self  is  premised  on  non- 
plurality.  Much  of  the  criticism  levelled  at  deep  ecology  in  this  section  is  consistent  with 
the  eco-feminist  critique  of  deep  ecology  based  on  its  denial  of  difference  and  particularity. 
According  to  Plumwood,  "Since  ethics  is  normally  viewed  as  concerned  with  the  relation 
between  self  to  other,  Naess's  substitution  of  the  'maxim  of  self-realization'  for  an 
account  of  ethical  relations  is  a  symptom  of  the  death  of  the  other  in  the  framework  of 
deep  ecology"  (1994:  174).  It  is  almost  as  if  the  ethical  question  concerning  the  proper 
treatment  of  the  nonhuman  world  can  be  reduced  to  an  inward-looking  contemplative 
tecological  self.  The  conflict  and  tension  normally  associated  with  normative  questions  is 
missing.  In  going  beyond  (McLaughlin,  1994:  169)  or  'dissolving'  ethics  (Plumwood, 
1993:  181),  deep  ecology  also  dissolves  the  'social'  as  the  basic  normative  context  for 
dealing  with  human-nature  affairs.  The  deep  ecology  view  of  green  moral  theory  is  that  it 
is  concerned  with  the  relationship  between  'self'  and  'nature'  rather  than  human  beings, 
their  social  relations  and  particular  'environments'.  Lacking  such  an  intersubjective 
understanding  of  the  moral  context  within  which  normative  principles  are  raised,  leaves 
deep  ecology  bereft  of  any  sense  of  interaction  and  dynamism  in  the  formulation  of  the 
moral  sense  of  human  dealings  with  the  nonhuman  world. 
Deep  ecology  is  primarily  concerned  with  the  self,  self-understandings  and  self- 
development  in  relation  to  the  nonhuman  world.  However,  as  a  political  theory,  green 
politics  is  concerned  with  social  institutions,  public  policies,  the  relationship  between 
individuals  within  society,  as  part  of  the  process  of  analysing  the  relations  between  society 48 
and  environment.  Deep  ecology  addresses  selves  as  philosophical  and/or  psychological 
entities  within  the  natural  world  whereas  green  politics  focuses  on  moral  agents  as  citizens 
within  pluralist  societies  within  environments.  As  indicated  in  section  2.5,  normative 
agreement  on  public  policy  requires  a  moral  discourse  derived  from  an  immanent  critique 
of  anthropocentric  moral  theory,  rather  than  the  wholesale  adoption  of  ecocentrism  that 
deep  ecology  recommends.  And  if  metaphysical  agreement  is  to  be  sought  for  green 
political  theory,  then  a  scientific  naturalism  is  sufficient,  as  I  argued  in  2.5.1. 
In  the  end,  for  deep  ecology,  an  appeal  for  an  'ethical'  articulation  of  human  relations 
to  nature  is  to  admit  falling  short  of  being  in  harmony  with  it.  An  environmental  ethics 
signifies  a  lack  within  human-nature  relations  of  sensitivity;  a  lack  of  compassion,  of 
sensitivity  on  behalf  of  humans.  In  this  respect,  the  deep  ecology  critique  of 
environmental  ethics  is  similar  to  the  communitarian  critique  of  justice.  From  the 
communitarian  position,  the  appeal  to  justice  as  the  normative  basis  of  social  relations 
signifies  a  lack  of  solidarity  and  fellow-feeling  within  society  as  a  whole.  On  this  account, 
justice  is,  at  best,  a  'remedial  virtue"  (Kymhcka,  1993).  In  a  similar  fashion,  deep  ecology 
criticises  environmental  ethics  on  the  grounds  that  it  is  an  inferior  or  second-best 
normative  basis  for  regulating  social-environmental  relations.  This  can  be  seen  in  Naess's 
comment  that,  'Ve  need  not  say  today  man's  relation  to  the  nonhuman  world  is  immoraL 
It  is  enough  to  say  that  it  lacks  generosity,  fortitude,  and  love'  (in  Fox,  1990:  221).  It  is 
for  this  reason  that  identification  is  so  important  within  deep  ecology  since  as  Naess  again 
points  out,  "there  must  be  identification  in  order  for  there  to  be  compassion,  and  amongst 
humans,  solidarity"  (1995b:  227).  The  ethical  is  unnecessary,  and  may  indeed  be 
unhelpful,  while  the  political  is  something  which  can  be  derived  from  discovering  our  place 
in  the  sun  and  the  order  of  nature.  As  Eckersley  states,  "In  terms  of  fundamental 
priorities,  an  ecocentric  approach  regards  the  question  of  our  proper  place  in  the  rest  of 
nature  as  logically  prior  to  the  question  of  what  are  the  most  appropriate  social  and 
political  arrangements  for  human  communitiee'  (I  992a:  28).  This  again  construes  human- 
nature  relations  as  primarily  a  metaphysical  as  opposed  to  an  ethical  matter,  as  well  as 
privileging  human-nature  relations  over  intrahuman  ones. 49 
The  development  of  an  ethical  anthropocentrism  divorced  from  a  metaphysical  one  is 
----------  --- 
the  common  ground  between  deep  and  non-deep  green  moral  theory.  It  is  the  arrogance 
of  humanism  (Ehrenfeld,  1978),  rather  than  humanism  itself  that  is,  or  ought  to  be,  the 
proper  object  of  the  deep  ecology  critique.  This  is in  keeping  with  Naess's  point,  in  the 
last  paragraph,  which  argued  that  it  was  sufficient  to  criticise  human  treatment  of  the 
environment  on  the  grounds  that  it  lacked  generosity,  compassion  or  love.  In  other 
words,  one  could  say  that  the  deep  ecology  argument  is  against  an  uncaring,  economic, 
narrow-minded  humanism  rather  than  against  humanism  itself.  A  humanism  which 
'honoured'  the  spirit  of  deep  ecology  would  appear  to  be  compatible  with  much  of  what 
deep  ecology  seeks  to  achieve.  Indeed,  as  outlined  in  the  next  section,  deep  ecology's 
emphasis  on  virtue  offers  a  way  in  which  it  can  be  incorporated  within  an  alternative,  but 
still  anthropocentric,  basis  for  green  politics.  Virtue  can  act  as  a  bridge  between  deep 
ecology  and  a  reformulated  anthropocentric  ethical  theory. 
2.7  From  Deep  Ecology  to  'Ecological  Virtue' 
For  deep  ecologists  the  'ecological  crisis'  is  partly  due  to  the  'illusion'  of  human 
technological  and  epistemological  prowess  vis-i-vis  the  natural  order.  Crudely  put,  the 
ecosystems  upon  which  all  fife  is  dependent  are  beyond  human  comprehension  and  the 
idea  of  human  control  over  ;  he  ecological  conditions  of  life  is  a  dangerous  fiction. 
According  to  Naess,  "Such  complexity  [of  ecosystems]  makes  thinking  in  terms  of  vast 
systems  inevitable.  Its  also  makes  for  a  keen,  steady  perception  of  the  profound  human 
ignorance  of  biospherical  relationships  and  therefore  of  the  effect  of  disturbances"  (1973: 
245).  The  overarching  idea  of  deep  ecology  could  be  summed  up  by  saying  what  we 
cannot  understand  we  cannot  control,  and  in  regard  to  nature  the  appropriate  attitude 
towards  that  which  we  cannot  control  is  humility,  awe  and  reverence.  A  typical  example 
is  Devall  and  Sessions  who  note  that  the  deep  ecology  movement  is  concerned  with 
"cultivating  the  human  Wrtues  of  modesty  and  humility"  (1985:  110;  emphasis  added). 50 
Deep  ecology's  concern  with  moral  character  and  habits  can  be  integrated  within  a 
reformed  anthropocentric  green  moral  theory. 
In  stressing  the  significance  of  identity  within  moral  experience,  deep  ecology  has 
something  positive  to  bring  to  green  politics  in  terms  of  a  critique  of  the  lack  of 
'concreteness'  in  'rationalist'  accounts  of  ethics,,  which  I  discuss  in  more  detail  in  the  next 
chapter  (3.3).  Interpreted  as  a  form  of  virtue-ethics,  deep  ecology  makes  the  valuable 
contribution  that  care  for  the  environment  and  nature  can  be  related  to  self  in  a  way  which 
bypasses  many  of  the  problems  associated  with  attempts  to  ground  care  in  the  intrinsic 
value  of  nature.  Stressing  the  cultivation  of  certain  virtues  as  indispensable  action-guiding 
qualities,  allows  aspects  of  the  'ecological  self  to  be  incorporated  within  green  political 
theory,  divested  of  the  limitations  mentioned  above.  Mulue-ethics,  in  short,  offers  a  less 
contentious  way  in  which  human  identity  and  character  can  be  made  more  central  to  the 
understanding  of  moral  experience  than  the  metaphysical  or  psychological  views  of  the 
ecological  self. 
For  example,  unlike  the  deep  ecology  account  of  the  'ecological  self,  a  virtue-based 
account  of  how  we  ought  to  treat  the  nonhuman  environment  would  make  the  social  and 
cultural  dimension  of  such  treatment  explicit.  That  is,  a  virtue-based  account  of  the  moral 
treatment  of  the  nonhuman  world  makes  sense  if  it  is  informed  by  and  consonant  with 
some  socially  constituted  valuation  of  the  nonhuman  world.  Thus,  a  virtue-based  account, 
unlike  'rationalist'  accounts  of  ethics,  focuses  on  the  character  of  the  individual  agent.  It 
highlights  the  particular  cultural  valuations  of  the  natural  world  which  form  the 
background  and  framework  within  which  character-formation  and  individual  moral  action 
takes  place.  Such  accounts  of  ethics  are  therefore  typified  by  a  sensitivity  to  the  context 
and  particularity  of  actual,  concrete  social-environment  relations.  It  follows  from  this  that 
where  virtue-ethics  is  accepted  as  the  moral  template  for  constructing  this  new 
relationship,  any  attempt  to  re-orientate  the  moral  relationship  between  humans  and  the 
natural  world  automatically  involves  reference  to  social  relations.  Virtue-based  accounts 
of  ethics  are  thus  political  in  a  way  which  the  'ecological  self  of  deep  ecology  is  not, 
while  sharing  the  latter's  concern  with  relating  ethics  to  character. 51 
Adopting  a  virtue-ethics-perspective  recasts  the  critique  of  anthropocentrism.  From 
this  perspective  the  arrogance,  hubris  and  inflated  self-importance  that  can  characterise  the 
latter  are  vices,  that  is,  unworthy  moral  attributes  or  dispositions  of  character.  Thus  a 
virtue  approach  can  enable  green  moral  criticism  to  find  the  correct  target:  the  'arrogance' 
rather  than  the  'humanism'  as  indicated  above.  Virtue  ethics  also  allows  the  positive 
attributes  of  the  ecological  self  to  be  understood  as  specific  environmental  virtues.  For 
example,  we  can  say  that  deep  ecology  suggests  a  degree  of  humility  and  compassion  to 
counter  the  excesses,  i.  e.  vices,  of  anthropocentrism.  However,  if  we  accept  the 
Aristotelian  definition  of  a  virtue  as  the  mean  between  two  vices/extremes,  deep  ecology 
can  be  criticised  for  sometimes  lapsing  into  the  opposite  extreme  of  'arrogant  humanism', 
namely  a  complete  submersion  within,  and  total  acceptance  of,  the  order  of  nature.  The 
latter  according  to  Frasz,  is  typical  of  "someone  who  has  lost  all  sense  of  individuality 
when  confronted  with  the  vastness  and  sublin-fity  of  nature"  (1993:  274).  This  is  the 
danger  of  both  'wilderness  experience'  and  a  desire  to  return  to  or  recapture  the  values  of 
a  hunter-gatherer  form  of  society.  This  opposite  extreme  of  'arrogant  anthropocentrism' 
typifies  many  unreflective  sentimental  or  romantic  views  of  human-nature  relations  which 
pepper  green  moral  and  political  discourse,  sometimes  expressing  itself  as  'quietism' 
(Wissenburg,  1993:  9).  And  as  an  extreme  this  moral  disposition  is  thus  not  an 
environmental  virtue,  but  rather  an  environrnental  vice.  Sentimentality  in  regard  to 
human-nature  relations  does  not  give  nature  or  humans  their  proper  regard  since  it  often 
occludes  'negative'  aspects  of  this  relationship,  such  as  predation,  use,  consumption, 
labour  and  death,  but  which  are,  in  reality,  inescapable  'facts  of  life'.  23  For  humility  to  be 
a  virtue  which  deep  ecology  supposes  it  to  be  it  must  be  understood  as  a  mean  between  a 
timid  ecocentrism  and  an  arrogant  anthropocentrism.  As  I  argue  in  the  next  chapter,  weak 
anthropocentrism  occupies  this  mean  between  these  two  extremes. 
23  This  refcrs  to  the  standard  division  between  the  'intellectual  virtues'  (knowledge)  and  those  associated 
with  character  (such  as  humility,  generosity,  friendship),  what  Aristotle  called  the  'moral  virtues'.  At  the 
same  time,  ignorance  of  our  dependence  on  nature,  as  given  by  ecological  and  other  sciences,  which  tells 
us  that  we  arc,  for  example,  social  animals  evolved  from  primates,  and  that  we  are  a  part  of  the  natural 
order,  such  ignorance  is  a  vice,  and  afortioH  an  environmcntal  vice.  Thus  knowledge  of  ecological  facts 
is  an  environmental  virtue  to  be  cultivated  See  chapter  3  (3.6.2). 52 
2.7.1  Ecological  Virtues  and  the  'Human  Condition' 
Virtues  are  qualities  of  character  enabling  their  possessor  to  be  responsive  to  the 
inherently  contingent  and  contextual  character  of  human  experience.  That  is,  virtues,  such 
as  courage  for  example,  are  dispositions  which  humans  need  or  find  useful  in  order  to  five 
because  of  the  type  of  beings  they  are  and  the  type  of  world(s)  they  inhabit.  it  is 
important  to  point  out  that  virtues  are  commonly  held  to  help  human  beings  cope  rather 
than  to  eliminate  the  problems  and  contingencies  of  the  'human  condition',  such  as  death, 
luck,  conflict,  human  plurality,  and  alienation  amongst  others.  As  suggested  earlier 
(2-3.1),  green  politics  can,  in  part,  be  viewed  as  concerned  with  'environmental  crisis 
management',  that  is  cultivating  modes  of  behaviour  and  character  which  helps  us  realise 
our  interests,  and  as  suggested  in  the  next  chapter,  encourages  us  to  reflect  on  those 
interests  as  part  of  this  process  (3.5).  Environmental  virtue  ethics  differs  greatly  from 
deep  ecology  in  that  it  does  not  seek  to  answer  or  solve  the  existential  riddle  of  human 
existence,  or  discover  a  permanent  solution  to  social-environmental  relations.  At  the  same 
time  they  are  also  said  to  be  required  in  order  to  five  well.  According  to  Aristotle,  "The 
good  of  man  is  an  activity  of  soul  in  accordance  with  virtue"  (1948:  1220a).  In  the 
classical  formulation  virtues  are  also  integral  aspects  of  the  'good  life',  that  is  the 
cultivating  virtues,  such  as  courage,  prudence,  charity  and  justice  are  not  simply 
instrumentally  valuable  but  also  constitutive  elements  of  the  good  and  human  well-being. 
Thus,  one  cannot  propose  an  account  of  ethics  centred  on  virtue  without  also  indicating 
what  is  the  'good'  around  which  these  virtues  are  orientated.  However,  as  indicated  in  the 
conclusion  and  later  in  chapter  7,  an  account  of  the  environmental  virtues  is  compatible 
with  a  'thinner'  theory  of  the  good  than  that  usually  associated  with  virtue  ethics,  such  as 
that  advanced  by  MacIntyre  (1984)  for  example.  A  starting  point  for  a  'modem'  and 
green  appropriation  of  the  virtue  ethics  tradition  is  given  by  Geach  who  points  out  that, 
"A  specific  answer  to  the  question  of  what  men  are  for  and  what  end  they  should  aim 
themselves  at  is  not  required  in  order  to  show  the  need  for  the  cardinal  virtues"  (1977: 53 
45).  As  a  praxis-orientated  view  of  morality,  a  virtue-ethics  casts  the  green  theory  of  the 
good  in  terms  of  being  and  'doing'  and  not  simple  as  'having'.  That  is,  the  good  of  which 
green  virtues  partake  is  one  in  which  human  well-being  is  understood  as  constituted  by 
action  rather  than  possession  or  consumption.  This  theme  is  developed  later  in  chapters  6 
(6.7)  and  7  (7.9.1). 
The  attractiveness  of  basing  green  moral  claims  within  the  idiom  of  virtue-ethics  comes 
partly  as  a  reaction  to  the  common  misperception  of  green  politics  as  requiring  a  large 
degree  of  self-denial  and  a  puritanical  asceticism  (Goodin,  1992:  18;  Allison,  1991:  170- 
8).  While  rejecting  the  claim  that  green  political  theory  calls  for  the  complete  disavowal  of 
materialistic  lifestyles,  it  is  true  that  green  politics  does  require  the  collective  re- 
assessment  of  such  lifestyles,  and  may  require  a  degree  of  shared  sacrifice.  24  Some  green 
policies,  particularly  in  their  initial  stages,  may  be  matters  of  necessity  rather  than  being 
intrinsically  desirable.  Initially  therefore  these  policies  have  to  do  with  things  that  are 
difficult  for  people,  getting  people  to  do  things  that  they  might  not  otherwise  want  to  do, 
but  can  be  demonstrated  to  be  in  their  long-term  interests.  This  is  where  virtue  comes  in, 
since  as  Foot  notes,  "virtues  are  about  what  is  difficult  for  men7  (1978:  8),  i.  e., 
correctives  to  human  fraility,  and  weakness  of  will.  Virtues,  let  it  be  clear,  are  not 
concerned  with  the  elimination  of  human  weakness.  That  is  while  virtues  do  promote  a 
mode  of  being  and  way  of  acting  which  will  help  individuals  attain  and  discern  their  good, 
it  is  not  part  of  the  argument  for  virtues  that  they  perfect  the  'human  condition'.  To  use 
ecological  terminology,  virtues  may  be  thought  of  as  character  traits,  modes  of  being 
which  help  to  find  the  best  'adaptive  fit'  between  the  individual  and  her  interests  and  the 
environment  (both  social  and  natural)  she  inhabits.  The  importance  of  virtues  for  the 
green  position  may  be  viewed  as  residing  in  the  necessity  of  such  virtues  as  self-restraint, 
prudence  and  foresight  so  that  long-term  i.  e.  sustainable,  well-being  is  not  sacrificed  or 
24  It  is  possible  of  course  to  follow  communitarian  writers  and  present  shared  sacrifice  as  a  formative  and 
important  aspect  of  life  within  a  'Constitutive  community',  or  a  community  of  distinction  (Cochran,  l9g9). 
Other,  less  strongly  communitarian  interpretations  of  shared  sacrifice  will  be  canvassed  in  chapter  7 
within  the  context  of  'ecological  citizenship'  and  its  associated  civic  virtues.  In  chapter  51  discuss  the 
place  of  nationhood'  as  a  source  of  shared  identity  (5.7). 54 
undermined  by  desires  to  satisfy  immediate  self-interest.  This,  as  argued  throughout  the 
thesis  is  the  essence  of  ecological  stewardship,  action  in  which  human  interest  and  the 
interests  of  the  nonhuman  world  coincide. 
At  the  same  time,  as  argued  in  more  detail  in  the  next  chapter,  the  cultivation  of 
ecological  virtue  may  be  thought  of  as  a  cultivation  of  those  modes  of  character  and  acting 
in  the  world  which  encourage  social-environmental  relations  that  are  symbiotic 
- 
rather  than 
parasitic.  In  other  words,  ecological  virtues  are  related  to  social-environmental  relations 
in  which  human  self-interest  and  well-being  are  fulfilled  by  modes  of  interaction  which 
minimise  harm  to  the  interests  of  the  nonhuman  world  as  much  as  possible. 
As  argued  later  in  chapters  6  and  7,  a  virtue  account  of  morality  can  add  another 
supporting  aspect  to  the  argument  concerning  the  centrality  of  transfonrning  preferences 
within  green  politics.  Here  it  is  enough  to  say  that  the  self-reflective  emphasis  that  virtue 
brings  to  the  ethical  experience  can  be  viewed  as  one  way  in  which  green  ethical  theory  is 
concerned  with  encouraging  the  movement  from  behaviour  based  on  what  Norton  calls 
'felt  preferences'  to  action  based  on  'considered  preferences'  (1984:  134-8).  Part  of  this 
movement  for  many  greens,  not  just  deep  ecologists,  involves  the  integration  of  ecological 
knowledge  and  ecological  moral  action,  that  is,  the  concern  to  ensure  that  ecological 
science  informs  (as  opposed  to  determines)  environmental  ethical  practice.  Another 
dimension  to  this  is  KohAk's  argument  that  what  deep  ecology  is  concerned  with  is  the 
development  of  new  perceptions  of  nature  rather  than  new  conceptions  of  nature  (1993). 
Here  we  may  think  of  environmental  virtue  as  having  to  do  with  the  refinement  of  moral 
discernment  in  regard  to  the  place  of  nature  as  a  constitutive  aspect  of  the  human  good. 
The  cultivation  of  environmental  virtues  can  then  be  regarded  as  a  matter  of  discerning 
the  place  nature  has  within  some  particular  human  good  or  interest.  25  A  more  positive 
statement  would  be  to  say  that  those  who  destroy  nature  are  motivated  by  an 
unnecessarily  narrow  view  of  the  human  good,  and  that  "What  they  count  as  important  is 
too  narrowly  confined"  (Hill,  1983:  219).  That  is,  forms  of  anthropocentrism  which 
25  For  a  similar  argument,  which  relates  human  care  for  the  environment  to  human  weH-being,  see 
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narrow  the  human  good  and  human  interests,  can  be  criticised  as  vices,  or  potential  vices. 
However,  to  reject  anthropocentrism  is  not  the  solution,  but  is  rather  itself  a  vice  of  which 
we  need  to  be  aware.  26  A  virtue  approach  is  thus  anthropocentric  in  that  its  reference 
point  is  some  human  good  or  interest,  but  as  argued  in  the  next  chapter,  this  ethical  (as 
oppose  to  metaphysical)  anthropocentrism  is  compatible  with  including  considerations  of 
nonhuman  interests  and  welfare. 
2.7.2.  Stewardship  and  Berry's  'Ecology  of  the  Virtues' 
Wendell  Berry's  'ecology  of  the  virtues'  (Thompson,  1995:  81)  offers  a  good  example  of 
the  role  virtue  ethics  can  play  within  green  political  theory.  Although  writing  specifically 
on  agriculture  and  the  virtues  of  'stewardship'  associated  with  the  'good  farmer',  Berry's 
analysis  can  be  extended  to  other  dimensions  of  green  politics.  Berry's  main  contribution 
concerns  the  fact  that  'good  fanning  practice'  is  a  matter  of  integrating  various  specific 
virtues,  associated  with  work,  community,  citizenship  and  care  for  the  land.  For  Berry, 
the  'ecology  of  the  virtues'  refers  both  to  the  to  the  interrelation  of  the  virtues,  and  the 
idea  that  one  cannot  attain  one  virtue  without  the  others.  Just  as  in  the  ecology  of  nature, 
so  in  the  moral  sphere,  everything  is  connected.  The  constellation  of  these  virtues 
constitutes  'stewardship'  (Thompson,  1995:  82),  which  will  be  a  central  theme  running  the 
analysis  of  green  politics  presented  in  this  thesis.  Berry's  main  point  is  that  the 
displacement  of  agriculture  by  'agribusiness'  has  destroyed  stewardship  as  a  virtue. 
Basically  put,  contemporary  farm  fife  is  qualitatively  different  from  that  which  preceded  it, 
thus  making  the  virtue  of  stewardship  more  difficult  to  sustain,  because  the  role  of  farmer 
has  changed  and  with  it  the  collection  of  interrelated  practices  and  virtues  which  went 
along  with  this  role.  In  short,  Berry's  complaint  is  that  contemporary  agriculture  is 
ecologically  unsustainable  and  socially  destructive  as  farmers  become  agri-business 
26  It  is  true  to  say  that  as  vices,  an  excessive  anthropocentrism  is  worse  than  an  excessive  ccoccntrism,  but 
the  point  is  that  it  is  between  these  two  extremes  (human  domination  on  the  one  and  human  quietism  on 
the  other)  that  we  find  the  mean.  As  argued  here  and  in  the  next  chapter,  a  naturalistic,  rcflcxivc 
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managers,  and  thus  import  practices,  norms  and  ways  of  thinking  which  systematically 
undercut  the  pattern  of  life  associated  with  what  it  means  to  be  a  farmer.  As  Thompson 
points  out, 
In  place  of  well-balanced  and  ecologically  sensitive  yeoman  farmers,  the 
tecbnologized  farm  tends  to  produce  individuals  with  a  moral  psychology  very 
much  like  that  of  impersonal  leisure  societies,  common  in  urban  centres.  Fanning 
loses  its  special  moral  character,  and  Berry  would  argue  that  a  decline  in 
agricultural  stewardship  is  hardly  surprizing  under  those  conditions  (1995:  85). 
Farming  in  the  modem  world  is  now  simply  another  business  and  Berry's  critique  is  that 
this  shift  causes  a  damaging  rupture  to  those  nature-regarding  and  community-regarding 
norms  which  are  essential  to  good  farming  practice,  that  is  farming  as  the  practice  of  land 
stewardship.  One  way  of  looking  at  this  transformation  of  farming  is  to  see  it  as  a  clear 
example  of  how  social  practices  can  be  undermined  by  external  institutions,  in  this  case  the 
globalising  market  and  to  a  lesser  extent  the  state.  27  On  this  view,  technological  advances, 
increased  specialisation,  and  an  ethos  of  food  production  for  profit  divorced  from  any 
long-term  considerations  of  the  effect  of  this  production  on  the  fertility  of  the  land,  have 
all  conspired  to  destroy  the  integrated  moral  harmony  that  characterised  farming  life. 
With  the  decline  of  the  'family  farm',  the  central  linchpin  which  held  the  ecology  of  the 
virtues  together  is  destroyed,  allowing  farming  to  become  simply  another  business  offering 
its  wares  on  the  open  market.  If  there  is  no  one  to  continue  the  farm  after  one's  death, 
then  it  is  less  likely  that  norms  of  stewardship  which  require  maintaining  the  long-term 
fertility  and  productivity  of  the  land  will  apply.  Farming  as  a  particular  way  of  fife  and  a 
social  practice  is  thus  dissolved. 
Apart  from  the  centrality  of  virtues,  Berry's  argument  that  farmers  are  'stewards  of  the 
land'  is  a  clear  example  of  an  'ethics  of  use'  concerning  social-environment  interaction 
27  This  contrast  between  institutions  and  social  practices  will  form  the  background  to  much  of  the 
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discussed  in  the  conclusion  and  the  next  chapter.  The  importance  of  stewardship  is  that  it 
stresses  the  part  played  by  human  intentionality  and  labour  within  human-nature  relations. 
Stewardship  in  being  fundamentally  related  to  human  interests  introduces  human 
transformational  activity  as  an  irreducibly  basic  aspect  of  human-nature  interaction.  It 
thus  acts  as  a  corrective  to  the  presumption  that  a  'hands  off'  approach  to  nature  is 
necessarily  the  aim  of  green  politics.  However,  stewardship  is  also  a  corrective  to  a  view 
of  social-environmental  interaction  in  which  human  self-interest  necessarily  means 
precluding  those  of  the  nonhuman  world.  Stewardship  as  a  practice  which  combines 
different  ecological  virtues,  is  a  mode  of  being  in  which  long-term  human  self-interest,  is 
not  undermined  by  short-run,  intemperate  desires.  Thus  acting  as  a  steward  is  not  inimical 
to  long-run  or  sustainable  human  productive  interests.  Stewardship  is  a  sustainable  mode 
of  human  interaction  in  an  ever-changing  nonhuman  world,  where  human  and  nonhuman 
interests  are  not  viewed  in  terms  of  a  zero-sum  game.  As  such  it  also  represents  a 
symbiotic  mode  of  human  metabolism  with  the  environment.  We  need  ecological  virtues 
in  order  both  to  cope  with  that  world  as  well  as  to  educate  and  integrate  the  legitimate 
human  desire  to  live  a  little  better  within  a  realistic  and  informed  view  of  human  interests 
in  the  long-run. 
2.8.  Conclusion 
The  general  view  of  deep  ecology  presented  here  is  that  its  concerns  relate  to  seeking 
answers  at  the  metaphysical  level  pertaining  to  the  proper  relationship  between  'humanity' 
and  'nature'.  However,  one  could  argue  that  deep  ecology  starts  out  from  a  particular 
understanding  of  that  relationship  and  then  works  backwards,  as  it  were,  to  provide 
various  arguments  for  that  apriori  position.  So  the  strong  critique  of  deep  ecology  is  that 
it  assumes  a  particular  metaphysical  understanding  of  the  way  in  which  humans  and  nature 
ought  to  interact.  Crudely  put,  deep  ecology  seeks  to  persuade  us  that  there  ought  to  be  a 
prima  facie  disposition  in  favour  of  non-interference  with  nature  by  humans.  Dobson 
succinctly  expresses  this  fundamental  deep  ecology  position  as  seeking  to  "turn  the  tables 58 
in  favour  of  the  environment,  such  that  the  onus  of  persuasion  is  on  those  who  want  to 
destroy,  rather  than  those  who  want  to  preserv6"  (1990:  69).  The  developments  within 
deep  ecology  from  its  initial  concern  with  defending  the  intrinsic  value  of  nature  to  its 
more  recent  ontological  and  psychological  turn  can  be  seen  partly  as  different  ways  to 
provide  justifications  for  this  a  pfiori  position  which  privileges,  celeris  paribus,  the 
preservation  of  nature  over  its  use  by  humans.  However,  deep  ecology  is  also  found 
wanting  from  the  point  of  view  of  providing  a  basis  for  normative  agreement  for  green 
politics.  Simply  put,  it  is  unlikely  that  deep  ecology  can  function  as  the  basis  for 
normative  agreement  within  contemporary  societies. 
However,  what  can  be  taken  from  deep  ecology  and  incorporated  within  green  moral 
theory  is  its  emphasis  on  the  dispositional  aspects  of  morality.  Deep  ecology  viewed  as  a 
form  of  virtue-ethics  does  have  something  to  offer  in  establishing  the  normative  basis  of 
green  politics.  The  idea  of  stewardship  as  a  mode  of  productive  interaction  with  the 
nonhuman  world  which  is  sustainable  and  symbiotic,  while  anthropocentric,  is  compatible 
with  the  policy  implications  of  ecocentrism.  It  therefore  represents  a  more  defensible 
moral  basis  for  green  politics.  This  anthropocentric  virtue  account  of  morality  in  which 
character  as  a  mode  of  being,  and  a  way  of  interacting  in  the  world  (both  social  and 
natural),  is  further  developed  in  the  next  chapter. Chapter  Three 
Naturalism  and  the  Ethical  Basis  for 
Green  Political  Theory 
3.1  Introduction 
One  of  the  most  distinctive  features  of  green  politics  is  its  insistence  that  human  relations 
with  the  nonhuman  world  are  a  legitimate  object  of  moral  concern,  a  concern  which  some 
greens  claim  has  been  largely  neglected  within  contemporary  moral  theory.  This  neglect 
has  typically  been  argued  to  stem  from  the  human-centredness  that  characterises  western 
moral  thinking,  which  lends  ethical  legitimacy  to  human-nature  practices  which  are 
exploitative  and  morally  unjustified.  The  strongest  expression  of  this  rejection  is  the  claim 
that  anthropocentrism,  represents  little  more  than  arbitrary  prejudice  in  favour  of  our 
species,  as  the  deep  ecology  critique  holds.  Anthropocentrism  is  held  similar  to  sexism 
and  racism,  i.  e.  a  form  of  'human  chauvinism'  (Routley  and  Routley,  1979)  or  'speciesism' 
(Singer,  1990),  an  indefensible  and  arbitrary  bias  in  our  treatment  of  other  species  simply 
because  they  are  not  human.  ' 
As  discussed  in  the  last  chapter  many  green  theorists  and  activists  see  the 
transcendence  of  this  human-centredness  as  the  only  way  in  which  the  'moralisation'  of 
human-nature  relations  can  occur.  In  this  chapter  I  further  develop  the  defence  of 
anthropocentrism,  briefly  indicated  in  the  last  chapter,  as  the  strongest  and  most 
appropriate  ethical  foundation  for  green  politics.  It  is  not  my  concern  to  enter  into 
detailed  discussion  of  'environmental  ethics'.  although  reference  will  be  made  to  salient 
I  As  will  be  made  clear  later  on,  distinguishing  between  the  concept  of  anthropocentrism  and  particular 
conceptions,  open  up  the  possibility  that  some  conceptions  of  anthropocentrism  are  compatible  with  green 
moral  claims  concerning  the  treatment  of  the  non-human  world.  What  critics  of  anthropocentrism,  need  to 
demonstrate  is  that  this  type  of  moral  reasoning  necessailly  leads  to  the  devaluation  of  nature  in  theory 
and  its  mistreatment  in  practice.  Together  with  the  last  chapter,  the  position  adopted  in  this  chapter  is 
that  this  link  between  anthropocentrism  and  ecological  destruction  or  the  mistreatment  of  nature  has  yet  to 
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debates  and  issues.  The  principal  task  of  this  chapter  is  more  limited:  to  outline  a  moral 
theory  consistent  with  green  politics.  That  is,  I  am  concerned  with  the  relationship 
between  the  moral  and  the  political  aspects  of  green  theory,  as  opposed  to  environmental 
ethics  considered  independently  of  green  politics. 
The  starting  point  of  the  defence  of  a  revised  form  of  anthropocentrism  as  the  most 
suitable  ethical  basis  of  green  politics  turns  on  a  threefold  distinction  between  arguments 
which  state  that; 
1.  there  is  an  ethical  dimension  to  social-environmental  interaction, 
2.  there  are  a  variety  of  reasons  that  can  be  given  for  this,  and 
3.  similar  treatment  of  the  environment  can  be  premised  on  different  reasons. 
Outlining  these  distinctions  and  the  different  arguments  they  express  opens  up  a  space 
within  green  moral  theory  between  'anthropocentrism'  and  'ecocentrism',  a  space  for  an 
alternative  position  in  which  this  perceived  opposition  may  be  overcome.  This  position, 
which  is  a  naturalistic  form  of  'weak  anthropocentrism'  is  sufficiently  flexible  to 
accommodate  the  normative  thrust  of  the  ecocentric  concern  with  protecting  the  interests 
of  the  nonhuman  world.  Following  Passmore  (1980)  and  Holland  (1984),  1  argue  that 
calls  for  the  nec-es-sity  of  a  non-anthropocentric  'new  ethic'  upon  which  to  ground  green 
normative  claims  are  misplaced.  To  a  large  extent  familiar  moral  language  and  what  one 
may  call  the  conventional  anthropocentric  'grammar  of  morality'  are  sufficient  to  the 
green  task.  The  naturalistic  position  developed  in  this  chapter  can  be  seen  to  draw  on 
traditions  of  western  ethical  thought  which  demonstrate  that,  contrary  to  some  green 
critics,  western  philosophy  and  culture  is  not  uniformly  anti-nature.  The  working 
assumption  of  this  chapter  (and  of  the  thesis  as  a  whole)  is  that  western  thought  in  general, 
and  that  associated  with  the  enlightenment  in  particular,  is  not  as  ecologically  bankrupt  as 
some  greens  think.  A  'new  ethic'  such  as  ecocentrism  is  not  required.  As  suggested 61 
towards  the  end  of  the  last  chapter,  a  reformed  anthropocentric  ethic,  based  on 
stewardship  as  a  mode  of  interaction  with  the  world  is  sufficient.  2 
The  argument  of  this  chapter  is  organised  as  follows.  In  3.2  the  political  dimension  of 
green  normative  claims  is  outlined,  with  green  politics  best  understood  as  an  immanent 
moral  critique  of  contemporary  moral  theory  and  culture.  As  such  green  politics  can  be 
seen  as  an  attempt  to  initiate  an  ecological  'reflective  equilibrium'  process  by  which  the 
ecological  contradictions  of  contemporary  society  may  be  resolved.  This  is  to  set  the 
context  for  the  argument  developed  in  3.6.1  where  the  political  resolution  of  the 
ecological  crisis  is  expressed  in  terms  of  a  contradiction  between  human  interests  in  nature 
associated  with  'consumers'  and  'citizens'. 
In  3.3  the  strengths  of  a  'moral  extensionist'  view  are  canvassed  and  found  to  be  the 
best  interpretation  of  what  environmental  ethical  theory  seeks  to  achieve  in  practice.  That 
is,  such  a  position  expresses  the  practical  implications  of  environmental  ethics  as  a  guide 
to  action,  and  a  normative  basis  for  environmental  policy  proposals.  However,  current 
formulations  of  environmental  ethical  theory,  I  argue,  are  dominated  by  a  problematic 
understanding  of  ethics,  a  'proprietarian'  one  based  on  the  assumption  that  the  main  issue 
concerning  the  ethical  status  of  human-nature  relations  is  discovering  criteria  for  'moral 
considerability'.  This  view,  which  sees  considerability  as  dependent  on  the  possession  of  a 
few  morally  relevant  capacities  or  properties,  is  argued  to  constitute  a  one-sided  and 
partial  understanding  of  morality  and  the  moral  life.  An  alternative  view  which  sees  the 
relations  of  human  moral  agents  as  the  essence  of  morality  is  developed. 
Section  3.4  presents  a  naturalistic  conception  of  anthropocentrism,  which  regards  the 
examination  of  what  it  means  to  be  human  to  be  crucial  in  the  moral  evaluation  of  human- 
nonhuman  interaction.  Anthropocentrism  is  defended  from  charges  of  'speciesism'  by 
rýecting  the  idea  that  it  is  an  irrational  or  arbitrary  bias  towards  fellow  conspecifics. 
2  It  also  represents,  as  Passmore  has  suggested,  a  long  tradition  within  western  culture  and  thought  (198o: 
2843).  In  using  the  moral  idiom  of  stewardship,  green  politics  would  thus  be  using  the  culture's  own 
resources  to  solve  and  cope  with  the  ecological  problems  within  the  culture.  Tapping  into  this  moral 
tradition  is  thus  a  positive  implication  of  seeing  these  problems  as  evidence  of  a  'cultural  contradiction' 
rather  than  a  'cultural  crisis',  as  suggested  in  the  last  chapter  (2.3.1). 62 
Focusing  on  human  nature,  anthropocentrism  is  argued  to  be  perfectly  rational  and  non- 
arbitrary,  while  the  coevolutionary  development  of  the  human  species  with  other  species 
cannot  sustain  a  radical  moral  separation  between  humans  and  the  rest  of  nature. 
In  3.5  'environmental  ethics'  is  presented  as  distinct  from  'human  ethics',  in  that  they 
are  two  interrelated  spheres  of  the  human  moral  realm,  with  different  concerns  and 
priorities.  I  argue  that  norms  regulating  human-nature  relations  supplement  rather  than 
replace  those  regulating  human  relations.  At  the  same  time,  green  ethical  naturalism  is 
cashed  out  as  an  ethicfor  the  use  of  the  environment  as  opposed  to  an  environmental 
ethic.  As  indicated  in  the  last  chapter,  seeldng  to  establish  the  a  priori  protection  of 
nature  from  human  behaviour  is  wrongheaded  and  unnecessary.  The  'moralisation'  of 
human-nature  exchanges  does  not  preclude  purposive-instrumental  relations.  An  'ethic  of 
use'  which  recognises  the  moral  considerability  of  parts  of  nature,  can  act  as  a  side- 
constraint  not  only  on  how  humans  can  use  nature,  but  also  on  whether  we  ought  to  use 
nature.  3  In  3.6  the  centrality  of  human  interests  in  moralising  human-nature  relations  is 
developed  as  an  ecological  form  of  virtue-ethics.  Excellences  of  character  (as  indicated  in 
the  previous  chapter,  2.7)  are  argued  to  be  important  to  the  green  moral  position. 
3.2  The  Political  Context  of  Green  Normative  Theory 
That  human-nature  interaction  is  a  matter  of  ethical  concern  I  shall  take  as  self-evidently 
true.  Firstly,  it  makes  sense  to  talk  of  an  ethical  dimension  to  human-nature  affairs  i.  e.  it  is 
intelligible  to  talk  of  such  a  dimension.  Secondly,  that  the  human  treatment  of  nature  is 
an  ethical,  and  a  political,  matter  is  something  for  which  there  is  both  historical  and 
contemporary  evidence  in  terms  of  human-nature  practices  in  the  west.  4  From  the  point  of 
3  Later  in  chapter  6  (6.3),  the  issue  of  whether  to  use  certain  parts  of  the  natural  world  is  discussed  in 
terms  of  'permissible'  and  'impermissible'  resources,  which  is  argued  to  be  a  central  concern  of  green 
political  economy. 
4  That  human-nature  relations  always  had  an  ethical  dimension  is  a  theme  developed  by  many  writers  in 
what  I  call  the  'naturalistic  tradition'  such  as  Nfidgley  (1983a,  1995)  and  Benton  (1993)  whose  work  I 
draw  upon  in  this  chapter.  For  evidence  of  this  feature  of  human  dealings  with  nature  see  O'Neill,  who 
argues  that  the  high  number  of  'protest  bids'  (where  individuals  place  an  extremely  high  value  on 
preservation  of  some  part  of  the  environment),  recorded  during  environmental  cost-benefit  analyses, 63 
view  adopted  here,  viz.  elaborating  an  ethical  theory  sufficient  to  support  a  political  one, 
the  issue  is  not  that  people  do  not  regard  human-nature  relations  as  an  ethical  matter,  but 
rather  the  different  reasons  given,  or  that  can  be  given,  that  can  explain,  justify  and 
perhaps  extend  such  concern.  As  I  hope  to  demonstrate,  there  need  not  be  one  over- 
riding  reason  for  the  moral  treatment  of  nature  (such  as  it  possessing  intrinsic  value,  or 
nature  as  enchanted  or  sacred)  but  a  variety  which,  taken  together,  constitute  an  ethical 
basis  for  green  arguments. 
Additionally,  I  also  assume  that  there  are  a  number  areas  on  which  nearly  all 
participants  in  the  debate  concur.  For  example,  the  greatest  area  of  agreement  between 
ecocentric  and  anthropocentric  positions  concerns  the  welfare  of  domestic  animals.  Both 
'animal  liberationists',  environmental  ethicists  and  green  humanists  are  united  in  their 
condemnation  of  basic  and  widespread  social-environmental  practices.  These  include 
factory-farming,  intensive  rearing  practices  such  as  battery  hen  'production",  hunting  for 
sport,  the  use  of  animals  for  human  entertainment,  and  animal  experimentation  for  the 
testing  of  cosmetics.  The  'humane'  treatment  of  animals  and  the  reduction  of 
cunnecessary  suffering'  is  something  all  sides  can  and  do  agree  upon.  Thus  there  is 
agreement  in  practice  while  diversity  and  disagreement  at  the  level  of  justification  (see 
2.5.1). 
At  the  level  of  ethical  theory  there  is  also  widespread  agreement  between  the  two 
positions.  For  example,  the  distinction  between  moral  agents  and  moral  subjects  is  widely 
used  within  the  literature.  Regardless  of  the  initial  starting  point,  most  theorists  when 
suggesting  guides  to  action  maintain  an  ethically  relevant  distinction  between  moral  agents 
(typically,  but  not  exclusively,  humans)  and  moral  subjects  (some  humans,  nonhuman 
demonstrates  'ethical  commitment'  (1993:  120).  See  also  Brennan  (1992:  17).  Other  more  intuitive 
grounds  for  the  ethical  framing  of  human-nature  relations  is  given  by  the  'last-person  argument'  which 
demonstrates  that  faced  with  the  hypothetical  situation  of  being  the  last  person  on  earth  (Lee,  1993)  or  the 
only  human  on  a  deserted  island  (Mdgjcy,  1983b)  most  people  feel  that  the  destruction  of  the  earth  or  the 
island  would  be  morally  wrong.  However,  the  hypothetical  and  abstract  nature  of  such  reasoning  is  often 
of  little  help  in  assessing  actual,  concrete  human-nature  relations  which  are  rarely  related  to  such  exotic 
examples.  Later,  in  3.5.1,  the  moral  censure  attached  to  forms  of  human  use  of  the  world  characterised  as 
'wanton",  'unnecessary'  or  not  fulfilling  a  serious  human  interest,  is  used  to  flesh  out  the  rcflcxive  nature 
of  weak  anthropocentrism.  This  is  held  to  consist  in  holding  that  human  interests  are  necessary  but  not 
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animals  and  other  parts  of  nature  incapable  of  being  held  morally  responsible  for  their 
actions).  5  The  usefulness  of  this  distinction  is  further  developed  in  section  3.5,  but  here  I 
simply  want  to  stress  that  despite  their  critique  of  anthropocentrism  and  the  'speciesist' 
charges  of  unjustified  partiality  to  our  own  kind,  even  the  most  ecocentric  of  deep 
ecologists  cannot  avoid  concluding  that  the  fact  of  being  human  does  have  evaluative 
importance  and  that  'species  impartiality'  is  impossible  to  achieve  in  practice  and 
constitutes  an  extremely  morally  dubious  guide  to  action.  6  The  main  point  I  wish  to  draw 
from  these  areas  of  theoretical  and  practical  agreement  is  that  an  effective  green  ethical 
perspective  sufficient  to  sustain  green  political  principles  and  policies  ought  to  start  from 
the  position  where  most  of  the  other  environmental  ethical  theories  end,  namely  how 
ethical  principles  are  translated  into  practice.  It  is  the  emphasis  on  environmental  ethical 
practice  that  both  makes  for  the  advantage  of  adopting  an  anthropocentric  as  opposed  to 
an  ecocentric  position  as  well  as  signifying  the  importance  of  the  political  background 
against  which  this  practice  takes  place. 
3.2.1  The  Necessity  for  Immanent  Critique 
Rather  than  develop  an  ethic  in  isolation  from  the  political  context  in  which  it  will  be 
applied  and  its  effects  felt,  as  given  by  specific  enviromnental  policies  or  altered  socio-  I- 
5  The  focus  of  this  chapter  is  on  the  political  as  opposed  to  the  purely  philosophical  dimensions  of 
normative  relations  between  humans  and  nature.  That  some  nonhumans  may  be  moral  agents  as  some 
suggest  (Clark,  1982;  De  Waal,  1982;  Singer,  1994;  Goodall,  1986)  is  beside  the  point,  since  it  is  the 
activities  of  citizens  (i.  e.  humans  in  particular  social  relations)  that  constitutes  the  audience  and  focus  of 
green  politics.  In  short,  even  if  some  nonhumans  (principally  fellow  primates  such  as  chimpanzees  and 
perhaps  other  social  animals  such  as  dolphins)  qualify  as  moral  agents  it  is  not  the  intention  of  green 
politics  to  police  their  behaviour.  It  is  the  behaviour  and  social  practices  of  human  agents  that  is  of 
primary  concern  to  green  politics. 
6  Generally  speaking,  something  like  a  'great  chain  of  being'  perspective  is  usually  (albeit  tacitly) 
accepted  as,  cetefis  paribus,  the  most  appropriate  moral  framework  within  which  actual  human-nature 
relations  can  and  ought  to  be  judged.  Even  deep  ecology  has  long  dropped  the  countcrintuitive  idea  of 
'biospheric  egalitarianism,  in  principle'  and  accepts  that  there  is  an  axiological  hierarchy  within  nature, 
with  humans  (though  not  all  their  interests)  at  the  top  (Fox,  1984).  Given  that  the  actual 
recommendations  given  by  non-anthropocentric  theorists  in  terms  of  guiding  action  are  at  root 
anthropocentric,  this  chapter  sets  out  to  explain  and  defend  it  as  the  only  defensible  moral  grounding  for 
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economic  practices  for  example,  sensitivity  to  the  political  context  is  central  to  the  ethical 
position  developed  in  this  chapter.  This  political  dimension  can  be  partly  explained  by  the 
centrality  of  human  interests  (section  3.5)  to  the  ethical  position  being  defended,  which 
stresses  the  way  in  which  human  interests  can  and  ought  to  frame  human-nature  relations. 
Here  however,  the  political  dimension  has  to  do  with  the  more  practical  fact  that  green 
arguments  seek  to  persuade  citizens,  governments  and  other  political  actors  of  the 
normative  rightness  of  these  arguments,  and  to  ensure  popular  support  for  whatever 
environmental  policies  or  practices  follow  from  these  moral  principles.  Thus  attention  to 
the  'political  environment'  has  to  do  with  both  the  securing  of  normative  agreement  for 
green  claims  and  also  with  the  practical  impact  of  green  policies  on  the  nonhuman  world 
as  the  'measure'  to  judge  the  success  of  green  politics. 
Sensitivity  to  the  political  ends  toward  which  green  normative  arguments  are  ultimately 
addressed  has  in  general  not  received  the  attention  it  deserves  within  the  literature  on 
green  politics.  This  political  dimension  has  its  origin  in  certain  'fran-dng  features'  of  green 
politics.  On  the  one  hand  there  is  the  idea  that  the  latter  ought  to  be  aimed  at  a  public 
securing  of  normative  agreement  for  green  policies  and  practices.  On  the  other  hand  any 
agreement  must  begin  from  an  awareness  of  the  political  nature  of  many  of  the  existing 
moral  parameters  concerning  human-nature  relations.  A  prime  example  is  the  various  laws 
prohibiting  cruelty  to  animals.  Building  on  what  was  suggested  in  the  last  chapter,  I  wish 
to  make  the  argument  that  the  heart  of  the  green  political  project  fies  in  the  exposition  of 
the  contradictions  within  contemporary  moral  thought  and  culture,  rather  than 
proclaiming  the  'total  crisis'  of  western  culture  and  the  bankruptcy  of  its  anthropocentric 
moral  tradition.  It  is  the  supposed  bankruptcy,  coupled  with  arguments  concerning  the 
'dangerousness',  of  anthropocentrism  that  leads  to  calls  for  a  'new'  (i.  e.  external)  non- 
anthropocentric  environmental  ethic.  However,  since  anthropocentrism.  has  not  been 
demonstrated  to  be  either  bankrupt  nor  'dangerous'  in  the  sense  implied  by  Fox  (1990), 
there  is  less  reason  to  search  beyond  anthropocentrism  for  an  appropriate  moral  idiom  and 
approach  to  social-environmental  problems.  An  immanent  critique  of  anthropocentrism 
ought  therefore  to  be  the  strategy  adopted  in  order  to  achieve  public  support  for  the 66 
normative  ends  of  green  politics.  For  example,  it  would  seem  more  likely  that  greens 
would  secure  normative  agreement  for  their  position  by  identifying  discrepancies  within 
the  present  normative  underpinning  of  current  human-nature  interaction.  By  presenting 
their  normative  case  in  terms  of  the  contradictory  and/or  the  incomplete  nature  of  the 
current  dominant  moral  consensus  on  human-nature  relations,  the  immanence  of  the  green 
position  means  that  it  would  be  both  stronger  (because  non-anthropocentric  accounts  do 
not  hold  up  under  scrutiny)  and  expressed  in  a  language  readily  understood  by  those  to 
whom  its  message  is  addressed. 
Green  politics  can  be  seen  as  an  attempt  to  show  the  internal  contradictions  of  current 
norms  and  as  an  attempt  to  persuade  people  of  the  rightness  of  an  alternative  perspective 
on  society's  received  attitudes  to  human-nature  affairs.  A  good  example  of  this 
contradiction  lies  is  what  Midgley  has  termed  a  "discrepancy  in  the  sensibilities  of  our  age,  ' 
(1992:  29).  An  example  of  this  discrepancy,  according  to  her,  is, 
The  steady  growth  of  callous  exploitation  is  occurring  at  a  time  when  our  response 
both  to  individual  animals  and  nature  as  a  whole  is  becoming  ever  more  active  and 
sensitive.  There  is  accordingly  now  a  much  greater  gap  between  the  way  in  which 
most  of  us  will  let  a  particular  animal  be  treated  if  we  can  see  it  in  front  of  us  and 
the  way  in  which  we  let  masses  of  animals  be  treated  out  of  our  sight  than  has 
arisen  in  any  previous  state  of  culture  (1992:  29). 
In  this  respect  the  green  moral  argument  is  not  simply  a  call  for  the  extension,  but 
ultimately  the  deepening  of  moral  concern  and  understanding.  Green  politics  is  thus 
concerned  with  the  task  of  political  negotiation  with  regard  to  the  moral  as  well  as  the 
practical  status  of  social-environmental  interaction  within  the  social  order.  7  It  is  an 
7  It  may  be  worthwhile  indicating  here  that  although  the  ethical  position  defended  here  seems  less  radical 
that  standard  non-anthropocentric  positions,  this  does  not  imply  that  changes  in  the  treatment  of  nature 
sanctioned  by  this  immanent  critique  may  not  require  large  scale,  and  sometimes  radical,  alteration  of 
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attempt  to  resolve  what  it  takes  to  be  salient  contradictions  within  the  existing  social  order 
concerning  the  treatment  of  the  nonhuman  world. 
My  strong  suspicion  is  that  the  various  forms  of  environmental  ethics,  from  animal 
rights  to  deep  ecology,  influence  how  individuals  behave  not  because  of  but  in  spite  of 
their  central  arguments.  What  I  mean  by  this  is  that  a  non-anthropocentric  ethic  'works' 
because  it  is  regarded  by  individuals  as  congruent  with  and  understandable  within,  the 
tspeciesist'  moral  'grammar'  of  contemporary  society  and  moral  reasoning. 
Environmentalism  has  political  resonance  because  it  is  largely  seen  as  complementary  and 
additional  to  conventional  human-centred  reasoning.  And  as  argued  in  the  discussion  of 
naturalism  below,  viewing  environmental  ethics  through  the  prism  of  human  interests  and 
human-centredness  is  not  merely  'conventional'  (in  that  it  is  capable  of  fundamental 
change),  but  is  also  partly  a  'given'  which  any  effective  ethic  that  proposes  to  alter  human 
behaviour  must  take  into  account.  For  example,  the  intelligibility  and  effectiveness  of 
appeals  to  'animal  rights'  lies  largely  in  the  rhetorical  impact  of  rights  talk  as  a  readily 
recognisable  way  in  which  to  convey  demands  for  certain  expected  kinds  of  human 
behaviour  in  the  treatment  of  animals.  "  As  Singer  states,  "the  question  of  whether  animals 
have  rights  [is]  less  important  than  ... 
how  we  think  they  ought  to  be  treated"  (1979:  197). 
It  is  not  animal  rights  but  human  treatment  or  duties  that  underpins  this  attempt  at  moral 
persuasion.  In  a  similar  manner  arguments  for  the  'intrinsic  value'  of  nature  can  be 
understood  as  expressing  the  strength  of  a  particular  human  interest  in  nature  being 
communicated,  i.  e.  the  human  interest  in  preserving  the  nonhuman  world  for  its  own  sake. 
Placing  the  question  of  green  normative  claims  wit  na  po  tical  context  highlights  the-h-a'a' 
that  these  claims  are  attached  to  humans  and  addressed  to  other  humans.  And  part  of 
what  it  means  where  someone  claims  that  human-nature  affairs  is  an  ethical  matter,  is  that 
8  Thus  rights-talk  represents  a  moral  idiom  through  which  moral  arguments  can  be  communicated  to 
others.  I  have  discussed  elsewhere  the  usefulness  of  the  rhetoric  of  rights  (Barry,  1996b).  Another  issue 
of  the  intelligibility  of  environmental  ethical  claims  is  related  to  Hayward's  emphasis  on  the  limits  of 
human  knowledge  of  the  nonhuman  world.  "Thus  moderate  anthropocentrists  argue  that  beings  other 
than  humans  may  be  of  value  in  and  for  themselves,  but  if  they  arc,  this  value  is  not  the  possible  object  of 
human  knowledge 
... 
What  anthropocentrists  question  is  whether  moral  agents  will  generally  have 
sufficicrit  access  to  the  experiences  of  nonhuman  beings  to  pronounce  on  their  valuc7  (Hayward,  1995: 
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we  understand  that  that  person  is  proposing  that  these  affairs  are  a  serious  matter,  not  just 
for  them  but  for  society  as  a  whole.  Assessing  this  seriousness  is  at  the  heart  of  the 
process  of  political  negotiation  mentioned  above.  I  hope  to  show  that  the  seriousness  of 
environmental  ethical  claims  can  only  be  understood,  and  made  intelligible  and  effective  in 
influencing  action,  by  being  passed  through  the  filter  of  human-centredness  and  translated 
into  the  language  of  human  interests. 
3.3  Moral  Extensionism  and  Moral  Reasoning 
'Moral  extensionism'  is  the  dominant  practical  strategy  that  non-anthropocentric 
environmental  ethics  offers  as  a  guide  to  action.  This  is  usually  expressed  in  terms  of  the 
extension  of  the  'moral  community'  to  include  nonhuman  entities.  This  understanding  of 
extensionism  is  based  on  what  I  call  a  'proprietarian'  notion  of  morality  in  contrast  to  a 
9  relational'  conception  of  morality  which  I  defend  in  the  rest  of  the  chapter.  The 
proprietarian  view  sees  morality  turning  on  the  possession  or  non-possession  of  morally 
relevant  properties  (e.  g.  sentience,  rationality,  consciousness,  intrinsic  value).  A  relational 
view,  as  its  name  suggests,  sees  relations  as  central  to  morality,  and  as  having  priority  over 
proprietarian  considerations. 
From  the  political  point  of  view,  extensionism  does  not  imply  the  application  of 
intrahuman  moral  reasoning  to  the  nonhuman  world.  Rather,  as  the  relational  view 
argues,  there  are  parts  of  the  nonhuman  world  which  are  already  embedded  within  existing 
moral  relations,  and  that  such  relations  are  constitutive  of  the  moral  life.  Extensionism  is  a 
process  by  which  the  range  of  human-nature  relations  which  are  subject  to  moral 
considerations  can  be  extended  outwards  as  a  result  of  critical  deliberation.  The  political 
force  of  extensionism  comes  from  the  fact  that  the  recognition  of  a  moral  dimension  to 
human-nature  affairs  is  an  accepted  aspect  of  moral  life.  There  is  nothing  new  about  the 
process  of  including  certain  parts  of  the  nonhuman  world  within  the  remit  of  morality,  it  is 
a  perfectly  natural  feature  of  all  human  societies  (see  3.5.2).  'Natural'  in  the  sense  of 
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the  particular  entities,  and  categories  of  entities,  to  which  they  propose  to  extend  moral 
consideration,  and  the  type  of  consideration  extended.  The  issue  is  not  whether  to  include 
human-nonhuman  relations  as  coning  under  the  category  of  moral  action,  but  rather 
which  relations  and  to  what  extent  they  are  to  be  so  included.  It  is  important  to  point  out 
that  whereas  proprietarian  extensionism  follows  an  'outside-in'  strategy  (from  the  non- 
moral  to  the  moral,  on  the  basis  of  an  external,  non-anthropocentric  ethic),  relational 
accounts  move  in  the  opposite  direction.  The  latter  seeks  to  include  nonhumans  by 
reflecting  on  existing  social-environmental  practices  and  their  moral  components,  rather 
than  basing  the  treatment  of  nonhumans  on  the  possession  of  capacities  alone. 
Unfortunately,  current  fonnulations  of  extensionism  are  narrowly  focused  on  looking 
for  morally  relevant  properties,  such  as  intrinsic  value,  or  capacities,  such  as  consciousness 
or  sentience,,  and  then  using  these  as  the  basis  for  deciding  who  or  what  is  to  be  included 
in  the  moral  community.  This  motif  of  the  'expanding  circle'  of  moral  concern  is  common 
currency  within  the  literature  (Singer,  1979,1990;  Regan,  1982,1983;  Nash,  1989; 
Rolston,  1988).  On  this  gloss,  environmental  ethics  sees  itself  as  the  modem  heir  of  the 
struggle  to  expand  the  moral  community.  The  historical  evolution  of  morality  is  regarded 
as  one  in  which  those  owed  equal  moral  consideration  progressively  transcend  tribal, 
national,  male,  white  criteria,  and  reaches  its  fullest  expression  in  the  declaration  of 
universal  human  rights.  Both  animal  rights  theorists  and  environmental  ethicists  claim  they 
are  simply  carrying  on  this  expansion  to  its  logical  conclusion  (Nash,  1989:  16).  Just  as 
blacks  and  women  were  'liberated',  accorded  equal  human  rights  and  included  as  full 
members  of  the  moral  community,  so  too  will  nature  (or  significant  parts  of  it)  be 
'liberated'  by  the  process  of  extending  rights  and  the  equal  consideration  of  interests 
(Singer,  1990;  Rodman,  1995).  9 
9  This  is  the  position  adopted  by  Eckersley's  ecocentric  interpretation  of  green  political  theory  in  which 
the  liberation  of  nature  or  what  she  calls  'emancipation  writ  large'  (1992a:  95),  is  the  basic  normative  aim 
of  green  politics.  In  line  with  what  has  been  said  above  about  the  intelligibility  of  non-anthropoccntric 
claims  such  as  intrinsic  value,  or  the  rights  of  nonhumans,  the  'emancipation  of  nature'  is  more  defensible 
on  rhetorical  than  conceptual  grounds.  Indeed,  I  must  confess  to  not  knowing  what  the  'emancipation  of 
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Such  an  understanding  of  morality  holds  that  the  most  important  issue  is  the 
specification  of  the  'moral  community',  and  that  it  can  be  explained  by  reference  to  one  or 
a  set  of  characteristics.  By  adopting  an  a  prioil  anti-anthropocentrism.  as  the  only  secure 
basis  for  the  moralisation  of  social-environmental  affairs,  proprietarian  extensionism 
moves  in  the  wrong  direction,  from  the  nonhuman  in,  rather  than  from  the  human 
outwards.  A  good  example  of  this  type  of  reasoning  is  Westra  (1989)  who  argues  for  the 
subsumption  of  intrahuman  and  social-environmental  affairs  under  a  single  comprehensive 
ethic.  For  her,  "rather  than  start  with  a  'humans  only'  ethical  perspective  and  then  strive 
to  broaden  its  basis  to  cover  other  entities  ... 
it  seems  preferable  to  start  with  an  all- 
encompassing  ethics,  and  agree  that  other,  more  specific  (perhaps  stricter)  sets  of  ethical 
principles  may  well  govem  each  group's  interaction  (including  our  own)"  (1989:  224). 
This  is  a  clear  example  of  the  'outside-in'  extensionism  that  characterises  proprietarian 
views  of  morality,  nicely  expressed  by  Rolston's  declaration  that  ",  we  must  move  from  the 
natural  to  the  moral"  (1992:  135).  Other  examples  include  Singer's  (1990)  utilitarian 
argument  concerning  the  equal  consideration  of  human  and  animal  interests,  or  Regan's 
(1983)  deontological  ascription  of  rights  to  animals  on  the  basis  that  some  of  them  are 
'subjects-of-a-life'  with  interests  that  ought  to  be  respected  and  protected.  These 
extensionist  positions  turn  on  the  claim  that  what  unites  us  in  a  morally  significant  sense  is 
not  that  we  are  'natural  beings'  like  other  creatures,  with  our  own  particular  nature. 
Rather,  what  we  are  argued  to  share  with  other  species  are  particular  capacities  such  as 
sentience,  or  being  'subjects-of-a-life'.  The  problem  with  this  form  of  extensionism  is  that 
the  complexity  and  richness  of  moral  experience  is  reduced  in  the  name  of  expanding  the 
moral  community.  10 
According  to  current  extensionist  arguments,  moral  relations  should  be  species- 
impartial  and  capacity-sensitive.  It  is  important  to  point  out  that  what  I  wish  to  criticise  is 
not  the  latter  but  the  former.  It  is  not  my  argument  that  the  possession  of  certain 
10  Current  extensionist  arguments  choose  the  class  of  nonhuman  to  be  protected,  and  then  go  about 
furnishing  reasons  why  they  be  considered  as  moral  subjects.  The  strategy  appears  to  be  driven  by  the 
need  to  whittle  down  the  'entrance  critcria'  for  admission  to  the  moral  club'.  Proprietarianism.  leads  to  a 
sufficiently  'thin'  theory  of  morality  so  that  particularity  as  well  as  partiality  are  transcended. 71 
capacities  is  a  matter  of  moral  indifference  in  the  determination  of  proper  treatment. 
Rather  it  is  that  a  view  of  morality  in  which  having  these  capacities  is  of  paramount 
significance  offers  a  problematic  conception  of  morality,  one  based  on  species-impartiality. 
This  has  to  do  with  the  link  between  proprietarian  accounts  of  morality  and  'discovering' 
rather  than  'creating'  moral  relationships  in  a  similar  manner  to  that  described  in  the  last 
chapter  in  criticising  deep  ecology.  Morally  relevant  properties  are  already  in  the  world, 
waiting  to  be  'discovered'  by  human  agents,  whereas  relations  are  created  and  maintained 
by  humans.  Hence  its  'outside-in'  logic.  Thus  proprietarianism  is  a  central  plank  in  the 
attempt  to  move  away  from  anthropocentric  partiality. 
The  reason  for  the  prevalence  of  proprietarian  accounts  of  morality  within  non- 
anthropocentric  ethics  is  that  they  secure  impartiality  in  a  way  in  which  a  relational 
account  cannot.  Relational  accounts  are  accused  of  'speciesism'  i.  e.  partiality  to  members 
of  our  own  species.  However,  for  capacities  to  come  into  play  as  side-constraints  on  the 
treatment  of  nonhumans,  there  must  be  a  prior  judgement  about  how  we  relate  to  bearers 
of  these  morally  relevant  properties.  An  awareness  of  properties  humans  and  nonhumans 
share  can  help  to  diminish  the  separateness  between  the  two.  However,  decreasing  the 
differences  between  humans  and  nonhumans  in  this  way  cannot  erode  the  fundamental 
moral  difference  between  'human'  and  'nonhuman'.  That  is,  a  proprietarian  account 
cannot  fully  capture  the  distinction  that  we  stand  in  a  qualitatively  different  set  of  relations 
to  others  of  our  kind  than  we  do  to  nonhumans.  It  is  only  by  starting  from  a  relational 
view  that  the  various  differences  and  similarities  between  humans  and  nonhumans  can  be 
accorded  their  proper  weight  in  moral  deliberation  on  the  conduct  of  relations  between 
them. 
The  distinction  between  moral  agents  and  subjects  or  patients  is  at  the  heart  of  moral 
extensionist  arguments.  The  extensionist  proposition  is  to  increase  the  class  of  moral 
subjects  deserving  of  moral  consideration.  On  the  whole  extensionism  does  not  question 
the  fact  that  only  human  beings  can  be  moral  agents,  and  thus  held  responsible  for  their 
actions.  One  of  the  standard  extensionist  arguments  is  the  'defective  humans'  argument 
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some  'defective'  humans  the  status  of  moral  subjects  (i.  e.  morally  considerable  but 
incapable  of  full  moral  agency),  and  wish  to  avoid  the  charge  of  arbitrarily  tying  treatment 
to  species  membership,  then  it  follows  that  it  is  the  possession  of  capacities  rather  than 
species  membership  that  widens  the  class  of  moral  subjects  and  thus  the  moral  community. 
There  is  no  one  capacity,  or  set  of  capacities  that  can  be  found  which  will  include  all 
humans  and  exclude  all  nonhumans.  In  this  way  it  purports  to  deflate  the  moral  relevance 
of  being  a  member  of  the  human  species,  while  still  maintaining  that  only  humans  can  be 
moral  agents.  It  works  by  separating  humans  into  agents  and  subjects  and  implicitly 
constructing  morality  as  composed  of  three  sets  of  relations:  those  between  human  agents 
and  other  agents,  human  agents  and  human  subjects  and  finally  human  agents  and 
nonhuman  subjects.  Impartiality  or  equal  consideration  is  the  rule  that  governs  the  totality 
of  relations  between  moral  agents  and  subjects.  To  treat  a  human  moral  subject  who  in 
terms  of  capacities,  is  similar  to  a  nonhuman,  differently  from  the  latter,  is  argued  to 
betray  a  'speciesist'  attitude,  akin  to  sexism  or  racism.  A  serious  problem  with  this 
proprietarian  view  is  its  abstract,  cold  and  calculative  quality.  In  the  end,  moral  practice, 
the  phenomenology  of  the  moral  life  is  not  constituted  by  impartial  relations  between  two 
sets  of  'capacity-holders',  moral  agents  (some  humans)  and  moral  subjects  (humans  and 
some  nonhumans).  Rather  the  richness  and  texture  of  morality  requires  seeing  it  as  rooted 
in  determinate  social  relations  between  humans,  which  include  social-environmental 
interaction.  To  be  a  human  being  means  (constitutively)  relating  to  other  humans  (both 
agents  and  subjects)  in  ways  not  shared  with  the  nonhuman  world  (subjects  or  otherwise). 
The  fundamental  moral  relation  humans  stand  to  each  other  is  thus  irrespective  of  the 
possession  of  capacities  as  argued  in  3.4.3. 
3.3.1  Rationalism  and  Moral  Reasoning 
Ultimately,  what  moral  extensionist  arguments  share  is  a  common  critique  of  that 
dominant  strand  in  western  moral  thinking  which  makes  remon  and  the  capacity  for 
rational  deliberation  of  cardinal  significance  in  moral  affairs.  It  is  their  attack  on  what  one 
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can  call  the  'rationalist'  tradition  within  moral  theory  which  leads  them  to  search  for 
alternative  properties  not  exclusive  to  humans  (such  as  sentience)  by  which  the  'moral 
community'  can  be  extended.  Yet  while  criticising  the  excessive  rationalism  of 
contemporary  ethics,  the  latter's  proprietarian  logic  is  maintained.  Moral  extensionism 
criticises  merely  the  choice  of  rationality  as  the  capacity,  the  possession  of  which  imparts 
moral  considerability  and  constitutes  the  core  of  morality,  not  that  the  specification  of 
capacities  is  that  core.  It  is  also  the  case  that  'animal  liberation'  theories  of  the 
deontological  or  utilitarian  sort,  actually  end  up  endorsing  the  primacy  of  reason.  This  is 
because  these  theories  work  by  rejecting  particularity,  but  also  non-rational  aspects  of 
moral  reasoning  such  as  sympathy,  so  as  to  ground  species  impartiality.  Singer  is  at  pains 
to  point  out  that  the  inclusion  of  animals  within  the  moral  community  is  based  on  reason 
not  emotion.  As  he  notes  in  the  preface  to  the  1975  edition  of  Animal  Liberation,  "The 
ultimate  justification  for  opposition  to  both  these  kind  of  experiments  [Nazi  experiments 
on  concentration  camp  victims  and  contemporary  ones  on  animals]...  is  not  emotion.  It  is 
an  appeal  to  basic  moral  principles  which  we  all  accept,  and  the  application  of  these 
principles  to  the  victims  of  both  kinds  of  experiment  is  demanded  by  reason  not  emotion" 
(1990:  iii).  As  will  become  clear  in  the  next  and  subsequent  sections,  the  role  sympathy 
plays  in  moral  life  in  general,  and  in  the  operation  of  that  part  concerning  our  dealings  with 
the  nonhuman  world  in  particular,  is  argued  to  be  of  central  importance  in  moral 
deliberation.  It  is  the  integration  of  reason  and  emotion  that  a  naturalistic  ethic  seeks. 
Singer's  rejection  of  sympathy  as  a  basis  upon  which  to  extend  moral  consideration  to 
animals  can  be  explained  by  his  earlier  confusion  of  'sympathy'  with  'sentimentality'  as 
when  he  states  that,  "This  book  makes  no  sentimental  appeals  for  sympathy  toward  'cute' 
animals"  (1990:  iii).  Sympathy  is  not  just  a  disposition  towards  'cute'  or  'attractive' 
animals/hurnans,  but  is  also  a  mode  of  being,  of  being  able  to  comprehend  another's 
situation  and  to  a  certain  extent  see  the  world  from  their  perspective.  "  Thus  Singer,  and 
other  proprietarian  non-anthropocentrists,  end  up  with  reason  remaining  the  prime  feature 
11  As  Gruen  notes,  "sympathy  is  fundamental  to  moral  theory  because  it  helps  to  determine  who  the 
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of  morality,  although  one  which  is  sensitive  to  capacities  such  as  sentience  or  properties 
such  as  intrinsic  value.  However,  the  non-anthropocentric  critique  of  the  dominance  of 
rationality  together  with  the  extensionist  logic  are  positive  aspects  of  the  proprietarian 
moral  position.  In  particular  the  critique  of  rationalism  is  something  that  can  be  built 
upon.  In  the  next  section  I  attempt  to  show  how  this  critique  can  be  worked  up  within  a 
naturalistic  ethical  theory,  which  while  being  speciesist  can  accomplish  much  of  what 
extensionism  hopes  to  achieve. 
The  problem  with  the  way  in  which  the  extensionist  argument  progresses  is  that  it  often 
does  not  make  clear  that  it  is  rationalism  and  the  use  of  reason  as  the  exclusive 
demarcation  between  'human'  and  'nonhuman',  and  as  marking  the  border  between  the 
'moral'  and  the  'non-moral',  as  opposed  to  anthropocentrism,  that  is  really  at  the  heart  of 
their  critique.  Rationalism  and  anthropocentrism  are  seen  as  synonymous  rather  than  the 
former  being  seen  as  a  particular  conception  of  the  latter.  12  In  opposition  to  the  rationalist 
tradition,  those  who  write  on  the  morality  of  human-animal  affairs  from  a  'Humean' 
perspective  which  stresses  the  role  of  sentiments,  emotions  and  instincts,  offer  a  more 
convincing  moral  outlook  for  green  politiCS.  13  Rather  than  decentre  the  human  from  an 
12  This  conflation  is  less  marked  within  one  strand  the  'animal  liberation'  literature  where  there  is  greater 
sensitivity  to  the  non-rational  (which  is  not  to  say  irrational)  dimensions  of  morality.  This  strand  does  not 
fall  into  the  deontological  animal  rights  approach  (Regan,  1983)  or  Singer's  utilitarian  theory  (1990),  but 
emphasises  the  role  of  sympathy  and  actual  contact  between  humans  and  animals.  This  includes  Nfidgley 
(1983a,  1992),  Clark  (1982)  and  others  in  what  can  be  called  the  'Humean  tradition',  and  more  recent 
manifestations  in  the  form  of  extending  the  feminist  'ethic  of  care'  argument  to  the  treatment  of  animals 
(Gruen,  1993;  Plurnwood,  1993). 
13  A  full  account  of  a  Humean-inspired  naturalism  would  have  to  include  a  critique  of  the  pre-eminence  of 
'human  autonomy'  and  'voluntarism'  within  Kantian  moral  theory,  from  the  point  of  view  of  the 
significant  part  played  by  those  non-chosen  and  given  aspects  of  human  nature  and  human  relations  from 
which  the  former  abstracts,  yet  which  play  a  pivotal  part  in  human  experience  and  relations.  That  moral 
obligations  are  a  product  of  past  voluntary  acts  see  Hart  (1955).  Our  neediness,  vulnerability  and 
dependence  on  others  is  something  that  has  only  recently  been  suggested  as  at  the  heart  of  moral  life  by 
feminist  moral  theorists,  amongst  others.  A  naturalistic  view  also  shares  the  feminist  concern  with 
4  embodying'  autonomy  in  the  sense  implied  by  Benton's  statement  below,  as  well  as  opening  the  way 
toward  modifying  the  view  that  moral  duties  are  paradigmatically  'chosen'  or  arise  from  previous 
voluntary  acts  as  suggested  by  Hart  (1955).  See  O'Neill  (1991:  298-9)  on  the  moral  significance  of 
human  neediness,  and  Goodin  (1985)  for  an  attempt  to  develop  a  theory  of  morality  based  on  the 
centrality  of  'vulnerability'.  Later  (7.8),  that  environmental  considerations  heighten  mutual  vulnerability 
is  taken  as  one  reason  why  democracy  ought  to  encourage  the  consideration  of  the  interests  of  others  and 
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alternative  account  of  morality,  what  is  decentred  and  placed  within  its  proper  perspective, 
is  the  role  of  reason  within  moral  reasoning.  What  can  be  termed  the  contextualisation  of 
reason,  reconceptualises  morality  such  that  the  insuperable  barrier  between  the  'rational' 
world  of  humanity  and  the  'irrational'  or  non-rational  natural  world  is  not  so  much 
transcended  (since  the  naturalism  developed  below  holds  that  being  human  is  of  central 
moral  importance)  as  placed  within  its  proper  context.  Whereas  standard  extensionist 
positions  seek  to  demonstrate  the  continuity  between  human  and  nonhuman  by  the  use  of 
the  various  trans-human  properties  mentioned  above,  and  standard  rationalist  accounts  of 
morality  are  premised  on  the  radical  separation  between  human  and  nonhuman,  the 
naturalistic  position  defended  below  attempts  to  reconcile  the  thrust  of  these  positions  by 
demonstrating  that  humans  are  a  differentiation  within  rather  than  a  separation  ftom 
nature. 
3.4  Naturalism  and  a  Defence  of  'Speciesism' 
If  we  reject,  as  I  believe  we  must,  claims  of  a  single  definition  of  ethics,  and  instead  focus 
on  ethics  as  a  practice,  embedded  in  human  social  life,  we  will  be  in  a  better  position  to 
account  for  the  inclusion  of  social-environmental  relations  within  the  scope  of  morality. 
This  will  also  be  the  case  if  we  reject  the  argument  that the  moralisation  of  social- 
environmental  relations  requires  the  discovery  of  a  single  ethical  code.  One  of  the 
problems  with  proprietarian  extensionism  is  that  it  is  insufficiently  sensitive  to  the  myriad 
of  ways  in  which  humans  interact  with  the  nonhuman  world,  and  to  the  varieties  of  human 
moral  experience  vis-a-vis  that  world.  At  the  same  time  it  cannot  be  supposed  that  there 
are  no  limits  to  moral  extensionism.  Constraints  on  the  practical  scope  of  extending  moral 
consideration  to  the  nonhuman  world  are  expressed  by  Brennan  as  implying  that,  'Even  if 
morality  succeeds  as  a  device  for  counteracting  limited  sympathies  within  the  human 
community,  it  is  unlikely  to  succeed  as  a  device  that  will  enable  us  to  yield  priority  over 
human  concerns  and  interests  to  the  good  of  things  'natural,  wild  and  free...  (1988:  30). 
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explicit  awareness  of  the  restrictions,  boundaries  and  contingency  that  marks  all  human 
experience,  including  moral  experience.  It  was  these  features  of  the  human  condition,  it 
will  be  recalled  (2.3.1),  that  made  a  virtue-ethics  approach  the  most  appropriate  one  to 
take  (2.7.1).  Here  we  can  supplement  this  view  by  holding  that  attention  to  what  it  means 
to  be  human  not  only  shows  the  continuity  between  the  human  and  nonhuman  worlds 
(thus  overcoming  the  standard  argument  levelled  at  anthropocentrism  concerning  the 
separation  between  'nonhuman'  and  'human'),  but  also  delimits  the  effective  range  of 
moralised  human-nature  relations.  The  naturalistic  meta-ethical  position  adopted  turns  on 
the  idea  that  being  human  counts  for  something  and  that  speciesism  or  prima  facie 
favouritism  towards  members  of  ones  own  species  is  neither  an  'irrational  bias'  or  akin  to 
sexism  or  racism  as  typically  held  by  non-anthropocentric  theorists  (Routley  &  Routley, 
1979).  Rather,  it  is  at  the  centre  of  any  workable  moral  theory  covering  social- 
environmental  interaction. 
Naturalism  implies  attention  to  how  the  moral  treatment  of  nonhumans  relates  to  what 
it  means  to  be  human,  with  the  supposition  that  the  particular  type  of  'natural  being'  we 
are  impinges  on  how  we  ought  to  treat  nonhumans.  Ought,  after  all,  implies  can.  Our 
nature  circumscribes  the  range  of  choices,  ethical  and  non-ethical  open  to  us.  Here  the 
working  assumption  is  that  before  we  can  'ecologise'  ethics  in  the  way  most 
environmental  ethicists  and  other  moral  extensionists  intend,  we  must  first  'biologise' 
ethics.  The  supposition  is  that  the  inclusion  of  human  nature  within  ethics  is  a  realistic 
manner  in  which  to  argue  for  the  inclusion  of  other  parts  of  nature.  In  the  following 
subsection  I  defend  the  argument  that  being  human  is  of  central  moral  importance.  The 
reason  for  this  is  that  the  use  of  the  predicate  'human'  to  describe  a  being  is  not  simply 
descriptive  but  carries  prescriptive  force.  Cicero's  remark  that  "The  mere  fact  that 
someone  is  a  man  makes  it  incumbent  in  another  man  not  to  regard  him  as  alien7  (in  Clark, 
1995:  318)  captures  the  essence  of  this  argument.  In  describing  a  being  as  'human'  one  is 
also  prescribing  the  general  type  of  treatment  owed  to  such  a  being. 77 
3.4.1  Human  Nature,  Nurture  and  Culture 
In  presenting  arguments  about  how  we  ought  to  treat  nonhuman  nature,  the  matter  of 
human  nature  must  also  be  addressed.  The  two  arep  as  I  hope  to  show,  inextricably  linked. 
if  green  politics  is  the  'politics  of  nature',  as  a  recent  book  indicated  (Dobson  and 
Lucardie,  1993),  then  human  nature  must  have  a  central  place  in  its  analysis.  This  aspect 
of  'nature'  has  not  received  much  attention  within  the  literature,  and  may  account  for  the 
incoherence  between  green  moral  and  political  claims.  When  greens  emphasise  limits  and 
point  out  that  we  cannot  transcend  certain  'givens'  of  external  nature,  they  often  forget 
that  the  same  caution  applies  to  the  nature  of  humans  themselves. 
This  concern  with  the  part  of  human  nature  within  moral  affairs  is  motivated  by 
Brennan's  suggestion  that,  "in  order  to  discover  what  sort  of  human  life  is  valuable  we 
must  first  consider  what  kind  of  a  thing  a  human  being  is.  Although  there  is,  in  my  view, 
no  complete  answer  to  this  question,  we  can  ...  grasp  one  important  aspect  of  human  nature 
by  reflecting  on  what  are  essentially  ecological  considerations"  (1988:  xii).  In  adopting  a 
naturalistic  ethical  position,  it  is  not  implied  that  the  moral  foundation  of  green  politics 
rests  on  a  strong  and  determinate  account  of  'human  nature'.  Rather,  it  highlights  certain 
salient  features  of  human  beings  that  are  more  or  less  'givens',  that  any  ethical  theory  must 
take  into  account.  This  understanding  of  'human  nature'  is  a  posteriori,  based  on 
anthropological  and  other  empirical  evidence,  from  which  a  naturalistic  understanding  of 
the  human  species  can  be  inferred.  Thinkers  who  adopt  such  a  naturalistic  perspective 
include  Midgley  (1983a,  1995),  Hampshire  (1983,1989),  Benton  (1993)  and  Clark  (1979, 
1982).  One  reason  for  adopting  this  approach  is  that  it  is  appropriate  to  talk  initially  of 
the  human  species  when  discussing  the  questions  of  interspecies  interaction.  We  are 
products  of  evolution  as  much  as  culture  and  convention,  and  as  such  our  range  of 
realistic  choices  are  'framed'  not  just  by  culturally  defined  norms,  if  only  because  these 
cultural  norms  are  'informed'  by,  for  want  of  a  better  word,  our  innate  dispositions  as 
social  animals.  Ex  hypothesi,  'we'  are  adapted  to  'our'  culture,  which  in  turn  is,  at  least 
temporarily,  adapted  to  its  environment. 78 
The  first  level  of  our  nature  turns  on  certain  universals  of  human 
biological/physiological  constitution.  These  distinguish  us  as  a  species  from  the  rest  of 
nature.  For  example,  that  we  are  vulnerable  to  harm  from  certain  nonhumans  and  not 
from  others  is  important.  We  do  not  and  cannot  stand  in  the  same  relationship  to  all  parts 
of  nature.  For  example,  trees,  unlike  snakes  or  viruses,  do  not  present  the  same  kind  of 
danger  to  us.  At  this  basic  level,  our  treatment  of  trees  will  consequently  be  different  from 
how  we  treat  snakes.  Given  our  make-up,  it  is  simply  inconceivable  that*  all  of  nonhuman 
nature  can  be  treated  and  viewed  in  accordance  with  one  master  principle.  Humans  do  not 
face  an  undifferentiated  'nature'  but  specific  parts  of  it. 
The  second  level  of  our  nature  relates  to  the  centrality  of  culture  in  the  determination 
of  human  nature.  A  human  without  a  culture  is  not  a  human,  just  as  a  bee  without  a  hive 
is  not  a  bee.  It  is  not  "humanity'  but  specific  groups/societies  that  interact  with 
determinate  parts  of  nature.  An  example  of  this  cultural  dimension  is  that  need-fulfilment 
for  humans  goes  beyond  mere  biological  subsistence.  As  Benton  points  out,  'Troper 
human  feeding-activity  is  symbolically,  culturally  mediated"  (1993:  50).  Culture  is  our 
species-specific  mode  of  expressing  our  nature,  or  species-being.  14  As  it  is  continuous 
with  our  nature  as  social  beings,  human  culture  does  not  represent  a  radical  separation 
from  nature,  but  can  be  viewed  as  our  'second  nature'  (Bookchin,  1986),  emerging  from, 
but  situated  within,  the  natural  order.  The  importance  of  this  has  been  expressed  by 
Kohdk  who  notes  that,  'Vere  culture  a  negation  of  nature,  no  integration  of  humans  and 
14  Hayward  proposes  a  much  stronger  relation  between  culture  and  human  nature  claiming  that,  "Culture 
is  an  intrinsic  component  of  human  nature  as  such;  and  it  is  not  possible  to  specify  human  nature  in  purely 
biological  terms  even  in  principle,  for  the  human  biological  organism  itself  did  not  reach  its  final 
evolutionary  form  before  the  introduction  of  culture'  (1995:  76).  Hayward's  reason  for  emphasising  this 
cultural  dimension  as  separate  from  biological  dimensions  of  human  nature  is  his  desire  to  stress  the 
uniqueness  of  human  needs  and  flourishing  which  he  claims  a  naturalistic  account  cannot  articulate. 
Maintaining  this  would  seem  to  depend  largely  on  empirical  evidence  concerning  the  evolution  of  Homo 
Sapiens  as  a  distinct  sub-species  of  primate.  Hayward's  position  would  need  to  specify  the  difference 
between  social  relations  upon  which  culture  is  built,  which  can  be  given  biological  and  evolutionary 
explanation,  and  human  culture  per  se.  Given  the  plausibility  of  the  evolution  of  culture  from  more 
fundamental  social  instincts,  that  is,  'culture'  as  a  particular  evolutionary  form  of  human  social  relations, 
at  which  point  can  we  say  social  relations  end  and  culture  begins?  Another  criticism  is  the  ethnological 
evidence  that  other  species  also  have  forms  of  social  relations  which  are  akin  to  human  culture  (De  Waal, 
1982).  In  this  sense,  'culture'  may  be  understood  as  an  demergent  property'  of  social  relations,  and  as 
such  not  limited  to  the  human  species. 79 
nature  would  follow"  (1984:  90).  Culture  can  thus  be  seen  as  a  collective  capacity  of  the 
human  species  to  adapt  to  the  particular  contingent  conditions  of  their  collective  existence, 
including  the  environments  they  face.  Thus,  culture  is  in  part  the  particular  mode  by 
which  humans  adapt  to  their  'ecological  niche',  but  not  simply  in  the  sense  that  cultures 
are  somehow  "determined'  by  environments.  Rather,  in  the  additional  sense  that  the  mode 
of  human  adaptation  to  their  'ecological  niche',  and  the  expression  of  their  'species  being', 
involves  the  active  transformation  of  their  environment.  As  Lewontin  puts  it, 
We  cannot  regard  evolution  as  the  'solution'  by  species  of  some  predetermined 
environmental  'problems'  because  it  is  the  life  activities  of  the  species  themselves 
that  determine  both  the  problems  and  the  solutions  simultaneously  ... 
Organisms 
within  their  individual  lifetimes  and  in  the  course  of  their  evolution  as  a  species  do 
not  a&rpl  to  environments:  they  construct  them.  They  are  not  simply  objects  of 
the  laws  of  nature,  altering  themselves  to  the  inevitable,  but  active  subjects, 
transforming  nature  according  to  its  laws  (in  Harvey,  1993:  28). 
Part  of  the  reason  for  this  is  that  the  'ecological  niche'  for  the  human  species  is  extremely 
wide,  as  can  be  readily  seen  in  the  success  of  our  species'  colonisation  of  the  earth's 
surface.  As  the  species  nature  did  not  specialise,  we  are  unique  in  the  range  of  ecological 
niches  in  which  we  can  flourish,  present  ecological  problems  notwithstanding.  At  the 
same  time,  membership  of  a  culture)  also  expresses  our  distinction  from  others  of  our 
kind.  it  is  not  an  undifferentiated  'nature'  that  we  face  at  the  first  level,  while  at  the 
second  level  it  is  not  the  'human  species'  that  is  the  proper  subject  of  analysis.  Rather 
what  we  should  be  concerned  with  are  determinate  social  practices  and  individuals  within 
particular  cultural  contexts  facing  more  or  less  determinate  parts  of  the  environment. 
These  environments  cannot  be  taken  to  be  "natural'  i.  e.  independent  of  human  influence, 
since  often  they  have  been  transformed  by  past  and  current  human  behaviour.  15  The 
15  There  is  thus  an  ontological  basis  to  the  claim  that  the  'environment'  is  socially  constructed.  it  is  not 
just  that  our  understanding  of  the  environment  is  mediated  by  human  social  relations,  but  ontologically 
the  environment  faced  by  human  culture  is  often  partly  the  'product'  of  previous  social  modification.  It  is 80 
significance  of  this  cultural  dimension,  raised  earlier  in  the  previous  chapter,  is  that  what 
green  politics  seeks  is  a  cultural  adaptation  to  altered  ecological  conditions.  In  other 
words,  the  human  'ecological  niche'  is  both  culturally  and  biologically  determined.  These 
aspects  of  human  being  (biological,  cultural  and  ecological)  have  been  expressed  by 
Benton  as  implying  that  "Humans  are  necessarily  embodied  and  also,  doubly,  ecologically 
and  socially,  embeddect'  (1993:  103).  We  must  use  nature  to  live  and  to  flourish,  but  we 
do  not  react  uniformly  to  it,  either  in  our  instrumental-productive  or  in  our  moral 
relations. 
An  important  naturalistic  indication  of  this  is  the  presence  of  various  morally  significant 
categories  in  almost  all  human  societies  for  describing  the  nonhuman  world.  Just  as  in  the 
use  of  the  predicate  'human',  some  of  these  descriptions  of  the  nonhuman  world  carry 
prescriptive  intent.  For  example,  Diamond  gives  this  explanation  of  designating  particular 
animals  as  'vermin'.  For  her,  "the  notion  of  vermin  makes  sense  against  the  background 
of  the  idea  of  animals  in  general  as  not  mere  things.  Certain  groups  of  animals  are  then 
signalled  out  as  not  to  be  treated  fully  as  the  rest  are,  where  the  idea  might  be  that  the  rest 
are  to  be  hunted  only  fairly  and  not  meanly  poisoned"  (1978:  476;  emphasis  in  original). 
Similarly  we  can  think  of  other  animal  categories  such  as  'pet'  or  'food  animal',  which  like 
4  vermin'  both  describe  the  particular  relation  in  which  that  animal  stands  to  us  as  well  as 
prescribing  the  appropriate  response.  Morally  relevant  categories  in  regard  to  the 
inanimate  world  are  less  common  but  conceptualisations  such  as  'private  property', 
'garden',  'national  park',  'city'  and  in  less  enlightened  times  'forest',  'uncharted  lands', 
C  wasteland'  and  'wilderness',,  are  testament  to  the  ubiquity  and  naturalness  of  human 
frequently  difficult  to  maintain  a  strict  division  between  a  'natural'  environment  and  one  which  is  the 
outcome  of  human-purposive  action  in  conjunction  with  that  natural  or  given  environment.  The 
ecological  niche  for  humans  is  as  much  a  'humaniscd'  as  a  'natural'  one.  Since  this  transformative 
activity  is  central  to  human  culture,  and  human  nature,  the  moral  regulation  of  this  transformative  activity 
is  vital  green  politics.  This  is  discussed  later  where  an  'ethics  of  use'  regulating  this  transformativc 
activity  is  proposed  as  the  moral  basis  for  green  politics  in  its  attempt  to  find  the  best  cultural  'adaptive 
fit'  between  society  and  environment.  It  is  also  discussed  in  chapter  5  (5.3  and  5.8)  in  terms  of  this 
humanised  environment  as  an  'anthropogenic  subclimax',  and  Leopold's  'land  ethic'  as  a  suggested 
cultural  'adaptive  fit'  in  which  responsible  stewardship  is  central. 81 
moral  relations  with  the  external  world.  16  This  human  concern  with  categorising  the 
natural  world  demonstrates  that  because  we  do  not  interact  with  an  entity  called  'nature' 
or  the  'environment',  there  can  be  no  single  moral  principle  to  govern  this  multifaceted 
and  complex  relation.  In  short,  such  moral  categories  and  the  process  of  categorisation 
are  constitutive  of  that  relation.  17 
We  do  not  react  to  the  world  as  disembodied  centres  of  rationality,  as  rationalist 
accounts  of  moral  experience  suppose.  Neither,  on  the  other  hand,  do  we  react  to  the 
world  in  the  same  way  as  other  animals  do,  this  is  one  of  the  mistaken  assumptions  of 
strong  sociobiological  arguments.  The  complex  of  human  reactions  to  the  world  cannot 
be  reduced  to  either  of  these  positions.  We  are  unique  in  the  range  and  variety  of 
possibilities  open  to  us.  It  is  precisely  this  self-reflexively  grounded  capacity  for  choice 
that  allows  the  possibility  of  moral  concerns  to  be  a  factor  permeating  social- 
environmental  exchanges.  One  way  of  looking  at  this  from  a  naturalistic  perspective  is  to 
note  the  difference  between  'open'  and  'closed'  instincts  (NEdgley,  1995:  52-7).  Closed 
instincts  are  fixed,  while  open  ones  are  tendencies  for  certain  general  kinds  of  behaviour 
which  are  learnt  by  experience.  It  is  the  relative  openness  of  our  instincts  with  regard  to 
how  we  flourish  and  interact  that  permits  the  possibility  of  non-instrumental 
considerations.  Closed  instincts  refer  to  a  limited  but  crucial  set  of  'givens'.  Chief  among 
these  closed  instincts  is  a  preference  for  others  of  our  kind,  Le,  'speciesism'  is  a  feature  of 
human  nature.  Midgley  rightly  rejects  the  common  argument  equating  speciesism  with 
racism  and  sexism  in  arguing  that,  "The  natural  preference  for  one's  own  species  does 
16  For  anthropological  accounts  of  the  various  cultural  and  mythical  meanings  attributed  to  such 
categories,  particularly  the  notion  of  'wilderness',  see  Rennie-Short  (1991).  What  I  intend  to  convey  by 
the  qualifier  'in  less  enlightened  times'  is  the  sense  that  the  usual  negative  moral  resonance  associated 
with  the  second  set  of  terms  are  difficult  to  sustain  in  the  contemporary  world.  On  the  one  hand  the 
'disenchantment  of  the  world'  has  largely  drained  such  terms  of  their  negative  and  often  threatening 
character,  while  on  the  other,  ecological  science  has  shown  us  that  what  looks  like  a  'barren  wasteland'  is 
in  fact  a  rich  ecosystem  supporting  a  multitude  of  life-forms.  To  think  of  it  as  'barren'  (valueless)  is  a 
mistaken  judgement,  based  on  ignorance  and  therefore  is  an  example  of  an  ecological  vice.  The  link 
between  ecological  science  and  environmental  virtue  is  discussed  in  section  3.6.2. 
17  That  there  are  also  more  culturally  specific,  more  narrowly  construed,  symbolic  catcgorisations  of 
nature  has  been  emphasised  by  environmental  theorists  such  as  Sagoff  who  argues  that,  "the  destruction  of 
symbols  is  a  step  towards  ignorance  of  the  qualities  these  symbols  express"  (in  Norton,  1987:  198). 82 
exist.  It  is  not,  like  race-prejudice,  a  product  of  culture.  It  is  found  in  all  human  cultures" 
(1983a:  104).  Thus  speciesism  is  not  a  product  of  western  culture  or  enlightenment 
thought:  it  is  a  ubiquitous  (and  complex)  feature  of  human  life.  However,  even  as  a  closed 
instinct,  the  preference  for  one's  own  kind  does  not  imply,  in  the  human  case,  a  callous 
disregard  for  other  species. 
Ironically,  although  environmental  philosophers  have  traditionally  urged  us  to 
recognise  the  continuities  between  ourselves  and  other  animals,  they  have  often 
underestimated  the  double-edged  implications  of  this.  Rolston,  for  example,  in  stating 
that,  "We  do  not  derive  ought  from  what  is,  but  what  ought  must  not  be  contrary  to  what 
is  in  nature'  (1979:  25),  seems  unaware  that  this  'nature'  includes  human  nature. 
Acknowledging  the  sin-dlarities  between  humans  and  the  rest  of  the  natural  order  does  not 
guarantee  the  outcomes  these  theorists  propose.  Attempting  to  dissolve  our  uniqueness  is 
the  wrong  way  to  go  about  analysing  the  question  of  the  moral  sense  of  human-nonhuman 
interaction.  If  we  were  to  take  seriously  the  environmental  argument  stressing  our  animal 
nature,  adopting  a  purely  instrumental  attitude  to  nature,  which  is  the  'natural'  attitude  of 
all  other  species,  unconstrained  by  anything  more  than  prudence  and  efficiency 
qualifications,  would  be  justified.  It  is  our  uniqueness  in  being  both  a  part  of,  and  apart 
ftom  nature  that  allows  space  for  ethical  concerns  to  influence  social-environmental  affairs 
(Barry,  1995c).  Although  it  is  important  to  stress  our  continuities  with  the  natural  order, 
as  soon  as  we  allow  moral  evaluations  of  our  behaviour  (and  our  behaviour  alone)  we  set 
ourselves  off  from  the  rest  of  nature  (Williams,  1992). 
3.4.2  'She  Does  Not  Know  Humanity  who  Only  Humanity  Knows' 
To  read  some  arguments  for  the  extension  of  moral  concern  to  include  the  nonhuman 
world,  one  would  think  that  these  writers  believe  they  are  suggesting  something 
completely  original  (and  that  explains  the  resistance  of  the  anthropocentric  'status  quo'  to 
their  propositions,  and  hence  the  need  for  an  external  rather  than  an  internal  critique).  That 
the  relationship  between  humans  and  the  nonhuman  world  has  never  been  completely  non- 83 
moral  plays  little  part  in  their  condemnation  of  speciesism,  thus  effectively  precluding  them 
from  exploiting  the  possibility  that  this  feature  of  human  society  could  serve  to  bolster  the 
extension  of  moral  concerns  to  further  dimensions  of  social-environmental  relations.  As 
even  a  cursory  knowledge  of  the  evolution  of  human  society  and  the  histories  of  human 
societies  indicate,  relations  between  humans  and  parts  of  their  environment,  particularly 
domesticated  animals,  has  never  been  entirely  devoid  of  moral  content.  For  example,  in 
every  human  society  we  find  social  relations  co-existing  alongside  productive  relations 
between  humans  and  nonhuman  animals.  A  strong  interpretation  of  this  is  Benton's 
statement  that,  "Humans  and  animals  stand  in  social  relationships  to  one  another  ... 
It 
implies  that  nonhuman  animals  are  in  part  constitutive  of  human  societies"  (1993:  68).  We 
need  not  accept  this  strong  version  to  see  that  human  culture  goes  beyond  relations 
between  humans.  Indeed  one  could  go  far  as  to  say  that  to  interact  with  other  species 
according  to  criteria  other  than  those  pertaining  to  material  consumption  is  itself 
constitutive  of  human  nature  and  culture.  A  person  who,  or  a  human  culture  which, 
treated  other  species  as  other  species  treat  and  interact  with  each  other,  i.  e.  with  no  moral 
dimensions  whatsoever,  would  be  strange  to  us. 
This  coevolutionary  character  of  the  human  species  is  a  powerful  basis  upon  which  to 
armie  for  the  moralisation  of  human  dealings  with  the  natural  world,  and  to  argue  for  the 
extension  of  moral  reasoning  to  more  of  these  dealings.  It  is  not  the  case  that  our  moral 
dealings  with  the  nonhuman  world  demands  a  non-anthropocentric  'new  ethic'  (Passmore, 
1980:  187).  One  reason  for  this  is  that  the  extension  of  sympathy  and  consideration  to  the 
nonhuman  world,  such  that  our  use  or  non-use  of  that  world  is  conditioned  by  ethical 
considerations,  is  part  of  what  it  means  to  be  human.  Midgley  asserts  that,  "Our  social 
life,  our  interests  and  our  sympathi  must  extend  outside  our  own  species,  but  they 
do  so  with  a  difference"  (1983a:  19).  Sympathy,  which  requires  contact  with,  and/or 
awareness  of,  others,  is  a  powerful  source  of  moral  concern,  a  source  which  can  operate 
over  the  whole  range  of  human  action,  both  with  her  own  kind  and  with  other  species.  In 
other  words,  a  human  being  who  displayed  no  sympathy  at  all  for  nonhumans,  would  be 
strange  to  us,  i.  e.  atypical.  As  Callicott  notes,  "a  certain  modicum  of  sympathy,  concern 84 
and  benevolence  is  humanly  normal,  very  little  or  none  at  all  is  aberrant"  (1992:  191).  An 
ethical  dimension  to  human  dealings  with  nature  is  not  something  unusual  or  novel.  Like 
other  ineliminable  aspects  of  the  moral  life  (some  of  which  are  set  out  below  in  3.5),  an 
ethical  concern  for  regulating  the  use  or  non-use  of  (parts  oo  the  natural  world  is  a  feature 
of  all  human  cultures.  That  this  can  take  a  variety  of  forms  within  different  cultural 
settings  does  not  in  any  way  count  against  its  significance.  As  outlined  above,  the  variety 
of  human  uses  of  the  nonhuman  world  demonstrates  the  manner  in  which  relations  with 
that  world  are  doubly  constitutive  for  human  beings.  First,  these  relations  mark  the 
(moral)  difference  between  'human'  and  'nonhuman'  (dealt  in  more  detail  in  the  following 
subsection),  while  they  are  also  constitutive  of  the  (cultural)  difference  between  groups  of 
humans,  discussed  in  3.6.1. 
An  argument  for  ethical  extensionism  would  therefore  be  less  difficult  and  more  in 
keeping  with  some  basic  and  morally  crucial  facts  of  human  moral  life  if  it  took  into 
account  and  sought  to  build  upon  this  constitutive  role  played  by  the  social  dimension  to 
human  uses  of  the  natural  world.  An  awareness  that!,  to  paraphrase,  'she  does  not  know 
humanity  who  only  humanity  knows'  would  go  some  way  to  integrating  the  ecocentric 
demand  to  overcome  the  human/nonhuman,  culture/nature  dichotomy  with  a  more 
defensible  naturalistic  alternative  ethical  position.  However,  for  this  to  be  achieved  the 
emphasis  on  the  continuity  between  human  and  nonhuman  needs  to  be  placed  within  its 
proper  context.  And  as  argued  in  the  next  subsection,  this  context  is  the  fundamental 
difference  between  'human'  and  'nonhuman'. 
3.4.3  'Being  Human  Counts  for  Something' 
One  of  the  motivations  for  arguing  that  the  fact  of  being  'human'  carries  with  it  evaluative 
import  is  to  deal  with  the  standard  argument  within  proprietarian  moral  extensionism  (and 
animal  liberation  in  particular)  which  equates  'speciesism'  with  sexism  and  racism,  and 
thus  equally  morally  unjustifiable.  As  indicated  above.  I  think  the  obsession  with  finding 
properties  upon  which  to  ascribe  moral  considerability  (often  in  the  form  of  the  'rights'  of 85 
nonhuman  animals  and  other  parts  of  nature),  represents  a  narrow  and  incomplete  view  of 
morality.  One  way  in  which  this  view  of  morality  is  incomplete  is,  as  mentioned  earlier,  its 
lack  of  attention  to  the  role  and  function  of  feelings  as  motives  and  guides  to  action.  As 
Gruen  notes,  "If  reason  were  the  sole  motivator  of  ethical  behaviour,  one  might  wonder 
why  there  are  people  who  are  familiar  with  the  reasoning  of  Singer's  work  [on  animal 
rights],  for  example,  but  who  nonetheless  continue  to  eat  animals  ...  reason  is  only  one 
element  in  decision-making.  Feelings  of  outrage,  revulsion,  sympathy  or  compassion  are 
important  to  the  development  of  concrete  moral  sensibilities"  (1993:  15  1). 
In  many  respects  the  standard  argument  comparing  human  'defectives'  to  animals,  for 
example  by  arguing  that  one  should  not  experiment  on  animals  unless  one  is  prepared  to 
see  it  carried  out  on  a  similarly  placed  human  defective,  is  to  have  one  thought  too  many. 
While  rightly  pointing  out  that  the  differences  between  humans  and  animals  in  terms  of 
some  morally  relevant  capacities  and  powers  possessed  by  one  and  not  by  the  other  cannot 
sustain  a  clear  and  permanent  boundary  between  the  two,  such  accounts  do  not  register 
the  fundamental  moral  importance  of  the  difference  between  'human'  and  'nonhuman'. 
When  we  use  the  prefix  'human'  what  this  conveys  is  that  certain  basic  types  of  treatment 
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e  called  for.  e  intent  is  thus  non-arbitrary. 
There  is  typically  a  limited,  but  nevertheless  significant,  number  of  duties,  usually  negative, 
owed  to  another  human  be  not  owed  to  other  beings.  This  is  why  denying 
another  person  as  'human'  is  usuall7a  Fe-n-tril-pir'f-bf-radicdl'di's-crirnination  against 
perceived  'aliens'  and  'outsiders',  and  they  receive  treatment  according  to  moral  codes  fit 
for  human-nonhuman  relations.  In  many  tribal  societies,  the  appellation  'human'  was 
often  tied  exclusively  to  the  tribe,  even  when  contact  was  made  with  other  humans.  A 
good  example  of  this  is  in  the  film  Little  Big  Man,  where  the  native  American  Indians 
understand  themselves  to  be  'the  human  beings'  and  the  'white  man'  as  something 
different,  or  Amazonian  tribes  who  while  including  some  nonhumans  within  their  moral 
community,  have  little  compunction  about  killing  members  of  another  tribe  because  they 
are  not  seen  as  fellow  human  beings,  like  themselves.  And  as  history  has  witnessed,  when 
humans  are  regarded  as  non-  or  sub-humans,  evil  follows. 86 
For  example,  the  moral  abhorrence  of  cannibalism,  the  fact  that  humans  do  not  eat  their 
dead,  or  amputated  limbs,  can  only  be  explained  and  fully  understood  by  the  distinction 
between  'human'  and  'nonhuman'  (or  perhaps  'not  human  enough'  in  the  case  of  eating 
one's  enemies).  Cannibalism  is  an  activity  in  which  those  that  are  eaten  are  ipso  facto  not 
'human'.  As  Diamond  points  out,  "what  underlines  our  attitude  to  dining  on  ourselves  is 
the  view  that  a  person  is  not  something  to  eaf  '  (1978:  468,  emphasis  in  original).  And 
from  this  perspective,  it  is  beside  the  point  that  the  person  in  question  is  'normal'  or 
'defective',,  the  so-called  mere  fact  of  being  a  zoological  human  is  not  so  inconsiderable 
after  all.  Being  human  counts  for  something,,  it  is  to  be  a  kind  of  being  to  which  others  of 
the  same  species  stand  in  a  foundational  moral  relationship.  As  Pickering-Francis  and 
Norman  point  out,  "human  beings  may  justifiably  attach  more  weight  to  human  interests 
than  to  animal  interests.,  not  in  virtue  of  the  supposed  differentiating  properties,  but 
because  human  beings  have  certain  relations  to  other  human  beings  they  do  not  have 
with  animals"  (1978:  127;  emphasis  added).  The  reason  why  humans  do  not  usually  eat 
or  experiment  on  each  other,  'human  defectives'  included,  is  not  typically  out  of  a  concern 
for  their  (lack  oo  capacities  or  interests.  Rather  it  is  a  basic  moral  fact  of  life  that  under 
normal  circumstances  relations  between  'human  beings'  are  founded  upon  a  set  of  moral 
considerations.  These  moral  considerations  are  limited  to  duties  such  as  not  eating 
another  human  (alive  or  dead),  non-interference,  mutual  aid,  as  well  as  other  less  precise 
concerns  relating  to  some  degree  of  sympathy  and  empathy,  particularly  with  another's 
suffering,  and  perhaps  most  importantly  a  recognition  that  the  other  is  a  fellow  human 
being  with  all  that  that  entails.  18  In  this  way  the  'otherness'  of  the  other,  like  'merely' 
being  human,  is  not  really  the  case.  The  strangeness  of  another  human  is  never  total.  We 
can  move  towards  and  understand  them  in  a  way  in  which  we  can  never  understand  and 
move  towards  the  nonhuman  world.  19  As  Midgley  notes,  "It  is  never  true  that  in  order  to 
18  Other  morally  relevant  characteristics  (i.  e.  not  properties)  of  being  human  include  the  central  ethical 
importance  of  sex,  birth,  death  and  collective  subsistence  within  all  human  societies  (Benton  1993). 
19  The  'otherness'  of  nature  as  the  appropriate  perspective  within  which  to  place  human-nature  relations 
is  I  think  correct,  not  least  because  it  follows  from  the  naturalistic  position  outlined  here,  but  also  because 
it  tempers  one  aspect  of  the  'arrogance  of  humanism'  concerning  the  ascribed  conviction  of  the  latter  in 
the  ultimate  transparency  of  the  natural  world  to  human  reason.  On  the  point  about  limits  to  human 87 
know  how  to  treat  a  human  being,  you  must  first  find  out  what  race  he  belongs  to" 
(1983a:  98).  In  the  last  analysis  what  separates  the  'human'  from  the  'nonhuman',  morally 
speaking,  is  a  difference  of  kind  and  not  just  of  degree. 
This  latter  point  simply  emphasises  the  limits  to  any  proposed  moralisation  of  human- 
nonhuman  relations.  If  it  is  accepted  that  morality  is  premised  on,  and  framed  within, 
certain  facts  about  what  it  means  to  be  human,  this  is  the  framework  within  which  any 
extension  of  morality  must  be  placed.  Diamond  captures  the  essence  of  this  in  holding 
that,  "rhe  ways  in  which  we  mark  what  human  life  is  belong  to  the  source  of  moral  life, 
and  no  appeal  to  the  prevention  of  suffering  which  is  blind  to  this  can  in  the  end  be 
anything  but  self-destructive"  (1978:  471).  And  of  course  one  of  the  ways  in  which  we 
mark  human  life  is  the  various  ways  in  which  we  use  the  nonhuman  world.  Although  it 
may  seem  that  the  stress  a  naturalistic  ethical  standpoint  lays  on  the  limits  of  any 
environmental  ethic  simply  reinforces  the  status  quo,  this  is  not  the  case.  In  claiming  that 
the  core  of  moral  life  concerns  human  interests  in  marking  what  it  means  to  be  human  and 
that  this  involves  using  the  natural  world  in  various  ways,  there  is  a  strong  and 
increasingly  supported  argument  turning  on  ethically  justifiable  and  unjustifiable  uses  of 
the  natural  world  in  the  service  of  that  end.  As  I  argue  below  in  the  next  section,  green 
politics  based  on  the  type  of  naturalistic  meta-ethic  outlined  in  this  section,  can  be  cashed 
out  in  terms  of  an  'ethics  of  use'  to  make  the  distinction  between  'use'  and  'abuse'  of 
central  importance  to  the  green  political  case.  Green  moral  theory  is  thus  partly  about 
determining  'serious'  from  'non-serious'  and  'worthy'  from  'unworthy'  modes  of  human 
interaction  with  the  nonhuman  world. 
At  the  same  time,  a  naturalistic  understanding  of  human  beings  carries  with  it  the  claim 
that  it  is  natural  for  humans  to  care  about  their  descendents  in  particular  and  future 
generations  in  general.  One  way  of  looking  at  this  is  to  see  care  and  obligations  to  the 
future  as  a  'natural  duty'.  This  feature  of  human  nature  is  another  'given',  non-chosen 
knowledge  of  the  world  see  Hayward  (1995).  As  O'Neill  notes  in  reference  to  the  centrality  of  science  in 
demonstrating  the  indifference  and  strangeness  of  nature,  "The  assumption  that  the  discovery  of  nature's 
impersonality  and  strangeness  is  something  to  be  regretted,  a  cause  of  the  'disenchantment  of  the  world', 
needs  to  be  rejecteT  (1993:  15  1). 88 
feature  of  human  nature,  but  one  that  can  and  does  work  in  favour  of  environmental 
arguments  for  sustainability  and  ecological  stewardship.  This  care  for  future  generations, 
as  Norton  (1991)  and  de-Shalit  (1995)  demonstrate,  does  have  positive  environmental 
implications  in  terms  of  acting  as  a  side-constraint  on  present  courses  of  action.  This 
&convergence'  hypothesis",  in  which  long-term  human  interests  are  consistent  with  an3 
indeed  require  some  measure  of  environmental  protection,  is  one  way  of  expressing  the 
ecological  stewardship  position  outlined  in  the  last  chapter. 
3.5  Human  Interests  and  an  Ecological  Ethics  of  Use 
Despite  appearances  to  the  contrary,  the  common  environmentalist  critique  of 
anthropocentrism  is  not  that  it  denies  wiy  moral  considerations  being  taken  into  account  in 
human  dealings  with  the  nonhuman  world.  Even  a  crude  anthropocentrism,  i.  e.,  one  that 
sees  no  independent  value  in  nature  and  values  nature  purely  in  economic/materialist 
terms,  can  be  compatible  with  the  imposition  of  some  ethical  limits  on  that  instrumental 
exchange.  That  treatment  is  tied  to  human  interests  and  concerns  does  not  mean  that  the 
relationship  is  ipso  facto  non-ethical.  The  common  misconception  of  non- 
anthropocentrism.  is  to  suppose  that  independent  moral  standing  is  a  requirement  for 
morally  motivated  treatment.  Most  commonly  this  independent  moral  standing  is  argued 
to  reside  in  the  intrinsic  value  of  the  non-human  world.  This  underwrites  a  view  of  green 
politics  for  which,  "The  important  point  ... 
is  that  it  seeks  to  persuade  us  that  the  natural 
world  has  intrinsic  value:  that  we  should  care  for  it  not  simply  because  this  may  be  of 
benefit  to  ue'  (Dobson,  1990:  49).  The  crucial  terms  here  are  'not  simply'  and  'benefit'. 
Care  for  nature  may  be  indepýndent  of  human  benefit  but  it  cannot  be  independent  of 
human  interests.  Equally,  that  this  care  may  involve  considerations  of  human  benefit  does 
not  drain  that  caring  relationship  of  its  moral  character. 
For  example,  by  claiming  part  of  nature  as  property  people  are  obliged  to  treat  it 
differently  than  if  it  were  unowned.  They  now  stand  in  a  different  relation  to  that  part  of 
nature,  because  they  now  stand  in  a  different  relation  to  other  humans.  Thus,  the 89 
treatment  of  nature  viewed  purely  as  a  human  resource  can  be  guided,  at  least  in  part,  by 
ethical  considerations.  20  In  discussing  the  question  of  how  ought  we  to  treat  the 
nonhuman  world  the  focus  should  be  on  the  evaluation  of  the  reasons  given  for  particular 
types  of  usage.  Much  of  environmental  ethics  concerns  itself  with  establishing  that 
treatment  be  on  the  premise  of  the  independent  moral  status  of  nonhumans,  rather  than 
focu,  s-i7ngýonýtne-p-ným-a--cy-of  -the-relational  -  character-of  -  human.;  nonhuman  -affairs:  --  One 
possible  reason  for  this  proprietarian  view  was  suggested  in  the  last  chapter,  namely  the 
non-anthropocentric  conviction  that  a  human-centred  environmental  ethic,  resting  on 
human  interests  in  and  valuations  of  nature,  cannot  guarantee  the  a  priori  preservation  of 
nature  from  human  use  that  many  deep  ecologists  and  environmental  ethicists  see  as  the 
mark  of  any  'true'  environmental  ethic.  Anthropocentric  moral  reasoning  is  held  to  be  a 
precarious  and  insufficient  ethical  basis  for  the  protection  of  nature.  If  however  we  reject 
the  notion  that  an  environmental  ethic  must  be  judged  by  whether  or  not  it  secures  this  a 
priori  protection  for  the  natural  world,  and  instead  see  the  job  of  any  environmental  ethic 
as  regulating  actual  human  uses  of  nature  and  identifying  abuses,  then  anthropocentrism 
per  se  (as  opposed  to  particular  conceptions  of  it)  need  not  stand  accused  of  being  part  of 
the  problem  rather  than  part  of  the  solution.  It  is  the  conviction  of  those  who  believe  that 
non-anthropocentrism  is  necessary  for  arenvironmental  ethic  that  leads  to  an  emphasis  on 
the  non-anthropocentric  powers,  values  or  capacities,  and  which  marks  much  of  what  I 
have  earlier  called  the  proprietarian  strand  of  environmental  ethics.  This  non- 
anthropocentric  ethic  presents  us  with  a  picture  of  the  world  in  which  humans  are 
disinterested  valuers.  The  naturalistic  anthropocentrism  of  an  ethic  of  use  sees  humans  as 
'interested  and  partial  valuers',  and  active  transformers  of  that  world.  Because  a  relational 
view  ultimately  turns  on  human  interests  and  concerns,  it  is  viewed  as  capable  only  of  an 
'ethic  for  the  use  of  the  environment'  as  opposed  to  a  genuine  'environmental  ethic' 
20  That  the  designation  of  nature  as  human  property  carries  with  it  often  strong  prohibitions  against 
certain  uses  of  it  is  most  clearly  seen  in  the  medieval  Christian  idea  of  nature  as  'God's  creation'.  Since 
the  earth  was  God's  property  and  not  humanity's,  they  had  no  right  to  destroy  or  abuse  what  was  not 
theirs.  Rather  than  the  earth  being  made  for  humans,  i.  e.  the  metaphysical  anthropocentrism  canvassed  in 
the  previous  chapter,  the  Christian  doctrine  of  stewardship  held  the  opposite,  that  we  were  made  for  the 
earth,  as  the  stewards  and  custodians  of  God's  creation.  S 90 
(Regan,  1982)  defined  as  an  ethic  which  gives  non-anthropocentric  reasons  for  the 
protection  of  nature.  What  I  wish  to  do  in  this  section  is  to  argue  that  an  'ethics  of  use' 
which  regulates  social-environmental  interaction  is  a  sensible  ethical  platform  upon  which 
actual,  concrete  human-nature  conflicts  and  decisions  can  be  resolved. 
The  central  claim  of  an  ethics  of  use  is  that  an  extension  of  human  interests  can  achieve 
many  of  the  practical  outcomes  desired  by  non-anthropocentrists  but  on  a  more  secure 
basis,  that  of  critically  interrogating  human  interests  in  the  world.  This  position  starts 
from  Norton's  observation  that,  "A  narrow  view  of  human  values...  encourages 
environmentalists  to  look  to  nonhuman  sources  of  value  to  justify  their  preservationist 
policies!  '  (1987:  222).  A  broader  view  of  human  values  and  interests  in  the  world  thus 
obviates  the  necessity  for  non-anthropocentric  sources  of  moral  concern.  Part  of  this 
broadening  process  involves  the  examination  of  human  interests.  The  reason  for  this  is 
that  this  critical  and  self-reflexive  process  opens  up  the  possibility  of  new  moral  relations 
between  humans  and  nature  within  anthropocentric  moral  reasoning.  The  problem  with 
most  critiques  of  anthropocentrism  and  speciesism  is  that  they  are  insufficiently  sensitive 
to  its  environmental  possibilities,  especially  in  relation  to  the  political  defence  and 
articulation  of  green  policies  and  ideas.  Although  an  ethics  o[u  !  nsejjýty  definition,  human- 
centred  and  related  to  human  interests,  it  seeks  to  argue  the  green  position  on  the  basis  of 
qualitative  moral  distinctions  within  human  ifiGr_e;  t_s  The  justification  of  a  particular 
practice  on  the  grounds  that  it  fulfils  a  human  interest  is  no  longer  considered  as 
acceptable  simply  because  it  is  a  human  interest.  In  other  words,  the  fact  that  a  particular 
use  of  nature  fulfils  a  human  interest  cannot  be  taken  as  a  decisive  reason  for  either  its 
initiation,  continuation,  or  its  continuation  in  the  same  manner.  It  is  this  understanding  of 
speciesism/anthropocentrism,  that  deserves  to  be  criticised  as  'arrogant  humanism',  the 
idea  that  the  mere  reference  to  human  interests  is  sufficient  to  justify  morally  any  human 
use  of  nature.  An  ecological  ethic  of  use  argues  on  the  other  hand  that  human  interests 
are  a  necessaty  but  not  sufficient  condition  for  the  justification  of  human-nature 
relations.  For  any  human-nature  relation  to  be  fully  morally  justified  the  particular 
interests  which  that  relation  fulfils  must  be  justified.  This  position  begins  from  Midgley's 91 
conviction  that,  "however  far  down  the  queue  animals  may  be  placed,  it  is  still  possible  in 
principle  for  their  urgent  needs  to  take  precedence  over  people's  trivial  onee'  (1983a:  17). 
in  short,  not  all  human  interests,  simply  by  virtue  of  being  human,  are  equally  acceptable. 
That  we  must  consume  parts  of  nature  to  flourish,  and  use  it  in  other  ways  to  mark  human 
life,  does  not  mean  that  all  uses  are  equally  justified.  Some  are  more  morally  defensible 
than  others.  The  aim  of  green  politics  then  becomes  centred  on  determining  defensible  or 
permissible  human  uses  of  the  environment. 
3.5.1  Human  Preferences  and  Interests:  The  Good  the  Trivial  and  the  Wanton 
Adapting  to  my  own  purposes  a  distinction  Norton  (1984)  draws  between  'strong 
anthropocentrism'  and  'weak  anthropocentrism'  I  now  wish  to  outline  the  way  in  which 
the  ecological  ethic  of  use  turns  upon  the  distinction  between  human  preferences  and 
interests  as  well  as  the  extension  of  human  interests.  According  to  Norton,  "A  value 
theory  is  strongly  anthropocentric  if  all  value  countenanced  by  it  is  explained  by  reference 
to  satisfactions  of  felt  preferences  of  human  individuale'  (1984:  134;  second  emphasis 
added).  For  my  purposes  the  distinguishing  feature  of  strong  anthropocentrism.  is  the 
claim  that  human-nature  relations  can  be  justified  by  reference  to  felt  or  'given' 
preferences  alone.  21  From  the  strong  anthropocentric  position  it  does  not  make  sense  to 
talk  about  moral  judgement  derived  independently  ftom  human  preference-fulfilment.  It  is 
the  reductive  character  of  strong  anthropocentrism  in  conceiving  of  human-nature 
relations  in  purely  instrumental  terms  (typically  economic),  that  'crowds  out'  both  the 
need  for  their  justification  and  the  requirement  that  moral  considerations  ought  to  act  as 
side-constraints  on  how  relations  are  managed.  Strong  anthropocentrism  in  holding  that 
the  moral  justification  of  human  uses  of  the  natural  world  need  not  go  beyond  reference  to 
preference-fulfilment  reduces  the  various  human  interests  that  extend  (or  could  extend) 
21  A  similar  argument  can  be  found  in  point  3  of  the  deep  ecology  platform  which  holds  that,  -humans 
have  no  right  to  reduce  the  diversity  of  life  except  to  satisfy  vital  needs".  See  last  chapter  2.2.  However, 
as  pointed  out  below  'vital  needs  satisfaction'  does  not  set  the  limit  on  the  justifiable  human  use  of  the 
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over  our  relations  with  nature  to  preferences  humans  happen  to  have.  22  According  to 
Norton,  if  preferences  are  insulated  from  critical  appraisal,  human  interests  in  the 
nonhuman  world  are  narrower  than  they  would  otherwise  be.  This  type  of  reasoning  is 
most  commonly  used  in  economic  cost  benefit  analysis,  where  individuals  are  asked  to 
place  an  economic  value  on  some  part  of  the  environment  as  a  way  to  'reveal'  their 
environmental  preferences  (Jacobs,  1994;  O'Neill,  1993).  The  common  green  critique  to 
such  an  approach  in  assessing  human-nature  relations  is  precisely  that  cost-benefit  analysis 
'crowds  out'  any  critical  reflection  on  whether  economic  preferences  by  themselves  are 
strong  enough  to  justify  an  econon-fic  understanding  of  the  relationship  or  practice.  This 
issue  of  economic  valuation  of  the  environment  is  discussed  in  more  detail  in  chapters  6 
and  7. 
At  root  this  green  critique  shares  with  critical  theory  the  view  that  economic  reasoning, 
if  unchecked,  can  lead  to  the  'demoralisation'  of  human-nature  exchangeS.  23  Green 
politics  is  thus  not  against  economic  reasoning  but  rather  seeks  to  place  it  within  its  proper 
context,  as  one  amongst  other  modes'of  human  interaction.  From  a  green  point  of  view, 
the  aim  must  be  to  assess  preferences  by  reference  to  the  'seriousness'  or  'worthiness'  of 
the  human  interest  it  is  related  to.  The  conception  of  anthropocentrism  as  presented  by  an 
ethics  of  use,  is  thus  a  form  of  'weak  anthropocentrism',  which  acknowledges  a  plurality- 
of  human  interests  in  the  natural  world  and  thus  a  variety  of  possible  relations  to  that 
world. 
As  far  as  human-nature  affairs  go  the  capacities  of  nonhumans,  do  count  for  something 
for  they  partly  identify  what  a  being  is,  and  are  indispensable  in  guiding  us  in  how  to  treat 
it,  but  as  argued  above,  in  the  human  case  it  is  the  relations  between  individuals  that  mark 
22  It  is  also  the  case  that  strong  anthropoccntrism.  is  intimately  tied  up  with  'rationalist'  accounts  of  ethics 
which  not  only  set  humans  above  nature  in  a  moral  sense,  but  on  this  questionable  basis  proceed  to  make 
humans  the  be-afl-and-cnd-all  of  the  world.  In  other  words  there  seems  to  be  a  connection  between 
rationalist  accounts  of  ethics  and  the  'arrogant'  anthropocentric  metaphysics  discussed  in  the  last  chapter. 
It  does  not  make  sense  to  talk  of  the  'moral  superiority'  of  humans  over  nonhumans  since  they  are  not 
moral. 
23  Later  in  chapters  6  and  7,  the  critique  of  the  imputed  'demoralisation'  of  human-nonhuman  relations 
on  account  of  economisitic  reasoning  actually  concerns  the  argument  that  the  moral  theory  underpinning 
the  latter  form  of  reasoning  is  the  real  target.  Tle  normative  underpinning  of  economic  thinldng  is 
inappropriate  when  dealing  with  the  moral  relations  people  feel  or  have  with  nature. 93 
the  difference  between  human  and  nonhuman.  Therefore  while  a  proprietarian  account  is 
important  for  knowing  how  to  treat  a  nonhuman,  it  is  only  one  among  a  number  of 
considerations  in  the  human  case.  Proprietarian  considerations,  discussed  in  the  next 
subsection,  are  largely  parasitic  on  the  prior  justification  of  the  particular  practice  in 
question.  Even  where  a  practice  is  deemed  to  be  morally  justified,  attention  to  such 
considerations  may  require  an  alteration  to  the  way  in  which  it  is  carried  out.  Relational 
considerations,  which  hinge  on  assessing  interests,  address  the  issue  of  whether  specific 
human  uses  should  continue,  while  proprietarian  ones  generally  bring  up  issues  around 
how  that  relation  ought  to  be  conducted.  An  ethics  of  use  is  concerned  with  establishing 
the  contested  boundary  between  legitimate  use  and  abuse,  as  well  as  the  often  more 
complex  issue  of.  when  use  cannot  be  morally  justified,  i.  e.  the  line  between  use  and  non- 
use.  24  These  boundaries  can  never  be  fixed  in  the  manner  that  a  commitment  to  the  a 
priori  preservation  of  nature  would  require,  but  are  ineliminably  contingent.  This  relative 
indeterminacy  of  the  ethics  of  use  will  not  satisfy  those  who  seek  cast  iron  protection  of 
the  nonhuman  world.  There  is  simply  no  remedy  for  this  and  the  most  we  can  do  is  to 
acknowledge  it  and  make  it  explicit.  This  is  the  responsibility  of  green  politics,  in  that  the 
implementation  of  green  policies  is  partly  a  matter  of  'policing'  this  indeterminacy  and 
identifying  when  and  why  human  use  of  the  environment  becomes  unjustified  abuse. 
In  environmental  ethical  discussions  phrases  Eke  'for  no  good  reason'  or  ad  ectives  J 
such  as  'wanton'  are  of  critical  importance  because  they  indicate  that  morally  wrong  acts 
against  nonhumans  are  wrong  because  they  cannot  be  justified  by  reference  to  good 
reasons.  For  example,  common  sense  moral  reasoning  holds  that  one  ought  not  cause 
unnecessary  suffering  or  avoidable  harm.  The  keywords  here  are  not  only  'suffering'  and 
'harm'  which  pick  out  the  relevant  nonhumans  that  are  morally  considerable,  but  also  the 
24  In  many  respects  the  distinctions  drawn  between  use/abusc  use/non-usc  are  similar  to  Kantian  concerns 
relating  to  treating  humans  always  as  'ends  in  themselves'  and  never  purely  as  means.  The  Kantian 
injunction  is  not  that  we  ought  to  never  treat  humans  (or  at  least  rational  ones)  as  means,  but  rather  than 
we  should  always  regard  them  as  ends  in  themselves  as  well.  This  implies  that  any  'use'  of  one  human  by 
another  (for  example,  employment)  ought  to  be  tempered  by  moral  considerations  not  related  to  that  use. 
be  OLo  In  a  comparable  fashion,  an  ethics  of  use  seeks  tq  persuadc  us-that.,  5,  omc  human  uses  of  naýEe  og  to 
governed  by  wider  hum;  "Tin-tercsts  which  'temper'  'narrow'  considerations  of  economic  efficiency,  for 
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intentional  or  voluntary  dimension  of  the  description  as  expressed  by  terms  such  as 
'unnecessary'  and  'avoidable'.  Here  the  question  is  with  the  motive  of  the  action. 
Typically,  it  is  the  'wantonness'  or  'triviality'  of  an  act  that  merits  moral  censure.  The 
capacity  to  suffer  or  be  harmed  is  important  in  specifying  the  injured  party,  but  it  is  the 
character  of  the  act  and/or  the  actor,  that  is  the  focus  of  moral  judgement.  For  example, 
slaughtering  an  animal  may  seem  wrong  but  if  given  the  circumstances,  it  can  be  shown 
that  it  possesses  ritualistic  significance,  is  absolutely  necessary  for  a  group's  sense  of 
identity,  and  it  does  not  cause  the  animal  an  excess  of  pain  and  suffering,  then  it  mayl'e'ýý 
justified.  But  the  same  act  carried  out  for  'fun'  would  not  carry  the  same  weight. 
One  of  the  distinguishing  features  of  the  ethics  of  use  is  that  it  stresses  the  rather 
obvious  idea  that  the  participants  involved  are  not  an  undifferentiated  'humanity'  facing  an 
equally  undifferentiated  'nature'.  In  respect  to  the  latter,  there  are  morally  relevant 
distinctions  between  domesticated  animals,  other  animals,  other  living  beings,  plants,  and 
inanimate  nature.  There  is  no  one  overarching  principle  which  will  cover  all  human 
relations  to  these  various  parts  of  the  nonhuman  world.  Nor  can  it  be  expected  that  we 
can  treat  all  natural  entities  within  a  particular  category  in  a  similar  manner,  as  indicated 
above  in  section  3.4.1  on  human  nature. 
An  ethics  of  use  is  particularly  suited  to  issues  relating  to  human  dealings  with 
domesticated  animals,  where  'abuse'  can  take  on  the  more  visible  and  readily  identified 
form  of  suffering.  It  is  within  this  category  of  human  relations  with  animals  that  sympathy 
is  strongest,  and  where  we  may  expect  greatest  political  agreement  for  altering  these 
relations.  This  is because  we  can  sympathise  with  other  social  animals,  their  pain  and 
suffering  in  a  way  which  is  not  possible  with  other  animals  and  the  vegetable  world. 
Another  important  factor  in  the  extension  of  sympathy  to  domesticated  animals  is  the 
(relative)  publicness  or  visibility  of  our  treatment  of  them.  Although  the  majority  of 
people  do  not  have  day-to-day  contact  with  domesticated  animals  (except  of  course  as 
ready-wrapped  meat,  milk  or  leather  products),  there  is  some,  although  incomplete, 
awareness  concerning  the  relationship.  And  as  the  last  two  decades  of  animal  welfare 95 
activism  demonstrates,  the  more  people  know  about  'food'  animals  and  how  they  are 
treated,  the  greater  the  sympathy  with  them,  often  independent  of  moral  arguments. 
A  good  example  of  the  application  of  an  ethics  of  use  is  the  practice  of  factory  farming 
The  latter  reduces  animals  to  the  status  of  pure  resources  and  denies  them  any  opportunity 
to  express  their  social,  i.  e.  'natural'  character.  It  can  be,  and  increasingly  is,  judged  as 
morally  wrong.  As  Benton  argues,  "This  form  of  'humanism'  [factory  farming] 
conceptualizes  the  needs  of  animals  as  instinctual  and  fixed  in  a  way  which  simply  leaves 
no  room  for  morally  significant  differences  to  emerge  between  existence  and  thriving  or 
living  well"  (1993:  59).  There  are  alternatives  available  that  would  permit  meat  eating  to 
continue  but  under  more  'humane'  production  conditions.  As  indicated  in  the  last  chapter 
(2.7.2),  animal  rearing  viewed  as  a  social  practice  which  contributes  to  stewardship, 
represents  a  forms  of  human  productive  relation  with  nonhumans  which  is  less  'abusive' 
than  factory  farming.  From  an  ethics  of  use  position,  the  suffering  inflicted  upon  such 
animals  cannot  be  justified  simply  by  appealing  to  the  higher  economic  costs  associated 
with  alternative  husbandry  methods.  The  human  interest  in  food,  and  indeed,  meat  as 
food,  can  be  satisfied  in  other,  more  humane  ways.  In  other  words,  the  suffering  of  these 
creatures  is  unnecessary.  Factory-farming  as  a  particular  form  of  productive  relation 
between  humans  and  animals  is  abusive,  and  their  suffering  unjustified.  25  In  the  case  of 
T4ýto  human  interests  in  profit  fac1gry  farminglLe  pp  -making  or  having  cheaper  meat  is 
insufficient  For  Benson  the  case  against  factory-farming  is  that,  "the  wholesale  torture  of 
animals  that  goes  on  in  the  name  of  nothing  that  could  be  regarded  as  a  serious  human 
purpose"  (1978:  530).  26  Thus  in  some  circumstances  human  preferences  (and  perhaps  in 
25  The  same  external  pressure  which  transformed  the  social  practice  of  farming  qua  stewardship  (outlined 
in  the  last  chapter)  into  another  business  also  accounts  for  the  transformation  of  animal  husbandry  into 
factory-farming.  Both  can  be  said  to  be  the  victims  of  the  application  of  industrial-economic  criteria  to 
agricultural-economic  practices. 
26  Because  the  abolition  of  factory-farming  will  have  distributive  cffccts,  in  terms  of  higher  prices  for 
meat  for  those  now  no  longer  able  to  afford  it,  a  complete  account  of  the  political  implications  of  an  ethics 
of  use  needs  to  be  supplemented  with  a  theory  of  distributive  justice. 96 
more  limited  set  of  situations.,  interests)  ought  to  be  accorded  less  weight,  such  that  the 
welfare  of  nonhumans  may  be  considered  to  be  of  more  pressing-moral-imp2rtanýeI7 
Morality  and  moral  reasoning  have  to  do  with  something  serious  (Foot,  1978;  Midgley, 
1983a,  1983b).  It  is  this  quality  of  'seriousness'  in  relation  to  human  interests  that  is 
crucial  in  the  reordering  of  human  priorities  that  moral  extensionism  entails.  Some 
reasons  for  using  nature  in  particular  ways  simply  do  not  carry  as  much  weight  as  others. 
Uses  of  nature  which  involve  its  material  consumption,  that  are  not  for  serious  reasons 
deserve  to  be  morally  condemned.  Thus  in  regard  to  the  factory-fanning  example  above, 
what  makes  it  morally  wrong  is  not  that  it  is  justified  in  terms  of  human  reasons,  as  the 
deep  ecologist  and  non-anthropocentrist  hold.  Rather  it  is  wrong  because  the  particular 
set  of  circumstances  surrounding  its  operation  render  its  justification  on  economic 
considerations  less  deserving  to  count  as  a  serious  human  interest.  28  There  are  alternative 
ways  in  which  such  preferences  may  be  fulfilled,  and  although  it  is  possible  that  some 
preferences  will  not  be  satisfied,  it  is  not  the  case  that  abolishing  this  particular  practice 
would  result  in  great  harm  to  central  human  interests  such  as  political  liberty,  social 
justice,  need-fulfilment  above  subsistence,  or  the  minimisation  of  human  suffering. 
Thus  an  ethics  of  use  indicates  another  important  division  pertaining  to  an  additional 
set  of  limiting  conditions  on  the  operation  of  any  green  framework  or  process  regulating 
our  dealings  with  nature.  This  is  the  division  between  possible  effects  of  policies  and 
altered  practices  issuing  from  this  green  process  on  human  welfare  on  the  one  hand  and 
considerations  relating  to  human  liberty  on  the  other.  This  is  discussed  later  in  chapter  6 
(section  6.6).  Without  going  too  deeply  into  the  issue,  what  I  wish  to  signal  here  is  that 
environmental 
those  which  compromise  human  liberty.  This  distinction  is  useful  because  it  not  only 
27  This  does  not  mean  nonhumans  gain  rights.  It  is  more  accurate  to  say  that  humans  acquire  obligations 
to  treat  them  in  certain  ways,  including  of  course,  the  possible  obligation  not  to  use  them. 
28  The  question  we  must  ask  is  whether  or  not  deep  ecology  associates  green  politics  with  a  view  of  the 
good  that  unnecessarily  constrains  it  in  terms  of  the  balance  between  the  right  and  the  good  in  its  political 
principles.  Is  the  deep  ecology  vision  simply  too  tightly  tied  to  particular  social  practices  that  it  limits  the 
range  of  positions,  lifestyles,  uses  of  nature  that  can  be  described  as  'green'?  How  tolerant  in  other  words 
would  a  green  politics  premised  on  the  deep  view  of  the  'good  life'  be  of  other  views  of  the  good?  Just  as 
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reinforces  that  there  are  different  spheres  of  ethical  inquiry  (human-only  and  human- 
nature)  but  suggests  some  (admittedly  inexact)  'rules  of  engagement'  in  the  case  of 
conflict  between  the  two  spheres.  Thus  social-environmental  relations  concern  the  trade- 
off  between  human  and  nonhuman  welfare  alone.  29  Rawls'  priority  rule  which  ranks  the 
principle  of  equal  liberty  lexically  higher  than  the  difference  principle  is  one  obvious 
example  of  this  priority  rule  (1972:  302-303).  What  this  means  is  that  environmental 
policies  which  threaten  central  human  liberties,  such  as  the  right  to  elect  and  influence 
government,  or  formative  elements  of  human  identity,  for  example  need-fulfilment  beyond 
subsistence,  are  deemed  illegitimate  and  prohibited  in  any  but  the  most  pressing  of 
circurnstances.  30  In  this  manner  green  politics  accepts  that  trade-offs  in  any  conflict 
between  the  two  ethical  spheres  are  limited  to  possible  sacrifices  in  human  economic 
welfare  and.  what  Norton  calls  'consumptive  values'  (1984:  135).  This  priority  rule  is 
widely  endorsed  even  within  non-anthropocentric  positions  when  it  comes  down  to 
questions  of  implementation  and  actual  policy  proposals.  Unfortunately,  as  this  rule  is 
usually  acknowledged  at  the  conclusion  rather  than  the  start  of  most  environmental  ethical 
deliberation,  its  importance  goes  largely  unnoticed.  In  the  terms  outlined  above,  in  the 
case  of  these  sets  of  human  interests  the  question  is  how  nature  is  used  rather  than  whether 
it  is  used  at  all.  On  the  other  hand  an  ethics  of  use  attempts  to  delineate  the  ethical 
threshold  beyond  which  the  human  use  of  nature  becomes  abuse.  31  In  other  words,  the 
fulfilment  of  human  liberty  and  welfare  interests  is  compatible  with  ecologically  sensitive 
29  Later,  in  chapter  7,  this  argument  is  developed  into  a  defence  of  the  non-contingcnt  place  of  democracy 
within  green  politics,  premised  on  grounding  democracy  on  'liberty'  interests  as  opposed  to  'welfare' 
interests  (7.2). 
30  In  this  way  the  'eco-authoritarian'  solution  to  the  'ecological  crisis'  is  ruled  out  as  a  reasonable 
conception  of  green  politics  since  it  requires  the  sacrifice  of  democratic  practices,  the  severe  curbing  of 
fi=dom,  and  the  acceptance  of  an  authoritarian  regime.  This  is  discussed  at  greater  length  in  chapter  7 
(7.2). 
31  Lee  encapsulates  the  central  issue  in  asldng,  "moral  philosophers  surely  would  not  regard  abstinence 
from  over-consumption  as  a  supererogatory  matter.  Or  would  they  ?"  (1989:  22).  In  a  similar  vein  it  is 
no  injustice  to  be  denied  that  to  which  one  has  no  right.  This  similarity  may  explain  why  some  greens 
wish  to  extend  considerations  of  distributive  justice  to  human-nature  affairs,  a  feature  most  prominent  in 
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use  as  well  as  principled  non-use.  The  point  of  the  ethics  of  use  is  to  find  symbiotic  rather 
than  parasitic  social-enviromnental  relations. 
It  is  in  the  distinction  between  serious  and  not-so-serious  human  interests  that  we  can 
find  the  essence  of  the  normative  green  critique  of  undifferentiated  economic  growth.  it  is 
the  assumption  that  human  preferences  for  'trivial'  comforts  or  minor  additions  to  welfare 
are  good  enough  reasons  for  the  suffering  and  destruction  of  the  natural  world  and  its 
living  entities  that  is  the  real  target,  not  that  they  ought  to  be  criticised  for  being  human 
preferences.  It  is  the  moral  quality  of  the  reasons  given  rather  than  the  source  that 
underpins  the  critique.  This  is  what  is  meant  by  the  claim  that  although  humans  are  the 
only  measurers  of  value  in  the  world,  this  does  not  mean  that  they  are  the  only  measure  of 
value.  Further  investigation  of  the  green  critique  reveals  that  it  is  not  only  deeply  critical 
of  undifferentiated  economic  growth  but  perhaps  more  radically  it  is  suspicious  of  the 
uncritical  primacy  accorded  to  economic  reasoning  in  articulating  human  interests  in  the 
nonhuman  world.  32  And  the  main  reason  for  this,  I  suggest,  is  that  economic  reasoning,  in 
its  attempt  to  be  'value-free',  simply  takes  preferences  as  'given',  exogenous  variables 
outside  economic  analysis  and  therefore  beyond  critical  reflection  and  moral  judgement. 
This  is  dealt  with  in  more  detail  in  chapter  7  (7.6  &  7.8) 
3.6  Ethics  of  Use  and  Ecological  Virtue 
Having  derived  a  more  focused  ethic  of  use  from  a  naturalistic  perspective,  we  finally 
come  to  looking  at  how  this  ethic  of  use  relates  to  green  politics.  In  this  section  the  idea 
of  'ecological  virtue'  (indicated  in  the  last  chapter  section  2.7),  captures  the  general  thrust 
of  the  part  such  an  ethic  can  play  within  green  political  theory  and  practice.  Unlike 
environmental  ethicists  like  Westra  (1989)  who  argue  for  a  'new  ethic'  sufficiently  broad- 
ranging  to  include  intrahuman  as  well  as  human-nature  relations,  an  ethic  of  use  for  the 
32  Williams  suggests  that  there  may  be  values  expressed  in  human-nature  relations  constitutive  of  a 
worthwhile  life  but  that,  "It  may  well  be  that  our  ways  of  honouring  such  values  cannot  take  an  economic 
form"  (1992:  68).  For  further  discussion  of  the  green  critique  of  economic  reasoning,  with  special 
attention  to  cost-bcnefit  analysis,  see  O'Neill  (1993). 99 
environment  maintains  that  there  is  a  fundamental  distinction  between  these  two  sets  of 
relations  and  spheres  of  moral  life.  Her  position  (which  typifies  much  of  American 
environmental  ethics)  is  that,  "the  main  thrust  of  any  ecological  ethic  is  that  it  refuses  to 
accept  different  sets  of  values,  one  for  an  isolated  community  of  human  beings  and  another 
ranging  only  in  the  wilds  ...  we  can  have  one  extremely  broad  ethic"  (1989:  224;  emphasis 
in  original).  Quite  apart  from  what  she  means  by  an  ethic  which  ranges  in  the  wilds,  which 
seems  to  suggest  that  relations  between  nonhumans  are  ethical,  this  section  seeks  to 
develop  further  the  argument  that  the  search  for  one  ecological  ethic  is  both  theoretically 
impossible  to  sustain  and  unnecessary  for  green  political  prescriptions. 
As  set  out  below,  separating  out  moral  concern  into  intrahuman  and  human-nature 
spheres  is  a  necessary  precondition  for  establishing  the  normative  claims  of  green  politics. 
This  separation  is  not  a  simplistic  and  regressive  rephrasing  of  the  human/nature  duality, 
but  represents  part  of  a  wider  process  to  transcend  that  duality.  Green  politics  in  basing 
itself  upon  a  view  of  morality  in  which  virtues  are  central,  seeks  to  create  what  may  be 
called  'symbiotic'  rather  than  'parasitic'  social-environmental  relations:  the  cultivation  of  a 
particular  human  mode  of  interaction  with  the  environment.  The  border  between 
symbiotic  and  parasitic  relations  denotes  the  ethical  border  between  use  and  abuse.  33 
Certain  dispositions  of  character,  and  their  social  requirements,  are  held  to  be  constitutive 
aspects  of  human-nature  relations.  Some  of  these  virtues  are  peculiar  to  this  domain  of 
moral  life,  but  some,  perhaps  the  most  important,  such  as  sympathy  or  humanity,  range 
over  all  aspects  of  morality. 
The  point  about  the  virtues  is  that  they  are  both  partly  constitutive  of  human  well- 
being,  while  also  being  instrumentally  valuable  to  human  well-being.  The  claim  that  the 
practice  of  ecological  virtues  are  constitutive  of  well-being  helps  to  offset  the  notion  that 
green  politics  necessitates  sacrificing  human  welfare,  a  common  view  premised  on  the  idea 
33  'Symbiosis'  and  'parasitism'  convey  the  general  moral  nature  of  social-environmental  relations,  while 
SuStainability  and  unsustainability  convey  the  productive  relations  between  society  and  environment. 
There  is  no  assumed  'mapping'  of  these  two  sets  of  criteria  such  that  morally  symbiotic  social- 
environmental  relations  are  also  sustainable  and  vice  versa.  It  is  perfectly  possible  for  a  society  to  be 
morally  parasitic  and  ecologically  sustainable.  These  issues  are  further  discussed  in  chapter  5  (5.3). 100 
that  the  relationship  between  humans  and  nature  is  necessarily  a  zero-sum  game.  This 
leads  to  parasitic  forms  of  social-environmental  relations.  Green  politics  in  the  search  for 
symbiotic  relations,  can  take  inspiration  from  the  deep  ecology  notion  that  while  human 
flourishing  is  compatible  with  decreasing  human  impact  on  the  world,  the  flourishing  of 
the  natural  world  requires  such  a  decrease. 
A  related  issue  concerns  the  common  misperception  regarding  an  apparent  conflict  of 
obligations  between  those  in  the  human-nature  ethical  sphere  and  those  in  the  human 
sphere.  The  usual  way  in  which  this  is  presented  is  that  a  moral  concern  for  nonhumans, 
particularly  animals,  means  that  there  is  less  concern,  compassion,  or  sympathy  'left  over' 
for  humans.  However,  a  virtue  ethics  perspective  can  easily  demonstrate  the 
wrongheadedness  of  this  assumption.  The  practice  of  ecological  virtue  does  not  decrease 
compassion  and  concern  for  humans  but  rather  the  opposite.  As  Midgley  points  out, 
"concern,  like  other  feelings 
... 
is  something  that  grows  and  develops  by  being  deployed, 
like  our  muscles,  not  a  sort  of  small  oil  well  that  will  run  out  shortly  if  it  is  used  at  all" 
(1992:  35).  It  is  also  the  case  that  'serious'  human  interests  are  non-tradable.  Therefore 
the  trade-off  between  humans  and  nonhumans  within  social-environmental  relations 
governed  by  an  ethics  of  use,  is  limited  to  (some)  human  welfare  interests  and  not  human 
'liberty'  interests. 
3.6.1  Citizens,  Consumers  and  Ecological  Virtue 
The  political  interpretation  of  the  ethics  of  use  turns  partly  on  a  shift  within  the  'human' 
part  of  the  human-nature  relation.  Green  politics,  if  it  is  to  have  any  purchase  on  the  real 
world,  any  input  into  aiding  the  complex  process  of  how  real  environmental  problems  are 
to  be  resolved,  must  take  as  its  subject  matter  the  actual,  tangible  relations  and  practices 
between  particular  humans  and  particular  environments.  Naturalism  indicates  the  general 
background  and  limiting  conditions  of  social-environment  relations,  while  an  ethics  of  use 
indicates  that  a  'citizen-environment'  perspective  is  the  most  appropriate  standpoint  from 
which  to  judge  politically  the  normative  standing  of  the  nonhuman  world. 101 
This  perspective  introduces  what  can  be  called  a  'green  conception  of  citizenship', 
dealt  with  in  more  detail  in  chapter  7  where  it  is  presented  as  a  key  issue  in  the  relationship 
between  green  politics,  democracy  and  the  state.  For  the  moment,  all  I  wish  to  register 
here  is  that  from  the  ethical  standpoint  the  practice  of  the  'ecological  virtues'  is 
constitutive  of  this  green  conception  of  citizenship.  The  importance  of  this  conception  is 
that  the  practice  of  green  citizenship  can  be  regarded  as  the  process  by  which  individual 
preferences  may  be  transformed  not  just  as  a  result  of  reflection,  justification  and  debate, 
but  also  because  the  virtues  educate  and  refine  preferences.  This  is  one  way  of  expressing 
Norton's  shift  from  'felt'  to  'considered'  preferences  mentioned  in  3.5.1. 
In  part  this  process  has  to  do  with  the  idea  that  individuals  as  consumers  have  interests 
which  are  different  to  those  they  have  (or  potentially  have)  as  citizens,  and  that  on  the 
whole,  'ecological  interests'  are  not  well  served  by  the  former.  34  Ecological  interests  here 
encompass  both  the  interests  of  the  nonhuman  world,  and  human  interests  in  that  world. 
As  noted  above,  economic  considerations  and  reasoning  if  left  to  itse#',  in  simply  taking 
preferences  as  given  and  beyond  evaluation,  is  more  likely  to  result  in  practices  which  will 
unnecessarily  affect  non-human  interests.  At  the  same  time  if  economic  preferences  are 
the  sole  or  primary  way  in  which  human  interest  in  the  environment  is  expressed,  non- 
economic  ecological  interests  are  less  likely  to  be  articulated.  In  other  words,  qua 
consumers,  individuals  have  a  narrower  set  of  ecological  interests  than  would  be  the  case 
qua  citizens  since,  as  citizens,  preferences  are  only  provisionally  'given',  are  not  immune 
from  critical  debate  and  discussion  and  are  capable  of  being  transformed.  Simply  put,  as 
consumers  people  have  a  more  limited  range  of  interests  in  the  environment  than  as 
citizens.  35  In  part,  'citizens'  and  'consumers'  are  used  as  shorthand  for  distinguishing 
34  This  discrimination  between  consumer  and  citizen  is  common  in  green  politics,  and  attention  to  the 
relationship  and  possible  reconciliation  between  them  has  increasingly  occupied  centre-stage  in  debates. 
The  most  obvious  example  of  this  is  the  'sustainable  development'  debate  which,  at  root,  can  be  seen  as  an 
attempt  to  reconcile  the  interests  of  consumers  in  economic  growth,  with  their  interests  as  concerned 
Ggrecn  citizens'  in  ecological  sustainability.  Sustainable  development  is  thus,  in  part,  a  deeply  normative 
issue  in  which  culturally,  that  is  locally  defined,  values  and  relationships,  economic  on  the  one  hand  and 
normative-cnvironmcntal  on  the  other,  can,  in  principle,  be  reconciled.  See  Sagoff  (1988),  Brennan 
(1992)  and  Keat  (1994). 
35  A  deeper  understanding  of  this  citizen/consumer  distinction  can  be  found  in  ArcndL  Anticipating 
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market  and  political  approaches  to  environmental  problems.  Aggregative  approaches  to 
social-environmental  problems  often  fail  to  register  the  'public  goods'  dimension  of  the 
environment.  That  is,  one  cannot  ascertain  the  value  of  the  environment  as  public  good 
simply  by  aggregating  private  valuations,  since  these  valuations  will  be  dependent  upon 
other  people's  valuations  and  the  mechanism  through  which  the  public  good  is delivered. 
Consumer  approaches  to  environmental  issues  also  fail  to  correctly  register  the  ethical 
dimension  of  social-environmental  issues. 
. 
The  consumer  mode  of  acting,  the  consumer 
character,  is  inappropriate  to  articulate,  never  mind  integrate,  the  range  of  human  interests 
in  the  nonhuman  world.  The  appropriate  idiom,  according  to  Jacobs  is  one  in  which  "what 
is  done  to  it  [the  environment]  can  be  discussed  in  terms,  not  simply  of  costs  and  benefits 
(whether  private  or  public),  but  of  right  and  wrong"  (1996:  1).  36  Part  of  this  relates  to  the 
fact  that  within  modem  society,  new  forms  of  social-environmental  relations  as  a  result  of 
technological  improvement,  have  outstripped  our  moral  capacity  to  deal  with  them.  In 
this  sense  green  politics  seeks  to  point  out  that  this  power  needs  to  be  balanced  and 
regulated  by  a  collective  sense  of  moral  responsibility.  That  consumer-centred,  or  market- 
based  approaches  to  social-environmental  problems  restrict  the  range  of  operand  human 
interests  and  indeed  reduce  interests  to  preferences,  is  a  fairly  standard  critique  within  the 
literature  (O'Neill,  1993;  Jacobs,  1994,1996;  Norton,  1994;  Dryzek,  1987,1996)?  7 
The  articulation  and  creation  of  expanded  interests  is  tied  up  with  the  collective 
political  deliberation  on  the  'ecological  common  good'.  And  there  is  no  reason  why  this 
common  good,  a  central  concern  of  'classical"  views  of  citizenship,  should  be  narrowly 
restricte  to  te  uman  good.  t  is  an  openness,  and  a  willingness,  to  search  for  ways  in 
which  human  interests  can  be  fulfilled  with  minimum  hann  to  the  interests  of  the 
within  a  consumer-driven  economy,  "harbours  the  grave  danger  that  eventually  no  object  of  the  world  will 
be  safe  from  consumption  and  annihilation  through  consumption7  (1959:  115).  Here  citizenship,  while 
obviously  premised  on  human  consumption,  sets  parameters  on  the  latter  in  the  interests  of  rcalising  the 
ideals  of  the  vita  activa,  or  human  action. 
36  This  is  related  to  the  discussion  in  7.8  where,  within  the  context  of  the  issue  of  endogenous  preferences, 
the  choice  of  policy  instrument  used  by  government  (market-based  or  legal)  affects  preferences  and  how 
individuals  regard  the  environmental  problem  (i.  e.  as  a  consumer  or  as  a  citizen,  in  terms  of  costs  and 
benefits  or  in  terms  of  right  or  wrong). 
37  This  debate  between  'consumer'  and  'citizen'  as  modcs  of  action  is  dealt  with  in  more  detail  in  chapters 
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nonhuman  world  that  is  one  of  the  traits  of  green  citizenship.  38  This  is  discussed  later  in 
chapter  7  (7.8). 
The  importance  of  adopting  a  citizen  as  opposed  to  a  consumer  perspective,  from  the 
point  of  view  of  green  politics,  is  that  a  moralisation  of  human-nature  relations  is  directly 
related  to  their  politicisation.  It  may  well  be  that  there  will  never  be  consensus  on  the 
philosophical  basis  of  our  moral  dealings  with  nature.  From  a  political  point  of  view 
pitching  one's  argument  at  this  philosophical  level  is  neither  necessary  nor  helpful,  since  it 
sets  green  politics  an  unrealistic  task  to  achieve,  as  argued  in  the  last  chapter.  As  a 
political  theory  seeking  to  persuade  others  of  the  normative  rightness  of  adopting 
symbiotic  (as  well  as  sustainable)  forms  of  social-environmental  relations,  green  politics 
does  not  need  to  insist  on  convincing  people  of  the  intrinsic  value  or  rights  of  nature. 
Rather  there  are  a  variety  of  ways  in  which  we  can  explore  the  moral  dimensions  of  our 
dealings  with  nature  and  the  search  for  one,  overarching  'environmental  ethic',  is 
unhelpful  to  green  politics.  The  issue  of  the  moral  status  of  collective  relations  to  the 
environment  cannot  be  resolved  at  a  philosophical  level,  it  can  only  be  resolved  politically. 
3.6.2  Ecological  Virtues  and  Moral  Character 
The  majority  of  the  ecological  virtues  concern  avoiding  ecological  vices.  Such  vices 
include  familiar  ones  like  inflicting  unnecessary  harm  or  suffering  to  animals,  particularly 
domesticated  animals,,  39  and  wanton  and  irreversible  destruction  of  other  parts  of  nature 
such  as  ecosystems.  Ecologic  virtues  are  thus  aimed  at  encouraging  that  the  human  use 
of  nature  stays  within  morally  justifiable  Emits  and  does  not  become  morally  unjustifiable 
abuse.  The  cultivation  of  the  ecological  virtues,  the  creation  of  'ecological  character', 
and  dispositions,  helps  create  and  maintain  a  proper  balance  within  social-environmental 
38  This  'vffllingness'  to  experiment  is  itself  a  virtue  of  the  mode  of  behaviour  green  politics  seeks  to 
cultivate,  it  is  also  related  to  the  vibrancy  of  a  democratic  society  (7.4). 
39  As  Williams  points  out,  "A  concern  for  nonhuman  animals  is  indeed  a  proper  part  of  human  life,  but 
we  can  acquire  it,  cultivate  it,  and  teach  it  only  in  terms  of  our  understanding  of  ourscIvcr  (1985:  118). 
In  terms  of  the  present  discussion,  ecological  virtue  cannot  be  derived  independently  of  the  naturalistic 
ethical  outlooL 104 
relations.  The  emphasis  on  character  is  to  cultivate  dispositions  and  modes  of  action 
which  will  discourage  acting  from  'wantonness'  or  ignorance. 
This  discriminating  aspect  of  the  ecological  virtues  picks  up  that  stream  of 
environmental  ethical  theory  which  emphasises  the  relation  between  ecological  science  and 
environmental  ethics  (see  Callicott  (1992),  Rolston  (1982,1988)  and  Norton  (1984,1987, 
1991)).  Although  the  attempt  to  'read  ofr  how  we  should  treat  nature  from  ecological 
observations  has  largely  been  acknowledged  as  fundamentally  flawed,  the  ways  in  which 
ecological  science  and  environmental  ethics  have  been  connected  leave  much  to  be 
desired.  Ecological  virtue  suggests  a  possible  way  of  reconciling  this  issue  by  making  the 
virtues  appropriate  to  human-nature  exchanges  a  matter  of  moral  character.  Thus, 
following  the  traditional  approach,  we  can  say  that  the  ecological  virtues  are  a 
combination  of  'inteflectual'  and  moral  virtues  which  together  combine  to  foster  character. 
Both  contribute  to  the  cultivation  and  development  of  moral  character.  Green  moral 
theory  then  becomes  a  theory  of  'ecological  character',  a  particular  mode  of  behaviour,  a 
way  of  knowing,  feeling  and  acting.  For  example,  we  would  expect  an  ecologically 
virtuous  individual  to  be  sympathetic,  as  opposed  to  sentimental,  towards  the  nonhuman 
world,  and  to  act  from  knowledge  and  experience  rather  than  ignorance. 
This  division  of  the  ecological  virtues  pertaining  to  moral  character  along  traditional 
lines  reinforces  the  central  moral  importance  of  adopting  a  discriminating  attitude  to  the 
natural  world.  Depending  on  which  part  of  that  world  is  under  consideration,  either  and  in 
some  cases  both  sets  of  virtue  will  be  called  for.  For  example,  it  is  perhaps  with  those 
nonhuman  animals  closest  to  us,  both  in  terms  of  familiarity  and/or  proximity,  and 
especially  in  their  social  nature,  that  the  virtues  of  character  will  be  strongest,  as  indicated 
earlier.  In  these  cases,  'reason'  or  moral  reasoning  does  not  need  to  infonn  us  that  such 
creatures  and  their  suffering  are  proper  objects  of  our  sympathy.  It  is  simply  the  case  that 
with  such  animals  as  domesticated  cats,  dogs,  cattle,  horses  and  non-domesticated  animals 
such  as  apes,  dolphins,  whales  and  elephants,  their  social  nature  makes  their  lives 
intelligible,  however  dimly,  to  us  and  their  sufferings  more  recognisable,  such  that  it  is 
usually  quite  easy  to  sympathise  with  them.  Such  extended  empathy  becomes 105 
progressively  more  difficult  to  sustain,  as  we  move  to  other  living  creatures  such  as  slugs, 
insects,  or  rats,  to  plants  and  finally  to  the  inanimate  world  of  rivers,  seas,  mountains, 
rocks,  ecosystems  and  bioregions.  Although  not  discounting  the  possibility  of  empathy 
with  the  inanimate  world,  for  example,  there  are  those  who  attempt  to  follow  Leopold's 
advice  and  'think  like  a  mountain'  (Seed  el  al,  1988),  it  is  more  likely  that  as  we  move 
through  the  various  categories  of  nature  the  virtues  that  inform  appropriate  treatment  will 
emphasise  those  pertaining  to  the  intellect.  A  lack  of  sympathy  with  the  inanimate  world 
is  not  an  insuperable  obstacle  in  terms  of  cultivating  a  proper  Toward_sF7If-ihay-- 
not  be  felt  as  intensely  as  moral  sentiments  in  respect  to  fellow  social  mammals,  but 
ecological  science  as  a  component  of  intellectual  ecological  virtue  can  extend  our  moral 
interests  (if  not  our  sympathy)  beyond  the  animal  boundary.  Science  can  thus  inform  us  of 
new  and  proper  objects  of  moral  sympathy  and  concern  and  thus  of  new  moral 
relationships  with  wider  and  more  distant  parts  of  the  natural  world.  For  example, 
ecological  science  can  inform  us  that  what  on  first  sight  looks  like  a  'barren'  wasteland  is 
in  fact  a  rich  and  thriving  ecosystem.  Indeed,  to  see  it  as  'barren'  is  to  look  at  it  purely 
from  a  particularly  narrow  perspective.  Scientific  knowledge  can  thus  expand  and  refine 
our  perspective  and,  perhaps,  our  interests  in  the  world.  That  is,  scientific  knowledge  can 
be  a  corrective  (a  virtue)  to  the  vice  of  seeing  nature  from  an  unduly  narrow  and 
uninformed  viewpoint. 
One  example  of  ecological  vice  can  be  found  in  the  increasing  gap  between  human 
transformative  relations  with  the  environment  and  the  consumption  of  the  goods  and 
services  created  by  those  relations.  It  seems  that  the  greater  the  gap  between  production 
and  consumption  the  greater  is  the  likelihood  of  parasitic  rather  than  symbiotic  productive 
relations.  Such  a  view  is  consistent  with  the  'corruption'  of  social-environmental 
practices,  such  as  farming,  and  animal  husbandry,  as  a  result  of  the  imposition  of  external 
institutional  norms,  as  a  result  of  the  transformation  of  farn-fing  into  a  business.  Once  this 
occurs  the  internal  norms  and  excellences  which  regulated  the  treatment  of  their 
nonhuman  subjects,  are  no  longer  operable.  Equally,  these  parasitic  i.  e.  abusive,  forms  of 
productive  relations  arise  and  continue  partly  because  consumers  are  largely  unaware  of 106 
them,  and  their  lack  of  direct  experience  or  awareness  of  animals  within  these  productive 
relations  limits  their  sympathies  and  thus  their  moral  concern.  At  the  same  time 
unsustainable  forms  of  productive  relations  come  about  partly  because  of  the  physical 
distance  between  the  site  of  production  and  consumption.  This  latter  point  is  developed  in 
more  detail  in  chapter  6  (6.6).  An  important  aspect  therefore  of  ecological  moral 
character  refers  to  attempting  as  far  as  possible  to  bridge  this  gap,  both  materially  (in 
terms  of  'prosuming'  and  self-reliance  as  discussed  in  6.6),  and  morally  (by  extending 
moral  sympathy  and  humane  treatment  to  nonhumans  involved  in  these  productive 
relations). 
3.7  Conclusion 
The  position  outlined  in  this  chapter  not  only  presents  an  alternative  green  ethical  theory 
from  those  advanced  by  non-anthropocentrists,  but  also  an  alternative  understanding  of 
morality  and  the  moral  life  to  that  found  in  non-anthropocentrism.  The  main  features  of 
this  alternative  view  is  that  morality  has  to  do  with  action  and  experience,  relates  to 
character,  and  is  divided  into  two  broad  spheres,  one  pertaining  to  humans  only  and  the 
other  to  human-nonhuman  relations.  This  relational  view  of  morality  is  indispensable  to 
the  development  of  a  feasible  green  moral  theory  concerning  human-nature  affairs.  Unlike 
a  proprietarian  view  it  begins  from  where  we  are  now,  and  through  an  immanent  critique 
and  engagement  with  humanism  seeks  to  develop  a  more  reflexive,  less  arrogant  form. 
Thus  the  ethical  dimension  of  green  politics  can  be  viewed  as  a  form  of  'moral 
extensionism'  (3.3),  characterised  as  (a)  weakly  or  reflexively  anthropocentric  (b) 
naturalistic,  (c)  premised  on  an  understanding  of  morality  which  sees  it  in  relational  terms, 
(d)  turns  on  the  importance  of  human  and  nonhuman  interests,  (e)  does  not  seek  'one  new 
ethic'  to  cover  all  spheres  of  human  action,  and  (0  stresses  the  cultivation  of  moral 
character  as  the  best  way  in  which  to  integrate  this  reflexive  anthropocentrism. 
The  relational  view  suggests  that  morality  is  to  be  understood  as  a  practice  rather  than 
a  catalogue  of  principles.  In  a  sense  there  can  never  be  a  complete  rendering  of  the 107 
'ethical'.  Following  Aristotle,  we  can  say  it  cannot  be  completely  systematised  (Clark, 
1982).  Principles  cannot  therefore  'map  out'  the  ethical  realm  in  full:  it  is  something  to  be 
created  in  and  through  experience,  rather  than  discovered.  However,  this  is  not  to  say  that 
morality  is  created  ab  Whilo,  or  that  it  can  be  about  anything.  From  the  naturalistic  point 
of  view  (3.4),  our  status  as  a  particular  species  standing  in  certain  relations  to  each  other, 
not  shared  with  nonhumans,  is  constitutive  of  what  morality  is  about.  Of  particular 
significance  is  the  naturalistic  claim  that  humans  do  care  about  future  generations.  This 
future-orientated  concern  can  be  seen  as  a  central  part  of  responsible  stewardship.  The 
strength  of  the  naturalistic  perspective  may  be  said  to  he  not  so  much  in  the  ability  to 
provide  definite  answers  to  moral  predicaments  between  the  human  and  the  nonhuman 
worlds.  Rather  it  provides  the  appropriate  'moral  grammar'  in  which  to  articulate  those 
questions. 
The  ethics  of  use  position  (3.5),  stresses  what  one  may  call  the  'ecological 
management'  concern  of  green  politics.  The  normative  commitment  of  green  politics  in 
terms  of  human-nature  relations  can  be  understood  as  placing  individual  human  interaction 
with,  and  transformation  of,  the  environment  within  a  moral  context.  The  apparent 
overtones  of  hubris  and  arrogance  associated  with  the  idea  of  'ecological  management'  are 
just  that.  An  ethic  of  use  is  consistent  with  principled  non-interventionist  solutions  to 
human-nature  conflicts.  Thus,  it  can  realise  the  'hands-off  goal  of  deep  ecology,  as 
discussed  in  the  last  chapter.  Set  within  this  moral  context,  green  politics  is  concerned 
with  the  provision  of  informed,  ethically  appropriate,  and  flexible  social  'coping  strategies' 
in  relation  to  the  ever  shifting  horizons  of  the  relationship  between  the  human  and  the 
nonhuman  worlds.  Human  use  of  the  nonhuman  world,  to  mark  as  well  as  maintain 
human  life,  does  not  necessarily  lead  to  the  degradation  of  that  world,  and  that,  despite 
local  conflicts  of  interests,  in  the  round,  there  can  be  a  large  degree  of  harmony  between 
human  and  nonhuman  interests-40  The  point  of  ecological  virtue  and  the  cultivation  of  an 
4ID'Ms  is  similar  to  Hayward's  defence  of  'humanism'  understood  as  enlightened  self-interest  which  he 
claims  -amounts  to  an  assumption  of  an  underlying  rational  harmony  between  the  interests  of  human  and 
non-human  beings.  "  (1995:  63).  However,  as  indicated  in  chapter  5,  this  harmony  is  dynamic  not  static 
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ecological  moral  character  is  that  this  harmony  of  interests  ought  to  be.  However,  as 
suggested  in  3.4.1,  and  later  in  chapter  5  (5.6),  any  harmony  between  human  and 
nonhuman  interests,  must  be  congruent  with  the  fact  that  the  human  'ecological  niche'  is 
the  outcome  of  a  metabolic,  transformative  relation  between  culture  and  nature.  Thus 
any  harmony  between  the  human  and  the  nonhuman  worlds  is  'created'  not  'discovered',  a 
product  of  culture,  not  a  natural  process  of  nature.  The  character  traits  that  most  fit  with 
this  view  are  those  of  stewardship,  a  mode  of  transformative  interaction  with  the 
nonhuman  world  in  which  this  harmony  is  realised  However,  as  a  mode  of  interaction  it  is 
not  based  on  ignorance,  arrogance  or  'quietism'.  It  seeks  to  avoid  these  ecological  vices 
through  the  cultivation  of  ecological  virtues,  adaptive  dispositions  and  habits  which 
recognise  the  legitimacy  of  human  transformation  of  the  nonhuman  world,  but  encourages 
a  self-reflexive,  discriminating  attitude  as  regards  that  transformation.  Simply  because 
some  human  interest  is  fulfilled  is  a  necessary  but  not  a  sufficient  condition  to  justify  any 
use  or  transformation  of  the  nonhuman  world. 
Green  theory  is  premised  on  the  normative  rightness  of  transforming  morally  wrong  or 
unworthy  'parasitic'  social-environmental  practices  into  'symbiotic'  ones.  The  'ethic  of 
use')  complements  weak  anthropocentrism  by  acting  as  a  first  line  of  defence  for  nonhuman 
welfare  in  the  clash  between  human  and  nonhuman  interests.  Or  rather,  in  this  clash 
human  interests  are  reorganised  in  such  a  way  as  to  create  a  space  for  the  moral 
considerability  of  nonhumans  and  a  recognition  that  human  life  (including  the  'good  life'), 
does  not  require  the  insensitive  or  inhumane  treatment  of  those  with  whom  we  share  the 
planet.  As  Watson  avers,  "It  is  nice  that  human  "survival  is  compatible  with  the 
preservation  of  a  rich  planetary  ecology,  but  I  think  it  a  mistake  to  try  and  cover  up  the 
fact  that  human  survival  ae  ood  life  for  man  is  some  part  of  what  we  are  interested 
iif'(1983:  256).  This  is  precisely  the  point  of  the  ethics  of  use  position.  Itisnotagainst 
human  interests  to  acknowledge  moral  considerations  in  respect  to  our  dealings  with 
nature.  This  recognition  does  not  preclude  our  purposive  use  of  it.  In  terms  of  practical 
outcome,  there  is  an  increasing  convergence  between  human  interests  and  nonhuman 
welfare.  Policies  based  on  ecocentric  or  animal  rights  moral  arguments  often  lead  to 109 
similar  treatment  of  nonhumans  as  that  grounded  in  human  interests.  This  is  especially  so 
in  regard  to  future  human  generations,  where  we  can  say  that  our  continued  flourishing 
demands  the  type  of  habitat  and  ecosystem  protection  that  would  result  from  a  concern 
with  nonhuman  welfare. 
in  rejecting  the  notion  that  green  normative  arguments  must  be  understood  as  the 
proposition  of  a  "new  ethic',  and  insisting  that  the  spheres  of  human-nature  and 
intrahuman  action  must  be  kept  separate,  I  conclude  that  there  are  resources  within  the 
western  moral  tradition,  and  within  existing  western  culture,  that  greens  can  tap  into  and 
use.  Demands  for  a  'new  ethic'  because  the  existing  one  is  'speciesist'  are  misplaced. 
Conventional  moral  reasoning  can,  like  Achilles  lance,  heal  the  ecological  wounds  it  has 
inflicted.  According  to  Holland,  "opponents  of  speciesism  are  right  about  the  shabby 
treatment  of  other  animals  meted  out  by  humans,  and  also  about  the  need  for  a  radical  re- 
formation  of  human  attitudes.  But  I  am  not  convinced  that  speciesism  is  the  villain  of  the 
piece,  and  am  more  inclined  to  suspect  some  of  the  more  old-fashioned  vices  such  as 
cruelty,  lack  of  sensitivity  and  lack  of  understanding"  (1984:  291).  And  to  combat  these 
and  other  ever-present  ecological  vices  we  need  ecological  virtues.  In  the  end  then  what 
green  politics  comes  down  to  is  the  claim  that  the  normative  roots  of  our  ecological  crisis 
lie  in  the  rather  fan-filiar  moral  territory  of  greed,  short-sightedness,  intemperance  and 
ignorance.  As  Passmore  remarks,  'Vhat  it  [the  west]  needs,  for  the  most  part,  is  not  so 
much  a  'new  ethic'  as  a  more  general  adherence  to  a  perfectly  familiar  ethie'  (1980:  187). 
Aquinas  wisely  pointed  out  that  it  is  better  for  a  blind  horse  to  be  slow.  Likewise  it 
would  be  better  for  contemporary  society,  given  the  uncertainty  that  marks  our  dealings 
with  the  environment,  coupled  with  the  technological  capacity  to  alter  the  conditions  of 
life  on  earth  as  we  know  it,  to  moderate  its  demands  for  material  consumption  (ends),  and 
adopt  a  more  prudent  disposition  in  the  employment  of  its  means.  After  all,  we  do  not 
have  exclusive  ownership  of  the  earth  (as  argued  in  2.4.1),  but  share  it  with  other  species 
and  future  generations  of  humans,  and  while  we  transform  it  to  fulfil  our  interests,  we 
must  be  ever  wary  that  we  do  not  unjustiflably'harm  the  interests  of  other  species  or  those 
who  will  come  after  us.  The  earth  was  not  made  for  us,  but  neither  Wereye  made  for  the 110 
earth.  Finding  a  mean  between  these  extremes  of  'arrogant  humanism'  on  the  one  hand 
and  'ecological  quietism'  on  the  other,  is  I  hope  to  have  shown  in  this  and  the  previous 
chapter,  the  goal  of  green  politics  as  ecological  stewardship.  These  themes  will  be 
pursued  in  more  detail  in  chapters  6  and  7. 
Having  outlined  a  what  I  hope  is  a  defensible  anthropocentric  moral  basis  for  green 
politics,  the  chapters  4  to  7  seek  to  develop  a  conception  of  green  politics  consistent  with 
that  ethical  basis.  However,  before  moving  onto  outlining  this  alternative  conception,  the 
next  chapter  takes  a  critical  look  at  eco-anarchism,  which  in  many  ways  stands  to  green 
political  theory  in  much  the  same  status  as  deep  ecology  did  to  green  moral  theory. Chapter  Four 
A  Critique  of  Eco-Anarchism 
4.1  Introduction 
The  characterisation  of  green  politics  as  either  'anarchistic'  (Dobson,  1990:  834;  Freeden, 
1995:  16-18)  or  a  modem  form  of  anarchism  (Bookchin,  1992a)  has  wide  currency.  Both 
within  and  without  the  green  movement,  its  distinctiveness  is  held  to  reside  in  its 
embodiment  of  traditional  anarchist  values  expressed  within  a  contemporary  ecological 
political  idiom.  This  self-understanding  is  particularly  evident  in  the  almost  complete 
monopolisation  of  the  green  political  imagination  by  an  anarchist  vision  of  the  society 
greens  would  like  to  create.  The  many  pastoral  utopias  that  litter  green  political  literature, 
pay  eloquent  testimony  to  the  common  view  that,  "'greens  are  basically  libertarians-cum- 
anarchiste'  (Goodin,  1992:  152).  While  'soviets  plus  electrification'  equalled  socialism  for 
Lenin,  it  seems  that  for  many  green  theorists,  activists  and  commentators,  stateless,  self- 
governing  communities  plus  solar  power  equals  the  'sustainable  society'.  Although  'small 
is  beautiful',  beauty,  as  already  suggested  in  2.4,  is  often  in  the  eye  of  the  beholder.  And 
in  the  case  of  the  eco-anarchist  vision,  the  disproportionate  attention  given  to  describing 
the  future  society  blinds  greens  to  the  necessity  of  developing  a  critical  analysis  of  the 
present  situation,  and  of  paying  attention  to  the  problems  of  political  transformation,  that 
is,  getting  from  the  unecological  present  to  an  ecological  future.  The  aim  of  this  chapter  is 
not  to  banish  the  eco-anarchist  vision  from  the  green  pantheon,  but  rather  to  critically 
interrogate  it  with  a  view  to  integrating  its  insights  within  the  conception  of  green  political 
theory  being  developed  in  this  thesis.  ' 
Several  reasons  can  be  given  for  the  negative  attitude  of  greens  to  the  state.  First,  the 
strong  influence  of  anarchism  on  the  early  development  of  green  political  theory 
I  Ms  reconstructive-integrative'  approach  has  already  been  applied  in  chapter  2  in  reference  to  deep 
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underwrites  a  rejection  of  the  state  on  the  grounds  that  it  is  inextricably  bound  up  with  the 
ecological,  political,  social,  and  ethical  Problems  that  greens  are  concerned  with  solving. 
Thus  the  state's  continued  existence  simply  exacerbates  the  fundamental,  underlying  cause 
of  which  the  ecological  crisis  is  an  effect.  The  state  is  regarded  as  protecting  an 
'environmentally  hazardous  dynamic'  (Carter,  1993:  45-9),  or  the  embodiment  of 
"materialism,  institutionalized  violence,  centralization,  hierarchy", 
-  values  and  practices 
antithetical  to  the  green  perspective  (Porritt,  1984:  216-17).  2 
Second,  a  suspicion  of  approaches  that  give  a  prominent  place  to  formal  political  and 
legal  institutions  is  tied  up  with  the  authoritarian  nature  of  previous  green  defences  of  the 
state,  which  stand  at  odds  with  its  self-professed  libertarian  and  democratic  character.  The 
undemocratic  character  of  'realist'  solutions  to  the  ecological  crisis,  as  in  the  authoritarian 
proposals  of  Ophuls  (1977),  Heilbroner  (1980),  and  Hardin  (1977),  have  made  greens 
weary  of  state-centred  approaches  to  environmental  problems.  3 
Third,  more  'benign'  readings  of  the  liberal  state's  role  in  dealing  with  ecological 
problems  are  held  to  invariably  favour  'technocratic'  and  administrative,,  as  opposed  to 
'democratic',  solutions  (Dryzek,  1995).  In  other  words,  only  a  'technocentric'  outlook 
(O'Riordan,  1981:  11-19),  premised  on  an  instrumentalist  valuation  of  nature  and  a 
reductionist  problem-solving  methodology,  is  compatible  with  the  bureaucratic- 
administrative  logic  of  state  agencies.  Common  to  these  arguments  against  the  state  is 
that  talk  of  the  state  having  a  positive  role  in  green  theory  and  practice  belies  an 
'environmental'  rather  than  an  'ecological'  perspective  (Bookchin,  1980a:  70;  Dobson, 
1990:  13).  That  is,  talk  of  a  'green  state'  is  an  oxymoron  at  best,  or  a  betrayal  of  the 
2  It  is  also  the  case  that  for  many  greens  the  nation-state  represents  one  of  the  central  achievements  of  the 
enlightenment.  The  state  represents  the  institutionalisation  of  instrumental  rationality,  in  the  guise  of 
state  bureaucracies,  and  supports  an  instrumental  view  of  nature  and  a  predominantly  materialist  or 
consumptive  conception  of  human  well-being.  Thus  the  state  is  seen  as  the  engine  of  'modcrnisation,  the 
pursuit  of  'economic  growth'  which  leaves  nature  bereft  of  intrinsic  value.  At  the  same  time  the  nation- 
state  systematically  destroys  local  communities,  historically  by  usurping  the  ecological  'commons'  which 
grounded  the  (relative)  autonomy  of  such  communities.  Thus,  in  the  eyes  of  many  greens,  the  state  stands 
accused  of  destroying  not  only  nature,  but  also  local  communities,  colonising  and  transforming  both  into 
homogenised  categories.  Hence  from  the  anarchist  perspective  the  state  is  a  permanent  threat  to 
'difference'  and  communal  self-determination. 
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radical  promise  of  green  politics,  at  worst.  The  strength  of  feeling  generated  by  the  place 
of  the  state  within  green  politics  can  be  most  dramatically  seen  in  the  ideological  division 
within  the  green  movement  between  :  Pndi'  and  'realo'  elements  (Doherty,  1992).  This 
division  parallels,  and  is  related  to,  the  distinction  between  'ecological'  and 
&environmental'  perspectives  on  green  ideology.  Environmentalism  is  typically  presented 
as  a  reformist  strategy  whose  principal  focus  is  the  'greening'  of  contemporary  liberal 
democracies,  particularly  the  instrumental  use  of  nature,  rather  than  seeking  widespread 
social  and  economic  change  to  create  a  particular  vision  or  blueprint  of  the  'sustainable 
society',  which  is  the  aim  of  'ecologism'  (Dobson,  1990:  73-130).  For  present  purposes 
this  distinction  between  environmentalism  and  ecologism  will  be  assumed  to  centre  mainly 
around  opposing  attitudes  to  the  state,  with  ecologism  being  unequivocally  anti-state  and 
environmentalism  more  agnostic. 
Fourth,  and  following  on  from  the  above,  proposing  state-centred  solutions  to  the 
ecological  crisis  are  not  only  'reformist'  in  political  but  also  in  ethical  terms.  Articulations 
of  the  ecological  crisis  which  give  a  prominent  role  to  the  state  'crowd  out'  the  need  for 
radical  moral  change.  In  other  words,  the  technocentric  outlook  which  favours  reformist 
as  opposed  to  more  radical  institutional  change  also  underwrites  a  continuation  of  the 
anthropocentric  moral  outlook  in  general  and  the  treatment  of  nature  as  a  stock  of  raw 
materials  in  particular. 
Two  anti-state  eco-anarchist  theories  will  be  examined  in  this  chapter;  bioregionaRsm 
(4.3),  and  social  ecology  (4.4).  After  critically  analysing  these  two  theories  and  finding 
them  wanting  in  their  rejection  of  the  state,  I  then  move  on  in  4.5  to  argue  that  the 
transformation  rather  than  the  abolition  of  the  state  and  civil  society  is  compatible  with 
green  values.  The  argument  of  this  chapter  is  that  as  one  moves  along  the  green  political 
continuum  from  bioregionalism  to  social  ecology,  the  eco-anarchist  position  'shades  into' 
an  understanding  of  green  politics  which  sees  its  primary  goal  as  the  democratic 
transformation  of  the  state  and  civil  society.  This  chapter  seeks  to  establish  a  role  for  the 
state  within  green  political  theory  by  utilising  the  analytic  distinction  between  the  state  and 
civil  society,  which  is  further  developed  in  chapter  7.  At  the  same  time  it  is  also  hoped 114 
that  this  critical  analysis  may  integrate  eco-anarchist  insights  within  green  political  theory. 
This  sees  the  eco-anarchist  contribution  to  green  politics  as  resting  in  hollouring  as 
opposed  to  realising  eco-anarchist  values.  The  chapter's  overall  aim  is  to  forge  a 
workable  synthesis  between  the  anti-state  and  pro-state  positions  within  green  political 
theory. 
4.2  Eco-Anarchism:  Strong  and  Weak  Versions 
What  O'Riordan  has  called  the  'anarchist  solution'  (1981:  307)  has  been  an  enduring  part 
of  the  green  ideological  spectrum.  It  is  not  difficult  to  see  why  anarchist  forms  of  social 
organisation  have  appealed  to  greens.  Anarchism  argues  that  if  left  to  themselves  human 
beings  will  naturally  cohere  into  'organic'  communities  regulated  by  principles  of  mutual 
aid  and  sociality.  As  such  it  coheres  weH  with  the  'naive  naturalism',  the  idea  that  we  can 
cread  off  social  relations  from  nature,  that  peppers  green  politics.  The  quality  of  social 
relations  within  stateless  communities  is  such  that  the  laws,  procedures  and  institutions  of 
the  state  are  unnecessary  for  governance.  In  short,  the  traditional  defence  of  the  state, 
that  it  alone  can  provide  'public  goods',  particularly  social  order  and  environmental 
quality,  is  undermined.  4 
Green  political  theory  is  usually  thought  of  as  representing  an  inherently  anti-state 
position.  Most  green  writers  and  commentators  seem  to  agree  that  its  general  anarchistic 
complexion  is  one  of  its  unifying  features.  Green  theorists  as  different  as  Naess  and 
Bookchin,  both  agree  on  the  basic  stateless  nature  of  the  type  of  society  they  envisage. 
Naess  can  say  that,  "supporters  of  the  deep  ecology  movement  seem  to  move  more  in  the 
direction  of  non-violent  anarchism  than  toward  communism7'  (1989:  156);  while  Bookchin 
claims  that  his  social  ecology  theory  is  premised  on  the  abolition  of  the  state  (1992b:  95- 
4  For  some  deep  greens,  cco-anarchisin  is  understood  as  a  return  to  the  'natural'  social  organisation  for 
humans.  This  type  of  argument  is  prominent  within  'neo-primitivist'  shades  of  green  theory,  and  others 
who  stress  the  political  significance  of  stateless  societies  being  the  social  order  within  which  the  human 
species  evolved  (Shepard,  1993).  Here  the  ascription  of  positive  moral  value  upon  such  societies  is 
presaged  on  a  simplistic  identification  of  the  'natural'  with  the  'good'. 115 
6).  That  a  commitment  to  this  'anarchist  solution'  may  actually  undermine  crucial  aspects 
of  green  political  theory  is  rarely  fully  addressed,  although  some  green  theorists  and 
commentators  are  aware  of  the  problems  raised  by  green  anti-state  arguments  (Eckersley, 
1992a:  175,181-6;  Young,  1992;  Dobson,  1990:  183-6). 
Bioregionalism  begins  from  the  argument  that  the  resolution  of  the  ecological  crisis 
calls  for  greater  integration  of  human  communities  with  their  immediate  environment,  with 
natural  rather  than  human-political  (read  state)  boundaries  delimiting  the  appropriate 
human  social'unit.  This  claim  that  the  state  is  unnecessary  for  securing  and  enjoying 
public  goods,  I  call  the  'weak'  version  of  eco-anarchism,  to  distinguish  it  from  the 
stronger  claims  made  by  social  ecology.  While  bioregionalism  envisages  an  ecological 
stateless  society,  roughly  along  the  lines  of  the  traditional  anarchist  vision  of  a  'commune 
of  communes',  it  does  not  base  its  claims  on  a  critical  assessment  of  the  state  in  political 
theory  and  practice.  Social  ecology,  on  the  other  hand,  does. 
For  social  ecologists,  "'The  state  consolidates  and  protects  the  family  of  hierarchies 
[class,  gender,  race,  age,  mind-body]  becoming  a  hierarchy  in  its  own  righf'  (Kossoff, 
1992:  8).  Carter  (1993)  develops  a  comprehensive  green  anarchist  theory,  which 
highlights  many  of  the  concerns  of  social  ecology.  Beginning  from  a  view  of  the  state  as 
"an  autonomous  agenf'  (45),  he  claims  the  state  cannot,  nor  ever  could,  be  used  to  serve 
civil  society  (42).  This  discounting  of  the  dominant  'instrumentalist'  view  of  the  state, 
that  is,  seeing  the  state  in  functional  terms  as  an  'enabler'  to  civil  society,  is  the  hallmark 
of  what  I  want  to  call  the  'pure'  anarchist  position.  5  On  a  pure  anarchist  reading  the  state 
has  its  own  interests  and  agenda,  and  its  sole  raison  d'etre  is  the  systematic  exploitation  of 
society  as  a  whole.  Adding  a  ferninist  perspective,  Bookchin  holds  that,  "The 
institutionalized  apex  of  male  civilization  was  the  state'  (1990:  66).  Social  ecology 
advances  what  I  call  a  'strong'  version  of  eco-anarchism.  It  goes  beyond  claiming  that  the 
state  is  unnecessary  for  ensuring  the  public  goods  of  social  order  and  environmental 
protection,  to  stipulating  that  it  is  positively  undesirable.  It  is  undesirable  because  by  its 
5  Later  in  7.5  green  politics  and  a  green  state  are  described  in  tenns  of  restructuring  the  relations  between 
state,  market  and  civil  society,  in  which  the  former  are  in  the  service  of  the  latter. 116 
very  nature  the  state  is  a  coercive  institution  which  curbs  human  freedom.  Thus  from  the 
strong  or  pure  anarchist  position,  the  state  is  not  just  part  of  the  ecological  problem;  it  is 
the  problem.  It  is  the  Gordian  knot,  the  severing  of  which  is  a  necessary  condition  for  the 
creation  of  an  emancipated,  ecologically  rational  society. 
Central  to  both  the  strong  and  weak  versions  of  eco-anarchism  then  is  the  conviction 
that  only  the  transcendence  of  state  institutions,  and  their  replacement  with  informal, 
community-based  social  mechanisms,  will  produce  the  social  conditions  for  the  realisation 
of  green  values.  The  argument  for  stateless  self-determination  is  summed  up  by  Taylor, 
"If  we  want  to  do  without  the  state  or  substantially  reduce  its  role,  we  have  to  revive  and 
rebuild  communities"  (1982:  4).  This  distinction  between  strong  and  weak  versions  of 
eco-anarchism  is  significant.  The  strong  version  of  anarchism  is  problematic,  particularly 
as  regards  the  lack  of  empirical  evidence  to  support  its  claims,  while  theoretically  it  can  be 
criticised  as  dependent  upon  an  ahistorical  explanatory  schema  which  confuses  the  concept 
of  the  state  with  particular  conceptions.  The  pure  anarchist  position  in  which  the  state  is 
an  intrinsically  exploitative  institution  is  both  unnecessary  and  unhelpful  to  green  politiCS.  6 
At  the  same  time  the  traditional  anarchist  demand  that  social  relations  be  transparent  is 
neither  a  necessary  nor  a  desirable  political  aim  of  green  politics.  Indeed,  as  argued 
below,  a  close  analysis  of  the  social  ecology  position,  is  compatible  with  the 
democratisation  and  decentralisation  rather  than  the  abolition  of  the  state. 
4.3  Bioregionalism 
Bioregionalists  place  a  premium  on  the  necessity  of  strong,  affective  senses  of  communitýL 
and  communal  identity,  and  see  the  ecological  problems  we  face  as  due  in  no  small  part  to 
the  demise  of  community.  Although  this  decline  in  community  is  a  common  observation 
6  The  cco-anarchist  goal  of  transparent  social  relations  is  similar  to  the  deep  ecology  goal  of  transparent 
moral  relations  with  nature.  This  attempt  at  transparency  is  also  a  vice  of  enlightenment  science  and 
technology,  based  on  the  Baconian  hubris  that  human  reason  can  fully  comprehend  that  which  it  has  not 
created.  As  suggested  in  the  last  chapter,  there  are  limits  to  human  knowledge  of  the  world.  The  issue  of 
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of  communitarian  critiques  of  'modemity'  and  the  process  of  'modemisation", 
bioregionalists  locate  one  of  the  roots  of  its  decline  in  the  disengagement  of  people  from  a 
specific  land-base.  With  no  enduring  fink  to  the  land,  community 
- 
is 
-- 
'rootless'  and 
individuals  vulnerable  to  the  anomie  and  alienation  of  'mass  society'.  The  movement  of 
people  from  the  land  into  the  cities,  which  is  one  of  the  chief  characteristics  of  the  process 
of  modernisation,  also  marks  a  decisive  increase  in  ecological  degradation  and  a  shift  in 
ecological  consciousness.  On  the  one  hand,  with  less  people  in  agriculture,  there  is  a  shift 
towards  capitalisation  of  a  culture  production,  with  pesticides,  heavy  machinery  etc.  gri 
increasing  the  (short-lived)  productivity  of  the  land.  This  process  leads  to  ecological 
degradation  as  more  and  more  pesticides,  fossil  fuel,  etc.  have  to  be  used  to  keep  the  land 
fertile  and  productive.  This  was  discussed  in  chapter  2  (2.7.2)  in  terms  of  the  shift  from 
agriculture  as  a  social  practice  and  way  of  life,  to  an  industrial  business.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  demographic  shift  from  rural,  agricultural  lifestyle  to  an  urban,  industrial  one 
means  that  for  most  people,  the  'environment'  becomes  the  human,  built  one,  while  the 
nonhuman  environment  is  simply  not  part  of  their  lived  experience.  Thus  there  is  an 
increasing  gap  (both  actual  and  cognitive)  between  the  environment  as  a  sphere  of  human 
production  and  the  environment  as  a  resource  for  human  consumption,  as  a  result  of 
altered  social-environmental  relations. 
People  in  modem  society  according  to  bioregionalism  have  'forgotten'  that  the 
economy  and  all  its  works  is  a  subset  and  dependent  upon  the  wider  ecosystem. 
Bioregionalists  argue  is  that  whereas  it  may  be  possible  to  have  a  'post-industrial  society' 
we  cannot  have  a  'post-agricultural  society'.  Yet  this  is  precisely  the  misperception  of  the 
majority  of  citizens  in  the  western  world.  Modem  citizens  have  not  only  lost  contact  with 
the  land,  and  their  sense  of  embeddedness  in  the  land,  but  at  the  same  time  they  have  lost 
that  elemental  social  form  of  more  or  less  intimate  and  relatively  transparent  social 
relations.  Thus  a  basic  aim  of  bioregionalism  is  to  get  people  back  in  touch  with  the  land, 
and  constitutive  of  that  process  involves  the  recreation  of  community  in  a  strong  sense, 
This  sense  of  community  is  close  to  the  gemeinschaft  view  of  community,  in  opposition  to 
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ecology,  indeed  it  would  be  fair  to  say  that  bioregionalism  is  the  politics  of  deep  ecology. 
For  example,  according  to  Sessions,  'Many  supporters  of  the  Deep  ecology  movement 
believe  that  human  habitation  on  Earth,  including  the  cities,  should  ultimately  be 
bioregional"  (1995a:  416) 
. 
Both  share  the  belief  that  only  a  radical  transformation  of 
society,  at  the  economic,  social,  political  and  cultural  levels,  can  resolve  the  'total  crisis'  of 
contemporary  societies  as  discussed  in  chapter  2. 
This  return  to  the  land  ethos  is  eloquently  expressed  by  DH  Lawrence:  'Ve  must  get 
back  into  relation,  vivid  and  nourishing  relation  to  the  cosmos  and  the  universe  ...  Vitally, 
the  human  race  is  dying.  It  is  Eke  a  great  uprooted  tree  with  its  roots  in  the  air.  We  must 
plant  ourselves  again  in  the  universe'  (1968:  4  10).  Bioregionalism  sees  itself  as  offering  a 
way  in  which  we  can  return  to  the  'land'  and  'replant'  ourselves  again  in  the  natural  world. 
In  the  words  of  Kirkpatrick  Sale,  we  must  become  "dwellers  in  the  land"  (1984a:  224)  if 
we  are  to  resolve  the  ecological  crisis. 
4.3.1  Gemeinschaft  and  Gesellschaft 
For  the  nineteenth  century  sociologist  T6nnies,  the  emergence  of  the  modem  social  world 
was  marked  by  a  movement  from  'community'  or  gemeinschaft,  to  a  looser  sense  of 
csociety/association'  or  gesefischa 
. 
ft  (1957:  33).  Instead  of  individuals  collectively 
regulating  themselves  through  various  traditional  community  structures,  (external) 
institutions  (state  and  market)  became  necessary  to  'order'  an  emerging  'civil  society'  of 
individual  competitive  wills.  From  a  bioregional  point  of  view  this  movement  also 
accounts  for  the  ecological  crisis.  The  emergence  of  civil  society  in  the  modem  age, 
particularly  the  movement  from  the  land  to  the  city,  the  creation  of  extensive  trade  and 
other  relations  which  went  beyond  the  local  or  national  hinterland,  as  well  as  the  evolution 
of  'mass  society',  have  all  contributed  to  severing  the  link  between  human  community  and 
the  land.  Hence  its  concern  with  recreating  gemeinschaftlich  communities  along 
ecological  or  bioregional  lines.  This  is  well  expressed  by  Jones  who  declares  that,  "If  a 
future  society  based  on  the  Gaian  principles  of  interdependence,  mutuality  and  inter- 119 
relatedness  is  to  be  achieved,  a  re-emergence  of  some  form  of  gemeinschaft  is  essential" 
(1990:  109). 
One  of  the  earliest  and  most  consistent  green  proponents  of  strong  communities  is 
Goldsmith  who  as  long  ago  as  1972  declared  that,  "cultural  and  economic  heterogeneity  is 
associated  with  a  state-like  political  structure  ... 
Only  an  elaborate  bureaucracy  run  by  a 
shameless  autocrat  can  hope  to  control  a  mass  of  people  deprived  of  a  common  culture 
and  a  sense  of  duty  to  their  society"  (Goldsmith,  1972:  253).  7  The  corollary  is  clear;  if  we 
seek  to  do  without  state  institutions,  forms  of  social  life  with  a  'common  culture'  and  a 
'sense  of  duty'  derived  from  that  culture  are  the  only  alternative.  Since  the  state  is  a 
historical,  contingent/artificial,  social  form,  there  is  nothing  inevitable  about  the 
continuation  of  state-centred  societies.  Therefore,  non-state  forms  of  social  organisation 
are  always  possible.  The  logic  of  Goldsmith's  position  is  that  a  non-state  social  regulation 
requires  not  only  the  recreation  of  community,  as  Taylor  indicated  above,  but  requires  a 
particular  type  of  community,  a  prominent  characteristic  of  which  is  a  low  degree  of 
plurality. 
Taylor  spells  out  why  anarchism  demands  communities  of  this  type.  For  him,  stateless 
social  order  requires  that  the  community  display  (a)  strongly  shared  beliefs,  (b)  relations 
between  members  that  are  direct  and  many-sided,  and  (c)  social  interaction  characterised 
by  reciprocity  and  mutual  aid  (1982:  26-30).  It  is  the  quality  of  relations  within  such 
communities  that  allow  the  operation  of  non-state  coercive  mechanisms  to  get  people  to 
do  things  they  would  not  voluntarily  do,  yet  are  necessary  for  social  order.  This  addresses 
two  common  misunderstandings  of  anarchism,  namely  that  it  implies  social  'chaos"  and 
relies  on  a  'myth  of  collective  harmony'.  The  former  misunderstanding  is  typically 
expressed  in  the  pejorative  connotations  of  the  term  'anarchy',  a  term  which  owes  much 
to  the  Hobbesian  conception  of  the  'state  of  nature'  as  the  description  of  stateless 
7  This  association  of  cultural  heterogeneity  with  state-regulated  social  organisation  seems  to  fly  in  the  face 
of  the  earlier  anarchist  critique  of  the  state  on  the  grounds  that  it  denied  difference.  It  would  seem  on  this 
point  that  a  distinction  needs  to  be  made  between  'libertarian'  and  'conservative'  forms  of  cco-anarchism 
with  Goldsmith  (1991)  falling  into  the  latter  category  on  the  basis  of  his  emphasis  on  homogeneity.  This 
conservatism  is  also  shared  with  other  bioregional  theorists  such  as  Sale  (1980:  501),  discussed  later. 120 
disorder.  Anarchism  as  opposed  to  anarchy  does  not  imply  social  chaos  and  it  explicitly 
rejects  the  Hobbesian  vision  of  social  life  without  the  state.  To  those  who  claim  that 
human  nature  undermines  the  anarchist  case  for  voluntary  social  co-operation  and  the 
provision  of  public  goods  without  the  state,  anarchists  reply  that,  "The  assumpt  ions  made 
by  Hobbes  and  Hume  were  supposed  to  characterise  human  behaviour  in  the  absence  of 
the  state;  but  perhaps  they  more  accurately  describe  what  human  behaviour  would  be  like 
immediately  after  the  state  has  been  removed  from  a  society  whose  members  hadfor  a 
long  time  lived  under  states"  (Taylor,  1976:  141).  In  other  words,  with  the  decline  of 
'community'  and  the  rise  of  the  state,  individuals  have  lost  the  capacity  to  govem 
themselves  without  the  state.  8  As  he  argues  elsewhere,  "the  state  is  like  an  addictive  drug: 
the  more  we  have  of  it,  the  more  we  'need'  it  and  the  more  we  come  to  depend  on  it" 
(1976:  134).  However,  in  opposition  to  this  extreme  view,  one  may  view  the  state 
instrumentally,  as  a  prosthesis  rather  than  as  an  addictive  and  dangerous  drug. 
The  second  misunderstanding  is  the  assumption  that  anarchism  posits  that  once  the 
state  has  been  abolished,  individuals  will  'automatically'  or  'naturally'  be  in  harmony  with 
one  another.  This  'myth  of  social  harmony'  is  rejected  by  realist  anarchist  theorists  such 
as  Taylor  and  eco-anarchists  such  as  Goldsmith  and  bioregionalists  such  as  Sale.  9  All 
these  anarchist  theorists  agree  that  the  provision  of  the  public  goods  such  as  social  order 
and  environmental  protection  depends  on  getting  people  to  do  things  they  might  not  want 
8  According  to  Taylor,  "the  liberal  theory  of  the  state  critically  depends  on  the  assumption  that  individuals 
are  pure  egoists  or  at  least  are  'insufficiently'  altruistic;  with  enough  altruism,  this  rationale  for  the  state 
evaporates"  (1982:  55-6).  As  I  argue  in  chapter  7  (7.8),  a  more  limited  form  of  this  can  be  defended  in 
terms  of  environmental  considerations  leading  to  a  view  of  democracy  in  which  individuals  take  the 
interests  of  others  into  account.  However,  while  this  can  be  seen  as  an  attempt  to  encourage  people  to  be 
less  'unecological'  (or  less  'knavish'  in  Hume's  term  (5.2)),  this  is  viewed  not  in  terms  of  abolishing  the 
state,  but  rather  in  terms  of  a  virtuous  green  citizenry  to  complement  the  state. 
9  Yet  it  is  upon  this  very  idea  of  the  'natural  harmony'  of  society  that  many  greens,  implicitly  or 
explicitly,  base  their  argument  when  they  wax  lyrical  about  the  social  and  ecological  balance  of  pre- 
modem  peoples,  and  hold  them  up  as  examples  of  how  we  modems  should  behave  and  construct  our 
social  relations.  The  logic  of  this  position  is  analogous  to  the  Marxist  idea  that  with  the  withering  away  of 
the  state  social  conflict  wiJI  cease,  except  that  the  logic  seems  to  run  in  the  reverse  order.  Equanimity  is 
an  ever  present  possibility  (existing  prior  to  the  state),  therefore  the  state  is  superfluous,  indeed  it  is 
perceived  as  detrimental  to  the  'natural'  harmony  of  society.  This  is  similar  to  the  deep  ecology  argument 
that  our  'natural  urge'  to  celebrate  nature  is  thwarted  by  anthropocentrism,  viewed  as  part  of  the  'natural' 
harmony  between  society  and  environment  (2.3.1). 121 
to  do.  Hence  'realistic'  anarchists  do  not  argue  for  the  abolition  of  social  coercion,  but 
rather  one  particular  form  of  it,  namely  the  forms  of  institutionalised  coercion  employed  by 
the  state.  Socialisation,  the  internalisation  of  communal  norms  and  conventions  together 
with  informal  forms  of  social  sanction  such  as  public  ridicule  and  shaming,  perform  the 
necessary  coercive  functions  within  stateless  communities  (Taylor,  1982:  80-7;  Goldsmith 
et  al,  1972).  Thus  the  prevention  of  'free  riding',  a  precondition  for  the  provision  of 
collective  goods,  can  be  achieved  without  recourse  to  the  state,  but  not  without  the 
employment  of  social,  non-state  forms  of  coercion.  The  state  may  be  abolished  within  an 
anarchist  society  but  coercion  and  power  are  not. 
Recovering  such  communal  principles  from  a  bioregional  point  of  view  requires 
creinhabitation',  the  conscious  re-integration  of  human  communities  within  their  local 
bioregion  (Eckersley,  1992a:  167).  This  is  not  just  on  the  grounds  that  small-scale 
communities  dependent  upon  and  living  in  close  contact  with  'their'  local  environment  are 
less  ecologically  destructive  than  large  societies  dependent  on  the  biosphere  as  a  whole,  or 
a  collection  of  ecosystems.  This  argument  is  discussed  below.  Reinhabitation,  becoming 
(native'  to  a  place,  is  also  held  to  be  an  identity-constituting  ecological  condition.  no 
you  are  is  a  question  of  where  you  are,  the  types  and  quality  of  relations  you  find  yourself 
in,  both  social  and  ecological.  Reinhabitation  of  the  land  is  not  only  necessary  on 
ecological  grounds  but  also  on  moral  grounds.  Part  of  the  latter  involves  the  creation  of  a 
bioregional  community,  a  central  aspect  of  which  is  knowing  one's  bioregion  through 
experience,  as  a  way  of  becoming  'rooted'  once  again  in  the  land.  10 
The  basic  bioregional  vision  is  of  a  patchwork  of  self-sufficient,,  small-scale,, 
ecologically  harmonious  communities,  organised  according  to  their  own  normative 
standards  (Sale,  1984a:  233).  Bioregionalists  (as  with  many  greens)  discourage  trade  and 
stress  the  ecological  and  social  benefits  of  communal  autarky.  II  One  of  the  main  reasons 
10  Often  this  is  underwritten  by  Heideggerian  concerns  of  'dwelling  in  place',  and  a  rejection  of 
existentialist  views  of  the  inhospitality  of  the  earth  to  human  concerns.  That  is,  bioregionalism  is 
premised  on  a  view  of  the  biorcgion  in  particular,  and  the  earth  in  general,  as  'home',  i.  e.  a  convivial 
place  to  which  humans  are  suited  and  'welcome,  if  only  they  would  'follow'  the  natural  order. 
II  The  issue  of  trade  within  green  political  economy  is  discussed  later  in  chapter  6  (6.6),  where  a 
distinction  is  drawn  between  self-sufficiency  which  is  what  bioregionalism  implies,  and  self-reliance. 122 
given  for  this  is  to  encourage  people  to  live  within  the  limits  set  by  their  local  environment 
rather  than  depending  on  the  planet  as  a  whole.  Dasmann's  distinction  between 
cecosystem  people'  and  'biosphere  people'  captures  the  basic  bioregional  position. 
According  to  him,  'Siosphere  people  draw  their  support,  not  from  the  resources  of  any 
one  ecosystem,  but  from  the  biosphere 
...  [They]  can  exert  incredible  pressure  upon  an 
ecosystem  they  wish  to  exploit...  something  that  would  be  impossible  or  unthinkable  for 
people  who  were  dependent  upon  that  particular  ecosysterif'  (in  Sessions,  1993:  121). 
Each  ecosystem  is  unique,  and  thus  demands  a  particular  way  of  life.  In  this  way  the 
community's  distinctiveness  is  intimately  related  to  how  it  interacts  with  its  local 
ecosystem  or  bioregion.  This  interaction,  the  metabolism  between  community  and 
environment,  and  thus  the  community's  identity,  is  co-determined  by  the  bioregional 
ecological  context.  Defending  biodiversity  and  cultural  diversity  thus  go  hand  in  hand. 
From  the  bioregional  position,  it  is  trade  between  disparate  parts  of  the  world  as  a 
result  of  the  global  market,  that  has  created  the  impression,  particularly  in  those  western 
nations  who  benefit  most  from  such  planetary-wide  exchange,  that  escaping  the  confines 
of  their  particular  ecological  context  is  evidence  of  transcending  'natural  limits'  as  a 
whole.  12  This  is  the  ecological  slant  on  the  historical  necessity  for  the  imperial  expansion 
of  western  societies,  and  the  ecological  reason  for  present  day  neo-colonial  trade 
practices,  which  from  the  green  perspective  underwrites  current  North-South  inequalities. 
Simply  put,  countries  such  as  Britain,  France  and  the  United  States,  could  never  have 
achieved  the  rates  of  material  economic  growth  and  affluence  they  did  and  continue  to 
enjoy  if  they  were  dependent  upon  their  own  native  natural  resources.  The  affluent 
lifestyle  enjoyed  in  these  countries  is  dependent  on  a  disproportionate  consumption  of 
12  According  to  Georgescu-Rocgen  "the  absence  of  any  difficulty  in  securing  raw  materials  by  those 
countries  where  modem  economics  flourished  was  yet  another  reason  for  economists  to  remain  blind  to 
this  crucial  economic  factor  [nature's  perennial  contribution]"  (1971:  2).  This  logic  of  displacement 
whereby  the  necessities  for  economic  development  are  provided  not  by  one's  own  local  ecosystem  but  by 
non4ocal  ecosystems  continues  in  the  modern  age  with  the  advent  of  the  global  market  where  the  planet's 
resources  arc  traded  as  commodities,  and  thus  in  theory  available  to  any  society.  In  the  contemporary 
world,  'effective  demand'  (purchasing  power),  rather  than  'local  supply'  (nearness  of  resources) 
determines  the  ecological  inputs  available  to  any  particular  economic  system.  Thus  the  link  between  the 
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world  resources.  To  many  greens  these  economies  are,  in  strict  ecological  terms, 
unsustainable,  in  the  sense  that  their  models  and  modes  of  development  are  physically 
impossible  to  achieve  on  a  global  scale  (Whiteside,  1994:  340;  Goodland,  1995). 
Bioregionalists  encourage  economic  self-sufficiency,  which  by  rendering  the  community 
completely  dependent  upon  its  local  ecosystem,  encourages  prudence,  and  the  adoption  of 
a  long-run  time  perspective.  One  way  of  looking  at  this  is  to  say  that  a  bioregional  view 
encourages  us  to  see  the  productivity  of  the  earth  in  terms  of  a  renewable  (but  limited) 
flow  of  'income'  rather  than  as  'capital'  (Daly,  1973).  In  this  way  bioregionalism 
proposes  to  save  the  whole  (the  global  biosphere)  by  saving  the  parts  (individual 
ecosystems),  as  well  as  fostering  the  independence  and  cultural  uniqueness  of  bioregional 
communities. 
There  are  several  positive  aspects  which  can  be  drawn  from  bioregionalism.  These 
include,  the  emphasis  on  econon-dc/ecological  indppýndeqqe,  on  ecosystem  sensitivity,  and 
on  the  environmental  destruction  and  social  exploitation  attendant  upon  global  trade. 
However,  the  bioregional  vision  is  also  flawed  in  some  significant  ways.  The  first  refers  to 
issues  arising  from  the  lack  of  interaction  between  bioregions  in  the  context  of  the 
distribution  of  resources  across  the  face  of  the  planet.  Simply  put,  the  autarky  imperative 
coupled  with  strict  ecosystem  dependence,  implies  that  those  living  in  resource  poor 
ecosystems  are  condemned  to  their  fate  as  there  is  no  provision  for  the  redistribution  of 
resources  between  bioregions.  The  redistribution  of  resources  across  the  planet,  regarded 
by  many  as  a  core  part  of  any  green  or  environmentally-informed  theory  ofjustice  (Pasek, 
1994;  Attfield  &  Wilkins  (eds.  ),  1992),  seems  to  go  against  the  communitarianism  which 
underwrites  much  of  bioregionalism.  Transfers,  whether  from  trade  or  charity,  may 
compromise  the  distinctiveness  of  bioregional  communities,  since  their  identity  as  a 
community  is  tied  up  with  how  they  live  within  and  use  'their'  ecosystem.  The  wholesale 
global  redistribution  of  resources  is  based  on  prioritising  a  universal  'biosphere-human 
species'  relationship,  over  any  particular  'ecosystem-culture'  one,  that  is,  that  sees  the 
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At  the  same  time  redistribution  on  any  large  scale,  like  trade,  seems  to  be  ruled  out  as  a 
homogenising  process,  destructive  of  cultural  difference  and  diversity.  According  to  Berg, 
"Global  Monoculture  dictates  English  lawns  in  the  desert,  orange  juice  in  Siberia  and 
hamburgers  in  New  Delhi.  It  overwhelms  local  cultures  and  'raises'  them  regardless  of  the 
effects  on  cultural  coherency  or  capacities  of  local  natural  systeme'  (1981:  25).  Even 
'cultural'  exchange,  expressed  in  such  practices  as  tourism,  even  if  ecologically  sensitive, 
is  discouraged  as  being  destructive  of  rootedness  and  communal  distinctiveness  (Mills, 
1981:  5).  As  such  bioregionalism  is  arguably  the  most  communitarian  strand  within 
contemporary  communitarian  theory.  13  An  extreme  interpretation  would  be  that  resource- 
poor  bioregions  and  communities  have  to  simply  survive  and  flourish  as  best  they  can  on 
their  own  without  any  (or  much)  external  exchange. 
The  bioregional  vision  of  a  world  made  up  of  self-sufficient,  ecologically  harmonious 
bioregions,  harks  back  to  a  pre-modem  era  before  exploration,  trade,  and  cultural 
exchanges  brought  people  from  different  parts  of  the  world  together  and  gave  tangible 
expression  to  the  idea  of  the  'human  species'.  In  place  of  the  global  village,  with  its 
communications  networks,  global  political  and  economic  institutions  (inter  alia,  a  world 
market,  the  World  Bank  and  United  Nations),  bioregionalism  implies  a  'refeudalisation', 
or  'Balkanization'  of  the  world  into  ecologically  defined  political  and  economic  units 
(Sale,  1984b:  171). 
Other  problems  vvith  bioregionalism  can  be  grouped  under  two  headings;  those  relating 
to  internal  relations  within,  and  those  relating  to  external  relations  between,  bioregional. 
communities.  On  the  former,  Dobson  points  out  that  there  is  no  guarantee  than 
bioregional  communities  will  be  democratic  or  just  (1990:  122).  Indeed  according  to  Sale, 
"truly  autonomous  bioregions  will  likely  go  their  own  separate  waye'  (1984b:  170).  The 
reason  for  this  is  that  bioregionalists  place  the  communal  right  to  self-legislate  as  the 
highest  social  value.  The  affirmation  of  communal  solidarity  is  prioritised  over  contingent 
13  A  fin-thcr  objection  to  biorcgionalism  relates  to  dangers  inherent  in  presaging  communal  identity  and 
membership  on  the  strong  affinity  between  the  community  and  'the  land'.  This  is  the  'brown'  possibility 
of  'reinhabitation'.  This  v61kisch  tendency  within  certain  strands  of  green  theory  has  been  noted  by 
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values  such  as  equality,  fairness  or  democracy.  This  communitarianism  together  with  the 
assumption  that  the  root  of  social  and  ecological  problems  are  rooted  in  'bigness'  (Sale, 
1980:  82),  or  a  lack  of  appropriate  or  'human'  scale,  are  the  two  principles  around  which 
bioregionalism  is  woven.  However,  small  is  not  always  beautiful,  and  small-scale, 
although  an  important  consideration,  is  not  a  panacea  for  all  social  and  ecological  ills. 
An  examination  of  how  bioregionalism  copes  with  internal  differences  brings  into  sharp 
relief  its  problematic  place  in  green  theory.  Conflict  within  bioregional  communities, 
according  to  Sale  (1980),  should  not  require  recourse  to  formal  principles  of  justice  or 
political  institutions  external  to  the  community.  For  example,  the  'natural'  way  to  deal 
with  disputes  between  an  aggrieved  !  ±nRýýaqd  an  implacable  majority  is  for  the 
c&-m-mu@_ty__t_o  divide,  with  the  minority  free  to  settle  elsewhere.  From  the  bioregional 
point  of  view  "The  commodious  solution  is  not  minority  rights  hut  minority  settlements" 
(1980:  480;  emphasis  added).  This  'fissioning'  of  communities  when  they  get  too  large  or 
develop  tensions  incompatible  with  communal  consensus,  is  according  to  Taylor  "a  normal 
part  of  the  life  of  stateless  societiee'  (1982:  92;  Sale,  1984b:  170).  But  in  a  non-Lockean 
world,  that  is  where  there  is  no  unsettled  territory,  this  'solution'  to  conflicts  within 
societies  is  simply  unworkable.  In  a  closed  world,  there  is  no  'away'  to  which  the 
displaced  can  go  without  entering  the  territorial  jurisdiction  of  another  political 
community,  unless  the  existing  territory  is  divided  between  the  two  sides.  This  recourse 
to  fissioning  and  relocating  is  surprising  given  the  strong  link  made  between  communal 
and  personal  identity  and  the  land.  Perhaps  the  bioregional  point  is  that  people  must  make 
a  choice  between  exile  (and  thus  compromising  one's  identity)  and  putting  up  with  the 
discomfort  of  being  in  serious  disagreement  with  the  rest  of  society.  In  other  words, 
individuals  are  required  to  rank  community  membership  relative  to  other  values. 
However,  one  has  only  to  look  at  the  conflict  within  such  divided  societies  as  Northern 
Ireland,  the  former  Yugoslavia  and  USSR,  to  see  that  'minority  settlements'  do  not 
constitute  a  realistic,  never  mind  a  just,  solution.  Whether  eco-anarchists  like  it  or  not,  the 
history  of  the  nation-state  (and  not  necessarily  the  liberal-constitutional  version  either) 
provides  ample  evidence  that  it  can  protect  the  rights  of  minorities  and  individuals,  as 126 
much  as  it  can  hinder  them.  The  instrumental  view  of  the  state,  namely  that  it  can  serve 
the  interests  of  civil  society,  contra  the  strong  anarchist  thesis,  is  not  completely  mistaken. 
This  'justice  as  displacement'  argument,  is  premised  on  protecting  the  community's 
sense  of  identity  and  solidarity  from  those  who  argue  for  a  different  understanding  of 
communal  identity,  shared  goods,  history  or  meanings.  Hence  the  distrust  of  appeals  to 
justice  as  an  entrenched  system  of  individual  rights  and  liberties,  which  transcend  local 
norms.  Justice  as  an  ethical  perspective  that  transcends  communal  conventions,  is  either 
incompatible  with  complete  communal  autonomy,  or  is  unnecessary  for  social  order.  Like 
other  communitarians.,  bioregionalists  (and  some  social  ecologists)14  regard  justice  as  a 
remedial  virtue,  useful  for  remedying  flaws  in  social  life  (Kyrnlicka,  1993:  367):  flaws  that 
are  the  result  of  a  decline  in  community.  15  That  bioregional  communities  would  tend  to  be 
conservative  is  accepted  by  bioregionalists  as  the  necessary  price  to  maintain  what  Kumar 
(1978)  has  called  the  'intimacy  of  scale'.  According  to  Sale,  "To  be  sure  ...  consensual 
communities  will  tend  towards  conservatism  ... 
but  it  will  by  the  same  token  make  them 
more  stable,  more  predictable,  more  'comfortable',  and  less  prone  to  ill-considered 
decisions"  (1980:  501).  16  However,  one  does  not  need  consensus  in  order  to  make 
collectively  prudent  decisions. 
The  danger  here  is  not  just  the  threat  to  individual  liberty  within  extreme  forms  of 
communitarianism,  where  the  individual  as  an  'organic  part'  of  the  wider  collectivity  can 
have  her  interests  sacrificed  for  the  benefit  of  the  'common  good'.  Rather  the 
conservative  possibility  inherent  in  aspects  of  the  green  position  illuminates  the  threat  to 
14  For  an  example  of  Bookchin's  critique  of  justice  contrasted  with  'freedom'  see  (1990:  97-100;  1991: 
chapter  6). 
15  A  similar  view  was  canvassed  in  chapter  2  in  examining  deep  ecology's  view  of  an  appeal  to  'ethics'  as 
second-best  solution,  to  a  solution  based  on  ecological  consciousness  (2.6). 
16  At  this  point  green  theory  leaves  itself  open  to  appropriation  by  conservatives,  and  for  critics  to  claim 
that  the  'progressive'  nature  of  green  politics  is  more  apparent  than  real.  A  recent  example  of  the  former 
is  the  attempt  by  Gray  to  present  green  politics  as  compatible  with  a  conservative  agenda,  stressing  the 
moral  importance  of  preserving  settled  habits  and  conventions,  deferring  to  the  authority  of  tradition,  and 
the  imperative  to  maintain  a  shared  way  of  life  as  the  context  for  the  realisation  of  human  goods  and 
values  (1993:  chapter  4).  According  to  him,  "Both  conservatism  and  Green  thinkers  repudiate  the 
shibboleth  of  liberal  individualism,  the  sovereign  subject,  the  autonomous  agent  whose  choices  are  the 
origin  of  all  that  has  value  (1993:  136),  in  that  both  affirm  communal  'forms  of  life'  as  the  true  bearer  of 
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plurality  and  social  diversity  and  thus  the  preconditions  for  democratic  politics.  A  clear 
example  of  the  conservatism  expressed  in  some  versions  of  bioregionalism,  can  be  seen  in 
the  emphasis  placed  on  communal  self-identity  being  constituted  by  a  religious  or  quasi- 
religious  outlook.  In  bioregionalism  this  outlook  is  provided  by  deep  ecology  and  the 
'reinhabitation'  process,  and  has  affinities  with  the  'ecomonastic'  strategy  associated  with 
Rudolf  Bahro  (1994,  also  Eckersley,  1992a:  163-7).  In  both  bioregionalism,  and  eco- 
monasticism,  it  is  a  strong  possibility  that  the  community  is  held  together  by  a  shared 
metaphysical  view  (usually  spiritual  or  mystical)  of  the  natural  world  in  general  and  local 
ecosystem  in  particular,  and  the  community's  relationship  to  it  (Sale,  1984a).  17 
Bioregionalism  seems  to  endorse  cultural  diversity  between  bioregional  communities  and 
favours  homogeneity  within  them. 
As  I  argued  in  chapter  2  (2.5),  it  is  extremely  unlikely  that  a  spiritualised  view  of  the 
natural  world  (as  opposed  to  a  moral  view  informed  by  science)  would  succeed  in 
cconverting'  western  citizens  to  the  green  cause.  More  damaging  to  green  theory  in 
terms  of  its  'progressive'  self-understanding  is  that  societies  infused  with  a  strong  shared 
religious  sense  have  typically  functioned  as  fertile  breeding  grounds  for  intolerance.  A 
possible  response  to  this  is  that  the  spiritualised  worldview  put  forward  by  bioregionalists 
and  deep  ecologists  is  inclusionary,  welcoming  difference  and  otherness.  However,  it 
remains  to  be  seen  if  such  a  flexible,  non-dogmatic  shared  spiritual  vision  is  sufficiently 
robust  to  furnish  the  community  with  a  strong  sense  of  shared  identity  in  the  sense 
required  for  stateless  social  mechanisms  to  work.  Baldly  put,  there  is  every  reason  to 
believe  that  the  tolerance  proclaimed  for  green  metaphysics  may  be  undermined  by  the 
emphasis  on  'tribalism'  (Sale,  1984b),  and  the  requisite  degree  of  social  homogeneity  that 
is  required. 
17  This  emphasis  on  the  self  and  the  constituent  conditions  for  identity-formation  make  biorcgionalism. 
close  to  the  deep  ecology  position  in  this  regard.  In  allim-dng  a  contextual  understanding  of  self  and 
community,  with  the  ultimate  context  being  the  environment,  bioregionalism  states  albeit  in  a  rather 
extreme  form,  one  of  the  central  goals  of  green  politics.  This  is  to  conceive  of  the  self  as  'self-in-society- 
in-cnvironment',  a  central  part  of  the  naturalistic  view  presented  in  the  last  chapter. 128 
It  is  perhaps  at  the  external  level  that  the  shortcomings  of  bioregionalism  are  most 
apparent.  Given  the  on-going  impact  of  globalisation  on  human  societies,  drawing  them 
into  an  increasingly  complex  web  of  interrelations,  the  complete  realisation  of  the 
bioregional  vision,  that  is  complete  bioregional  autarky,  is  impossible.  When  we  look  at 
the  global  nature  of  ecological  problems  such  as  ozone  depletion  and  global  warming, 
there  is  a  need  for  more  not  less  co-operation  and  interaction  between  societies.  From  a 
global  ecological  point  of  view,  the  fragmentation  of  the  world  as  propounded  by 
bioregionalism  may  exacerbate  ecosystemic  problems.  The  strategy  of  saving  the  whole 
by  saving  the  parts,  only  works  if  there  is  some  degree  of  trans-communal  co-operation 
and  co-ordination.  This  is  because  when  it  comes  to  ecosystems.  Commoner's  first  law  of 
eS(ý2ýhý.  olds,  'I  t  ev  rythingji§  connected  to  every  hing  else"  (1971:  29),  saving  the  part 
involves  knowing  what  is  happening  to  other  parts  and  to  the  whole.  Co-operation  may 
be  possible  in  a  world  of  bioregions,  but  reaching  agreement  may  be  more  difficult  under 
stateless  conditions  because  of  the  increase  in  the  number  of  parties  to  the  agreement 
(Goodin,  1992). 
Although  economic  autarky  may  be  possible,  ecosystem  indgýýýý.  Trans- 
bioregional.  problems  render  the  emphasis  on  individual  ecosystem  protection  short- 
sighted.  Simply  withdrawing  from  the  global  economy  does  not  address  how  to  solve 
existing  commons  problems  (although  it  may  prevent  them  getting  any  worse). 
Bioregionalism  may  work  to  maintain  global  ecosystem  health  but  it  is  debatable  whether 
it  would  actually  create  the  conditions  required  to  reach  social-environmental  balance. 
Given  that  trans-societal  co-ordination  and  communication  is  more  important  within  such 
a  context,  decisions  taken  within  bioregional  communities  are  only  meaningful  within  that 
context.  Unfortunately,  as  Taylor  admits,  "the  controls  which  can  be  effective  within  the 
small  community  cannot  generally  have  a  great  impact  on  relations  between  people  of 
different  communities"  (1982:  167).  Added  to  this  is  Goodin's  observation  that, 
"decentralization  gives  each  member  of  the  community  more  control  over  that 
community's  decisions.  But  the  smaller  the  community,  the  less  and  less  the  community's 
decisions  will  ordinarily  matter  to  the  ultimate  outcome.  People  are  being  given  more  and 129 
more  power  over  less  and  less  (1992:  150).  So  the  multiplication  of  decision-making  units 
within  the  context  of  reaching  agreement  and  co-operation,  may  compromise  the  self- 
determination  imperative.  It  is  perhaps  because  of  the  compromises  that  trans-communal 
co-operation  necessitate,  either  due  to  economic  trade  and  exchange,  shared  political- 
normative  commitments,  or  ecological  commons  issues,  that  bioregionalism  is  so  keen  on 
autarky  and  linking  community  tightly  to  the  local  ecosystem.  Being  self-sufficient  allows 
bioregional  communities  the  freedom  to  determine  their  own  destiny  and  character. 
In  this  sense  Dasmann's  conclusion  that,  "the  future  belongs  to  ... 
[ecosystem  people]" 
overstates  the  bioregional  case  to  say  the  least  (in  Sessions,  1993:  121).  While  not 
wishing  to  undermine  the  positive  values  expressed  by  the  bioregional  position,  it  is  not  a 
perspective  greens  need  take  in  toto.  There  are  three  main  aspects  that  can  be  taken  ftom 
bioregionalism  which  can  be  integrated  within  green  politics.  Firstly,  the  importance  of 
'place'  and  its  role  as  an  identity-forming  condition,  which  is  discussed  in  the  next  chapter 
(5.7).  Secondly,  the  emphasis  on  decentralisation  and  appropriate  scale,  discussed  in 
chapters  5  and  6.  And  finally  the  extremely  useful  distinction  between  'ecosystem'  and 
'biosphere'  perspectives  which  is  examined  in  chapter  6  in  more  detail. 
4.4  Social  Ecology 
Social  ecology,  although  generally  sympathetic  to,  and  sharing  much  with,  bioregionalism, 
offers  a  different  and,  in  many  respects,  a  more  coherent  eco-anarchist  political  vision. 
Bookchin,  the  founder  and  leading  theorist  of  social  ecology,  calls  the  social  ecology 
vision  of  stateless  social  order  'libertarian  municipalism'  (1986:  3744;  1990:  179-85; 
1992b).  This  is  defined  as,  "a  confederal  society  based  on  the  co-ordination  of 
municipalities  in  a  bottom-up  system  of  administration  as  distinguished  from  the  top-down 
rule  of  the  nation-state'  (Bookchin,  1992b:  94-5).  It  differs  from  bioregionalism  in  its 
concern  with  the  issue  of  interaction  between  communities  and  the  rejection  of  the 
bioregional  model  of  small-scale,  self-sufficient  communities  (Bookchin,  1992a:  xix).  The 130 
confederal  nature  of  the  arrangement  means  it  is  a  voluntary  political  association  of 
autonomous  communities  with  sovereignty  retained  at  that  level.  Yet,  the  relativism  that 
typified  bioregionalism,  is  explicitly  ruled  out  by  Bookchin;  "parochialism  can  ... 
be  checked 
not  only  by  the  compelling  realities  of  economic  interdependence  but  by  the  commitment 
of  municipal  minorities  to  defer  to  the  majority  wishes  of  participating  communities" 
(1992b:  97).  Here  economic-ecological  interdependence  goes  hand  in  hand  with  political 
autonomy  and  self-determination.  Unlike  bioregionalism,  autarky  is  not  a  central  principle 
of  social  ecology. 
Libertarian  municipalism  as  an  eco-anarchist  theory  can  be  argued  to  represent  a  novel 
form  of  anarchism.  Limiting  the  scope  of  communities  to  simply  go  their  own  way  marks 
a  decisive  break  with  traditional  anarchist  thought,  which  took  the  communal  right  to  self- 
governance  as  its  principal  and  highest  political  norm.  This  distinction  between  libertarian 
municipalism  and  other  forms  of  anarchism  (including  bioregionalism)  can  be  seen  in  their 
different  understandings  of  community.  Whereas  for  bioregionalists  (Jones,  1990;  Sale, 
1980,1984a),  and  'pure'  anarchists  (Taylor,  1982),  community  is  understood  as  some 
version  of  'gemeinschaft',  fibertarian  municipalism  is  presaged  on  the  idea  of  a 
'democratic  community'.  Community  is  defined  politically  not  ecologically.  Within 
libertarian  municipalism.  the  aim  is  to  recapture  the  values  of  the  polis,  and  'authentic' 
politics,  in  opposition  to  the  'inauthentic'  politics  of  'statecraft'  (Bookchin,  1992a: 
chapter  6). 
Another  difference  is  that  libertarian  municipalism  is  urban  rather  than  rural  based 
(Bookchin,  1992a).  His  understanding  of  community  is  thus  less  'organic'  than  traditional 
anarchist  and  bioregional  views  This  marks  significant  development  in  social  ecology 
thought  away  from  earlier  formulations  which  accorded  normative  significance  to 
gemeinschaft,  and  praised  the  authenticity  of  organic  forms  of  social  life  (Whitebook, 
1981/2).  One  could  question  whether  libertarian  municipalism,  is  an  'anarchist'  theory  in 
the  traditional  sense  of  the  term.  The  suggestion  here  is  that  it  may  be  better  viewed  as  an 
attempt  to  spell  out  what  a  more  democratised  and  decentralised  society  would  look  like 
with  a  continuing  role  for  the  state,  particularly  at  the  local  level. 131 
His  drift  away  from  pure  anarchism  is  further  evidenced  by  his  assertion  that  there  is  a 
"shared  agreement  by  all  [communities]  to  recognize  civil  liberties  and  maintain  the 
ecological  integrity  of  the  region7  (I  992b:  97-8).  The  contractual  and  legal-constitutional 
overtones  of  confederalism  is  more  usually  associated  with  liberal  not  anarchist  discourse 
and  practice.  And  his  description  of  the  confederal  council  as  composed  of  elected 
representatives,  with  legitimate  right  to  use  coercion  within  a  specified  ecological 
territory,  to  ensure  compliance  with  a  shared  agreement,  could  be  taken  as  a  traditional 
Weberian  analysis  of  a  state-like  political  entity,  legitimated  along  standard,  but  beefed  up, 
liberal  lines  (ibid.:  99).  His  assertion  that  the  confederal  council,  made  up  of  deputies 
elected  in  direct  democratic  elections,  are  purely  administrative  with  no  mandated  policy- 
making  powers,  which  is  retained  at  lower  levels  (1992a:  297;  1992b:  97),  is  no  more  than 
that,  i.  e.  an  assertion.  Given  the  interconnectedness  of  communities,  the  existence  of  a 
binding  confederal  agreement  relating  to  human  rights  and  ecological  imperatives,  and  the 
description  of  this  social  arrangement  as  a  'Community  of  communities',  one  can  imagine 
the  confederal  council  taking  a  more  pro-active  role  than  Bookchin  assigns  to  it. 
Goodin's  criticism  made  in  reference  to  bioregionalism  above  applies  a  fortiori  in  this 
instance,  since  inter-community  relations  go  beyond  trade,  or  the  maintenance  of 
ecological  integrity,  and  consist  of  substantive  normative  principles  and  practices. 
A  weak  criticism  of  Bookchin's  position  would  be  that  he  has  failed  to  clearly  and 
convincingly  demonstrate  the  stateless  nature  of  libertarian  municipalism.  Indeed,  by 
recasting  the  problem  in  terms  of  'degrees  of  statehood',  rather  than  in  monolithic  terms 
of  'the  state',  Bookchin's  reformed  eco-anarchism  is  close  to  themes  within  recent  non- 
anarchistic  radical  democratic  theory,  concerning  the  importance  of  plural  and 
decentralised  sites  of  political  and  social  power  independent  from  the  state  (and  the 
market)  (Keane,  1988;  Bobbio,  1989)  This  is  particularly  evident  when  Bookchin  asserts 
that,  "'the  state'  can  be  less  pronounced  as  a  constellation  of  institutions  at  the  municipal 
level,  and  more  pronounced  at  the  provincial  or  regional  level,  and  most  pronounced  at  the 132 
national  level"  (1992a:  137),  and  seems  to  recommend  city  and  local  government  levels  as 
appropriate  sites  for  green  activism  which  will  not  compromise  its  ends  (ibid:  3034).  18 
The  emphasis  on  appropriate  scale,  which  as  we  saw  above  is  also  a  bioregional 
concern,  is  a  principle  supported  by  almost  all  greens.  It  is  usually  taken  as  expressing  the 
need  for  'appropriate  scale'  in  political  decision-making  procedures  and  especially  the 
sphere  of  production  within  which  the  particular  economy-ecology  metabolism  of  the 
community  is  located.  According  to  Porritt,  "In  terms  of  restoring  power  to  the 
community  nothing  should  be  done  at  a  higher  level  than  can  be  done  at  a  lower"  (1984: 
166).  This  principle  is  compatible  with  state  institutions  because  for  some  things, 
particularly  international  negotiation  on  global  commons  issues,  it  is  the  lowest  level.  The 
very  term  'municipal',  with  its  strongly  urban  character,  resonates  and  is  compatible  with 
the  demand  to  strengthen  local  and  regional  tiers  of  government/governance  away  from 
the  centre.  The  principles  of  libertarian  municipalism  seem  to  accord  with  T.  H.  Green's 
assessment  of  those  sceptical  of  the  state.  According  to  him,  "The  outcry  against  state 
interference  is  often  raised  by  men  whose  real  objection  is  not  to  state  interference  but  to 
centralisation,  to  the  constant  aggression  of  the  central  executive  upon  local  authoritiee' 
(1974:  217).  Thus  the  critique  of  the  state  is  in  large  part  a  critique  of  centralisation,  and 
conversely  eco-anarchism.  can  be  translated  as  a  demand  for  decentralisation  and  devolved 
decision-making  powers.  This  demand  will  be  discussed  later  (chapters  6  and  7)  in  terms 
of  the  local  political,  economic  and  ecological  levels  as  often  the  most  appropriate  level 
for  dealing  with  social-environmental  relations. 
One  can  interpret  Bookchin's  argument  for  devolving  power  to  municipal  levels,  yet 
maintaining  a  legitimate  right  for  the  'confederal  council'  to  intervene  in  municipal  affairs, 
as  bestowing  state-like  institutionalised  powers  on  the  council.  These  powers  of  the 
18  A  possible  defence  open  to  Bookchin's  qualified  anarchism  is  that  it  is  a  strategic  step  towards  pare 
anarchism.  According  to  Sylvan,  "A  committed  anarchist  can  quite  well  also  be  committed,  as  an 
intermediate  goal  amongst  others,  to  achieving  more  sumpathico  states.  That,  in  turn,  may  involve 
political  activity,  conventional  or  unconventional"  (1993:  241).  On  this  view,  recent  policy  initiatives 
such  as  Local  Agenda  21  which  sees  the  local  state  as  the  most  appropriate  level  for  achieving 
sustainability  and  the  emergence  of  new  local,  non-monetary  market  exchange  systems  such  as  LETS,  can 
be  argued  to  'honour,  rather  than  'realise',  some  eco-anarchist  values.  These  are  discussed  in  the  chapter 
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council  could  be  regarded  as  underwritten  by  'the  shared  agreement'  (1992b:  98).  From 
this  it  is  not  stretching  things  too  far  to  suggest  that  this  agreement  functions  as  an 
tecological  social  contract',  which  on  familiar  contractarian  grounds  legitimises  the  state. 
In  the  manner  of  a  decentralised  (and  a  democratised)  state,  the  confederal  council 
circumscribes  communal  rights  to  complete  self-legislation,  since  upholding  the  ecological 
compact  depends  on  such  circumspection.  Political  power  is  shared  rather  than 
completely  devolved  to  local  levels,  which  do  not  seem  possessed  of  sufficiently  strong 
senses  of  common  gemeinschafflich  identity,  which  could  underwrite  complete  communal 
self-governance  in  the  manner  of  pure  anarchism  or  bioregionalism.  What  I  want  to 
suggest  then  is  that  the  libertarian  municipal  a  enda,  the  content  of  which  most  greens 
would  accept,  such  as  participatory  democratic  structures,  local  empowerment,  social 
justice,  and  human  rights,  is  more  consistent  with  a  political  project  aimed  at 
democraftsing  the  state  and  civil  society.  The  efficacy  of  adopting  this  state/civil  society 
framework  will  be  defended  in  chapters  5  and  6  while  the  democratic  content  of  this 
project  will  be  spelt  out  in  chapter  7. 
4.5  Eco-Anarchism:  From  Constitutive  to  Regulative  Ideal'9 
Why  has  the  eco-anarchist  vision  of  a  federated  community  of  small-scale,  face-to-face 
communities  living  in  harmony  with  the  environment  been  such  an  enduring  feature  of 
green  politics?  To  answer  this  question,  one  must  focus  on  the  ideological  roots  of  early 
green  politics. 
Firstly,  the  eco-anarchist  vision  of  the  future  'sustainable  society'  vividly  encapsulated, 
in  shorthand  form,  the  basic  principles  and  values  of  green  politics;  i.  e.,  inter  alia, 
ecological  and  social  harmony,  decentralisation,  simple  living,  quality  of  life,  community, 
and  direct  democracy.  Within  the  context  of  the  early  development  of  green  theory,  it  was 
19  The  distinction  between  constitutive  and  regulative  ideals  is  taken  from  Kant  who  held  that,  "A 
principle  is  'regulative'  when  it  merely  guides  our  thinking  by  indicating  the  goal  towards  which 
investigation  should  be  directed...  it  is  'constitutive'  when  it  makes  definite  assertions  regarding  the 
existence  and  nature  of  the  objectively  real"  (1957:  211). 134 
simply  assumed  that  an  ecological  transformation  of  society  required  anarchism  updated 
for  the  age  of  ecological  limits.  Secondly,  the  dominance  of  the  eco-anarchist  vision  has  to 
do  with  the  dichotomous  style  adopted  by  green  theorists  and  commentators.  The  most 
influential  instance  of  this  is  O'Riordan's  fourfold  typology  of  the  institutional  choices 
open  to  green  politics;  (1)  new  global  order,  (2)  authoritarian  commune,  (3)  centralised 
authoritarianism,  or  (4)  the  anarchist  solution  (1981:  404-7).  In  reality  the  choice  comes 
down  to  the  anarchist  solution  or  the  rest,  given  that  it  was  the  only  one  which,  a  pfiori, 
embodied  the  green  values  and  principles  noted  above.  As  green  political  theory 
developed  therefore,  it  was  assumed  that  the  'sustainable  society'  was  'anarchistic' 
(Dobson,  1990:  83-4). 
In  a  way  this  utopia-building  was  prompted,  in  part,  by  the  need  for  greens  to  adopt  a 
strongly  critical  edge  in  their  analysis  of  contemporary  industrial  societies.  As  Goodwin 
points  out,  "the  process  of  imagining  an  ideal  community,  which  necessarily  rests  on  the 
negation  of  the  non-ideal  aspects  of  existing  societies,  gives  utopian  theory  a  certain 
distance  from  reality  which  makes  it  a  sharper  critical  tool  than  much  orthodox  political 
theory"  (1991:  537).  One  could  say  that  its  initial  reaction  to  the  contemporary  social 
world  was  so  antithetical,  so  radical  in  questioning  almost  every  aspect,  that  utopianism 
was  the  only  form  of  theorising  which  could  contain  and  convey  the  green  message.  If 
asked  for  proof  for  the  ecological  superiority  of  stateless  social  order,  aboriginal  societies 
and  their  harmonious  social-environmental  metabolism,  could  be  presented  to  vindicate  the 
eco-anarchist  argument. 
This  anticipatory-utopian  form  of  political  critique  is  directly  related  to  the  evolution  of 
the  green  movement,  and  its  roots  are  manifold.  Firstly,  the  practical  requirement  as  a 
f  new  social  movement'  to  maintain  its  distinct  identity,  to  prevent  existing  ideologies  from 
stealing  their  ideas  and  proposals,  presented  a  good  case  for  accentuating  the  radical,  the 
utopian.  Secondly,  in  common  with  other  new  social  movements,  greens  seemed  to  be 
particularly  obsessed  with  questions  of  self-identity,  to  demonstrate  (to  themselves  as 
much  as  to  anyone  else)  their  'newness'.  Thus  the  green  movement  was  at  pains  to 
portray  itself  as  a  completely  new  type  of  politics,  'neither  left  nor  right,  but  in  front'.  For 135 
example,  Porritt  declared  that,  'Tor  an  ecologist,  the  debate  between  the  protagonists  of 
capitalism  and  communism  is  about  as  uplifting  as  the  dialogue  between  Tweedledum  and 
Tweedledee'  (1984:  44),  a  statement  noteworthy  for  lumping  these  alternatives  together 
as  different  versions  of  the  super-ideology  of  'industrialism.  Green  politics  was  'post'  or 
'anti-industrial',  which  cast  greens  as  the  vanguard  of  the  future  society  (Milbrath,  1984), 
and  green  politics  as  the  politics  of  the  21  st  century  (Sessions  (ed.  ),  1995). 
Thirdly,  added  to  these  internal  dynamics  was  the  simple  fact  that,  as  a  new  social 
actor,  it  had  little  or  no  access  to  the  policy-making  process,  and  therefore  did  not  need  to 
outline  programmes,  budgets  or  detailed  policies  in  the  language  of  that  process.  Broad- 
brush  strokes  rather  than  attention  to  the  fine  print  characterised  early  green  discourse. 
The  overriding  imperative  was  to  distance  itself  theoretically  from  the  reality  surrounding 
it,  and  in  the  case  of  the  'eco-monastic'  strand  of  eco-anarchism,  to  turn  one's  back  on  the 
existing  social  order  and  create  'liberated  zones'  from  the  'industrial  mega-machine' 
(Eckersley,  1992:  163-67;  Bahro,  1994).  This  formative  experience,  like  all  formative 
experiences  still  exerts  an  influence  on  green  politics. 
Fourthly,  this  concern  with  outlining  its  diametric  opposition  to  the  status  quo,  was 
underpinned  by  the  rather  naive  belief  that  the  green  case  was  so  obvious  and  so 
compelling,  that  all  that  was  needed  was  simply  publicly  to  outline  its  critique  and 
proposed  solutions  (Dobson,  1990:  131).  Finally,  following  the  'doom  and  gloom'  that 
typified  the  post-Limits  to  Growth  (Meadows  et  al,  1972)  ecology  movement,  there  was 
clearly  a  need  for  greens  to  outline  an  image  of  a  better  future.  As  Paehlke  points  out, 
"The  Malthusian  perspective  is  neither  necessary  nor  helpful  in  engendering  positive 
change.  An  environmental  perspective  and  policies  must  seek  to  create  a  preferable 
world"  (1989:  55:  emphasis  in  original).  Like  a  skilled  preacher  the  early  green  movement 
had  threatened  apocalypse  if  its  warnings  were  not  heeded,  now  it  also  promised  the  eco- 
anarchist,  liberated  society,  if  people  changed  their  ways  in  time.  20 
20  The  Marxian  critique  of  utopian  socialism  is  an  obvious  analogy  here,  and  indeed  many  Marxists  have 
criticised.  green  politics,  or  some  conceptions  of  it,  as  a  modem  day  version  of  utopian  critical  theory 
(Pepper,  1993).  The  basic  Marxist  critique  of  green  theory  is  that  it  lacks  a  political  economy,  a  theory  of 
transition  to  the  'sustainable  society.  Engels'  rejection  of  the  utopian  socialists  expresses  one  of  the  basic 136 
A  cursory  review  of  green  literature  will  quickly  highlight  the  extent  to  which  green 
theorists  and  commentators  are  obsessed  with  presenting  the  green  case  in  an  either/or 
fonnat.  Almost  ubiquitous  is  the  habit  of  drawing  lists  distinguishing  the  green  from  non- 
green.  Examples  include  Porritt's  two  29  -item  lists  differentiating  'The  politics  of 
industrialism'  from  'The  politics  of  ecology'  (1984:  216-7),  O'Riordan's 
technocentric/ecocentric  dichotomy  (1981:  ch.  1),  Dobson's  distinction  between 
'ecologism'  and  'environmentalism'  (1990:  13),  to  Capra's 'paradigm  shift'  from  'The 
Newton  World-Machine'  to  'The  New  Physics'  (1983:  part  11).  Surprise  that  this  dualistic 
methodology  is  so  widespread  within  a  political  theory  that  is  supposed  to  be  holistic,  is 
only  surpassed  by  the  fact  that  it  persists  to  frame  its  concerns.  This  dualistic  thinking 
(also  noted  in  the  discussions  of  deep  ecology  and  non-anthropocentrism)  is  clearly 
evident  in  the  debate  about  the  role  of  the  state  within  green  politics.  From  the  eco- 
anarchist  perspective  there  is  a  simple  (and  simplistic)  choice:  either  centralisation  or 
decentralisation,  anarchism  or  the  nation-state,  ecology  or  industrialism  (Carter,  1993). 
That  green  political  theory  could  attempt  to  combine  elements  of  both  is  pre-emptively 
dismissed  as  reformist  and  therefore  not  'really'  green.  21 
It  is  from  this  dualistic  methodology  coupled  with  the  utopian-critical  demands  of  the 
early  green  movement,  that  eco-anarchism.  became  the  dominant  political  theory  of  greens. 
Three  steps  can  be  identified  in  this  process; 
1.  The  concern  with  what  a  'sustainable  society'  would  look  like  to  highlight  the 
unsustainable  nature  of  existing  society  led  to, 
2.  A  focus  on  mapping  'the  sustainable  society',  that  is  describing,  often  in  great  detail,  a 
generally  agreed  picturelblueprint  of  that  society, 
Marxist  problems  with  green  politics,  "To  all  these  [utopian  socialists]  socialism  is  the  expression  of 
absolute  truth,  reason,  and  justice,  and  has  only  to  be  discovered  to  conquer  all  the  world  by  virtue  of  its 
own  power"  (in  Tucker,  1978:  693). 
21  It  is  here,  as  in  other  places,  that  the  difference  between  green  political  theory  and  ccologism  as  a 
political  ideology  is  evident.  Ecologism  is  a  subset  of  interpreted  principles,  values  and  practices  drawn 
from  a  wider  set  that  make  up  green  political  theory.  In  other  words,  ecologisms  represent  particular 
conceptions  or  derivations  of  green  theory,  and  arc  less  flexible,  being  more  ideologically-drivcn,  than  the 
set  of  values  and  principles  that  make  up  green  political  theory. 
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3.  Finally  the  assumption  of  the  sustainable  society  as  'anarchistic',  to  rule  out  eco- 
authoritarian  dystopias,  and  to  act  as  the  benchmark  against  which  'greenness'  could 
bejudged. 
it  is  the  particular  historical  development  of  green  theory  (both  internal  debates,  and 
between  it  and  other  theories  such  as  socialism  and  liberalism),  and  green  political  practice 
(fundilrealos),  that  largely  account  for  the  prevalence  of  the  eco-anarchist  solution.  These 
factors  produce  a  marked  tendency  within  green  theory  to  work  backwards,  as  it  were, 
from  utopia  to  theory,  with  practical  engagement  in  the  political  realities  surrounding  it 
reduced  to  publicly  articulating  the  utopian-theoretical  synthesiS.  22  Although  there  is 
nothing  wrong  with  outlining  a  vision  of  a  better  society,  indeed  this  prescriptive 
dimension  is  the  mark  of  any  ideology  worth  its  salt,  this  tendency  unfortunately  resulted 
in  the  description  of  the  future  society  becoming  a  substitute  for  the  task  of  specifying  and 
spelling  out  green  principles.  These  principles  were  held  to  be  self-evident  and  could  be 
cread  ofr  from  the  description  of  the  future  eco-anarchistic  society.  If  however  we  start 
from  green  principles  and  values,  some  of  which  are  shared  with  other  political  theories, 
such  as  democratisation,  social  and  global  justice,  there  is  no  reason  to  believe  that  a 
society  consistent  with  them  (assuming  that  these  values  are  compatible),  will  necessarily 
be  'anarchistic'.  It  is  perhaps  more  than  coincidence  that  the  common  'reading  ofr  social 
principles  from  nature  often  occurs  together  with  'reading'  them  off  from  the  anarchistic 
society:  one  reinforces  the  other  (Dobson,  1990:  24-5;  Sale,  1980:  329-35;  Bookchin, 
1991:  75-86). 
According  to  Dobson,  "the  Green  sustainable  society  can  be  negatively  defined  by 
saying  that  it  will  not  be  reached  by  transnational.  global  co-operation,  it  will  not  be 
principally  organized  through  the  institutions  of  the  nation-state,  and  it  is  not 
22  This  tendency  to  work  backwards  was  also  noted  in  reference  to  non-anthropocentrism  in  general  and 
deep  ecology  in  particular.  In  chapter  2  (2.4.1),  it  was  argued  that  deep  ecology  was  premised  on  an  a 
priori  disposition  in  favour  of  preservation,  while  in  chapter  3  (3.3),  1  suggested  that  non- 
anthropocentrism.  was  driven  primarily  by  a  desire  to  include  nonhumans  in  the  moral  community,  which 
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authoritariaif'  (1990:  84).  However,  if  one  starts  from  green  principles,  it  may  be  that 
some  of  these  institutions,  values  and  practices  are  required  for  the  realisation  of  green 
political  goals.  This  view  will  be  defended  in  the  rest  of  this  thesis.  Ultimately, 
determining  what  a  green  society  would  look  like  is  a  poor  substitute  for  articulating  and 
justifying  green  political  principles. 
4.6  Conclusion 
What  this  chapter  hopes  to  have  shown  is  that  eco-anarchism,  as  a  constitutive  ideal  of 
green  politics,  is  not  an  essential  component  in  that  the  values  greens  espouse  may  be 
institutionalised  in  non-anarchistic  ways.  For  example,  the  eco-anarchist  concern  with 
autonomy  and  self-determination  is  something  which  as  a  green  value  can  be  realised  in 
non-anarchist  ways.  The  green  concern  with  autonomy  is  discussed  later  in  chapter  6 
(6.7)  where  an  ecological  virtue  perspective  on  human  flourishing  is  argued  to  hinge  on 
the  relationship  between  human  autonomy  and  welfare.  Nor  is  it  desirable  that,  as  it 
stands,  the  eco-anarchist  utopia  acts  as  a  fetter  on  the  future  development  of  green  theory, 
unnecessarily  precluding  its  positive  engagement  with  the  state.  It  is  perhaps  not 
completely  contingent  that  a  reassessment  of  eco-anarchism  within  green  theory  is 
occurring  at  a  time  when  greens  are  serious  contenders  for  political  power,  when  the 
minds  of  greens  are  turning  from  ideals  to  principles,  and  from  principles  to  practice.  This 
is  not  to  say  that  eco-anarchism  is  to  be  rejected  from  the  green  political  canon:  the 
integration  of  its  insights  within  the  context  of  green  theory  moving  from  negative 
criticism  to  positive  proposals  calls  for  it  to  become  a  regulative  rather  than  a  constitutive 
ideal  for  green  politics.  That  is,  informing  and  guiding,  but  not  determining  its  goals. 
Institutional  arrangements  are  thus  to  be  judged  instrumentally  in  terms  of  whether 
they  hinder  or  promote  green  practices  and  values,  the  sum  of  which  I  term  'collective 
ecological  management'.  On  this  reading  it  is  the  'essentialist'  view  of  the  state  held  by 
eco-anarchists  like  Sale  (1980)  and  Bookchin  (1991)  who  regard  the  state  as  intrinsically 
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rejection  of  the  state  as  a  part  of  the  green  political  project.  A  good  example  of  this  is 
Khor's  argument  that  "under  state  control  the  environment  necessarily  suffers"  (in 
Goldsmith  et  al,  1992:  128).  23  This  is  especially  clear  in  Bookchin's  thought.  The 
originating  thesis  of  social  ecology  is  that  the  ecological  crisis  is  due  to  hierarchy.  The 
domination  of  humans  over-nature-is-the-firsUevel  of  this  hieEKchy_but_BqqKq4ý!  1  ggues 
that  this  hierarchical  relationship  itself  stems  from  the  domination  of  humans  by  other 
humans  (1991:  2-12).  For  him,  as  the  state  is  the  highest  contemporary  expression  of 
social  hierarchy,  it  is  the  ultimate  cause  of  the  present  ecological  criSiS.  24  Added  to  this  is 
his  view  that  the  'State'  is  not  just  a  set  of  institutional  arrangements  but  also  a 
psychological  disposition.  According  to  Bookchin,  "the  State  is  not  merely  a  constellation 
of  bureaucratic  and  coercive  institutions.  It  is  also  a  state  of  mind,  an  instilled  mentality 
for  ordering  reality"  (1991:  94).  25  For  Bookchin,  as  for  others  in  the  anarchist  political 
tradition,  this  'instilled  mentality'  is  a  combination  of  unreflective  subservience,  apathy  and 
powerlessness.  These  are  extremely  strong  claims,  to  say  the  least,  the  plausibility  of 
which  really  depends  upon  accepting  the  anarchist  analysis  as  a  whole,  particularly  its 
version  of  the  historical  origins  and  evolution  of  the  state  (Carter,  1993).  It  is  on  this 
23  A  similar  anti-state  argument  is  also  proposed  by  free  market  environmentalism  (6.2). 
24  One  may  add  the  Wcberim  idea  that  as  society  increases  in  size  and  complexity  there  is  a  need  for 
more  formal,  bureaucratic  forms  of  social  regulation.  That  is  as  we  move  from  gemeinschaft  to 
geselischaft,  the  increasing  complexity  of  civil  society,  especially  in  respect  to  the  social  division  of 
labour,  requires  some  degree  of  state  co-ordination.  'Modemisation'  therefore  goes  hand  in  hand  with 
increased  state  administration  and  regulation  as  the  classical  sociologists  first  pointed  out.  See  chapter  7 
(7.5). 
25  Despite  their  many  and  profound  disagreements,  and  Bookchin's  often  vicious  criticisms  of  deep 
ecology,  social  and  deep  ecology  do  share  some  central  positions.  Firstly,  both  accept  the  centrality  of 
psychological  transformation  to  the  green  project;  deep  ecology  emphasises  the  shift  from  an 
anthropocentric  conception  of  self  to  a  wider  ecological  sense  of  self  (see  chapter  2,  section  2.4),  while 
social  ecology  the  substitution  of  an  unreflective  obedience  to  state  authority  with  a  rational  belief  in  one's 
capacity  for  self-determination  and  autonomy.  Secondly,  both  base  their  respective  critiques  of  the  status 
quo  on  the  artificiality  of  contemporary  institutions  and  ways  of  thought  and  life.  Deep  ecology  (and 
bioregionalism)  claims  that  modem  social  life  is  'divorced'  from  its  'natural  context',  and  out  of  touch 
with  the  rhythms  of  the  natural  world.  In  a  similar  vein,  social  ecology  makes  much  of  the  'artificiality' 
of  the  nation-state  in  opposition  to  the  'natural'  forms  of  human  sociality  expressed  in  stateless  forms  of 
human  organisation.  Thirdly,  both  work  with  an  explanatory  idcological  framework  within  which  the 
idea  of  'the  fall'  and  the  possibility  of  'redemption'  are  central  orientating  concepts.  For  deep  ecology  the 
cnlightcnmcnt/modemity/industrialisation  constitutes  humanity's  'second  fall'  while  for  social  ecology  the 
State  is  society's  'original  sin'  (Bookchin,  1991:  2). 140 
essentialist  conception  of  the  state  that  eco-anarchists  such  as  Bookchin  (1991,1992a) 
argue  that  the  resolution  of  the  ecological  crisis  is  simply  impossible  while  the  nation-state 
exists.  But  more  than  that,  on  traditional  anarchist  grounds  the  state  is  also  deemed  to  be 
both  winecessary  as  well  as  widesirable  to  its  resolution.  The  plausibility  or  otherwise  of 
the  anarchist  position  need  not  detain  us,  since  as  argued  in  the  previous  chapter,  the  eco- 
anarchist  perspective  is  to  be  thought  of  as  a  constitutive  as  opposed  to  a  regulative  ideal 
of  green  political  theory  (4.5).  It  is  the  'essentialist'  view  of  the  state  that  explains  its 
rejection  on  eco-anarchist  grounds.  If  this  essentialist  view  is  rejected,  then  the  eco- 
anarchist  solution  does  not  constitute  an  insuperable  barrier  to  a  positive  green 
engagement  with  the  state. 
The  conclusion  of  this  chapter,  that  an  immanent  critique  of  the  state  rather  than  its 
rejection  is  more  appropriate  to  green  political  theory,  is  similar  to  the  immanent  critique 
of  the  enlightenment  and  anthropocentrism  suggested  in  previous  chapters.  The  problem 
of  eco-anarchism's  'utopian'  critique  is  that  it  is  a  'view  from  nowhere'.  That  is  to  say, 
the  values  and  principles  it  represents  are  not  widespread  within  the  existing  culture.  As 
Hayward  puts  it,  "critique  [becomes]  mere  criticism  [when  it]  appeals  to  a  utopian  vision 
that  others  may  not  share,  which  is  not  rooted  in  the  norms  and  values  of  the  culture,  and 
so  is  an  abstract  'ought...  (1995:  51).  The  point  about  immanent  critique  is  that  it  starts 
from  where  we  are  now,  rather  than  adopting  a  view  from  nowhere,  a  view  from  the  past 
or  a  view  from  the  future.  That  is,  we  can  only  approach  the  'new'  via  a  critique  of  the 
old,  rather  than  simply  think  up  wonderful  blueprints  for  the  future.  Immanent  critique 
represents  a  qualitatively  different  kind  of  theorising  from  utopian  critique.  While  it  is  less 
'radical'  in  the  sense  that  it  is  committed  to  the  possible  and  not  just  the  desirable,  it  is  all 
the  more  radical  in  the  sense  of  being  a  realisable  alternative  to  the  status  quo. 
One  may  view  eco-anarchism  as  a  permanent  reminder  of  the  dangers  and  problems 
involved  in  the  state  having  a  role  in  social  affairs  and  ecological  management.  At  the 
same  time  eco-anarchism  also  emphasises  the  state's  role  in  ecological  governance  is  a 
necessary  rather  than  a  sufficient  condition  for  achieving  green  goals,  reflecting  its 
instrumental  as  opposed  to  intrinsic  role  and  value.  However,  the  public  goods  argument 141 
for  the  state  having  a  key  role  in  providing  such  environmental  public  goods  has  not  been 
undermined.  It  is  to  an  examination  of  the  nation-state  that  we  turn  to  next. Chapter  Five 
The  Nation-State,  Governance  and  the 
Politics  of  Collective  Ecological  Management 
5.1  Introduction 
Having  discussed  and  raised  some  doubts  concerning  the  centrality  and  role  of  eco- 
anarchism  within  green  political  theory,  this  chapter  seeks  to  outline  an  alternative 
institutional  programme  for  green  politics.  A  central  aspect  of  this  alternative  view  is  the 
positive  role  given  to  the  nation-state  in  the  resolution  of  the  various  ecological,  economic 
and  ethical  dilemmas  raised  by  the  ecological  crisis.  In  what  follows  I  propose  an 
instrumental  view  of  the  state  within  the  context  of  what  I  term  'collective  ecological 
management'.  That  is,  the  state  should  be  seen  not  as  a  green  value  itsel(  but  rather  as 
one  particular  institutional  means  which  can  realise  green  values  and  practices. 
In  chapter  3  (3.4.1),  it  was  argued  that  the  'ecological  niche'  for  humans  is  created 
rather  than  given.  That  is,  a  'humanised'  or  transformed  environment,  is  our  'natural' 
habitat.  The  collective  management,  manipulation  and  transformation  of  the  environment 
is  thus  a  universal  feature  of  all  human  societies.  As  a  universal  requirement  it  is,  in  a 
sense,  pre-political.  It  is  how  human  societies  create  their  humanised  ecological  niches, 
the  various  institutional  mechanisms  used  to  maintain  a  stable  metabolism  between  the 
social  and  the  natural  system,  that  are  moot  political  questions.  In  this  chapter,  'collective 
ecological  management',  is  presented  as  an  institutional  form  regulating  this  metabolism 
based  on  green  values  and  principles.  This  idea  of  active  ecological  management  cuts 
across  the  deep-shallow,  radical-reformist  continuum  within  green  theory.  What 
conceptions  of  green  political  theory  differ  over  are  the  scale,  type,  institutional  structure 
and  normative  side-constraints  operative  upon  social-environmental  metabolic  states,  not 
the  necessity  for  environmental  management  and  transformation.  For  example,  even  deep 
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constitutes  a  central  principle,  accept  that  preserving  wilderness  requires  active  social,  and 
particularly  institutional,  intervention.  In  other  words,  preservation  from  development  as 
much  as  conservation  for  (future)  development  or  ecological  restoration,  all  take  place 
within  the  broad  framework  of  'ecological  management'.  The  deep  ecology  ideal  of 
wilderness  preservation,  the  preservation  of  the  nonhuman  world  from  a  certain  type  of 
collective  human  transformation,  in  the  form  of  'development',  paradoxically  necessitates 
another  form  of  human  management,  in  the  form  of  institutional  structures,  practices,  etc. 
which  function  as  a  form  of  social  governance  to  limit  and/or  transform  development,  such 
that  wilderness  is  preserved.  What  appears  as  non-management  at  one  level  is  at  another 
level  simply  another  form  of  management.  Valking  lighter  on  the  earth'  is  as  much  a 
form  of  ecological  management  as  economic  development,  the  political  and  normative 
issue  is  that  collective  purposive-transformative  interaction  with  the  environment  can 
simply  be  more  or  less  extensive,  have  a  different  character  or  be  more  or  less  sustainable. 
In  chapter  3,  the  normative  issues  relating  to  social-environmental  interaction  were 
argued  to  concern  the  boundary  between  'use'  and  'abuse'.  This  chapter  builds  on  that 
position,  a  position  which  sees  the  normative  core  of  green  politics  as  concerned  with  an 
'ethics  of  use'.  The  political  issue  for  green  politics  is  over  the  type,  scale,  and 
institutional  structures  for  managing  social-environmental  interaction  which  best  concur 
with  green  values  and  principles.  What  this  chapter  sets  out  to  explore  is  the  role  the  state 
may  play  in  this  process,  it  does  not  set  out  to  provide  green  justifications  for  the  nation- 
state.  Rather  the  institutional  focus  of  this  chapter  should  be  taken  as  an  attempt  to  widen 
the  parameters  of  the  debate  around  the  political,  economic  and  cultural  structures  of  a 
sustainable  society  beyond  that  offered  by  a  stark  choice  between  the  status  quo  or  eco- 
anarchism. 
More  precisely,  the  aim  of  this  chapter  is  to  further  develop  this  understanding  of  green 
political  theory  by  discussing  the  nation-state  as  a  particular  institutional  form,  and  its  role 
and  limitations  in  realising  green  goals.  These  goals  can  be  summarised  as  ecological 
sustainability  and  morally  regulated  collective  interaction  with  nature.  The 
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thought  of  in  terms  of  'governance'  as  opposed  to  'government'.  That  is,  while  the  state 
has  a  role  to  play  in  creating  and  maintaining  a  sustainable  and  ethically-informed 
metabolism  with  the  environment,,  it  is  not  the  only  or  the  pre-eminent  institution. 
Although  aspects  of  a  theory  of  a  'green  state'  may  be  gleaned  from  this  chapter,  the 
instrumental  view  of  the  state  from  which  governance  starts,  which  sees  the  state  as  one 
amongst  other  institutional  forms  that  regulate  a  specific  social-environmental  metabolism, 
ought  to  temper  an  interpretation  of  the  position  being  defended  here  as  overly  'statist' 
(Wall,  1994;  Paterson,  1996).  Such  an  interpretation  reveals  the  dualistic  thinking  that 
characterises  the  eco-anarchist  standpoint,  where  the  choices  for  green  politics  are  either 
'statism'  or  'eco-anarchism',  the  state  or  community,  and  so  on.  The  principle  of 
appropriateness  with  regard  to  institutional  design,  scope,  scale,  co-ordination  and 
internal  regulation,  is  the  touchstone  of  collective  ecological  management.  Institutional 
arrangements  ought  to  be  judged  by  their  appropriateness  for  achieving  green  values  and 
practices.  There  is  nothing  new  here  since  'appropriateness'  is  a  well-established  green 
institutional  principle  (Porritt,  1984:  164-5;  Dobson,  1990:  125;  Martell,  1994:  54-8).  As 
in  the  search  for  a  conception  of  green  moral  theory  which  transcends  the  non- 
anthropocentrism-anthropocentrism  dualism  (chapter  3),  this  chapter  seeks  to  widen  out 
the  issue  of  institutional  arrangements  within  green  politics  beyond  the  opposition  between 
'eco-anarchism'  and  'eco-statism'.  A  good  example  of  this  is  Wall's  claim  that,  "The 
debate 
...  over  the  governance  of  Green  societies  has  been  a  debate  between  eco-anarchists 
and  eco-statists,  while  one  party  claims  that  the  creation  and  maintenance  of  Green 
imperatives  demands  centralised  restraint,  the  other  argues  that  such  imperatives  are 
served  by  greater  freedom,  participation  and  self-government"  (1994:  13).  In  this  chapter, 
like  Wall,  I  will  discuss  the  question  of  institutional  design  and  organisation  within  green 
politics  in  terms  of  'governance'.  However,  unlike  him,  institutions  are  here  discussed  in 
the  light  of  their  efficacy  in  realising  green  values  and  principles,  such  as  sustainability, 
rather  than  how  they  fit  into  some  ideal  of  the  'sustainable  society'.  I  At  the  same  time,  the 
I  This  issue  of  the  eco-anarchist  concern  with  mapping  out  the  contours  of  the  fiaure  'sustainable  society' 
to  the  detriment  of  spelling  out  the  principle  of  sustainability,  was  raised  in  the  last  chapter  (4.5). 145 
supposition  that  the  only  means  available  to  state  governance  is  'centralised  restraint' 
(with  the  implicit  suggestion  that  non-state  forms  of  'decentralised  restraint'  are  either 
impossible  or  not  really  forms  of  restraint  at  all)2  will  be  challenged,  as  well  as  the 
simplistic  binary  presentation  of  the  institutional  options  available  to  green  political  theory. 
In  some  respects  the  instrumental  view  of  institutions,  including  the  state,  adopted  in 
this  chapter  is  close  to  Goodin's  (1992)  division  of  green  political  theory  into  a  'green 
theory  of  value'  and  a  'green  theory  of  agency'.  For  him,  these  two  aspects  of  green 
politics  are  logically  independent,  so  that  accepting  green  arguments  concerning  the 
intrinsic  value  of  the  natural  world,  for  example,  does  not  imply  accepting  green 
arguments  concerning  political  arrangements.  As  he  puts  it,  "we  can,  and  probably 
should,  accept  green  policy  prescriptions  without  necessarily  adopting  green  ideas  about 
how  to  reform  political  structures  and  processee'  (1992:  5).  While  rejecting  the  thrust  of 
Goodin's  particular  dualistic  analysis  of  green  political  theory,  I  do  wish  to  draw  a  similar 
means-ends  distinction  for  purposes  of  exposition.  The  heuristic  distinction  I  wish  to 
make  is  between  green  values  and  aims  (such  as  sustainability,  democratisation,  the 
moralisation  of  social-environmental  interaction)  and  the  various  institutional 
arrangements  and  social  practices  that  may  frame,  articulate,  embody,  prioritise  or 
otherwise  realise  these  values  in  determinate  social  and  social-environmental  relations.  On 
the  one  hand,  green  values  are  perhaps  compatible  with  a  narrower  range  of  institutional 
arrangements  than  Goodin  allows,  such  that  accepting  green  values  does  commit  one  to 
adopting  some  distinctively  'green'  political  and  economic  structures.  On  the  other,  in 
opposition  to  so-called  'radical  greens',  it  is  also  possible  that  green  values  are  compatible 
with  a  wider  range  of  institutional  arrangements  than  they  acknowledge.  This  chapter 
looks  at  the  institutional  options  available  to  achieve  green  goals  in  the  area  between  these 
two  positions.  Again  in  opposition  to  Goodin,  this  chapter  by  building  on  the  ethical 
arguments  raised  in  chapters  2  and  3,  seeks  to  present  a  conception  of  green  politics  in 
2  As  mentioned  in  the  last  chapter,  realistic  eco-anarchistic  theories  do  not  suppose  that  non-state  forms  of 
governance  are  non-coercive,  they  simply  require  different  less  formal  forms  of  coercion  as  Taylor  points 
out  (1982).  A  good  example  of  'decentralised  restraint',  what  O'Riordan  (1981:  306)  classifies  as  an 
'authoritarian  communal'  solution,  can  be  found  in  Goldsmith  et  al  (1972),  and  Heilbroner  (1980). 146 
which  its  ethical  and  political  conunitments  are  both  directly  rather  than  contingently 
related  and  mutually  supporting. 
The  organisation  of  this  chapter  is  as  follows.  In  section  5.2  there  is  a  brief  discussion 
of  structure/agency  within  green  politics.  In  section  5.3,  the  idea  of  ecological  rationality 
vi  nmental  is  introduced  as  the  standard  against  which  institutional  responses  to  social-en  ro 
I- 
are  to  be  judged  fi7om  a  green  perspective.  Following  on  from  this  section  5.4  the  role  of 
the  nation-state  within  green  politics  is  examined  as  a  way  of  introducing  collective 
ecological  management  (5.6)  by  way  of  a  reconstructive  critique  of  'ecological 
modernisation'  (5.5).  In  5.7  the  dimensions  of  collective  ecological  management  are 
further  fleshed  out  by  looking  at  its  cultural  and  normative  dimensions.  In  5.8  this  cultural 
dimension  is  expressed  as  a  political  interpretation  of  Leopold's  'land  ethic'.  In  5.9  the 
role,  scope  and  institutional  forms  of  regulation  and  planning  within  collective  ecological 
management  is  discussed  while  in  5.9.1  ecological  restoration  is  briefly  presented  as  an 
issue  where  environmental  planning  and  management  are  central. 
5.2.  Structure  and  Agency  within  Green  Politics 
From  the  point  of  view  of  green  political  theory,  the  resolution  of  the  ecological  crisis  is 
not  simply  a  matter  of  structural  reorganisation,  either  of  the  economy  and  the  scale  of 
technology  and  production,  or  of  changing  the  level  of  legislative  or  policy-making  power. 
For  many  of  the  issues  that  green  political  theory  deals  with,  particularly  those  related  to 
its  moral  claims,,  attention  needs  to  be  focused  on  changing  people's  attitudes  and 
interests,  as  discussed  in  chapter  3.  To  put  it  simply,  many  of  the  questions  raised  by 
greens  are  matters  of  individual  and  collective  will  as  much  as  institutional  transformation. 
They  are  of  course  related,  and  the  specific  manner  in  which  agents  are  related  to 
structures  will  constitute  a  particular  understanding  of  green  theory.  For  example,  we  can 
understand  deep  ecology  as  a  theory  which  emphasises  agent-level  change  (consciousness 
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this  deeper-level  change.  3  For  green  politics,  institutional  change  must  be  placed  within  a 
wider  cultural  context. 
As  we  have  seen  in  chapters  2  and  3,  a  non-anthropocentric  green  politics  aims  to  alter 
the  prevailing  attitudes  to  nature.  On  this  account,  green  politics  is  a  moral  crusade 
seeking  to  win  'converts'  away  from  anthropocentrism  and  its  worldview.  These 
approaches  have  much  in  common  with  what  Dobson  calls  the  'religious  approach'  to 
green  change  which  holds  that,  "the  changes  that  need  to  take  place  are  too  profound  to 
be  dealt  with  in  the  political  arena,  and  that  the  proper  territory  for  action  is  the  psyche 
rather  than  the  parliamentary  chamber"  (1990:  143;  emphasis  added).  On  the  other  hand, 
reformist  environmentalism  focuses  mainly  on  'greening'  existing  structures,  rather  than 
reflecting  on  the  structures  themselves  in  the  light  of  ecological  considerations,  and  the 
relationship  between  structures  and  the  behaviour  and  attitudes  of  agents.  This 
relationship  between  agents  and  structure  will  be  further  discussed  in  chapters  6  and  7, 
where  I  offer  a  critique  of  'economistic'  forms  of  environmental  valuation  based  on  the 
phenomenon  of  'endogenous  preferences'. 
The  conception  of  green  political  theory  being  developed  in  this  thesis  seeks  to 
combine  both  agency  and  structural  approaches.  Indeed,  as  I  hope  to  show  in  this  and  the 
following  chapters,  the  values,  principles,  and  goals  that  are  central  to  the  green  political 
project  depend  upon  combining  both  agent  and  structural  level  change.  Collective 
ecological  management  therefore  has  to  do  with  both  preferences  and  policies,  agents  and 
structures.  In  this  respect,  unlike  market  approaches  to  ecological  issues,  collective 
ecological  management  is  a  problem-solving  rather  than  a  preference-aggregating  process. 
For  green  politics,  understood  as  a  form  of  collective  ecological  management,  resolving 
environmental  problems  requires  cultural  and  not  just  institutional  change.  Because  the 
roots  of  ecological  problems  do  not  lie  exclusively  in  either  cultural  norms  or  institutional 
structures,  neither  do  the  solutions.  From  the  point  of  view  of  green  politics  defended 
3  This  understanding  of  deep  ecology  is  similar  to  Dobson's  critique  of  the  lack  of  reflection  upon  green 
principles  within  the  early  green  movement  due  to  the  fact,  "that  the  message  was  so  obvious  that  it  only 
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here,  the  long-run  resolution  of  social-environmental  problems  requires  a  politics  based  on 
an  immanent  critique  of  the  prevailing  cultural  as  well as  institutional  order. 
In  chapter  2  (2.3.1),  it  was  suggested  that  aspects  of  deep  ecology  as  a  'radical 
ecologism'  are  premised  on  the  conviction  that  the  "ecological  crisis'  is  ultimately  a  'total 
crisis'  of  contemporary  western  civilization,  its  core  cultural  values  and  institutions.  If  it  is 
indeed  the  case  that  we  are  faced  with  a  complete  crisis,  then  reforming  or  transforming 
structures  is  of  secondary  importance  at  best,  or  at  worst  simply  'fiddling  while  Rome 
bums'.  If  we  add  to  this  belief  the  eco-anarchist  contention  that  it  is  these  very  structures 
themselves  which  have  caused  this  crisis,  then  we  can  easily  see  why  for  many  radical 
greens  the  real  battle  is  for  the  hearts  and  minds  of  people  rather  than  their  votes.  4  But  to 
see  attempts  to  change  people's  attitudes  to  nature  as  somehow  separate  from  structural, 
especially  political  and  economic,  arrangements  is  problematic.  If  one  does  not  accept 
that  the  ecological  crisis  represents  a  complete  crisis  of  civilisation,  but  rather  expresses  a 
contradiction  within  contemporary  societies,  then  it  is  possible  that  structural 
transformation  rather  than  abolition  and  reconstruction,  may  be  necessary  (if  not 
sufficient)  for  cultural  transformation.  Structural  and  agent-level  change  are  thus  not 
mutually  incompatible,  but  potentially  mutually  reinforcing  and  supporting. 
From  a  green  point  of  view,  social  practices  form  an  important  connection  between 
structures  and  agents,  as  well  as  between  agents  themselves.  MacIntyre  describes  a 
practice  as,  "any  coherent  and  complex  form  of  socially  established  co-operative  human 
activity  through  which  goods  internal  to  that  form  of  activity  are  realized  in  the  course  of 
trying  to  achieve  those  standards  of  excellence  which  are  appropriate  to  and  partially 
definitive  of,  that  form  of  activity"  (1984:  187).  In  terms  of  the  analysis  of  virtue  in 
chapter  2  (2.7),  it  is  clear  that  MacIntyre's  'standards  of  excellence'  are  another  way  of 
spelling  out  virtues,  although  I  do  not  subscribe  to  his  interpretation  of  virtue.  At  the 
4  An  alternative  conclusion  that  can  be  drawn  from  the  'total  crisis'  position  is  that  offered  by  the  eco- 
authoritarians  for  whom  it  is  the  beliefs  and  lifestyles  of  liberal  democratic  populations  that  have  brought 
these  societies  close  to  ecological  annihilation.  They  suggest  that  strong,  effective  and  authoritarian 
political  structures  are  required  to  regulate  the  unruly  and  unecological  desires  of  the  populace.  See 
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same  time,  I  want  to  suggest  that  a  green  examination  of  the  institutional  structure 
appropriate  to  its  values,  requires  attention  to  the  way  in  which  practices  are  related  to 
institutions.  As  O'Neill  points  out,  "Institutions,  however,  not  only  sustain  practices,  they 
can  also  corrupt  them.  The  pursuit  of  external  goods-  wealth,  power  and  status-  may 
come  into  conflict  with  the  pursuit  of  internal  goods  and  practicee'  (1993:  127).  5  Social 
practices,  such  as  Berry's  view  of  the  social-environmental  practice  of  farming  discussed 
in  chapter  2  (2.7.1),  are  therefore  central  to  green  institutional  arrangements.  However,  it 
is  not  the  case  that  green  institutional  arrangements  are  to  be  determined  by  social 
practices.  Rather  it  is  that  institutions  are  to  be  judged  to  the  extent  that  they  support 
rather  than  undermine  practices  which  embody  green  values,  principles  and  modes  of 
behaviour.  At  the  same  time  it  is  not  only  practices,  in  the  strong  sense  implied  by 
MacIntyre,  which  can  express  values  or  be  partly  constituted  by  normative  considerations. 
Institutional  change  can  also  signal  profound  changes  in  modes  of  behaviour.  As  Dryzek 
notes,  "in  remaking  our  institutions  we  also  remake  ourselves:  who  we  are,  what  we 
value,  how  we  interact,  and  what  we  can  accomplisif'  (1987:  247).  While  it  is  the  case 
that  green  institutional  arguments  favour  structural  change  which  enhance  ecological 
social-environmental  practices  (which  focus  on  'internal  goods'),  this  does  not  rule  out 
social-environmental  exchanges  which  are  governed  by  'external  goods'  (such  as  wealth 
creation).  Both  internal  and  external  goods  can  contribute  to  human  well-being. 
Recalling  the  discussion  of  an  'ethics  of  use'  in  chapter  3,  it  is  not  the  case  that  all  social- 
environmental  practices  are  automatically  exempt  from  criticism,  and  all  institutionally- 
regulated  social-environmental  exchanges  ethically  wrong.  That  is,  not  all  social  practices 
are  assumed  to  be  symbiotic,  nor  are  all  institutional  activities  assumed  to  be  parasitic. 
Rather,  an  ethics  of  use,  as  a  publicly  agreed  set  of  normative  codes  which  distinguishes 
5  Recalling  the  stress  on  virtue  in  chapters  2  and  3,  it  is  interesting  to  note  that  O'Neill  (1993)  defines 
virtue  in  relation  to  practices.  According  to  him,  "A  virtue  is  an  acquired  human  quality  the  possession  of 
which  (and  exercise  of)  tends  to  enable  us  to  achieve  those  goods  which  are  internal  to  practices  and  the 
lack  of  which  effectively  prevents  us  from  achieving  any  such  goods"  (ibid.:  178).  This  relationship 
between  social  practices  and  virtues  has  already  been  alluded  to  in  the  discussion  of  Berry's  'ecology  of 
the  virtues'  in  relation  to  farming  in  chapter  2.  This  chapter  will  seek  to  build  upon  this  by  examining  the 
institutional  arrangements  which  can  support  social-environmental  practices  and  their  associated 
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'use'  from  'abuse',  is  to  range  over  all  social-environmental  exchanges,  whether  they  be 
institutional,  individual  or  carried  out  within  social  practices. 
Thus,  even  if  we  allow  for  the  importance  of  'ecological  consciousness'  as  an  essential 
aspect  of  green  politics,  as  deep  ecologists  and  eco-anarchists  claim,  the  state  does  not 
necessarily  stand  in  the  way  of  the  spread  of  such  mores.  6  The  point  is  that  it  is  through 
altered  relationships  between  individuals  as  citizens,  consumers,  producers  and  parents, 
within  the  spheres  of  the  nation-state,  civil  society,  and  the  economy,  that  ecological 
modes  of  action  and  thought  will  be  expressed.  It  is  in  social  practices  and  social 
institutions,  that  green  norms  and  ecological  modes  of  behaviour  will  be  located.  The 
point  about  collective  ecological  management  is  that  it  is  not  simply  to  do  with  finding 
more  effective  social  institutions  to  deal  with  environmental  problems.  Rather,  it  seeks  to 
deal  with  the  causes  and  not  just  the  effects  of  social-environmental  problems,  by 
expanding  the  criterion  of  'effective'  to  include  normative  as  well  as  'instrumental'  or 
utilitarian  considerations.  Crucially,  it  has  to  do  with  meshing  the  activity  of  structures 
and  agents  in  such  a  way  that  the  collective  outcome  is  ecologically  rational  and  socially 
acceptable.  7  In  other  words,  structures  and  agents  must  be  seen  as  dialectically  related, 
such  that  agents  (collectively)  can  have  some  input  at  the  level  of  structures  which 
themselves  influence  the  behaviour  of  agents  by  affecting  the  conditions  under  which  they 
make  decisions. 
6  One  way  of  looldrig  at  it  would  be  to  argue  that  eco-anarchistic  values  may  be  expressed  through  social 
practices  supported  by  state  institutions.  That  is,  they  could  be  honoured  as  opposed  to  reaftsed.  What  is 
meant  by  this  is  that  the  values  and  practices  of  eco-anarchism,  including  inter  afta,  communal  self- 
determination,  care  for  a  particular  environment,  liberty,  equality  and  well-being,  may  be  represented 
uithin  and  influence  the  institutional  structures  of  society.  In  short,  honouring  eco-anarchistic  values  does 
not  involve  the  wholesale  rejection  of  state  institutions  as  would  be  the  case  if  these  particular  values  and 
practices  were  to  be  realised.  Eco-anarchistic  values  and  practices  are,  after  all,  simply  alternative 
conceptions  of  green  values  and  practices.  This  is  an  implication  of  seeing  eco-anarchism  as  a  regulative 
as  opposed  to  a  constitutive  ideal. 
7  One  of  the  most  important  social  practices  from  this  point  of  view  is  citizenship,  the  outlines  of  which 
will  be  presented  below  and  developed  ftirther  in  the  chapter  7.  Other  social  practices  which  impinge 
directly  on  social-environmental  transformative  activities  include  science,  technology,  as  well  as  more 
direct  forms  of  interaction  such  as  farming,  animal  husbandry,  forestry,  andwork  Work  are  discussed  in 
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Green  politics  in  the  last  analysis  is  not  simply  about  macro-level  changes,  but  is  also 
about  choosing  to  live  in  a  different  manner  at  the  micro-level  of  individuals  and 
communities.  Building  on  the  discussion  of  virtue  (chapters  2  and  3),  within  collective 
ecological  management,  individuals  are  faced  not  just  with  the  question  of  'what  ought  I 
to  do?  ',  but  more  importantly  have  to  ask  themselves  'what  sort  of  person  do  I  wish  to 
be?  '  and  ultimately,  'what  sort  of  society  do  I  wish  to  be  in?  '.  In  response  to  Hume's 
adage  that  we  ought  to  'design  institutions  for  knaves',  one  desired  aim  of  green  politics  is 
to  discourage  people  from  being  knavish  in  the  first  place.  This  requires  designing 
institutional  structures  to  sustain  'ecologically  rational'  modes  of  behaviour  by  supporting 
rather  than  undermining  ecological  social  practices.  It  is  my  contention  that  ecologically 
rational  modes  of  interaction  involves,  in  part,  cultivating  ecological  virtue  at  the 
individual  level  in  the  various  roles  they  occupy  and  identities  they  have  as  consumers, 
producers,  citizens  and  parents.  At  the  social  level,  ecologically  rational  social- 
environmental  relations,  ultimately  requires  the  creation  of  an  ecologically  adapted  and 
adaptive  culture,  supported  by  an  institutional  structure  in  which  the  state  and  market  are 
restructured  so  that  they  are  instrumental  to  social  life  and  democracy  as  popular 
sovereignty.  It  is  to  this  criterion  of  ecological  rationality  that  we  turn  to  next. 
5.3  Ecological  Rationality 
In  order  to  assess  what  institutional  forms  best  concur  with  the  conception  of  green 
politics  being  developed  here  a  criterion  or  standard  by  which  they  can  by  judged  is 
required.  To  this  end  I  wish  to  adapt  Dryzek's  criterion  of  'ecological  rationality'  to  my 
own  purposes  in  order  to  develop  a  workable,  heuristic  device  by  which  to  rank 
alternative  institutional  arrangements  for  dealing  with  social-environmental  relations. 
According  to  Dryzek  ecological  rationality  can  be  understood  as,  "the  capability  of 
ecosystems  consistently  and  effectively  to  provide  the  good  of  human  life  support  ... 
From 
the  perspective  of  ecological  rationality  ...  what  one  is  interested  in  is  the  capacity  of  human 
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(1987:  36;  emphasis  in  original).  This  idea  of  ecological  rationality,  which  captures  the 
essence  of  ecological  sustainability,  will  be  used  as  one  of  the  criteria  against  which  to 
judge  different  institutional  arrangements.  However,  ecological  rationality,  as  Dryzek 
defines  it,  is  problematic  from  the  green  point  of  view  defended  here,  since  it  refers  only  to 
'human  life  support'  with  no  reference  to  other  values  such  as  democracy,  autonomy  or 
social  justice.  Nor  does  it  refer  to  the  well-being  or  interests  of  the  nonhuman  world. 
Dryzek's  view  of  ecological  rationality  may  be  said  to  be  a  'pure  ecological  sustainability' 
conception,  concerned  simply  with  maintaining  a  stable  and  productive  entropic 
metabolism  between  social  and  ecological  systems.  That  is,  ecological  rationality  for 
Dryzek  is  a  form  of  functional  rationality  (1987:  34-5).  This  is  not  surprising  since  he 
discusses  social-environmental  interaction  in  terms  of  the  'human  system'  interacting  with 
the  'natural  system',  with  the  aim  of  securing  long-run  human  'life-support'.  Within 
collective  ecological  management  the  appropriate  criterion  is  a  conception  of  ecological 
rationality  which  includes  DgLeqkjLsustainabiýt  '  Eonce2tion  but  exp  das  ilt  1!  q  iLclude 
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the  normative  as  well  as  the  'functional'  dimensions  of  social-environmental  problems.  8 
That  is,  this  expanded  view  of  ecological  rationality  refers  to  communicative  (i.  e.  parasitic 
and  symbiotic,  use  and  abuse,  just  and  unjust)  as  well  as  functional  (sustainable  and 
unsustainable,  productive  and  unproductive)  criteria  by  which  to  judge  social- 
environmental  relations. 
This  expanded  understanding  of  ecological  rationality  is  therefore  one  which  addresses 
the  totality  of  social-environment  metabolism,  not  just  the  material  aspect  of  this 
relationship.  The  expanded  conception  refers  to  the  impact  of  human  and  natural  systems 
upon  nonhuman  welfare  as  well  as  being  concerned  with  values  other  than  long-term  life 
support.  As  used  in  this  thesis,  ecological  rationality  also  refers  to  both  ends  and  means. 
That  is,  in  sum,  an  ecologically  rational  social-environmental  metabolism  must  fulfil  three 
inter-related  criteria.  Firstly,  this  metabolism  needs  to  be  sustainable,  in  the  sense 
8  There  may  be  a  link  between  Dryzek's  functional  conception  of  ecological  rationality  and  'weak 
sustainability',  which  is  premised  on  the  substitutability  of  social  and  natural  capital  and  is  concerned 
solely  with  maintaining  a  non-declining  overall  capital  stock  over  time,  defined  in  relation  to  human 
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indicated  by  Dryzek.  Secondly,  it  must  be  symbiotic,  in  the  sense  indicated  in  chapter  3 
(3.6).  And  finally,  it  must  be  sociilly  acceptable  i.  e.  decided  democratically  rather  than 
undemocratically,  extended  to  a  point  where  the  ends  as  well  as  the  means  of  social- 
environmental  exchanges  are  on  the  agenda.  The  latter  is  discussed  in  chapter  7.  The 
range  of  issues  covered  by  the  expanded  conception  of  ecological  rationality  is  therefore 
greater  than  that  covered  by  a  pure  sustainability  conception.  Whereas  the  instrumental 
view  judges  social  arrangements  in  terms  of  their  ability,  in  conjunction  with  ecosystems, 
to  produce  long-term  sustainability  of  a  given  view  of  human  well-being/life  support,  the 
substantive  view  judges  arrangements  with  respect  to  values  other  than  human  well- 
being.  9 
The  resolution  of  environmental  problems  from  a  green  point  of  view  involves 
normative  as  well  as  practical  considerations.  Environmental  problems,  even  when 
presented  as  economic  problems  of  scarcity,  underpricing,  or  political  problems  of 
legitimacy,  competence  or  whatever,  are  at  root  deeply  normative  as  well  as  technical 
problems.  That  is,  these  problems  are  not  just  about  problems  in  respect  to  the  social- 
environmental  means  which  sustain  human  welfare,  but  are  also  about  what  human  welfare 
means,  and  whether  considerations  of  human  welfare  alone  ought  to  regulate  social- 
environmental  relations.  The  aim  of  green  politics  is  concerned  with  initiating  a  public 
debate  over  the  ends  of  the  social-environmental  metabolism,  rather  than  debate  the  most 
effective  means  to  given  ends.  It  is  the  green  contention  that  much  of  the  environmental 
crisis  stems  from  the  depoliticisation  of  the  ends  of  social-environmental  interaction,  the 
prime  example  of  which  is  the  central  place  accorded  to  undifferentiated  economic  growth 
and  consumption  within  western  societies,  politically,  economically  and  culturally  (Barry, 
1990). 
9  These  values  include  those  pertaining  to  social  justice,  democratic  norms  as  well  as  those  relating  to 
social-environmental  interactions.  In  other  words,  the  communicative  aspects  of  ecological  rationality 
cover  both  intrahuman  and  human-nonhuman  aspects  of  social-crivironmental  relations.  However,  in  this 
chapter  I  focus  on  ecological  rationality  as  concerned  with  sustainability  and  symbiosis.  Democracy  and 
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The  point  is  that  from  the  green  point  of  view  the  ecological  crisis  is  not  just  a 
technical  problem  which  requires  the  adoption  of  a  specific  set  of  institutional 
arrangements  or  social  choice  mechanisms  (although  these  are  of  course  crucial).  From 
the  point  of  view  of  green  political  theory,  the  'ecological  crisis'  is  not  only  a  crisisfor 
society  but  also  a  crisis  of  society  in  the  sense  of  stemming  from  contradictions  within 
society.  As  a  normative  problem  the  appropriate  criterion  against  which  any  'solution' 
should  be  judged  calls  for  substantive  and  not  instrumental  rationality.  It  is  for  this  reason 
that  economic  solutions  to  environmental  problems  were  questioned  in  chapter  3  (sections 
3.5  and  3.6  and  in  the  next  chapter).  10  For  example,  both  economic  rationality  and 
ecological  rationality  qua  sustainability  are  governed  by  the  principle  of  efficiency  geared 
towards  maximisation,  without  any  normative  consideration  of  ends  or  the  impact  on 
nonhuman  welfare.  Ecological  rationality  as  a  communicative  form  of  rationality  in 
respect  to  the  economy-ecology  metabolism  is  not  geared  towards  the  long-term 
maximisation  of  human  material  welfare  alone.  In  terms  of  the  argument  presented  later 
(5.6.1),  societies  do  manage  their  environments  so  that  ecosystems  are  constrained  to  an 
'anthropogenic  sub-climax'  (Odum,  1983:  473).  11  According  to  Dryzek,  "in  the  absence 
of  human  interests,  ecological  rationality  may  be  recognized  in  terms  of  an  ecosystem's 
provision  of  fife  support  to  itself  Left  to  its  own  devices,  ecological  succession  tends 
toward  the  production  of  climax  ecosystems7'  (1987:  44;  emphasis  in  original).  Thus 
10  As  argued  in  the  next  chapter,  the  elevation  of  sufficiency  as  a  principle  regulating  the  economy- 
ecology  metabolism  necessitates  the  rc-cmbedding  the  economy  within  society  in  Latouche's  (1993)  terms, 
the  collective  self-conscious  limiting  of  economic  imperatives.  For  Gorz  this  stems  from  the  inability  of 
economic  rationality  to  define  and  adhere  to  its  own  limits.  As  he  puts  it,  "Capitalism  has  been  the 
expression  of  economic  rationality  finally  set  free  of  all  restraint"  (1989:  122).  Sufficiency  as  a  culturally 
and  politically  defined  category  represents  an  important  feature  of  collective  ecological  management 
namely  as  the  process  by  which  society  imposes  limits  upon  itselL  The  clash  between  maximisation  and 
sufficiency  can  be  readily  observed  in  the  debates  over  competing  conceptions  of  development  and 
progress  between  green  critiques  of  economic  growth  and  competing  visions  of  'sustainable  development'. 
Another  aspect  of  this  has  to  do  with  the  value  of  self-reliance  within  green  political  theory,  discussed  in 
the  next  chapter. 
11  An  'anthropogenic  sub-climax'  is  an  ecological  state  which  is  different  from  that  which  would  have 
been  the  case  in  the  absence  of  human  intervention.  One  way  of  understanding  this  concept  is  that  this 
anthropogenic  sub-climatic  state  is  the  'humanised  environment'  which  constitutes  our  'ecological  niche'. 
Thus,  it  is  only  in  the  absence  of  human  interests  does  it  make  sense  to  argue,  as  Commoner  (1971)  does, 
that  'nature  knows  best.  It  is  discussed  in  more  detail  below  in  5.8. 155 
within  sustainable  social-environmental  relations,  ecosystems  are  characterised  by  stable 
sub-climatic  states  and  unsustainable  relations  by  unstable  sub-climatic  states.  However, 
symbiotic-sustainable  relations  will  be  characterised  by  sub-climatic  ecological  states 
within  which  long-run  sustainability  (in  terms  of  human  material  welfare)  will  be  less  than 
that  given  by  a  pure  sustainability  conception  of  ecological  rationality.  In  other  words, 
whereas  sustainability  implies  human  society  constraining  and  managing  the  natural 
progression  of  ecosystems  for  its  own  interests  in  maximising  long-run  human  material 
welfare,  symbiosis  implies  society  imposing  extra  normative  limits  on  itself  in  the 
ýustainable_41S  of  ecOsYste-  _s 
For  collective  ecological  management,  functional 
rationality  is  not  sufficient  by  itself  (though  it  is  necessary)  for  resolving  ecological 
problems.  From  the  point  of  view  of  green  politics,  resolving  the  ecological  problems 
facing  society  requires  deliberative  processes  within  which  the  normative  content  and  ends 
of  social-environment  relations  may  be  discussed,  debated  and  possibly  reconstituted. 
However,  this  is  not  to  say  that  the  expanded  conception  of  ecological  rationality  outlined 
here  will  guarantee  sustainable  and  symbiotic  social-environmental  relations.  Nothing  can 
guarantee  the  latter  and  seeking  to  frame  green  politics  in  those  terms  is 
counterproductive.  It  was  the  desire  to  guarantee  green  values  that  helps  us  understand 
the  odd  position  of  early  green  theorising  being  either  utopian  (as  discussed  in  the  last 
chapter  and  parts  of  the  critique  of  deep  ecology)  or  authoritarian  (discussed  in  chapter  7). 
All  one  can  reasonably  hope  to  achieve  is  to  create  the  context  within  which  it  is  more 
likely  that  the  social-environmental  metabolism  will  be  ecologically  rational. 
A  final  way  in  which  to  understand  ecological  rationality  is  to  see  it  as  an  indication  of 
the  learning  and  adaptive  capacities  of  social  institutions  to  cope  with  the  material  and 
moral  dimensions  of  the  social-environment  metabolism.  Ecological  rationality  referring 
as  it  does  to  the  normative  as  well  as  material  aspects  of  social-environment  interaction  is 
in  part  concerned  with  the  inter-relationships  between  the  various  parts  that  together 
constitute  a  particular  pattern  of  social  interaction  with  the  nonhuman  world.  As  such, 
collective  ecological  management  (which  has  ecological  rationality  as  its  principal 
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of  the  environment,  the  particular  social-environmental  relationships  they  indicate,  and  the 
human  interests  evoked,  relate  to  one  another.  In  the  next  section2  the  state  as  one  of  the 
institutions  of  collective  ecological  management  is  examined. 
5.4  The  State  and  Ecological  Management  within  Green  Politics 
Some  green  theorists  and  commentators  have  sought  to  argue  that  the  election  of  a  'green 
government'  be  seen  as  an  interim  measure,  an  intermediate  stage  on  the  way  to  the  future 
sustainable  society  (Young,  1994;  Spretnak  and  Capra,  1985).  This  strategic  commitment 
to  state-institutions,  -  and  the  political  aim  of  'greening  the  nation-state'  is  often  found  in 
debates  around  strategy  within  the  green  movement.  For  example,  Irvine  and  Ponton 
explicitly  state  that  the  aim  of  their  book,  tellingly  entitled  A  Green  Manifesto,  is  to 
"explore  how  governments  might  begin  to  move  towards  this  [Green]  goal,  and  away 
from  the  present  slide  into  ecological  and  social  chaos7'  (1988:  16),  and  go  on  to  offer 
detailed  policy  prescriptions  for  an  incoming  'Green  government'  (ibid.:  30).  Other 
examples  of  this  strategic  aim  to  greening  the  state  can  be  found  in  Porritt  (1984:  165-7), 
and  the  programme  of  the  German  Green  Party  (Die  Grfinen,  1983).  Sometimes  the  use 
of  'statist'  short-term  measures  to  achieve  non-statist,  long-term  ends  is  argued  to  be 
compatible  with  eco-anarchism.  A  case  was  made  for  such  an  interpretation  of 
Bookchin's  libertarian  municipalism  in  the  last  chapter.  A  similar  view  may  be  found  in 
Begg's  argument  that,  "Complete  rejection  [of  the  state  system]  would  clearly  be  a 
mistake,  little  of  this  [green  political  change]  is  possible  without  the  incapacitation  and 
internal  transformation  of  the  centralized  state"  (1991:  29;  emphasis  added).  This 
instrumental-strategic  view  of  the  state  as  a  stepping  stone  to,  and  a  possible  institutional 
part  of,  the  sustainable  society  is  one  that  will  be  examined  in  this  section. 
There  are  also  more  directly  policy-orientated  conceptions  of  green  politics  which 
work  with  the  assumption  of  state  institutions  as  given,  often  in  an  uncritical  fashion.  The 
policy  orientation  almost  by  definition  means  these  approaches  have  to  frame  their 
proposals  with  the  assumption  of  the  continuing  importance  of  the  nation-state,  since  state 157 
institutions  are  the  primary  policy-making  and  implementing  agencies  (Weale,  1992; 
Young,  1992,1993;  Kemball-Cook  et  al,  199  1).  A  recent  example  of  this  is  'ecological 
modernisation'  which  is  discussed  in  the  next  section.  The  centrality  of  the  state  is 
perhaps  most  obvious  in  policy-orientated  debates  on  the  international  dimensions  of 
environmental  problems  where  the  nation-state  is  simply  accepted  as  the  appropriate 
institutional  subject  of  analysis  (Goodin,  1992:  146-68).  Together  with  the  strategic 
acceptance  of  the  state  outlined  above,  the  tensions  caused  by  the  pragmatism  of  policy- 
orientated  green  political  action  are  readily  seen  in  the  division  between  'realos'  and 
'fundis'  within  the  green  movement  (Doherty,  1992).  This  division  is  partly  a  debate 
concerning  different  means  to  shared  ends.  Realos  defend  the  'greening  of  the  state'  as  an 
intermediate  step  to  the  end  of  the  sustainable  society,  while  fundis  claim  that  one  cannot 
use  statist  means  to  non-statist  ends.  A  variation  of  this  argument  concerns  those  who 
place  the  role  of  the  state  in  environmental  affairs  within  the  context  of  the  multi- 
institutional  'governance'  that  reaching  and  maintaining  a  sustainable  development  path 
for  society  requires  (Jacobs,  1995).  The  latter  is  close  to  the  collective  ecological 
management  position  being  developed  in  this  chapter. 
A  third  reason  for  'green  statism'  can  be  found  in  the  writings  of  those  for  whom  the 
green  endorsement  of  state  regulation  is  a  mark  of  their  scepticism,  if  not  outright 
rýection,  of  market-based  approaches  to  environmental  problems.  These  range  from  the 
4green  social  democracy'  of  Eckersley  (1992a,  1992b)  and  De  Geus  (1996),  to  the  eco- 
socialist  proposals  of  Stretton  (1976),  Pepper  (1993),  Mulberg  (1992,1993),  Weston 
(1986)  and  Ryle  (1988).  Such  arguments  for  the  state  can  be  traced  back  to  the  initial 
political  debate  on  the  environmental  crisis  in  the  1970s.  Typical  of  this  early  green 
suspicion  of  market-based  approaches  is  Ashby's  statement  that,  "The  future  of  man's 
environment  cannot  be  left  to  private  enterprise  ... 
Therefore  governments  have  to  take 
responsibility"  (1974:  6).  Here  much  of  the  argument  focuses  on  either  the  limited 
ecological  rationality  of  the  market  (Dryzek,  1987),  the  inability  of  the  market  to  deal  with 
the  question  of  the  optimum  scale  of  the  economy  relative  to  the  environment  (Daly  and 
Cobb,  1990),  or  to  cope  with  the  scale  of  the  structural  changes  that  sustainability  requires 158 
(Jacobs,  1994,1995).  A  related  critique  developed  in  the  next  chapter  concerns  the 
suitability  of  market  approaches  to  articulate  the  normative  and  political  dimensions  posed 
by  ecological  problems.  12 
A  related  argument  in  favour  of  the  state  turns  on  the  green  recognition  of  the  utility  of 
state-institutions  with  regard  to  social  justice.  An  early  example  of  this  is  Daly's  (1973) 
argument  that  a  steady-state  economy,  which  is  characterised  by  a  fixed  amount  of  wealth, 
increases  the  necessity  and  desirability  for  state  redistribution.  More  contemporary 
arguments  in  favour  of  the  state  in  terms  of  distributive  justice  have  to  do  with  the 
incapacity  of  market  and/or  anarchistic  institutional  arrangements  to  ensure  an  equitable 
distributive  pattern  from  a  green  point  of  view  (Eckersley,  1992a:  175-8;  Goodin,  1992: 
150;  Gorz,  1982).  13 
A  final  argument  in  favour  of  there  being  some  role  for  the  state  within  green  politics 
comes  from  those  writers  concerned  about  the  status  of  democratic  norms  and  practices 
within  green  political  theory.  Typical  of  this  position  is  Frankel  who  argues,  from  an  eco- 
socialist  position,  that,  "any  post-industrial  society  is  going  to  fall  far  short  of  achieving 
greater  equity,  social  justice  and  genuine  popular  sovereignty,  without  the  construction  of 
a  democratic  state  structure"  (1987:  51-2).  A  similar  position  is  held  by  theorists  such  as 
Saward  (1993),  for  whom  representative  democracy  and  the  liberal  democratic  state  can 
achieve  green  goals.  In  the  latter  case,  the  retention  of  the  state  for  achieving 
sustainability  is  a  retention  of  representative  forms  of  democracy.  This  is  a  point  further 
developed  in  chapter  7  (7.7). 
12  Scepticism  concerning  market  approaches  to  the  normative  dimensions  of  social-cnvironmcntal  issues 
has  already  been  introduced  in  chapter  3  (3.6.1).  However,  as  argued  in  the  next  chapter,  the  green 
critique  of  the  market  makes  a  distinction  between  the  'global  capitalist  market'  and  the  market  as  a  social 
institution  for  uncoerced.  exchange  (6.4).  Later  in  chapter  7,1  suggest  that  while  the  normative  issues 
surrounding  social-cnvirorancntal  interaction  are  not  best  dealt  with  by  market  approaches  (or  policy 
instruments),  this  view  does  not  suggest  that  a  market  economy  is  necessarily  ecologically  irrational,  or 
that  the  market  cannot  function  as  an  institution  of  collective  ecological  management.  The  latter  concerns 
the  issue  of  the  regulation  or  'steering'  of  the  market  in  the  interests  of  sustainability,  discussed  in  5.9. 
13  More  contemporary  analyses  of  the  distributive  implications  of  green  politics  also  emphasise  that  any 
putative  'green  theory  of  social  justice'  must  take  into  account  that  what  is  to  be  fairly  distributed  includes 
social  and  environmental  costs  or  risks  as  well  as  environmental  and  social  benefits.  See  for  example 
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Some  proposals  for  a  'green  state'  are  naive  in  the  sense  that  they  see  the  institution  of 
the  state  as  a  neutral  mechanism  which  can  be  used  unproblematically  to  forward  the  green 
policy,  and  in  some  cases,  its  normative  agendas.  For  the  most  part,  however,  advocates 
of  the  'green  state'  are  pragmatists  who  accept  that  the  state  is  an  institution  without 
which  green  proposals  cannot  be  realised.  That  is,  most  of  those  who  emphasise  the  role 
of  the  state  within  'ecological  governance'  see  it  as  one  of  the  primary  institutions  with  the 
capacity  and  legitimacy  to  carry  out,  either  directly  or  indirectly,  the  type  of  changes 
greens  call  for  (Jacobs,  1995).  According  to  Young,  in  his  overview  of  green  political 
ideology,  'serious  greens'  are  not  arguing  for  the  abolition  of  the  state,  but  rather  for  its 
transformation  (1992:  21). 
Alongside  management  strategies  which  have  a  role  for  the  state  are  those  which 
emphasise  community-based  strategies  such  as  those  advocated  by  proponents  of  the 
'commons'  (Goldsmith  el  al,  1992),  which  have  much  in  common  with  the  eco-anarchist 
position  outlined  in  the  last  chapter.  There  are  also  those  who  put  forward  market-based 
solutions  in  which  community  and  the  state  have  relatively  little  role  to  play  in  effective 
ecological  management  (Anderson  and  Leal,  199  1),  discussed  in  the  next  chapter  (6.2). 
The  place  of  the  state  within  green  political  theory  is  thus  to  be  assessed  from  its 
functional  value  in  implementing  the  various  green  goals  that  together  make  up  'collective 
ecological  management'.  There  is  widespread  agreement  within  the  green  political 
programme  conceming  the  necessity  and  desirability  of  collective  strategies  for  managing 
the  environment.  The  debate  within  green  political  theory  is  essentially  over  the 
appropriate  level  (global,  national  or  local),  institutional  form  (state,  market,  or 
community),  procedural  content  (democratic,  technocratic),  normative  composition 
(ecocentric,  anthropocentric),  and  forms  of  knowledge  (vemacular,  local,  scientific- 
universal)  appropriate  to  collective  ecological  management.  In  the  next  section  I  outline 
an  interpretation  of  this  ecological  management  perspective  as  one  way  in  which  the  idea 
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5.5  A  Reconstructive  Critique  of  Ecological  Modernisation 
This  section  begins  with  a  critical  examination  of  attempts  to  'green  the  machinery  of 
government',  focusing  on  what  has  become  know  as  'ecological  modernisation'  (i.  e. 
existing  state-initiated  environmental  political  practice).  I  then  consider  how  this  approach 
can  be  used  to  advance  a  more  radical  conception  of  green  politics,  collective  ecological 
management,  within  which  the  state  has  a  key  role  (i.  e.  possible  environmental 
governance). 
Although  criticised  for  betraying  an  environmentalist  or  green  reformist  outlook, 
because  it  works  within  the  existing  institutions  of  modem  societies,  and  does  not  seem 
over  receptive  to  anything  other  than  an  economic  view  of  the  non-human  world, 
'ecological  modemisation'  does  represent  a  'realistic'  theory  of  dealing  with  ecological 
problems  and  suggests  one  path  for  sustainable  development.  The  transformations  it 
demands,  although  not  as  radical  as  those  proposed  by  eco-anarchists,  are  not  as  reformist 
and  limited  as  critics  often  suppose. 
The  basic  tenet  of  ecological  modernisation  is  that  the  zero-sum  character  of 
environment-economic  trade-offs  is  more  apparent  than  real.  Ecological  modernisation 
challenges  the  idea  that  improvements  in  environmental  quality  or  the  protection  of  nature 
are  necessarily  inimical  to  economic  welfare,  the  fundamental  position  which  dominated 
the  early  response  to  the  'environmental  crisis'.  In  this  earlier  debate  the  green  position 
was  that  a  steady-state  economy,  in  conjunction  with  zero-population  growth,  was  the 
only  economy-ecology  relationship  which  could  ensure  long-term  sustainability  (Daly, 
19732  1985;  Olson  &  Landsberg,  1975;  Kerry-Smith,  1979).  14  In  opposition  to  this  idea, 
14  It  is  worth  noting  that  although  the  steady-state  economy  position  is  at  odds  with  the  underlying 
principles  of  ecological  modernisation,  both  agree  on  the  importance  of  an  interventionist  pro-active 
state.  For  example,  Daly  (1987),  a  leading  proponent  of  the  steady-state  economy,  argues  that  the  advent 
of  a  society  premised  on  the  minimisation  rather  than  the  maximisation  of  'economic  throughput'  has  as  a 
corollary  the  need  for  the  state  to  manage  ecological  resources  and  distribute  the  available  wealth.  The 
latter  justffication  for  the  state  comes  from  his  argument,  with  which  most  green  theorists  and  activists 
would  agree,  that  economic  growth  is  a  substitute  for  tackling  the  problem  of  socio-economic  inequality. 
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ecological  modernisation  suggests  that  economic  competitiveness  is  not  incompatible  with 
environmental  protection,  indeed  as  Weale  points  out,  "environmental  protection  [is] 
a  ...  potential  source  for  future  growth"  (1992:  76).  Future  economic  prospects 
increasingly  depend  on  achieving  and  maintaining  high  standards  of  environmental 
protection.  In  general  terms  then,  ecological  modernisation  can  be  viewed  as  an  account 
of  how  existing  political  and  economic  institutions  have  responded  to  public  pressure  for 
governments  to  'do  something'  about  environmental  problems.  In  terms  of  the 
ends/means  distinction  drawn  above  (5.2),  it  is  concerned  mainly  (but  not  exclusively) 
with  finding  more  sustainable  means  (technical,  economic)  to  the  same  ends  (continuing 
increases  in  material  goods  and  services).  As  an  ideology  and  approach  to  dealing  with 
environmental  problems  it  clearly  originates  from  within  the  state  system,  rather  than  from 
within  civil  society,  which  is  the  usual  source  of  green  ideas.  This  is  demonstrated  by 
Weale's  analysis  of  it  as  a  policy  approach  to  pollution  control,  originating  in  a  critical 
rejection  of  early  policy  approaches  (1992:  75),  what  have  been  described  as  'first  wave 
environmental  problems'  (Goodin,  1992:  3).  15  Ecological  modernisation  as  an  ideology  is 
largely  constituted  by  government  programmes  and  policy  styles  and  traditions, 
particularly  those  of  Germany  (Weale,  1992:  79-85)  and  The  Netherlands  (Weale,  1992: 
ch.  5),  European  Union  environmental  programmes,  particularly  the  Fourth  Environmental 
Action  Programme  (Weale,  1992:  76-7).  Thus  one  can  say  that  the  origins  of  ecological 
modernisation  lies  in  the  environmental  discourse  of  policy  elites  . 
However,  seeing  it 
purely  as  a  legitimising  ideology  for  'business  as  usual',  would  be  a  mistake,  as  argued 
below. 
Ecological  modernisation  for  Weale  is  understood  both  as  a  legitimating  ideology 
within  certain  liberal  states'  response  to  environmental  problems,  and  as  a  new  departure 
in  environmental  policy  principles  (1992:  79).  As  such  it  can  be  viewed  as  marking  a  new 
environmental  policy  discourse  from  within  the  existing  institutions  of  the  liberal  state.  Its 
maximum  on  wealth  -a  limited  band  of  inequalities  necessary  for  incentives,  for  rewarding  work  of 
varying  irksomeness  and  intensity,  yet  ruling  out  extreme  inequality"  (1985:  125). 
15  'First-wave'  environmental  problems  were  largely  national  and  localised,  unlike  the  international  and 
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emergence  and  strength  as  an  ideology  lies  mainly  in  its  capacity  to  render  the  imperative 
for  economic  growth  compatible  with  the  imperative  to  protect  environmental  quality. 
The  evolution  of  this  perspective  has  been  described  by  Potier,  'Sy  the  mid-70s  it  had 
become  clear  that  it  is  both  environmentally  and  economically  sound  to  anticipate  the 
possible  negative  effects  of  an  activity  such  as  an  industrial  plant  and  to  design  it  in  such  a 
way  as  to  prevent  pollution  before  it  occure'  (1990:  69).  At  the  same  time  in  the  1980s 
there  developed  a  sizeable  market  for  'green'  or  'enviromnentafly-friendly'  products 
(Elkington  &  Burke,  1990).  Finally  there  was  greater  public  pressure  for  governments  to 
tackle  environmental  problems  (Young,  1993:  53-6;  Weale,  1992:  167-70),  as  well  as  the 
legitimacy  of  government  being  increasingly  tied  up  with  providing  environmental 
protection  (Weale,  1992:  1,26;  Walker,  1989:  38).  The  congruence  of  these  two  factors, 
one  from  the  demand  and  the  other  from  the  supply-side,  represents  the  context  within 
which  ecological  modernisation  developed.  To  use  economic  terminology,  one  could  say 
that  ecological  modernisation  represents  an  'equilibrium'  policy  position:  a  point  at  which 
supply  (of  ecologically-fiiendly  goods  and  services)  and  demand  (for  those  goods  and 
greater  levels  of  environmental  quality)  met.  Thus  it  acts  as  an  institutional  (and 
ideological)  compromise  between  economic  and  ecological  interests,  and  as  Weale 
suggests,  a  compromise  between  the  economic  imperative  for  capital  accumulation  and 
political  legitimacy  (1992:  89).  16 
On  this  view  the  state  policy-elites  act  as  brokers  and  primary  movers  in  encouraging 
interest  groups,  trades  unions,  industry,  consumer  groups  and  the  environmental  lobby,  to 
adopt  and  accept  the  agenda  (and  language)  of  ecological  modernisation.  This  character 
of  the  ecologically  modernising  state,  pro-active,  agenda-setting  and  interventionist,  has 
16  In  this  respcctý  ecological  modernisation  as  an  ideology  at  the  national/regional  level  is  similar  both  in 
terms  of  its  origin  and  function,  to  'sustainable  development'  at  the  international  level.  Both  depend  for 
their  success  on  rephrasing  the  economy-ecology  debate  in  a  language  which  harmonises  ecological 
sustainability  with  continuing  economic  development.  This  is  done  by  translating  the  environment  into 
the  language  of  orthodox  neoclassical  economic  theory  (Pearce  et  al,  1989,1993)  so  that  the  environment 
is  recast  as  an  'economic'  problem  which  can  crowd  out  its  political-normative  dimensions.  Both 
ecological  modernisation  and  sustainable  development  arc  state  or  supra-state  level  responses,  and  thus 
find  their  origins  in  the  policy  discourse  of  bureaucratic  management.  See  Barry  (1996c),  Dryzek  (1995), 
Sachs  (1995)  and  Richardson  (1994). 163 
led  some  commentators  to  view  ecological  modernisation  as  an  environmental  neo- 
corporatist  political  arrangement  (Young,  1993:  88-90;  1994:  16-18).  This  is  particularly 
so  with  regard  to  the  centrality  of  some  degree  of  economic  planning  within  ecological 
modernisation  discussed  in  section  5.6.  Ecological  modernisation  is  to  be  distinguished 
from  radical  accounts  of  'sustainable  development'  and  'green  economics,  which  argue 
that  the  compatibility  of  environmental  protection  and  the  economy  depends  on  the 
transformation  of  'economic  growth'  into  'social  development'  (Eckersley,  1992b,  World 
Commission  on  Environment  and  Development,  1987).  Ecological  modernisation  does 
not,  for  example,  require  alternative  measurements  of  human  welfare  as  does  green 
political  economy  (see  6.5).  Ecological  modernisation  reconciles  environmental  and 
economic  imperatives  perhaps  because  it  shares  with  the  ideology  of  'sustainable 
development'  an  essentially  ambiguous  character,  which  reconciles  erstwhile  opposing 
interests  i.  e.  'environmental'  ones  on  the  one  hand,  and  'industrial'  ones  on  the  other 
(Richardson,  1994;  Sachs,  1995;  Barry,  1996c).  And  while  from  an  ideological  green 
position  this  is  a  problem,  from  a  practical  political  point  of  view  it  is  a  positive  advantage. 
Thus  ecological  modernisation  can  be  viewed  as  dealing  with  one  aspect  of  social- 
environmental  problems  from  a  state-centred  'administrative'  perspective.  It  is  not  so 
much  a  political  theory  as  an  ideology  of  environmental  public  policy.  However,  despite 
its  state-centred  origins,  ecological  modernisation  can  be  used  as  a  basis  for  a  more  radical 
position,  which  I  outline  in  the  next  section. 
For  Weale,  "The  challenge  of  ecological  modernisation  extends  beyond  the  economic 
point  that  a  sound  environment  is  a  necessary  condition  for  long-term  prosperity  and  it 
comes  to  embrace  changes  in  the  relationships  between  the  state,  its  citizens  and  private 
corporations,  as  well  as  changes  in  the  relationship  between  states"  (1992:  31-2).  As 
argued  below  ecological  modernisation  shades  into  collective  ecological  management 
when  other  considerations  are  posited  alongside  the  institutions  of  ecological 
modernisation.  As  Weale  agues  (1992:  78),  ecological  modernisation  is  in  many  respects 
a  coping  strategy  adopted  by  states  in  the  face  of  demands  for  higher  environmental 
protection,  which  may  become  radicalised  in  terms  of  policy  outcomes,  when  its  focus 164 
shifts  from  dealing  with  the  effects  of  environmental  problems  to  their  causes.  Ecological 
modernisation,  particularly  when  placed  within  the  context  of  a  'green  welfarism'  or  green 
social  democracy,  may,  like  the  emergence  of  the  welfare  state  before  it,  be  construed  as 
an  attempt  to  politically  regulate  production,  via  state  planning  and  regulation,  in  response 
to  the  socialisation  of  the  (environmental)  costs  of  production  as  a  result  of  'market 
failure'.  'Polluter-pays'  legislation,  the  precautionary  principle,  mandatory  environmental 
impact  assessments  etc.,  all  of  which  are  central  to  ecological  modernisation,  can  be 
regarded  as  ways  in  which  the  environmental  costs  of  production  are  either  prevented  or 
'internalised'  to  some  extent. 
Another  way  of  putting  it  would  be  to  say  that  ecological  modernisation  becomes 
radical  when  the  institutional  focus  moves  from  one  of  problem  displacement  to  problem 
solution  (Dryzek,  1987:  11).  17  As  Weale  suggests,  "the  stress  upon  setting  emissions 
standards  implies  a  focus  on  effects  rather  than  causes  and  hence  a  focus  on  end-of-pipe 
solutions.  We  should  not  expect  a  great  deal  of  emphasis,  then,  in  policy  discourse  on  the 
need  for  structural  changes  in  production  and  consumption  to  reduce  pollution!  '  (1992: 
84).  In  other  words,  focusing  on  ex  ante,  preventative  measures,  rather  than  ex  post, 
compensatory  adjustments,  may  move  one  in  the  direction  of  structural  change  in  the 
organisation  of  the  economy. 
17  One  way  of  looking  at  this  issue  is  to  see  that  the  more  environmental  policy-making  becomes  a  matter 
of  'Solving'  environmental  problems  (which  includes  preventing  them),  the  more  structural  change  will  be 
required.  For  example,  solving  pollution  problems  would  no  longer  be  a  matter  of  'exporting'  pollution 
on  this  model,  since  this  simply  displaces  it  from  one  place,  time  or  medium  to  another.  This  may  be 
politically  rational,  but  ecologically  irrational.  Dealing  with  pollution  at  its  point  of  production  rather 
than  its  point  of  'consumption'  may  involve  the  idea  that  pollution  be  limited  to  the  assimilative  capacity 
of  the  immediate  environment.  Thus,  there  may  be  room  for  a  biorcgional-t)W  argument  that  production 
be  pren-dsed  on  the  idea  that  any  environmental  impact  be  absorbed  by  the  local  as  opposed  to  the  global 
environmental  commons.  In  other  words,  economic  activity  in  some  sectors  which  give  rise  to  pollution 
ought  to  be  regulated  by  'ecosystem'  rather  than  'biosphere'  principles  (4.2).  Such  principles  regulating 
ecological-<=nomic  exchanges  are  perhaps  demanded  by  a  very  strong  conception  of  sustainability.  This 
localising  of  economic-ecological  activity  is  close  to  green  concerns  about  economic  self-reliance  and 
green  arguments  against  extensive  trade,  discussed  in  the  next  chapter  (6.7).  Note  that  this  constraint 
only  applies  to  pollution  (negative  economic-ecological  output)  not  resources.  In  some  ways  this  is  an 
expanded  ecological  version  of  the  'polluter  pays'  principle,  and  is  one  interpretation  of  Weale's 
observation  that,  "pollution  control  has  to  be  as  much  concerned  with  where  pollution  occurs  as  with  the 
total  volume  of  a  pollutant  cmittecr'  (1992:  165;  emphasis  in  original). 165 
The  green  critique  of  ecological  modernisation  is  largely  that  it  does  not  go  far  enough 
in  terms  of  the  type,  level,  and  manner  in  which  the  changes  it  proposes  are  decided  and 
implemented.  That  is,  on  its  own,  ecological  modemisation  stands  in  danger  of  being  a 
state-dominated  and  initiated  process  of  ecological  management  which  is  heavily  weighted 
in  favour  of  'industrial'  interests.  Ecological  modernisation  can  thus  be  viewed  as  an 
extension  of  the  'crisis  management'  function  of  the  modem  state  to  include  social- 
environment  relations.  However,  ecological  modernisation  does,  as  Weale  suggests,  imply 
a  virtue-based  conception  of  citizenship  (1992:  150-1),  and  some  degree  of  public 
participation  in  environmental  policy  implementation.  Nevertheless  a  very  state-centred 
position.  An  example  of  ecological  modernisation's  commitment  to  participation  is  given 
by  Weale,  "An  important  aspect  of  project  development  is  that  there  is  typically  a  process 
of  public  consultation  necessary  before  the  project  is  allowed  to  proceed"  (1992:  171). 
nether  the  proposed  development  should  go  ahead  is  not  on  the  agenda;  participation  is 
limited  to  influencing  the  manner  in  which  it  proceeds.  In  other  words,  consultation  is 
restricted  to  discussing  means  not  ends.  While  not  agreeing  fully  with  Beck's  assessment, 
his  critique  of  state-centred  responses  to  ecological  problems  does  bring  out  some  of  the 
basic  problems  with  ecological  modernisation.  According  to  him,  "The  dangers  of  such  an 
eco-orientated  state  interventionism  can  be  derived  from  the  parallels  to  the  welfare  state: 
scientific  authoritarianism  and  an  excessive  bureaucrac.  31'  (1992:  230).  Ecological 
modernisation,  from  a  green  point  of  view,  does  not  go  far  enough,  since  it  remains  at  the 
level  of  means  and  is  unable  to  articulate  the  full  range  of  normative  issues  relating  to 
social-environmental  affairs.  When  environmental  problems  become  not  just  a  matter  of 
the  most  cost-effective  legislative  or  market-based  means  by  which  they  can  be  dealt  with, 
environmental  degradation  may  come  to  be  seen  not  just  as  an  economic  externality 
requiring  economic  or  scientific/technocratic  answers,  but  also  as  a  normative  question 
requiring  moral  and  political  answers.  That  is,  environmental  problems  are  also  questions 
of  'right  and  wrong'.  At  this  point  we  may  say  that  ecological  modernisation  has  shaded 
into  the  political-normative  process  of  collective  ecological  management,  that  is,  a 
transformation  within  the  political  regulation  of  social-environmental  interaction  has 166 
occurred.  The  mark  of  this  transformation  is  the  politicisation  (and  not  simply  their 
bureaucratisation  or  'marketisation')  and  moralisation  of  environmental  problems.  While 
collective  ecological  management  is  different  in  kind  from  ecological  modernisation,  this 
should  not  blind  us  to  the  areas  of  continuity  between  them.  Within  collective  ecological 
management  this  requires  radicalising  the  institutional  potentials  of  ecological 
modernisation,  particularly  in  respect  to  the  transformation  of  the  nation-state,  and  the 
relationships  between  state,  market  and  civil  society. 
5.6  Towards  Collective  Ecological  Management 
Whereas  ecological  modernisation,  at  least  in  part,  is  premised  on  a  neo-corporatist 
consensus  between  trades  unions,  the  state,  business,  consumer  groups  and  the  formal 
environmental  lobby,  collective  ecological  management  is  not  corporatist.  It  is  not 
corporatist  because  a  premium  is  placed  on  democratising  the  decision-making  processes, 
as  opposed  to  elite  bargaining  over  policy.  In  opposition  to  elite  bargaining  we  have 
popular  participation  through  a  variety  of  institutional  mechanisms  in  which  citizens  are 
given  more  control  over  decision-making  relating  to  social-environmental  interaction. 
Thus  collective  ecological  management  can  be  viewed  as  a  democratised  and  more  radical 
form  of  ecological  modernisation.  While  there  is  a  continuing  role  for  the  institutions  of 
the  nation-state,  collective  ecological  management  manifests  a  healthy  degree  of 
scepticism  with  regard  to  extensive  state  involvement.  At  the  same  time,  collective 
ecological  management  favours  decentralising  decision-making,  where  appropriate,  to  the 
local  state  level.  Ecological  modernisation,  on  the  whole,  focuses  on  the  national  level. 
Collective  ecological  management  is  concerned  with  the  political-normative  processes  by 
which  the  totality  of  the  social-environmental  metabolism  may  be  articulated,  it  is  not 
concerned  purely  with  establishing  ecologically  efficient  i.  e.  materially  productive  relations 
between  economy  and  environment.  It  is  because  ecological  modernisation  takes  as  its 
subject  of  analysis  the  relationship  between  the  economy  and  ecology,  rather  than  society 
and  ecology,  that  the  state  occupies  a  central  role.  Ecological  modernisation  is  about 167 
enhanced  economic-environmental  material  exchanges  in  the  name  of  'economic  growth', 
or  the  'competitiveness'  of  the  national  economy  within  a  global  market.  Collective 
ecological  management  on  the  other  hand,  while  not  completely  ruling  out  international 
trade,  is  concerned  with  shifting  the  orientation  of  the  economy  towards  the  national  and 
local  market,  and  viewing  economic  growth  as  one  amongst  other  social  goals.  Ends  and 
means  are,  within  reason,  open  for  democratic  scrutiny  and  decision.  These  issues  are 
dealt  with  in  more  detail  in  the  next  chapter. 
What  stands  out  about  ecological  modernisation  is  its  constraining  nature.  There  are  at 
least  three  ways  in  which  ecological  modernisation  is  constraining.  Firstly,  it  focuses  on 
elites,  many  of  which  do  not  have  any  democratic  mandate.  Secondly,  it  limits  the  type  of 
interests  that  can  be  brought  to  bear  in  establishing  environmental  policy.  Those  interests 
that  can  be  articulated  as  economic  values,  or  established  scientifically,  or  matters  of 
pressing  political  expediency  are  favoured.  As  indicated  above,  the  onus  of  'proof  is  on 
those  who  wish  to  protect  the  environment,  rather  than  those  who  wish  to  develop  it. 
Interests  pertaining  to  social  metabolism  with  the  external  world  are  reduced  to  political 
bargaining  between  elites  and  the  assignation  of  economic  values  to  environmental 
resources.  This  is  related  to  a  third  firnitation,  namely,  the  fact  that  ecological 
modernisation  is  premised  largely  on  bargaining  and  trade-offs  between  vested  interests. 
It  is  an  interest-aggregating  system  rather  than  an  interest-transforming  system,  where  the 
interests  articulated  is  a  function  of  power,  influence  and  access.  'Voice'  is  limited  to 
powerful,  established  interests,  hence  the  difficulty  the  environmental  movement  has  had  in 
gaining  access  to  the  policy-making  process  (Jahn,  1993;  Aguilar,  1993;  Robinson,  1992). 
At  root,  ecological  modernisation  works  because  the  interests  it  balances  are  couched 
in  the  language  of  economic  rationality.  Environmental  interests  get  a  look  in  only  to  the 
extent  that  these  interests  can  be  translated  into  the  language  of  cost-benefit  calculation. 
In  order  to  protect  the  environment,  it  must  first  be  demonstrated  to  be  a  'resource',  and 
preferably  a  resource  with  direct  and  immediate  economic  benefits.  In  this  manner  one 
can  say  that  the  grammar  of  ecological  modernisation,  and  one  of  the  main  reasons  for  its 
success,  is  its  use  of  neoclassical  environmental  economics.  As  indicated  in  the  next 168 
chapter,  neoclassical  environmental  economics,  reinforces  not  only  the  state-centred, 
bureaucratic  nature  of  ecological  modernisation,  but  also  the  latter's  choice  of  the  market 
as  the  central  organising  institution  of  economy  (6.2).  The  point  is  not  that  econ-onic 
interests  are  not  a  legitimate  form  of  human  valuation  of  the  environment,  but  that  under 
ecological  modernisation  it  becomes  the  dominant  form  of  valuation.  This  not  only 
'crowds  out'  non-economic  forms  of  valuation,  but  indeed  obliges  the  latter  to  present 
themselves  as  economic  forms  of  valuation.  Against  this  view,  the  logic  of  collective 
ecological  management  in  raising  economic,  ethical,  scientific  dimensions  of  the  ecological 
crisis  is  close  to  Daly's  view  of  'green  economics'.  According  to  him  green  economics, 
"[relies]  on  market  allocation  of  an  aggregate  resource  throughput  whose  total  is  not  set 
by  the  market,  but  rather  fixed  collectively  on  the  basis  of  ecological  criterion  of 
sustainability  and ethical  criterion  of  stewardship"  (1987:  7).  Daly's  emphasis  on 
collective  decision  making,  identifying  institutions  (the  market),  and  especially  the 
combination  of  ethical  and  ecological  criteria,  is  close  to  the  aims  of  collective  ecological 
management,  viewed  as  a  form  of  stewardship. 
However,  what  both  ecological  modernisation  and  collective  ecological  management 
share  is  a  concern  with  the  political  regulation  of  human  material  interaction  with  the 
environment.  Collective  ecological  management  widens  out  the  ecological  modernisation 
approach  by  viewing  the  totality  of  the  economy-ecology  metabolism  as  the  appropriate 
context  within  which  problems  in  the  material  interaction  between  economy  and 
environment,  as  manifested  in  the  'formal'  or  money  economy,  can  be  placed.  The  latter 
issue  is  dealt  with  in  the  next  chapter  (6.6). 
In  a  sense  the  collective  ecological  management  strategy  is  on  one  level  a  democratic 
political  procedure  within  which  various  ways  of  valuing  the  environment  (and  thus 
various  relations  and  interests  to  and  in  the  environment)  can  be  raised,  deliberated  and 
incorporated  into  policy  recommendations.  The  green  political  case  is  thus  not  for  a  pre- 
emptive  'hands  ofr  approach,  but  it  does  recognise  that  an  adequate  solution  to  the 
environmental  crisis  demands  a  wider  context  than  that  provided  by  economic  or  technical 
valuations  of  the  nonhuman  world.  This  can  be  taken  to  mean  that  in  the  case  of  social- 
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environmental  interaction,  'problem  identification'  is  not  be  left  up  to  market  processes 
alone.  However,  this  is  compatible  with  holding  market  processes  as  having  a  role  to  play 
in  the  management  or  resolution  of  social-environmental  problems.  In  other  words, 
markets  are  not  the  appropriate  institutional  setting  for  defining  and  thinking  about  social- 
environmental  problems. 
As  indicated  in  chapter  3,  the  green  normative  argument  is  for  the  moralisation  of 
society-environment  relations  not  for  a  'hands  off  approach,  i.  e.  one  particular  view  of 
this  moralisation  (3.1).  In  other  words,  whereas  ecological  modernisation  places  the  onus 
of  justification  on  those  objecting  to  development,  and  a  deep  ecology  view  of  green 
politics  demands  that  the  onus  of  justification  be  shifted  to  those  who  wish  to  use  the 
environment  (Dobson,  1990:  61),  collective  ecological  management  requires  that  there  be 
W.  - 
no  presupposition  in  favour  of  either  preservation  or  develop!  pent.  Rather  such  issues 
solved  poritic  fy-,  -w-hich  be  understood  as  implying  that  no  form  of  mu-s-tbe 
-re 
environmental  valuation  or  human  interest  in  the  world  is  exempt  from  public  criticism  and 
justification,  particularly  in  the  case  of  major  land-use  proposals,  for  example,  road- 
building,  mining  and  dam-building.  The  onus  of  justification  falls  equally  on  all  who 
propose  particular  social-environmental  relations.  From  a  democratic  point  of  view,  we 
simply  cannot  say  in  advance  whether  'use'  or  'non-use'  will  be  the  outcome,  although  a 
public  'ethics  of  use',  institutionalised  perhaps  in  law,  maps  the  border  between  morally 
justified  'use'  and  illegitimate  'abuse'.  That  is,  an  ethics  of  use  can  function  as  a  guide,  an 
institutional  representation  of  a  society's  collective  moral  assessment  of  pennissible  and 
impennissible  uses  of  nature.  "' 
Is  While  there  are  similarities  between  a  public  'ethics  of  use"  and  certain  understandings  ofjustice,  it  is 
not  my  view  that  such  an  ethics  of  use  should  be  thought  of  as  a  green  theory  of  justice  which  extends 
considerations  ofjustice  to  the  nonhuman  world.  A  more  appropriate  view  of  the  ethics  of  use  would  be  to 
see  it  as  a  legal  sidc-constraint  on  social-environmental  interaction,  perhaps  institutionalised  within  the 
constitution  of  a  democratic  polity.  That  is,  the  law  can,  and  already  does,  express  collective  moral 
judgements  which  are  not  considerations  of  justice.  If  our  relations  to  the  nonhuman  world  are  not 
matters  of  justice,  but  nevertheless  require  moral  deliberation  as  green  politics  suggests,  then  it  may  be 
that  the  most  appropriate  institutional  form  for  an  ethics  of  use  is  a  legal  one.  See  Barry  (1996b),  and 
Eckersley  (1996a)  for  an  examination  of  this  legal  option,  and  Norton  (1994)  and  Saward  (1996)  for 
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The  most  important  part  of  social-environmental  interaction  is  the  economy-ecology 
metabolism.  To  a  large  extent  it  is  the  type  of  governance  of  this  metabolism  which 
differentiates  ecological  modernisation  from  collective  ecological  management,  since  both 
are  based  on  the  necessity  for  such  management.  Collective  ecological  management 
differs  in  institutionalising  opportunities  and  fora  in  which  social-environmental  relations 
viewed  in  terms  of  right  and  wrong  are  not  disadvantaged  relative  to  positions  in  which 
they  are  viewed  in  terms  of  costs  and  benefits.  It  is  not  that  'moral'  accounts  of  social- 
environment  relations  are  superior  to  'economic'  accounts,  but  rather  that  economic  and 
technical  accounts  themselves  embody  normative  presuppositions.  Starting  from  the 
position  that  there  are  no  value-neutral  conceptions  of  the  proper  relation  between  society 
and  environment,  collective  ecological  management  can  be  regarded  as  raising  the 
normative  character  of  different  views  of  the  society-environment  metabolism  to  the  level 
of  public  and  political  debate.  For  example,  whereas  ecological  modernisation,  largely 
underwritten  by  neoclassical  environmental  economics,  seeks  to  monetise  environmental 
preferences  (which  are  exogenously  given),  and  then  calculate  policy  proposals  based  on 
information  gained  from  their  aggregation,  collective  ecological  management  focuses  on 
the  process  of  preference  formation  and  transformation  within  deliberative  fora.  The 
making  of  environmental  public  policy  decisions  within  collective  ecological  management 
is  not  a  matter  of  aggregating  pre-formed,  given  consumer  'environmental  preferences'. 
Rather,  the  point  is  that  the  public  good  character  of  environmental  issues  requires  a 
decision-making  procedure  in  which  individuals  make  judgements  about  the  public  good  in 
question  and  not  just  private  calculations.  Attitudes  to  public  goods  are  formed  from 
given  preferences  when  individuals  are  brought  together  within  a  public  rather  than  a 
private  setting.  In  other  words,  individual  preferences  are  important  as  the  starting  point 
not  the  conclusion  of  decision-making  about  public  goods.  The  appropriate  setting  for 
public  goods  is  a  'forum'  rather  than  a  'market'  (Elster,  1986). 
The  problem  aggregative  approaches  to  social-environmental  problems  partly  lies  in  the 
priority  given  to  'felt'  over  'considered'  preferences.  As  suggested  in  chapter  3  (3.5.1, 
3.6.1),  decision-making  based  on  economic  preferences,  while  appropriate  to  private 171 
goods,  is  not  appropriate  to  decision-making  in  respect  of  public  goods,  such  as  the 
environment.  After  all,  for  the  majority  of  social-environmental  issues,  the  'environment' 
in  question  is  not  a  private  good,  although  as  indicated  in  the  next  chapter  there  are  those 
who  propose  privatisation  as  the  appropriate  solution  (6.2.2).  That  is,  environmental 
public-policy  decisions  should  not  be  made  on  the  basis  of  aggregating  preferences,  but 
rather  should  be  made  on  the  basis  of  some  conception  of  the  common  good.  As  critics  of 
cost-benefit  analysis  (CBA)  point  out,  there  is  a  real  problem  in  attempting  to  reduce 
individual  values  to  preferences  and  make  them  commensurate  by  assigning  them  a 
monetary  figure  (O'Neill,  1993;  Jacobs,  1996).  Such  preference-aggregating  techniques, 
like  market-based  public  decision-making,  are  not  value  neutral.  As  Jacobs  puts  it,  "It 
encourages  a  particular  approach  to  the  valuation  of  environmental  public  goods,  namely  a 
gconsumers  one  in  which  private  income  is  exchangedgpersonal  benefif  '  (1996:  6).  The 
point  about  a  'citizen  valuation'  approach  is  that  the  public  good  dimension  is  explicit. 
Faced  with  the  classic  choice  between  'development'  and  "environmental  protection',  the 
question  that  ought  to  be  put  to  individuals  is  'wýat  should  be  done  in  the  interests  of 
society?  '  and  not  merely  'how  much  will  it  cost/benefit  meT  Jacobs  goes  on  to 
demonstrate  the  difference  between  'citizen'  and  'consumer'  approaches  to  environmental 
issues  by  pointing  out  that  in  relation  to  the  former  question  the  appropriate  payment 
vehicle  is  a  tax,  which  all  are  required  to  pay,  or  more  realistically,  shifting  tax  revenues 
from  one  area  of  public  policy  to  environmental  protection.  In  other  words,  asking  people 
how  much  additional  tax  they  would  be  willing  to  pay  to  preserve  the  environment, 
knowing  that  the  tax  burden  (cost)  will  be  borne  by  society  as  a  whole  (i.  e.  which 
minimises  the  free-rider  problem),  will  generate  qualitatively  different  answers  if  they  are 
asked  how  much  of  their  own  private  income  they  would  be  willing  to  pay  to  preserve  the 
environment.  19  In  other  words,  if  the  good  is  public,  its  costs  should  be  borne  by  all,  just 
19  It  is  also  likely  that  reversing  the  question  and  asldng  how  much  individuals  would  require  to  be 
adequately  compensated  for  the  loss  of  some  environmental  amenity,  would  lead  to  monetary  amounts  far 
in  excess  of  that  when  asked  how  much  they  would  be  willing  to  pay  to  prevent  such  a  loss.  The 
discrepancy  between  ex  ante  and  ex  post  amounts  may  be  due  to  self-interest,  since  compensation  is  paid 
by  someone  else,  the  public  authority.  In  other  words,  compensatory  approaches  encourage  'free-riding' 
since  the  costs  are  bomc  by  all,  but  the  benefits  are  enjoyed  by  the  individual.  However,  the  same 172 
as  its  benefits  are  available  to  all.  Asking  individuals  as  citizens  to  value  environmental 
goods  is  thus  markedly  different  from  asking  people  as  consumers  to  value  them. 
Part  of  this  immanent  critique  involves  the  radicalising  and  transformation  of  existing 
institutional  responses  to  environmental  problems,  such  as  ecological  modernisation.  As 
discussed  in  the  next  chapter,  neoclassical  environmental  economics  underpins  much  of 
ecological  modernisation.  The  former  employs  proxy-market  techniques,  such  as 
contingent  valuation  exercises  and  cost-benefit  analysis,  which  while  based  on  aggregating 
the  consumer  preferences  of  a  sample,  are  then  used  by  state  officials  as  the  public  or 
collective  valuation  of  society  as  a  whole  (7.2).  Once  a  sample  has  been  collected  in 
which  individuals  are  asked  to  reveal  their  (hypothetical)  consumer  preferences  in  an 
equally  hypothetical  market  situation,  this  is  all  the  'input'  from  'society'  that 
environmental  economists  and  state  officials  require. 
As  has  been  suggested  throughout  the  previous  chapters,  the  conception  of  green 
political  theory  being  defended  here  does  not  imply  wholesale  cultural  and  metaphysical 
reconstruction.  20  The  resolution  of  the  ecological  crisis  in  a  manner  which  would  accord 
with  green  values  and  principles  does  not  imply  the  ethical  rejection  of  anthropocentrism 
(as  argued  in  chapters  2  and  3),  a  central  shared  normative  orientation  of  Western  culture. 
Nor  does  it  imply  the  political  rejection  of  state  institutions  (as  argued  in  this  and  last 
chapter),  or  the  complete  rejection  of  consumerism  (as  suggested  in  6.7).  But  it  does 
imply  a  process  of  transformation  in  these  areas.  Both  these  observations  may  be  taken  to 
back  Goodin's  statement  that,  "we  can  presumably  live  more  or  less  in  harmony  with 
nature  even  in  advanced  industrial  and  post-industrial  societies,  without  necessarily 
dropping  out  of  those  societies  altogethee',,  adding  in  a  footnote,  "Indeed,  the  green 
political  agenda  would  be  even  more  pointless  that  its  worse  critic  imagines  were  that  not 
compensatory  approach  applied  to  citizen  as  opposed  to  consumer  decision-making,  would  not  have  the 
same  frce-riding  problems  since  the  appropriate  compensation  might  be  either  a  decrease  in  the  tax  rate, 
an  increase  in  welfare  benefits,  or  perhaps  a  public  holiday  or  festival  or  some  other  public  benefit.  Asked 
as  a  citizen,  the  individual  knows  that  the  compensation  will  be  shared  by  all.  This  point  is  related  to  the 
argument  in  chapter  7,  where  democratic  decision-making  based  on  encouraging  the  incorporation  of  the 
interests  of  affected  others,  best  coheres  with  green  aims  (7.7  &  7.8). 
20  Or  if  some  degree  of  metaphysical  transformation  is  required,  it  is  far  more  likely  to  come  through 
changed  perceptions  of  the  environment  as  a  result  of  scientific  knowledge  (3.6.2). 173 
the  case"  (1992:  119).  In  other  words,  green  political  theory  conceived  here  as  concerned 
with  the  political-normative  process  of  institutionalising  an  effective  and  ethically  informed 
collective  ecological  management,  works  with  the  idea  that  part  of  this  process  involves 
the  immanent  critique  and  transformation  as  opposed  to  the  abolition  of  existing 
institutional  structures  (eco-anarchism)  and/or  its  cultural  mediations  of  social- 
environmental  relations  (deep  ecology).  21 
That  the  other  traditional  counterpart  of  the  state  as  a  modem  form  of  political 
association,  namely  the  'nation',  may  have  an  equally  legitimate  place  within  green 
political  theory  will  be  briefly  examined  below  as  a  way  to  flesh  out  the  cultural 
dimensions  of  green  politics  as  collective  ecological  management. 
5.7  Nation,  Nature  and  Cultural  Identity 
That  conceptions  of  nature  have  played  a  part  as  an  identity  forming  condition  for  human 
societies  and  collectives  is  undeniable.  Nature  in  many  respects  is  the  original  'other' 
against  which  collective  forms  of  identity  are  formed  and  maintained.  As  was  indicated  in 
the  brief  discussion  on  human  nature  and  culture  in  chapter  3  (3.4.2),  and  in  the  analysis  of 
bioregionalism.  in  chapter  4  (4.3),  particular  understandings  of  social-environment  relations 
are  partly  constitutive  of  a  society's  sense  of  itself  and  formf  a  core  aspect  of  its  culture. 
This  is  a  feature  of  all  human  societies  from  tribal  to  contemporary  nation-states. 
Attention  to  the  cultural  dimension  underpins  the  suggestion  made  in  the  last  chapter 
that  the  ecological  crisis  can  be  described  as  a  contradiction  within  Western  culture  as 
opposed  to  a  total  crisis  of  that  culture.  Examples  of  this  include  Sagoff  (1988)  and  Keat 
(1994)  who  argue  that  the  environmental  crisis  can  be  viewed  as  a  tension  between  the 
21  This  point  is  clearly  related  to  the  rejection  of  the  'utopian-anticipatory'  critique  of  eco-anarchism  in 
favour  of  an  immanent  critique,  discussed  in  the  conclusion  to  the  last  chapter,  and  in  chapter  2  where  it 
was  suggested  that  green  politics  is  compatible  with  an  immanent  critique  and  reconstruction  of  the 
enlightenment  rather  than  its  reJection.  This  idea  of  immanent  critique  and  reformation  has  been 
explored  with  regard  to  the  relationship  between  green  theory  and  the  enlightenment  by  Hayward  (1995). 
He  argues  that  green  theory  is  best  seen  as  an  immanent  critique  of  the  ecological  and  social  excesses  of 
the  enlightenment  while  worldng  with  the  goal  that  the  enlightenment  can  be  'ecologised'.  In  this  way 
the  solution  to  the  ecological  crisis  does  not  require  the  abandonment  of  the  enlightenment  and  its  ideals. 174 
interests  of  individuals  as  consumers  on  the  one  hand  and  as  citizens  on  the  other  (see  3.7 
and  7.6).  The  resolution  of  this  tension  can  only  come  from  within  the  culture  itself  As 
such  the  plausibility  of  the  green  message  is  dependent  upon  its  ability  to  either  'tap  into' 
theýzRdstifl-g  Uu-M-re-,  or  Tto-extFe_ndoir_aýIter  the_e'xIsting  on7e  -in  _nFew-7J 
rejection  and  the  creation  of  acomp-  Mee  y-h-ew-one-Thurparrof  thei-eulfu-79  MM  o)-rg-ree`n_ 
politics  involves  the  possibilities  an  nec-  MY-761'r"transforrning  the  existing  national 
'bioculture'.  22  This  is  in  keeping  with  the  argument  in  chapter  3  concerning  the  efficacy  of 
adopting  an  'inside-out'  version  of  moral  extensionism,  rather  than  an  'outside-in'  based 
on  some  external  critique  and  proposed  'new  ecocentric  ethic'.  That  is,  start  from  existing 
social-environmental  relations  and  their  moral  character  and  extend  or  transform  the  latter, 
rather  than  adopting  a  'view  from  nowhere'  and  proposing  sweeping  changes  in  a  moral 
idiom  which  is  alien  to  the  culture. 
The  'bioculture'  is  defined  by  Taylor  as,  "that  aspect  of  any  human  culture  in  which 
humans  create  and  regulate.  the  environment  of  living  things  and  systematically  exploit 
them  for  human  benefit"  (1986:  269-70).  Without  this  attention  to  acting  but  also 
thinking  locally  about  the  environment,  green  politics,  while  not  being  completely 
unintelligible  to  these  national  audiences,  would  be  hampered  because  it  would  be 
speaking  in  a  language  which  had  no  or  little  currency  within  the  prevailing  culture.  While 
it  is  doubtless  true  that  for  many  environmental  problems,  especially  pollution,  a  purely 
national  response  is  inadequate,  this  does  not  preclude  the  importance  of  framing  the 
cecological  crisis'  within  a  national  cultural  (as  well  as  political)  context.  At  the  same  time 
the  language  and  methods  of  scientific  analysis  do  offer  a  trans-national  discourse  within 
which  trans-national  environmental  problems  may  be  expressed  and  can  serve  as  the  main 
epistemic  basis  for  policy-making  at  this  level.  That  is,  as  a  way  of  'thinking  globally'. 
If  as  suggested  in  the  previous  chapter  (4.3)  we  reject  as  inadequate  the  bioregional 
argument  that  the  boundaries  of  the  political  community  be  determined  by  natural  as 
opposed  to  political  territories,  then  green  political  theory  finds  itself  in  the  company  of 
22  As  argued  later  (chapter  7),  this  requires  a  view  of  'green  citizenship'  as  a  key  social  practice  to 
integrate  various  modes  of  human  action  and  roles  (especially  those  of  producer,  consumer  and  parent) 
such  that  a  stewardship  mode  of  character  and  action  is  cultivated. 175 
contemporary  political  theory  in  relation  to  the  question  of  nationhood  and  the  nation- 
state.  The  novelty  and  radicalness  of  the  bioregional  position,  it  will  be  recalled,  lies  in  its 
determination  of  community  which  is  'given'  or  'read  ofr  from  the  natural  world.  As  Sale 
states,  "A  bioregion  is  a  part  of  the  earth's  surface  whose  rough  boundaries  are 
determined  _!  b_yy___n7,  _r_atWceFr__than  humnan  (dFilctate;  "  and  "Political  principles  on  a  r  Yt-ural 
biOregiOnal  scale  areý-groýun-dedin--t-ge-d-i-c-tat-es-pýreserited  by  nature,  '  (1984a:  226,231). 
Bioregions  are  determined  naturally  not  politically,  and  as  such  the  political  problems  of 
determining  the  boundaries  of  the  polity,  its  territory  and  members  are  removed  from  the 
political  agenda.  The  are  simply  'given'.  In  becoming  'dwellers  of  the  land'  one  of  the 
most  central  issues  in  political  theory,  namely  the  process  by  which  the  political 
community  is  determined,  is  a  non-issue.  Bioregional  polities  are  thus  spared  the  vexed 
process  of  determining  'us'  and  'them'  because  these  categories  of  'insider'  and  'outsider' 
are,  at  least  initially,  settled  by  nature.  This  naturalness  of  bioregional  communities  is 
something  shared  with  those  who  claim  that  'nationhood'  is  also  an  assumed,  natural 
background  phenomenon  (Canovan,  1994).  According  to  Canovan,  "it  is  of  the  essence 
of  nationhood  to  seem  natural.,  to  the  point,  in  the  most  well-established  cases,  of 
becoming  unobtrusive'  (1994:  9).  However,  while  the  imputed  'naturalness'  of 
nationhood  is  testament  to  the  fact  that  the  latter  has  been  around  sufficiently  long  enough 
to  become  an  assumed  'background  condition'  of  political  life  and  political  theorising,  the 
cnaturalness'  of  the  bioregional  polity  is  material  rather  than  metaphorical.  That  is,  while  a 
nation  may  be,  "a  contingent  historical  product  that  feels  like  part  of  the  order  of  nature" 
(Canovan,  1994:  10),  the  bioregion  is  part  of  the  natural  order.  Indeed,  this  is  one  of  the 
aims  of  bioregionalism:  to  achieve  a  balance  between  the  human  and  nonhuman  worlds,  by 
integrating  humanity  back  into  that  world  through  humans  beconfing  dwellers  in  the  land 
on  a  bioregional  basis.  In  contrast  to  the  imputed  'naturalness'  of  nation-states, 
bioregionalists  as  well  as  other  eco-anarchists  hold  the  nation-state  as  an  'unnatural'  form 
of  human  sociality  and  organisation,  in  that  it  requires  the  coercive  force  of  the  state,  laws, 
and  legislation,  together  with  ongoing  and  intensive  socialisation  to  maintain  itself 
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nationhood  is  an  artificial  construction,  an  ideological  cloak  behind  which  the  exploitative 
activities  of  the  state  and  those  classes  and  groups  which  gain  most  from  the  state-system 
can  continue  under  the  guise  of  the  'national  interest'.  Although  this  may  be  true,  it  is  also 
the  case  that  no  form  of  social  organisation  can  make  itself  immune  to  the  possibility  of 
particular  interests  masking  themselves  as  general  interests.  This  issue  of  the  'intrinsic' 
exploitative  nature  of  the  state  has  already  been  discussed  and  criticised  in  the  last  chapter. 
Although  bioregionalism  shares  certain  similarities  with  nationhood,  it  is  nearer  the 
mark  to  compare  it  to  patriotism.  While  nationalism  presupposes  the  existence  of  nations, 
patriotism  "may  simply  involve  attachment  to  a  physical  locality  or  a  way  of  life,  and  need 
not  involve  any  abstract  idea  of  'country...  (Nfiller,  1991:  369).  Given  that  bioregional 
communities  are  delineated  by,  and  find  their  collective  sense  of  identity  partly  derived 
from,  determinate,  tangible  ecological  regions,  bioregional  loyalty  is  not  to  an  abstract 
human  collectivity.  Indeed,  one  could  go  further  and  say  that  what  marks  bioregionalism 
qua  'green  patriotism'  from  contemporary  forms  of  nationhood,  and  arguably  traditional 
conceptions  of  patriotism,  is  that  the  corporate  unity  which  makes  up  the  community  to 
which  one  is  loyal  transcends  the  human  members  of  the  bioregion.  A  fully  fledged 
bioregional  polity  demands  a  collective  identification  with  the  bioregion.  As  Sale  puts  it, 
"We  must  somehow  five  as  close  to  it  [the  land]  as  possible,  be  in  touch  with  its  particular 
soils,  its  waters,  its  winds;  we  must  learn  its  ways,  its  capacities,  its  limits;  we  must  make 
its  rhythms  our  patterns,  its  laws  our  guide,  its  fi7uits  our  bounty"  (1984a:  224).  Thus, 
from  the  bioregional  perspective  a  deep-rooted  'sense  of  place'  is  a  major  constituent  of 
collective  (and  individual)  senses  of  identity.  In  marked  contrast  to  the  dominant 
rarrogant"  version  of  humanism  which  has  typified  the  attitude  of  Western  culture  to  the 
non-human  world,  bioregionalism  involves  seeing  humans  as  belonging  to  the  land  rather 
than  the  land  belonging  to  humans.  At  the  same  time  the  tightly  circumscribed  account  of 
collective  identity  in  relation  to  the  land  also  accounts  for  the  accusations  of  racism,  ethnic 
purity  and  conservatism  and  other  ways  of  achieving  and  maintaining  the  high  degree  of 
social  homogeneity  as  a  principal  feature  of  bioregionalism,  as  argued  in  4.3. 177 
This  'Patriotic'  attachment  to  the  local  and  the  particular  is  something  that  may  be 
integrated  into  the  green  political  vision,  expressing  as  it  does  central  green  values  such  as 
decentralisation,  solidarity  beyond  humans  and  the  cultural  importance  of  a  sense  of  place. 
However  the  inclusion  of  bioregional  patriotism  within  ecological  governance  needs  to  be 
placed  within  the  context  of  wider  forms  of  collective  identity,  solidarity  and  shared 
institutions,  values  and  practices.  As  pointed  out  in  section  5.7  on  the  'Land  ethic',  green 
patriotic  attachment  to  particular  environments  can  be  integrated  within  the  cultural 
aspects  of  collective  ecological  management  if  this  attachment  is  not  simply  to  the  'land' 
but  to  the  land  with  a  particular  historical  or  cultural  significance.  That  the  land  to  which 
green  patriotism  relates  has  cultural  as  well  as  natural  importance  is  simply  another 
dimension  of  the  more  general  premise  of  ecological  governance  mentioned  above, 
namely,  that  the  environment  humans  interact  with  is  a  humanised  environment. 
The  relationship  between  this  putative  'green  patriotism'  divested  of  some  of  its 
contentious  bioregional  baggage,  and  the  mainly  national-level  political  and  cultural 
process  of  'collective  ecological  management',  will  be  the  primary  focus  of  this  section. 
This  relationship  between  the  particular  and  the  general,  the  local  and  non-local,  is  part  of 
the  process  of  fleshing  out  how  and  in  what  manner  the  green  slogan  of  'act  locally,  think 
globally'  may  be  integrated  within  green  political  theory  as  something  more  than  a  slogan. 
In  what  follows  I  suggest  that  both  the  state  and  the  nation  can  have  roles  as  mediating 
between  the  local  and  the  global. 
It  is  not  supposed  that  national  culture  and  national  identity  are  fixed  or  settled,  or  that 
they  need  to  be  'deep'  in  the  sense  that  membership  of  a  nation-state  is  a  sufficientP  as 
opposed  to  a  necessary,  constituent  of  personal  identity.  On  the  contrary,  the  terrain  of 
what  defines  a  nation's  identity,  its  sense  of  self  as  a  corporate  entity,  is  always,  to  some 
degree,  contested.  There  is  rarely  a  final  or  closed  understanding  of  'national  identity'. 
However  this  is  not  to  say  that  attempts  have  not  been  made  to  close  the  debate  and 
concretise  understandings  of  national  identity.  Often  this  has  been  effected  by  stressing  a 
particular  understanding  of  the  link  between  'the  people'  and  'the  land'.  One  has  only  to 
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possibilities  of  associating  national  self-understanding  with  a  particular  view  of  the 
relations  (particularly  historical  or  genealogical)  between  members  and  'the  land' 
(Bramwell,  1989;  Vincent,  1993).  Other  negative  examples  include  the  backward- 
looking,  racist  discourse  of  contemporary  far-right  nationalist  movements  who  strongly  tie 
a  particular  conception  of  the  nation  to  tle--n'ýa-ti-on's  environment 
ýin 
suc! 
ý 
a 
away 
as  to 
eZc-fu-Je-i-m-mig-rantýs 
-and-'other  'outsiders'  w-ho  do-not  partake  of  this-relationship.  For 
such  groups  the  preservation  of  the  land  is  at  the  same  time  the  preservation  of  a  particular 
understanding  of  the  nation.  23  At  the  same  time  more  positive  examples  of  this  association 
between  national  and  more  local  cultural  identity,  cultural  values  and  the  environment  can 
also  be  found  (Grodeland,  1995;  Sagoff,  1988:  124-145;  Norton,  1991).  In  the  end,  the 
green  argument  turns  on  the  plausibility  of  a  public  ecological  culture,  consistent  and 
supportive  of  an  ethics  of  use,  under  which  a  variety  of  private  cultural  ecological 
valuations  may  exist.  An  examination  of  this  difficult  issue  is  not  something  that  I  address 
here,  but  the  commitment  to  viewing  the  ecological  crisis  as  a  contradiction  within 
contemporary  Western  societies,  does  suggest  that  an  examination  of  nationhood  may 
provide  some  resources  with  which  these  societies  may  cope  and  resolve  their 
environmental  dilemmas. 
The  main  point  I  wish  to  get  across  here  is  that  one  cannot  simply  abandon  the  national 
cultural  dimension  when  analysing  either  social  understandings  of  or  reactions  to 
environmental  issues.  For  better  or  worse  it  is  through  the  filter  of  national  political 
23  For  further  discussion  of  right-wing  nationalist  environmentalism  see  Coates  (1993,1995),  Bramwell 
(1989,1994),  Hay  (1988),  Vincent  (1993),  and  Gray  (1993:  chapter  4).  In  Britain  this  discourse  is 
typically  concerned  with  the  relationship  between  English  nationalism  and  an  idealised  pastoral  past, 
which  yields  an  understanding  of  England  as  a  'green  and  pleasant  land'.  A  more  general  critique  of  the 
ideological/symbolic  dimensions  of  the  'pastoral'  is  given  by  Rennie-Short  who  argues  that,  "The  pastoral 
was  a  view  of  the  countryside  from  the  town  ... 
In  the  contrast  with  city,  court  and  market,  the  countryside 
is  seen  as  the  last  remnant  of  a  golden  age.  The  countryside  is  the  nostalgic  past,  providing  a  glimpse  of  a 
simpler,  purer  age  (1991:  28,3  1).  To  the  extent  this  characterises  some  conceptions  of  green  politics,  it 
shares  an  affinity  with  anti-modernist,  backward-looking,  conscrvative-nationalism,  as  Coates  argues 
(1995:  72-3).  A  rather  extreme  example  of  how  far  back  some  greens  are  prepared  to  go  is  Shepard 
(1993),  who  represents  a  position  I  have  elsewhere  termed  'palco-conservatism'  (Barry,  1995b),  in 
reference  to  the  fact  that  the  past  to  which  he  looks  to  is  not  simply  the  pre-modem  rural  idyll  but  the  pre- 
agricultural  huntcr-gathcr  stage  of  human  evolution.  For  a  critique  of  this  'neo-primitivism'  see 
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culture  that  green  ideas  will  need  to  pass  in  order  to  be  effective  and  find  a  response.  In 
other  words,  the  national  cultural  level  marks  one  of  the  main  points  from  which  green 
politics  can,  and  indeed  does,  beginftom.  There  is  no  contradiction  in  saying  this  and  in 
having  a  commitment  to  transnational  or  global  principles  on  the  one  hand  and  sub- 
national,  more  'patriotic'  levels  of  attachment  on  the  other.  In  many  respects  care  for  the 
national  environment  will  in  all  probability  increase  awareness  of  and  sensitivity  to  the 
global  aspects  of  the  environment.  24  Analogous  to  the  argument  presented  in  3.6,  caring 
for  particular  others  does  not  diminish  care  for  unfamiliars,  but  like  a  muscle  strengthens 
with  exercise.  In  a  similar  fashion,  it  is  through  caring  for  particular  environments  that  we 
initially  show  care  for  nature  as  a  whole.  These  particular  environments  need  not 
necessarily  be  national,  we  can  imagine  regional,  local  and  even  neighbourhood  levels 
where  care  can  be  practised.  Green  politics  then  is  also  about  the  institutionalisation  of  a 
culturally  mediated  (thus  normatively  informed),  ecological  (thus  scientifically  informed) 
modes  of  managing  'the  land',  to  use  Leopold's  phrase.  The  national  culture  may  be  said 
to  function  as  an  overarching,  macro-level  background  against  which  more  local  and  even 
more  particular  forms  of  care  for  the  land  can  be  effected. 
Such  macro-level  care  is  clearly  seen  in  the  English  case  of  linking  'national  heritage' 
and  the  'national  environment'  as  embodied  in  institutions  such  as  the  National  Trust,  Me 
Council  for  the  Preservation  of  Rural  England,  and  Yhe  Ramblers'  Association,,  each 
with  often  competing  understandings  of  the  relationship  between  'the  people'  and  the 
land,  and  thus  with  competing  views  on  nationhood  and  national  identity.  Equally 
important  are  critiques  of  these  institutions  and  their  conception  of  what  constitutes  the 
'national  heritage'  (Coates,  1995),  and  autonomous  movements  such  as  the  recent  'This 
Land  is  Ours'  campaign  to  reclaim  the  English  commons  with  a  different  vision  of  the 
24  It  is  perhaps  not  a  contingent  fact  that  those  societies  which  display  a  high  regard  for  global 
environmental  issues  are  also  societies  which  have  a  heightened  awareness  of  their  own  environments,  as 
can  be  gauged  from  their  ecological  practices  and  institutions  and  the  attitudes  and  behaviour  of  their 
citizens.  Examples  include  the  Nordic  countries,  Germany  and  the  Netherlands,  in  the  North  and  India, 
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relationship  between  nation  and  'the  land.  25  The  significance  of  this  type  of  analysis  is 
that  attention  to  the  cultural  dimension  of  collective  ecological  management  extends  the 
notion  of  the  'environment'  beyond  the  immediate  nonhuman  world  to  include  the  human, 
urban,  social  environment.  A  full  account  of  collective  ecological  management  would 
have  to  address  these  aspects  of  the  human  environment. 
5.8  The  Land  Ethic  and  Collective  Ecological  Management 
According  to  Norton, 
if  we  are  to  break  a  new  path,  we  must  set  our  sights  between  artificiality-  the 
choice  to  extinguish  nature,  to  control  it  everywhere-  and  primitivism-  the  choice 
to  isolate  and  save  nature  for  its  own  sake:  we  must  escape  the  environmentalist's 
dilemma  by  creating  a  culture  that  values  nature  independent  of  human  demands, 
but  not  independently  of  culture  itsey.  If  there  is  to  be  a  middle  path,  we  must 
give  up  the  idea  that  something  must  be  either  natural  or  artificial.  Naturalness 
(wildness,  too)  must  admit  of  degrees.  (Norton,  1991:  156;  emphasis  added). 
25  The  recent  anti-veal  protests  may  have  elements  of  both  'green  patriotism'  and  'green  nationalism'  to 
them  in  the  sense  that  it  may  be  that  some  of  the  protest  is  motivated  by  a  perception  that  it  is  'our'  (read 
English)  calves  that  are  being  shipped  to  be  butchered  to  fulfil  a  'foreign'  and  repugnant  demand  for  meat 
(practices  and  values  alien  to  the  'English  way  of  life').  Although  aware  of  the  dangers  of  simpli1ying 
what  is  doubtless  a  complex  issue,  it  does  not  seem  completely  wide  of  the  mark  to  suggest  that  the  anti- 
veal  protests  can  be  partly  explained  by  reference  to  the  way  in  which  food  is  produced  and  consumed 
partly  constitutes  collective  and  personal  identity.  To  a  large  degree  we  arc  what  we  cat.  Englishness  no 
less  than  being  a  vegetarian  or  vegan  is  to  be  understood,  in  part,  by  the  particular  relationship  it 
expresses  to  food,  which  parts  of  the  nonhuman  world  we  consider  fit  as  food,  how  it  is  prepared,  cooked 
and  consumed.  Indeed  a  fuller  examination  of  this  cultural  attitude  to  food  would  perhaps  involve  seeing 
this  attitude  to  food  as  the  archetypal  manner  by  which  'nature'  (the  raw)  is  introduced  and  transformed 
into  'culture'  (the  cooked),  as  Levi-Strauss  (1986)  argued.  As  Benton  points  out,  "Proper  human  feeding- 
activity  is  symbolically,  culturally-mediated  need-satisfaction7  (1993:  50).  However  with  the  rise  of  trans- 
cultural  culinary  habits  "The  boundaries  of  edibility  no  longer  follow  the  old  national  frontiers  but  fall 
rather  along  moral  or  aesthetic  or  ecological  lines:  We  take  sides  as  vegetarians  versus  carnivores  or 
favour  organic  or  whole  food  in  contrast  to  processed  or  fast  fooT  (Martin,  1995). 181 
In  claiming  that  "naturalness  must  admit  of  degreee'.  Norton's  position  is  close  to  the 
position  being  defended  here  for  collective  management  of  the  environment,  and  is 
compatible  with  a  non-anthropocentric  'ethics  of  use'.  This  section  focuses  on  Norton's 
work  since  it  brings  out  the  cultural  dimensions  of  collective  ecological  management. 
Although  a  much  disputed  topic,  following  Norton,  one  can  find  in  Leopold's  'land 
ethic'  an  endorsement  of  what  I  have  called  collective  ecological  management.  In 
Leopold's  critique  of  the  dominance  of  econornistic  thinking.  in  determining  social 
relations  to  the  environment  one  can  find  strong  intimations  of  what  Norton  terms  an 
'integrated  theory  of  environmental  management'  (1991:  chapter  3).  26  One  reason  for 
drawing  this  interpretation  of  what  many  deep  ecologists  regard  as  the  first  modem 
expression  of  their  position,  is  that  Leopold  was  critical  of  the  way  in  which  economic 
valuation  of  the  natural  world  'crowded  out'  alternative  valuations,,  i.  e.,  social,  scientific, 
aesthetic,  ethical.  Leopold  did  not  reject  economic  interests  in  nature  so  much  as  to  put 
them  in  their  proper  context  and  prevent  them  from  dominating  social  relations  to  the 
land.  A  clear  expression  of  this  is  his  statement  that, 
The  'key-log'  which  must  be  moved  to  release  the  evolutionary  process  of  an  ethic 
is  simply  this:  quit  thinking  about  decent  land  -use  as  solely  an  economic  problem. 
Examine  each  question  in  terms  of  what  is  ethically  and  esthetically  right  as  well 
as  what  is  economically  expedient.  A  thing  is  right  when  it  tends  to  preserve  the 
integrity,  stability,  and  beauty  of  the  biotic  community.  It  is  wrong  when  it  tends 
otherwise.  It  of  course  goes  without  saying  that  economic  feasibility  limits  the 
tether  of  what  can  or  cannot  be  donefor  Imid,  It  always  has  anti  it  always  will. 
(Leopold,  1968:  224;  emphasis  added). 
26  Tlis  focus  on  an  integrated  approach  to  environmental  problems  is  something  which  is  shared  with 
ecological  modcrnisafion  and  its  emphasis  on  integrated  policy  approaches  to  pollution  problems  (Wcalc, 
1992:  93-118).  Collective  ecological  management  can  be  viewed  as  the  extension  of  this  integrated 
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Unfortunately,  it  is  the  phrase  sandwiched  between  the  italicised  sentences  that  have 
received  most  attention  in  green  discussions  of  Leopold's  'land  ethic.  Placing  his  famous 
statement  within  context,  Leopold's  position  has  less  in  common  with  deep  ecology  than 
is  generally  assumed.  Leopold's  'land  ethic'  did  not  envisage  a  'hands  off  approach  to 
social-environmental  relations  of  the  type  favoured  by  most  deep  ecologists.  According  to 
Norton,  "Leopold  never  questioned  the  right  of  humans  to  manage  [the  environment]:  he 
questioned,  rather,  our  ability  to  manage'  (1991:  53;  emphasis  in  original).  Equally 
significant  is  Leopold's  suggestion  to,  "examine  each  question  in  terms  of  what  is  ethically 
and  esthetically  right  as  well  as  what  is  economically  expedient".  In  other  words, 
economic  considerations  are  not  to  be  abandoned  within  environmental  management,  but 
rather  placed  alongside  other  non-econon-dc  considerations  such  as  ecological 
sustainability  or  cultural  valuations  of  the  environment. 
In  agreement  with  Norton,  we  ought  to  see  the  'land  ethic'  not  as  a  proto-deep 
ecology  statement  of  the  'intrinsic  value'  of  the  nonhuman  world,  or  as  a  defence  of 
'biocentric  egalitarianism'.  Rather  we  should  interpret  it  as  an  attempt  to  develop  a  theory 
of  collective  ecological  management,  in  which  culture  plays  a  central  role.  That  is,  the 
land  ethic  holds  that  the  values  of  nature  are  culturally  defined,  and  cannot  be  independent 
of  that  cultural  context.  As  Norton  puts  it,  "Leopold  saw  the  search  for  such  an  ethic  as 
one  culture's  search  for  a  workable,  adaptive  approach  to  living  with  the  land"'  (1991:  5  8). 
The  land  ethic,  although  it  does  argue  for  harmony  between  society  and  its  environment, 
begins  from  an  environmental  management  perspective  which  recognises  that  harmony  is 
created  rather  than  discovered  or  given.  The  social  construction  of  this  harmony  is  the 
purpose  of  collective  environmental  management,  and  the  aim  of  green  politics  is  to  argue 
for  an  integrated  form  of  environmental  management  in  which  aesthetic,  scientific, 
normative,  democratic  as  well  as  economic  considerations  can  be  brought  to  bear.  The 
aim  is  to  find  the  best  'adaptive  fit'  between  particular  cultures  and  their  environments. 
As  such,  collective  ecological  management  and  ecological  culture  are  to  be  seen  as  part  of 
a  process  by  which  the  changing  relationship  between  culture  and  environment  can  be 
brought  to  an  equilibrium  position.  However  there  is  no  fixed  point,  but  a  variety  of 183 
possible  equilibrium  positions.  That  is,  for  green  politics  qua  collective  ecological 
management,  there  is  no  static  social-environmental  metabolism.  This  is  based  on  the 
distinction  made  earlier  (3.4)  and  above  (5.3),  between  wide  and  narrow  ecological 
rationality,  in  terms  of  parasitic  and  symbiotic  as  well  as  sustainable  and  unsustainable 
social-environmental  relations.  The  aim  of  green  politics  is  obviously  to-  encourage 
sustainable  and  symbiotic  forms  of  soCial-environmental  interaction.  The  latter  is  a 
--  -  ----------  ---, 
metabolism  which  seeks  to  ensure  that  both  human  and  nonhuman  interests  are  made  as 
compatible  as  possible,  understood  as  maximising  long  term  human  welfare  interests 
compatible  with  permitting  the  nonhuman  world  to  flourish. 
In  ecological  terms  what  environmental  management  implies  is  human  intervention  in 
natural  systems  to  attain  what  Odum  calls  an  "anthropogenic  sub-climax"  (1983:  473). 
This  is  an  ecological  state  which  is  different  from  that  which  would  have  been  attained  in 
the  absence  of  human  intervention.  In  other  words,,  this  sub-climax  state  is  the  'humanised 
environment'  mentioned  earlier  (5.3)  and  in  chapter  3  (3.4.1).  27  Human  intervention 
prevents  the  'natural  succession'  of  ecosystems  to  climax  states,  instead  transforming  and 
maintaining  ecosystems  in  accordance  with  human  interests.  An  indication  of  the  political 
significance  of  this  is  given  by  studies  in  the  UK  which  show  that,  "public  opinion  favours 
a  conserved  and  planned  landscape,  rather  than  the  one  allowed  to  revert  to  a  more 
natural,  climax  state'  (Pearce  et  al,  1993:  107-8).  In  the  UK  context,  the  issue  is  not 
whether  natural  climax  states  ought  to  be  permitted  to  emerge  because  they  are  somehow 
morally  superior  (because  they  are  'natural')  to  socially  managed  sub-climax  states,  but 
rather  over  the  particular  sub-climax  state  to  choose.  In  terms  of  the  distinction  often 
used  in  ecological  debates,  the  UK  environment,  an  that  of  Western  Europe  more 
generally,  is  more  of  a  'garden'  (i.  e.,  a  humanised  environment)  than  a  'wilderness'. 
Allowing  natural  ecological  succession  to  resume  within  the  context  of  an  environment 
that  has  been  intensively  managed  for  hundreds  of  years  would  not  only  cause  extensive 
and  unnecessary  social  disruption  and  upheaval,  but  also  cause  suffering  or  harm  to  those 
natural  entities  which  have  carved  out  niches  within  this  humanised  ecosystem.  Natural 
27  The  range  of  sub-climax  states  thus  specifies  the  range  within  which  stewardship  is  operative 184 
succession  and  the  attainment  of  a  climax  state  is  only  one  possible  equilibrium  metabolic 
rate  between  society  and  its  environment.  In  terms  of  ecological  rationality  there  are  other 
possible  equilibria  which  do  not  require  the  'quietism'  involved  in  the  prioritisation  of 
natural  over  human  induced  ecological  succession.  'Ecological  climax  states'  can  be  taken 
as  the  polar  opposite  to  the  complete  human  management  of  the  environment  to  the  point 
of  replicating  its  functions  within  the  'teclmosphere'.  28  On  this  account,  collective 
ecological  management  is  located  between  'non-interference'  and  'substitution',  or  to 
recall  Norton's  words,  between  'primitivism'  and  'artificiality'.  The  advantage  of  this 
view  of  the  'Land  ethic'  is  that  'ecosystem  health'  and  integrity,  includes  human  activities 
which  either  do  not  threaten  or  actively  promote  the  critical  threshold  levels  of  the  chosen 
anthropogenic  sub-climax'. 
The  cultural  dimension  of  green  politics  qua  collective  ecological  management,  can 
also  be  explained  in  reference  to  forms  of  knowledge.  Similar  to  the  green  principle  of 
decentralisation,  understood  as  meaning  that  nothing  should  be  done  at  a  higher  level  if  it 
can  be  done  at  a  lower  one,  it  is  also  the  case  that  different  forms  of  knowledge  may  be 
more  appropriate  as  we  move  from  global,  national  to  local  levels  of  social-environmental 
relations.  At  the  global  level  normative  concern  for  'nature'  as  a  whole  is  rather  abstract. 
As  Rolston  notes,  "A  duty  to  a  species  is  more  like  being  responsible  to  a  cause  than  to  a 
person7  (1988:  144).  29  Corresponding  to  this  abstract  ethical  commitment,  at  the  global 
level  of  'thinking  about  nature'  (Brennan,  1988),  it  is  likely  that  ecological  and  other 
disciplines  of  science  may  be  the  most  appropriate  forms  of  knowledge  at  this  level,  and 
upon  which  transnational  agreement  may  be  reached  as  how  to  deal  with  global 
environmental  problems.  As  we  move  down  to  the  national  level,  ethical  concern  becomes 
more  culture-specific  as  'nature'  becomes  'the  land'  or  a  determinate  environment.  At 
these  levels  the  modes  of  interaction  appropriate  to  regulating  human  action,  while  still 
having  a  place  for  science,  are  likely  to  have  a  'thicker'  normative  texture.  That  is, 
28  For  some  deep  ecologists  the  replacement  of  nature  by  technologicaRy  replicating  its  functions  is,  at 
worst,  the  logical  outcome,  or at  best,  a  permanent  possibility  within  anthropocentrism.  See  Sessions 
(1995b)  and  Mander  (1995)  for  typical  examples. 
29  Or  it  may  take  the  form  of  a  lament  as  in  McKibben's  (1989)  eloquent  elegy  on  the  'end  of  nature'. 185 
interacting  with  a  determinate  and  familiar  aspect  of  the  environment  is  more  likely  to 
involve  strong  and  concrete  moral  commitments.  This  is  particularly  so  if  one  takes 
sympathy  as  an  essential  component  of  moralising  social-environmental  dealings  as 
suggested  in  chapter  3.  The  moral  experience  of  nature  is  richer  since  it  is  more  partial  at 
the  level  of  particular,  familiar  parts  of  the  environment.  This  is  because  we  experience 
nature  in  the  particular,  rather  than  in  the  abstract,  as  suggested  in  chapter  2  (2.6). 
Knowledge  of  the  world  gained  from  direct  experience  of  determinate  parts  of  the 
environment  will  have  a  different  effect  on  our  ethical  treatment  of  the  nonhuman  world, 
than  abstract  knowledge  of  that  world.  However  as  Plumwood  points  out,  "Special 
relationships  with,  care  for,  or  empathy  with  particular  aspects  of  nature  as  experienced, 
rather  than  with  nature  as  abstraction,  are  essential  to  provide  a  depth  of 
concern  ...  experience  of  and  care  and  responsibility  for  particular  animals,  trees,  rivers, 
places  and  ecosystems  which  are  known  well  ...  enhance  rather  than  hinder  a  wider,  more 
generalised  concern  for  the  wider  global  environment"  (1993:  187).  It  is  interesting  to 
note  that  both  moral  sympathy  and  science  can  be  understood  as  universal  modes  of 
human  experience.  The  difference  between  them  is  that  science  is  universal  and  impartial, 
sympathy  is  universal  but  partial.  That  is,  sympathy  is  a  natural  feature  of  what  it  means 
to  be  human,  which  makes  it  universal.  However,  sympathy  is  directed  largely  to  partial 
rather  than  impartial  objects  of  concern.  Stewardship  as  a  virtuous  mode  of  interaction,  a 
social  practice  with  internal  standards  of  excellence,  may  be  said  to  be  a  combination  of 
sympathy  and  science.  Sympathy  without  knowledge  may  lapse  into  'sentimentality', 
while  knowledge  without  sympathy  may  lead  to  an  'arrogant  humanism'.  Both  are 
ecological  vices  to  be  avoided. 
The  importance  of  science  (as  a  non-local  form  of  knowledge)  in  the  establishment  of 
effective  collective  management  strategies  cannot  be  overestimated.  Not  only  is  it  the 
case  that  science  is  required  in  the  elaboration  of  effective  solutions  to  national 
environmental  problems  but  scientific  understanding  is  also  indispensable  in  dealing  with 
transnational  and  global  environmental  problems.  Without  going  into  an  analysis  of  the 
sociology  and  politics  of  science,  and  aware  of  that  'science'  is  not  a  monolithic  body  of 186 
angreed  knowledge,  and  that  it  can  be  used  to  support  privileged  groups  (Sachs,  1995; 
Thompson,  1995),  all  I  wish  to  suggest  here  is  the  potential  role  scientific  discourse  can 
play  as  a  common  language  for  dealing  with  international  and  global  environmental 
problems. 
At  the  local  or  micro  level  we  arrive  at  ethically  richer  and  stronger  attachments  to 
parks,  gardens,  allotments,  forests,  watersheds,  mountains,  particular  animals  and 
species.  30  At  the  local  level  more  vernacular  idioms  of  knowledge  relating  to  ecological 
management  may  be  appropriate.  This  emphasis  on  the  importance  of  the  vernacular  has 
been  a  constant  theme  within  green  politics  beginning  with  Illich's  critique  of  the  dominant 
western  model  of  development  as  the  'modernisation  of  poverty'  (1974)  and  the 
destruction  of  local,  autonomous  social  practices  as  a  result  of  the  rise  of  'disabling 
professions'  (1977).  In  more  recent  years,  the  defence  of  the  vernacular,  the  local  and  the 
traditional,  has  been  a  dominant  theme  within  Southern  green  politics  as  a  response  to 
globalisation  (Shiva,  1988).  These  issues  are  dealt  with  in  more  detail  in  the  next  chapter 
(6.7). 
As  we  move  from  the  local  to  the  global,  ethical  concern  for  the  nonhuman  world 
becomes  more  abstract,  while  the  forms  of  knowledge  appropriate  to  the  regulation  of 
human  interaction  with  that  world  become  more  'objective',  universalistic  and  impartial. 
But  without  the  meso-level  of  national  ecological  culture,  situated  between  the  macro- 
level  of  the  global  biosphere  (where  'humanity'  interacts  with  'nature')  and  the  micro-level 
of  particular  environments  (where  individuals  and  communities  interact  with  particular 
animals,  parks,  urban  spaces),  to  mediate  between  these  two  levels,  the  connection 
between  them  would  be  to  a  large  degree  opaque  culturally  and  politically  speaking.  It  is 
through  the  shared  and  contested  grammar  of  national  culture  that  the  ecological 
narratives  of  the  local  and  the  global  may  be  created  and  transmitted  while  individuals  can 
place  themselves  within  wider  and  wider  ecological  contexts.  In  this  sense  the  green 
political  project  as  given  by  collective  ecological  management  does  not  involve  arguing  for 
30in  this  respect  then  tending  one's  garden  may  be  just  as  cffective  in  demonstrating  and  developing  the 
d  ecological  virtues'  as  'wilderness  experience'.  'Authentic'  care  of  the  non-human  world  does  not  reside 
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a  'return  to  the  land'  in  some  pre-modem  sense  of  recovering  a  lost  rural  and  more 
harmonious  and  'natural'  way  of  life  (Ferris,  1992),  but  rather  for  the  re-integration  of  the 
'land'  both  ethically  and  ecologically  vdthin  western  cultures. 
To  return  to  a  bioregional.  point  made  in  the  last  chapter  (section  4.4),  given  the 
present  global  reach  of  human  activities  (which  is  not  to  say  that  all  humans  are 
responsible),  a  fiill  understanding  of  the  metabolic  interaction  between  human  societies 
and  the  nonhuman  world  requires  placing  them  in  relation  to  ecosysternic  levels  from  their 
local  'ecological  hinterland'  and  through  more  remote  ecosystems  right  up  to  the  global 
biospheric  level.  The  majority  of  presently  existing  societies  interact  with  the  nonhuman 
world  on  both  'ecosysternic'  as  well  as  'biospheric'  levels.  The  latter  can  be  take  to  mean 
that  the  'human  impact'  at  this  biospheric  level  is  the  sum  total  of  global  national 
interactions,  that  is,  the  aggregate  'total  biospheric  impact'  of  human  metabolic  activities 
organised  on  a  national  basis.  31 
5.9  Ecological  Management,  Planning  and  Governance 
For  many  writers  on  green  issues,  it  seems  almost  inevitable  that  dealing  effectively  with 
environmental  problems  requires  institutional  responses  in  which  there  is  some  degree  of 
planning.  This  is  particularly  so,  as  one  would  expect,  with  eco-socialist  positions 
(Stretton,  1976;  Mulberg,  1992,1993).  It  is  also  an  integral  part  of  green  social 
democratic  proposals  (Eckersley,  1992a;  De  Geus,  1991),  and  ecological  modernisation 
(Weale,  1992;  Young,  1994).  In  the  last  few  years  national  environmental  plans  have  been 
drawn  up  across  a  number  of  western  democracies  from  the  Canadian  'Green  Plan' 
(Selman,  1994),  the  Dutch  National  Environmental  Policy  Plan  (Van  Der  Straaten,  1992), 
to  the  Norwegian  'Samla  Plan'  for  the  management  of  water  resources  (Rothenberg, 
1992).  At  the  same  time  issues  around  'environmental  management'  have  been  at  the 
31  `17his  idea  has  been  developed  by  the  Wuppertal  institute  as  a  basis  for  calculating  sustainability  for 
different  regions  and  countries  (Friends  of  the  Earth  Europe,  1995).  The  basic  premise  of  their 
calculation  is  that  each  region  and  country  be  allowed  that  proportion  of  global  carrying  capacity  (or 
&environmental  space)  which  corresponds  to  its  proportion  of  the  global  population. 188 
heart  of  discussions  attempting  to  spell  out  the  policy  implications  of  sustainable 
development  (Pearce  et  al,  1989;  Carley  &  Christie,  1992).  While  the  adoption  of  a 
planned  approach  to  ecological  management  is  often  an  indication  of  the  level  of  public 
concern,,  and  the  extent  of  social  support  and  commitment  to  protecting  the  environment, 
there  are  a  variety  of  other  reasons  why  some  degree  of  public  planning  or  'steering' 
(Jacobs,  1995),  is  an  essential  aspect  of  green  politics. 
The  attraction  and  necessity  of  planning  and  co-ordination  can  be  seen  as  partly  to  do 
with  the  search  for  integrated  policy  approaches  to  dealing  with  environmental  problems  i 
(Weale,  1992:  93-118).  Following  Dryzek,  the  problem  is  that  a  purely  political  or 
economic  'solution'  to  an  environmental  problem  more  often  than  not  simply  displaces  it 
rather  than  solves  it  (1987:  10-11).  Displacement  can  cross  media  (water  pollution  to  solid 
waste  pollution),  in  space  (exporting  pollution),  time  (to  future  generations),  or  from  one 
institution  to  another  (externalities  from  the  economy  being  passed  to  the  political  sphere), 
or  within  an  institution  (from  one  department  to  another).  There  is  thus  a  gap  between 
these  'solutions'  to  ecological  problems  and  ecological  solutions.  Thus  while  it  may  be 
economically  or  politically  rational,  in  the  short-term,  to  pollute  the  environment  in  excess 
of  its  ability  to  assimilate  that  level  of  pollution,  it  is  clearly  not  ecologically  rational  in 
terms  of  the  environment's  capacity  to  sustain  non-decreasing  levels  of  human  (and 
nonhuman)  welfare.  Norton  (1991)  argues  that  the  nature  of  many  ecological  problems  is 
such  that  they  demand  an  integrated,  holistic  and  flexible  problem-solving  approach.  That 
is,  the  solution  as  opposed  to  the  displacement  of  pollution  problems,  for  example, 
requires  some  degree  of  public  regulation  and  planning. 
Planning  within  the  context  of  collective  ecological  management  can  be  thought  of  as 
analogous  to  collective  choice  under  conditions  of  uncertainty.  Planning  within  this 
context  is  more  about  the  maintenance  of  a  process  than  the  achievement  of  any  particular 
outcome.  Given  the  uncertainty  which  characterises  environmental  problems,  any 
environmental  planning  will  necessarily  have  to  be  flexible,  sensitive  to  ecological 
feedback  and  not  cause  irreversible  ecological  changes.  To  use  Beck's  terminology,  what 
is  required  is  a  'reflexive'  and  flexible  form  of  collective  regulation  understood  as  a  social 189 
learning  process  as  well  as  a  exercise  in  social-ecological  adaptation.  This  is  what 
Eckersley  means  when  she  claims  that,  "The  task  of  integrating  environmental  and 
economic  decision-making  requires  a  new  (and  yet  to  be  developed)  administrative 
framework  that  is  considerably  more  flexible,  collegial  and  consultative  than  the  traditional 
moder'  (1993:  22).  This  can  also  be  understood  from  an  ecological  modernisation 
perspective,  which  uses  a  modified  version  of  the  traditional  model,  but  with  the 
recognition  that,  "If  national  planning  is  shunned,  its  alternative  will  have  to  be  invented" 
(Weale,  1992:  149). 
Ae  used  within  the  context  of  ecological  governance,  planning  refers  to  conscious,  IL  1.0 
collective  determination  and  co-ordination  of  social  activities  in  the  pursuit  of  the 
maintenance  of  some  chosen  rate  of  metabolic  exchange.  Planning  therefore  does  not 
refer  to  social  reorganisation  in  accordance  with  some  state-imposed  blueprint.  That  is, 
the  planning  process  within  collective  ecological  management  is  not  about  wholesale 
4social  engineering'  (Popper,  1974:  158-67).  But  nor  is it  'piecemeal',  discrete  policy 
change.  Some,  like  Jacobs  (1995),  have  sought  to  see  the  issue  not  in  terms  of  planning 
versus  the  market  since  the  achievement  of  sustainability  requires  governmental 
intervention,  particularly  with  regard  to  the  economic  sphere;  as  he  puts  it,  "The 
opposition  between  'market  mechanisms'  and  'regulations'  is  overstated,  missing  the 
common  requirement  for  hands-on  government  interventiorf'  (1995:  1).  32  It  would  be 
more  accurate  to  describe  environmental  planning  as  involving  a  process  of  'ecological 
restructuring',  altering  and  re-integrating  the  relationships  between  state,  society, 
economy  and  environment  on  ecologically  altered  principles.  This  macro-level, 
institutional  change  parallels  the  micro-level  change  the  virtues  of  stewardship  seeks  to 
realise  in  integrating  the  different  roles  individuals  and  groups  have  as  citizens,  producers, 
and  consumers. 
32  A  more  radical  view  is  given  by  O'Neill  who  claims  to  "Find  it  difficult  to  see  how  environmental 
goods  could  be  realised  without  planning  within  the  economic  sphere  itself.  The  question  is  not  one  of 
market  or  plan,  but  rather  what  forms  of  planning  are  compatible  with  other  goods,  in  particular,  that  of 
autonomy"  (1993:  175).  O'Neill's  point  is  that  a  democratically  planned  economy  is  not  necessarily  a 
prelude  to  totalitarianism.  This  issue  is  discussed  in  the  chapter  7  (7.9). 190 
An  example  of  the  role  of  planning  and  the  state  within  ecological  governance  is  the 
precautionary  principle.  The  precautionary  principle,  together  with  the  'polluter  i)  s' 
a 
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principle,  is  the  most  important  green  policy  principle.  The  precautionary  principle  holds 
that  the  onus  of  proof  is  on  those  who  propose  social-environmental  change  rather  than 
those  who  oppose  it.  It  is  a  principle  of  prudence,  particularly  under  conditions  of 
uncertainty.  As  Boehmer-Christiansen  (1994)  argues,  the  precautionary  principle  evolved 
out  of  the  German  socio-legal  tradition  and  was  explicitly  set  within  the  context  of  state- 
management  and  planning.  Thus  the  precautionary  principle  is  an  interventionist  measure, 
a  justification  of  state  involvement  in  the  economy  in  the  name  of  good  government  (De 
Geus,  1996).  It  thus  has  much  in  common  with  the  interpretation  of  ecological 
modernisation  given  by  Weale  (1992),  which  is  unsurprising  since  both  can  be  placed 
within  the  German  Rechuslaat  tradition.  The  significance  of  the  precautionary  principle 
fies  in  the  fact  that  it  serves  to  justify  state  management  of  resource  use  because  one  of  the 
central  aspects  of  this  principle  is  the  idea  that  the  onus  of  proof  is  on  those  who  propose 
major  social-enviromnental  change.  33  The  operation  of  the  precautionary  principle  makes 
the  state  the  guarantor  of  the  environmental  status  quo.  This  principle  expresses  in  a 
modem  legal  form  the  virtue  of  prudence  in  respect  to  development  demands  on  the 
environment.  Although  the  precautionary  principle  seems  to  re-introduce  the  rejected  idea 
of  a  'hands  ofr  policy  regulating  social-environmental  exchanges  (5.7),  this  is  not  the 
case,  although  it  does  strengthen  the  case  for  environmental  preservation  when  compared 
with  the  current  regulation  of  social-environmental  interaction.  The  precautionary 
principle  and  the  role  of  the  state  in  implementing  it,  typically  within  the  context  of 
environment  vs.  development  disputes,  stress  the  need  for  discrimination  and  careful 
consideration  when  faced  with  development  proposals.  Thus  the  precautionary  principle  is 
not  anti-development  per  se,  nor  is  it  pro-preservation,  since  development  is  always 
33  A  fuller  exploration  of  the  precautionary  principle  would  require  placing  it  within  the  context  of  the 
'risk  society'  analysis  (Beck,  1992,1995a,  1995b).  For  example,  Beck's  analysis  of  risk  society  explicitly 
endorses  this  prcsumption  in  favour  of  non-action  with  regard  to  risky  cnvironmental  developments  by 
arguing  that,  "insisting  on  the  purity  of  the  scientific  analysis  leads  to  the  pollution  and  contwnination  of 
air,  foodstuffs,  water,  soil,  plants,  animals  and  peopld"  (1992:  62;  emphasis  in  original). 191 
possible  so  long  as  it  is  in  accordance  with  the  precautionary  principle.  However,  the 
main  point  here  is  that  solving  environmental  problems  as  part  of  a  collective  ecological 
management  strategy  requires  such  ex  ante  policy  principles,  like  the  precautionary  one, 
an  aim  of  which  is  to  possibly  prevent  environmental  problems  from  arising  in  the  first 
place.  And  such  ex  ivile,  preventative  measures  require  some  degree  of  democratic,  public 
management,  accountability,  consent  and  state  enforcement. 
Another  reason  for  some  degree  of  conscious  planning  as  part  of  a  wider  collective 
ecological  management  comes  from  the  idea  that  the  standard  green  reading  of  ecology 
which  sees  ecosystems  as  self-regulating  and  harmonious  is  a  disputed  claim  within 
ecological  science.  As  Brennan  points  out,  "the  whole  issue  of  whether  ecosystems  are 
generally  self-maintaining  diverse  systems  or  simply  fortuitous  groupings  of  populations 
that  at  least  for  a  time  are  not  lethal  for  one  another  is  very  much  undecided  in  ecology.  It 
is  striking,  and  unfortunate,  that  many  conservationists  operate  with  ideas  of  balance  and 
diversity  in  nature  that  were  more  prevalent  in  the  nineteenth  century  than  among 
contemporary  ecologiste"  (1992:  16-17).  As  indicated  in  the  last  section,  ecological 
diversity  within  social-environment  relations  requires  active  social  intervention,  and 
maintenance. 
Added  to  this  is  the  controversy  over  whole  idea  that  diversity  and  ecosystem 
complexity  are  positively  related  to  ecosystem  stability.  According  to  Clark  contrary  to 
popular  perception,  "The  highest  diversity  of  species  tends  to  occur  not  in  most  stable 
systems,  but  in  those  subject  to  constant  disturbance,  e.  g.  rainforests  subject  to  destruction 
by  storm,  and  rocky  intertidal  regions  buffeted  by  heavy  surf'  (1992:  42).  Oneimplication 
of  this  that  if  biodiversity  is  a  top  value  this  may  imply  human  intervention  in  ecosystems 
to  maintain  high  degrees  of  biodiversity,  perhaps  by  disturbing  ecosystems  in  the  requisite 
manner.  Of  the  many  conclusions  one  can  draw  from  this  perhaps  the  most  important  is 
that  a  'hands  off'  approach  cannot  be  said  to  guarantee  the  types  of  ecosystems  that  many 
deep  greens  desire.  Ecosystems  characterised  by  diversity,  balance  and  complexity  may 192 
have  to  be  actively  created  and  managed.  34  The  normative  standpoint  from  which  to  view 
social  impacts  on  the  environment  is  not  a  'hands  ofr  position  which  frames  the  issue  of 
the  relation  between  society  and  environment  in  terms  of  'use'  and  'non-use',  but  rather 
that  proposed  in  the  last  chapter  as  the  'ethics  of  use'  which  attempts  to  distinguish  'use' 
from  'abuse'.  Once  this  ethical  issue  has  been  settled,  ecological  science  can  then  be  used 
to  help  distinguish  'good'  from  'bad'  ecological  management,  i.  e.  sustainability  from 
unsustainability.  The  type  of  social  regulation  implied  by  collective  ecological 
management  involves  the  normative  constraining  of  permissible  policy  options.  We  could 
imagine  this  as  what  is  meant  by  the  democratic  character  of  collective  ecological 
management.  It  is  not  that  each  social-environmental  issue  is  to  be  dealt  with  by  all 
citizens  taking  a  vote  on  the  issue,  rather  it  is  that  citizens  (as  opposed  to  bureaucrats  and 
experts)  can  participate  in  what  Jacobs  calls  'decision-recommending'  rather  than 
decision-making  institutions  (1996:  13).  That  is,  such  forms  of  popular  democratic 
participation  lay  out  the  parameters  of  'use'  and  'abuse'  in  particular  cases,  that  is,  the 
normative  bounds  of  environmental  management  which  can  then  be  carried  out  through 
state  institutions.  This  is  discussed  in  more  detail  in  chapter  7. 
In  this  way  the  idea  of  political  ecological  management  begins  with  normative  issues 
and  then  moves  to  employ  ecological  science,  and  other  more  local  and  particular  forms  of 
knowledge  where  appropriate,  to  help  in  the  formulation  of  an  effective  strategy  for 
managing  the  ecological  commons.  35  From  the  point  of  view  of  collective  ecological 
34  Clark  makes  a  related  point  concerning  the  determinants  of  an  equilibrium  ecological  state.  She 
maintains  that,  "the  equilibrium  state  of  an  ecosystem  seems  not  to  be  determined  by  the  total  mix  of 
species  present;  but  by  the  presence  -  or  absence-  of  a  very  few  'keystone'  species  ...  the  presence  or  absence 
of  but  one  or  two  species  may  determine  the  texture  of  an  entire  ecosystcm7  (1992:  42).  That  humans  may 
be  one  of  these  'keystone'  species  within  certain  ecosystems  is  something  that  seems  intuitively  appealing, 
although  it  may  offend  the  ecocentric  sensibilities  of  some  greens.  If  humans  are  a  keystone  species,  then 
it  is  not  the  case  that  the  relationship  between  humans  and  nature  is  non-reciprocal  with  humans 
dependent  upon  nature.  In  the  context  of  maintaining  a  particular  ecosystem  in  which  humans  are  a 
keystone  species,  'nature'  and  'ecosystem  health'  is  dependent  upon  humans.  Another  situation  where  the 
mutual  dependence  of  social  and  ecosystems  can  be  seen  concerns  'ecological  restoration'  discussed 
below. 
35  Given  that  the  search  for  a  collective  strategy/proccss  for  managing  the  commons  involves  moral, 
scientific,  cultural  as  well  as  more  obvious  political  and  economic  inputs,  there  is  a  sense  in  which  this 
process  requires  that  all  forms  of  -traluation  and  understandings  of  the  environment  and  social  relations  to 
it  are  given  'voice'.  Hence  science  is  not  privileged  relative  to  indigenous  forms  of  knowledge  and 193 
management,  planning  and  management  will  be  informed  by  the  cultural  valuations  of 
nature  of  the  society  in  which  it  operates.  A  good  example  of  this  is  presented  by 
Rothenberg  (1992)  who  contrasts  the  Norwegian  'Samla  plan'  with  the  American 
Endangered  Species  Act  as  expressing  two  different  cultural  valuations  of  an  relationships 
to  the  environment.  Whereas  the  Samla  plan  (a  management  plan  for  Norway's  water 
resources)  assesses  costs  and  benefits  of  damming  rivers  which  is  sensitive  to  the  claims  of 
ecological  communities  of  wildlife  and  ecosystems,  the  US  Endangered  Species  Act  is 
individualistic  in  identifying  particular  species  rather  than  ecological  communities  as  the 
object  of  environmental  management  and  legislation.  Rothenberg  argues  that  this 
individualistic-community  difference  is  due  to  the  different  cultural  contexts  of  the  two 
countries.  Tellingly  he  notes  that 
One  might  argue  that  the  Samla  Plan  only  works  because  the  ideal  of  Norway  is 
sufficiently  unified  in  people's  minds  to  agree  that  each  part  of  the  society  needs  to 
compromise  to  serve  the  whole.  7he  belief  that  a  common  goal  is  important 
makes  the  system  singular,  not  pluralistic.  Perhaps  the  individually-centred 
American  system  is  even  more  pluralistic,  as  it  admits  no  common  ground  save 
'don't  tread  on  me!  '-  respect  for  the  rights  of  other  individuals  waiting  to  be 
conceived  and  tagged  (1992:  13  1;  emphasis  added). 
The  sensitivity  to  ecological  communities  is  thus  an  extension  of  Norwegian  political 
culture  in  which  community  and  the  idea  of  the  environment  as  an  overarching  national 
collective  good  are  central.  Such  a  political  culture  is  lacking  in  multi-cultural,  pluralistic 
America,  hence  the  individualistic  ethos  of  its  environmental  legislation,  where  concern  is 
not  for  the  'national  environment'  as  such  but  for  particular  threatened  individual  species 
or  ecosystems. 
traditional  commons-t3W,  i.  e.  non-state,  ecological  management,  which  still  exist  in  many  parts  of  the 
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However,  though  state-planning  and  co-ordination  may  be  invaluable  in  dealing  with 
ad  hoc  contingencies,  such  as  oil  spills,  it  is  unlikely  that  hierarchical  bureaucracies  will  be 
completely  effective  in  dealing  with  the  complexity  and  uncertainty  associated  with  all 
environmental  problems.  As  Dryzek  notes,  "Highly  structured  organizations  are  at  a  loss, 
though,  when  it  comes  to  dealing  with  high  degrees  of  uncertainty,  variability,  and 
complexityu-  circumstances  that  are,  of  course,  ubiquitous  in  the  ecological  realnf'  (1987: 
108).  In  other  words,  centralised,  bureaucratic  organisation  such  as  that  associated  with 
the  contemporary  nation-state,  may  be  ecologically  rational  only  across  a  specific  range  of 
environmental  problems.  This  is  not  so  much  an  argument  against  the  state  per  se,  but 
against  centralised,  hierarchical  and  bureaucratised  planning  and  administration  in  general. 
An  alternative  conception  of  the  state,  that  of  a  flexible,  enabling  state  with  minimal 
centralisation  and  bureaucratisation  is  one  that  concurs  with  the  goals  of  collective 
ecological  management.  Hence  the  focus  on  the  local  state  as  the  appropriate  level  for 
sustainability  in  Agenda  21  of  the  Rio  Declaration,  which  will  be  discussed  in  the  next 
chapter  (6.2.2).  It  is  not  the  state  that  manages  society's  metabolism  with  nature  on 
society's  behalf  (the  extension  of  the  welfare  state  to  the  ecological  sphere)  but  rather  that 
a  democratised  state  is  a  necessary  institution  which  in  conjunction  with  other  non-state 
forms  of  governance  contributes  to  the  overall  goal  of  collective  ecological  management. 
If  we  widen  out  the  context  of  solving  environmental  problems  as  a  matter  of  governance 
then  the  state  may  be  less  ecologically  irrational  in  its  acts  since  it  becomes  one 
institutional  aspect  of  a  much  wider  social  process.  Within  the  context  of  ecological 
governance  the  state  does  not  stand  completely  condemned  on  ecological  grounds, 
particularly  if  flexible  forms  of  administration  and  decentralised  forms  of  co-ordination, 
control  and  feedback  are  employed.  36 
36  In  this  restructuring  of  the  state  within  the  context  of  ecological  governance,  many  of  the  issues 
pertaining  to  the  shape  and  form  of  an  'enabling  state'  are  raisecl.  That  is  to  say  that  the  qpe  of  state 
required  by  the  process  of  collective  ecological  management  is  an  enabling  one. 195 
5.9.1  Ecological  Restoration 
Whereas  the  majority  of  environmental  problems  with  which  collective  ecological 
management  has  to  deal  concern  direct  ecological  inputs  to  human  welfare,  such  as 
ecological  resources  necessary  to  economic  activity,  there  is  another  type  of  social-nature 
relation  which  equally  calls  for  large-scale  social  organisation  and  co-ordination.  While 
most  enviromnental  problems  have  to  do  with  immediate  supply  problems  or  discrete 
ecological  goods  and  services,  'ecological  restoration'  has  to  do  with  repairing  degraded 
ecosystems  or  landscapes.  In  some  cases  this  involves  returning  a  disturbed  ecosystem  to 
the  status  quo  ante,  that  is,  either  its  stage  of  ecological  succession  prior  to  human 
interference,  or  its  ecological  state  as  a  'humanised  environment'  prior  to  industrial  forms 
of  human  interaction.  The  basic  premise  of  ecological  restoration  is  that  human 
interference  can,  to  some  extent,  cure  the  wounds  it  inflicts.  Part  of  restoration  ecology 
involves,  "returning  a  site  to  some  previous  state,  with  the  species  richness  and  diversity 
and  physical,  biological  and  aesthetic  characteristics  of  that  site  before  human  settlement 
and  the  accompanying  disturbancee'  (Morrison,  1987:  160).  The  novelty  of  ecological 
restoration  lies  in  that  it  is  an  example  of  social-environmental  interaction  where  the 
environmental  is  dependent  upon  social  agency,  rather  than  the  non-reciprocal  manner  in 
which  relations  between  society  and  environment  are  usually  understood. 
The  large  and  growing  philosophical  debate  and  controversy  around  ecological 
restoration  will  not  be  entered  into  here.  370ne  point  that  may  be  raised  concerns  the  fact 
37  Much  of  the  debate  around  ecological  restoration  centres  on  the  practical  and  philosophical 
implications  of  attempting  to  'fake  nature'  (Elliot,  1982).  For  example,  Goodin  (1992)  holds  that  a 
restored  landscape  is  less  'valuable'  (in  terms  of  his  green  theory  of  value)  than  a  'natural'  one,  since  the 
former  is  analogous  to  a  copy  of  the  latter.  Goodin's  green  theory  of  value  holds  that  what  is  valuable 
about  natural  entities  is  their  nonhuman  origin,  once  humans  restore  landscapes  their  value  is  diminished 
relative  to  the  'original'.  The  reason  for  this  value  differential  between  original  and  restored  nature  is  that 
the  basis  of  nature's  intrinsic  value,  namely  its  'naturalness',  is  present  is  the  former  and  not  in  the  latter 
(Elliot,  1994:  40-43).  However,  while  there  is  philosophical  debate  concerning  ecological  restoration, 
there  is  no  suggestion  that  it  ought  not  to  be  done.  Where  there  is  doubt  as  to  whether  it  ought  to  be  done 
is  where  claims  of  future  restoration  of  ecosystems  or  landscapes  are  used  to  justify  present  ecological 
disruption.  See  Goodin  (1992:  31-41).  However,  if  we  seek  to  realisc  values  other  than  the  intrinsic  value 
of  nature  based  on  its  'naturalness',  there  may  be  less  objection  to  the  din-tinished  value  of  restored 
ecosystems/landscapes  relative  to  the  original.  For  example,  if  what  we  wish  is  to  maximisc  biodivcrsity 196 
that  ecological  restoration  perhaps  more  than  any  other  social-environmental  relations 
highlights  the  potentially  symbiotic  (and  sustainable)  as  opposed  to  parasitic  quality  of 
social  interaction  with  the  environment.  In  the  case  of  restored  ecosystems,  and  to  a  lesser 
degree  in  other  managed  ecosystems,  there  is  a  mutual  reciprocity  in  the  metabolic  relation 
that  is  often  missed  in  green  talk  of  the  dependence  of  humans  on  nature.  Restored 
ecosystems  are  a  stark  reminder  that  there  are  situations  where  nature  is  dependent  upon 
society.  Of  course  this  'nature',  or  more  technically  the  particular  ecological  succession 
state  achieved  by  social  intervention,  is  human-determined,  this  does  not  mean  it  does  not 
partake  of  'naturalness'.  Recalling  Norton's  statement,  'naturalness  admits  of  degrees'. 
For  present  purposes  it  is  assumed  that  the  restoration  of  degraded  ecosystems  and 
landscapes  is  both  possible  and  desirable,  perhaps  even  necessary.  "  The  main  point  I  wish 
to  make  concerning  ecological  restoration  is  that  on  both  these  counts,  its  desirability  and 
possibility,  it  requires  large-scale  social  organisation,  regulation  and  intervention.  It  is 
because  of  the  costs  involved  in  ecosystem  rehabilitation  that  the  nation-state  and  its 
agencies  are  often  the  appropriate  institutions  to  carry  it  out.  The  state  with  its  tax 
revenues,  administrative  and  co-ordinating  ability,  together  with  its  access  to  the  relevant 
ecological  knowledge  (not  necessarily  that  given  by  ecological  science),  and  its  legitimacy, 
is  clearly  in  a  strong  position  to  restore  ecosystem  health.  Indeed,  it  may  have  a  statutory 
duty  to  restore  ecosystems  as  part  of  fulfilling  its  obligations  under  both  national  and 
international  law,  to  preserve  biodiversity  for  example. 
It  may  also  be  that  repairing  environmental  damage  requires  institutions  other  than 
those  appropriate  to  environmental  preservation.  Extending  the  subsidiarity  idea  that 
decisions  ought  to  be  taken  at  the  lowest  possible  level,  we  may  also  add  that  institutions 
should  be  relative  to  the  particular  issue  at  hand.  It  is  because  of  the  range  and  type  of 
social-environmental  issues  that  ecological  governance  deals  with  that  no  one  institution, 
then  it  is  clear  that  a  restored  ecosystem  which  had  a  greater  number  and  diversity  of  species  than  had 
been  there  before  human  interference,  would  be  more  valuable  than  the  original. 
38  Extensive  ecological  restoration  will  be  ncccs&W  if  global  sustainability  is  to  be  achieved,  in  the  sense 
that  biodivcrsity  will  have  to  increased.  For  example,  according  to  a  Friends  of  the  Earth  Europe  report,  if 
the  European  Union  is  to  achieve  sustainability  there  needs  to  be  a  ten-fold  increase  in  protected  land  so 
as  to  support  the  levels  of  biodivcrsity  required  (1995). 197 
such  as  the  nation-state,  will  be  sufficient  to  cope  with  them  all.  That  is,  the  various 
social-environmental  interactions  and  relations  that  together  make  up  the  totality  of  a 
society's  metabolism  with  its  environment,,  demand  different  institutional  forms,  principles 
and  modes  of  operation.  And  while  I  hope  to  have  demonstrated  why  the  nation-state  will 
still  have  a  role  to  play  within  collective  ecological  management,  I  also  hope  to  have 
shown  that  the  latter  can  only  be  understood  in  terms  of  'governance'  rather  than 
government. 
5.10  Conclusion 
The  main  question  this  chapter  has  addressed  is  the  issue  of  the  most  appropriate 
institutional  structure  for  green  politics.  In  section  5.2  it  was  argued  that  the  long-run 
concern  of  green  politics  is  with  institutional  and  agent-level  transformation.  Green 
politics  is  understood  as  a  political  theory  with  wider  cultural  ambitions.  In  5.3  the  idea  of 
cecological  rationality'  was  introduced.  Ecological  rationality  was  discussed  as  a  way  of 
expressing  the  moral  and  material  dimensions  of  the  green  view  of  social-environmental 
interaction.  Using  Dryzek's  'sustainability'  view  of  ecological  rationality,  the  distinction 
between  'symbiotic'  and  'parasitic'  forms  of  social-environmental  metabolism,  introduced 
in  chapter  3,  was  argued  to  articulate  this  moral  dimension.  An  ecologically  rational 
social-environmental  metabolism  is  one  which  is  both  sustainable  and  symbiotic.  The  use 
of  'ecological  rationality'  as  a  criterion  by  which  to  judge  the  institutional  structure  of 
society  is  an  attempt  to  synthesise  the  'ecological'  imperative  of  green  politics,  with  the 
contention  that  there  can  never  be  a  purely  objective,  non-normative  conception  of  this. 
In  5.4  through  to  5.9,  the  general  contours  of  collective  ecological  management, 
understood  as  an  appropriate  institutional  structure  for  green  values  and  principles,  were 
sketched.  In  5.4  the  positive  role  played  by  the  state  within  green  political  theory  was 
outlined,  as  a  way  of  introducing  one  of  the  most  recent  and  popular  state-centred 
approaches  to  social-environmental  management,  namely  ecological  modernisation.  In 
5.5.  a  reconstructive  explication  and  critique  of  ecological  modernisation  was  developed. 198 
Ecological  modernisation  was  criticised  for  being  overly  state-centred,  top-down, 
bureaucratic  and  generally  constraining.  However,  it  was  also  suggested  that  aspects  of 
ecological  modernisation,  which  was  understood  as  a  policy-based  ideology  rather  than  a 
worked  out  political  theory,  could  be  used  as  a  stepping  stone  to  collective  ecological 
management.  In  5.6  collective  ecological  management  was  examined.  Here  it  was  argued 
that  ecological  modernisation  could  become  radicalised  when  the  focus  of  political 
attention  shifts  from  causes  to  effects,  from  ex  post,  compensatory,  policy  approaches  to 
social-environmental  problems  to  ex  ante,  preventative,  structural  approaches.  In  5.7  the 
role  the  'nation'  and  'nationhood'  may  play  within  collective  ecological  management  was 
discussed  as  a  way  to  flesh  out  the  cultural  dimension  of  the  conception  of  green  politics 
being  defended.  Leading  on  from  that,  Norton's  interpretation  of  Leopold's  'land  ethic' 
as  a  form  of  environmental  management  within  which  cultural  adaptation  was  central  was 
discussed  in  5.8.  The  'land  ethic'  was  argued  not  to  be  a  'hands  ofr,  deep  ecological 
position,  but  rather  represents  an  ideal-type  of  collective  ecological  management  in  which 
social-environmental  relations  are  sustainable  and  symbiotic.  Within  Leopold's  view  of 
collective  ecological  management,  there  is  a  pluralist  assumption  in  respect  to  social- 
environmental  relations;  pluralist  in  the  sense  that  no  one  form  of  valuation  should  have  a 
privileged  position  to  any  other.  In  5.9  the  role  of  regulation  and  governance  within 
collective  ecological  management  was  discussed.  This  was  related  to  the  idea  that  the 
political  and  normative  issue  with  regard  to  social-environmental  affairs  is  not  whether  we 
should  manage,  but  rather  how  we  manage  the  environment.  While  anxious  to  distinguish 
'planning'  from  state-enforced  planning,  it  was  argued  that  the  governance  of  social- 
environmental  affairs,  requires  some  degree  of  collective,  democratic  regulation. 
This  chapter  amounts  to  an  admittedly  incomplete  defence  of  a  form  of  green  politics 
which  seems  to  break  with  most  of  the  touchstones  which  are  used  to  determine  whether 
or  not  a  theory  is  'really'  green.  Firstly,  it  is  anthropocentric,  but  a  self-reflexive 
anthropocentrism  which  does  not  suppose  that  any  human  reason,  simply  by  being  human, 
justifies  any  use  of  nature.  Secondly,  and  following  on  from  the  latter,  it  pitches  the 
political-normative  debate  at  the  level  of  an  immanent  critique  of  western  culture. 199 
Leopold's  'land  ethic'  for  example,  does  not  require  widespread  metaphysical 
reconstruction.  Thirdly,  it  does  not  reject  economic  valuations  but  rather  seeks  to 
mte(  grate  them  within  a  wider  political  process.  Finally,  it  is  committed  to  the  state  as  a 
key  institutional  feature  for  the  governance  of  a  sustainable  and  symbiotic  metabolism  with 
the  nonhuman  world. 
Collective  ecological  management  is  not  simply  about  institutional  changes,  but  is  at 
its  heart  a  normative  political  process  for  deciding  on  a  social-environment  metabolism, 
which,  in  part,  is  to  choose  to  five  in  a  different  sort  of  society.  Collective  ecological 
management  is  not  about  state  management  of  the  environmental  affairs  of  civil  society, 
that  is  the  state  taking  care  of  the  public  issues  of  policy-making  and  implementation. 
Ecological  management  as  understood  here  includes  but  goes  beyond  this  image  to 
encompass  forms  of  collective  action,  deliberation  and  implementation  which  go  beyond 
existing  liberal  democratic  theory  and  practice.  Issues  of  the  democratic  character  of 
collective  ecological  management  are  dealt  with  in  chapter  7.  However,  before  moving  on 
to  discuss  the  relationship  between  democracy  and  green  politics,  we  turn  to  green 
political  economy. Chapter  Six 
Green  Political  Economy 
6.1  Introduction 
This  chapter  outlines  a  green  political  economy  to  underwrite  the  collective  ecological 
management  argument  presented  in  the  previous  chapter.  In  section  6.2  two  current 
political  economy  approaches  to  environmental  issues,  neoclassical  environmental 
economics  (6.2.1)  and  free  market  environmentalism  (6.2.2),  are  criticised.  In  raising 
doubts  about  their  ability  to  deal  with  environmental  issues  an  alternative  green 
political  economy  position  is  put  forward  that  is  consistent  with  the  aims  of  collective 
ecological  management  as  outlined  in  the  last  chapter.  In  section  6.3,  this  green 
political  economy  position  is  introduced.  It  is  developed  in  6.4  by  drawing  a 
distinction  between  the  capitalist  or  free-market  economy  and  an  alternative,  more 
local  and  limited  conception  of  the  market  and  economy.  In  section  6.5  the  Local 
Employment  and  Trading  System  (LETS)  is  used  to  illustrate  some  principal 
dimensions  of  this  local  view  of  the  economy,  while  in  6.6  the  role  of  money  and  how 
it  separates  the  economy  from  nature  and  disembeds  the  economy  from  wider  social 
relations  is  considered.  In  section  6.7,  the  relationship  between  green  political 
economy  and  ecological  virtue  is  examined.  Together  with  the  green  principle  of 
cmeeting  local  needs  locally',  the  idea  of  self-reliance  is  used  to  outline  a  green 
understanding  of  liberty  in  terms  of  self-determination  and  autonomy.  This  section  also 
briefly  discusses  'development'  and  the  way  in  which  green  political  economy  differs 
from  orthodox  conceptions  of  political  economy. 201 
6.2  A  Critique  of  Neoclassical  Environmental  Economics  and  Free 
Market  Environmentalism 
Before  moving  on  to  present  a  green  political  economy  which  concurs  with  collective 
ecological  management,  I  wish  to  discuss  and  criticise  two  of  the  prominent  political 
economic  theories  used  to  address  ecological  issues. 
6.2.1  Neoclassical  Environmental  Economics 
Although  often  equated,  neoclassical  environmental  economics  and  free  market 
environmentalism  represent  quite  distinct  political  economic  perspectives,  assumptions 
and  aims.  Despite  sharing  a  broad  concern  with  finding  'economic'  and  'market- 
based'  solutions  to  environmental  problems,  these  two  theories  of  political  economy 
lead  to  radically  Oferent  forms  of  economic  organisation  both  of  which,  from  a  green 
point  of  view,  are  problematic. 
Following  Mulberg  (1992),  neoclassical  economics'  methodological  commitment  to 
positive  science,  although  ostensibly  in  favour  of  the  'free  market',  actually  constitutes 
a  justification  for  economic  planning  rather  than  laissez-faire  economics.  Accordingto 
him,  "the  logic  of  positive  economics  leads  to  a  notion  of  economic  planning  ... 
In  fact, 
the  solutions  based  upon  orthodox  theory  apply  a  sort  of  planning  'supplement'  to  a 
market  analysie'  (1992:  335).  Within  neoclassical  environmental  economics,  this 
planning  supplement  is  arrived  at  by  using  various  non-market  techniques,  such  as 
cost-benefit  analysis  and  contingent  valuation  exercises,  to  discover  individual 
economic  valuations  of  environmental  resources,  that  is,  their  economic  benefits  and 
costs  to  the  individual.  Economic  values  are  arrived  at  via  the  creation  of  hypothetical 
markets  in  which  individuals  are  asked  to  trade  non-tradable  environmental  goods.  For 
example,  a  neoclassical  environmental  economics  approach  to  dealing  with  a  proposal 
to  develop  a  particular  environment,  would  involve  conducting  survey  research,  in 
order  to  determine  the  individual's  'willingness  to  pay'  to  prevent  the  proposed 
development  or  ascertaining  the  monetary  amount  they  would  require  as 
compensation.  In  other  words  the  neoclassical  approach  is  to  conduct  a  cost-benefit 202 
analysis,  aggregate  individual  preferences  as  expressed  in  the  exercise  and  make 
recommendations  as  to  the  'adjustment'  of  the  price  mechanism  depending  on  the 
balance  of  'benefits'  and  'costs".  The  neoclassical  approach  is  one  which  attempts  to 
ascertain  the  price  of  unpriced  and  non-traded  environmental  goods  and  services 
(Pearce  el  al,  1989,1993).  Its  starting  point  is  that  many  environmental  problems  are 
due  to  the  unpriced  character  of  environmental  goods  and  services,  such  as  clean  air, 
drinkable  water  and  unspoilt  countryside.  To  combat  the  misperception  of 
environmental  public  goods  being  'free'  it  proposes  to  put  a  price  on  them  so  as  to 
internalise  a  potential  externality.  In  the  language  of  economics,  the  lack  of  a  market 
price  for  such  goods  means  that  market  behaviour  will  lead  to  a  sub-optimal,  or 
Pareto-inefficient,  allocation  of  these  particular  resources.  '  In  plain  words,  because 
these  environmental  resources  do  not  presently  have  a  price,  the  operation  of  the 
market  will  tend  to  overuse  and  over-exploit  them,  hence  pollution  and  other  forms  of 
environmental  degradation.  By  giving  the  environment  a  price  tag,  markets  will  ensure 
that  the  many  resources  and  services  it  provides  to  the  economy  and  society  in  general 
will  be  'protected',  that  is  sustainably  exploited.  Ascribing  a  price  to  environmental 
goods  and  services  makes  them  'visible'  within  the  market  and  nature's  contribution  to 
economic  activity  is  thereby  acknowledged.  For  free  market  environmentalism, 
environmental  problems  are  largely  due  to  open  access.  Hence  they  propose  private 
property  rights  as  a  solution  to  over-exploitation  and  degradation  of  the  commons. 
Thus  neoclassical  environment  economics  and  free  market  environmentalism  can  be 
distinguished  by  the  different  aspect  of  the  'public  goods'  problem  of  the  environment 
each  stresses.  Free  market  environmentalism  stresses  the  non-excludable  character  of 
environmental  public  goods,  while  neoclassical  environmental  economics  emphasises 
their  unpriced,  'free'  character. 
IThe  Pareto  criterion  has  conservative  implications  since  it  rules  out  any  allocative  pattern  in  which 
some  would  lose  and  others  gain.  This  principle  can  thus  be  seen  as  an  important  part  of  the  growth 
imperative  at  the  heart  of  orthodox  economic  theory.  Economic  growth,  as  opposed  to  redistribution 
from  the  rich  to  the  poor,  satisfies  the  Pareto  criterion  that  there  is  no  alternative  allocative  pattern  in 
which  everybody  gains,  This  criterion  thus  constitutes  one  of  the  primary  stumbling  blocks  against 
redistributive  arguments.  The  relationship  between  justifications  of  economic  inequality  and 
economic  growth  will  be  discussed  in  the  next  chapter  (7.5). 203 
Unlike  the  free  market  environmentalist  solution,  environmental  economics  does 
not  hold  that  the  value  of  a  given  environmental  resource  or  amenity  can  only  be 
revealed  in  actual  market  exchange.  This  fundamental  difference  can.  be  seen  in  the 
distinction  drawn  by  Pearce  et  al  between  the  privatisation  of  natural  resources  and  the 
creation  of  new  'environmental  markets'  (the  free  market  environmentalist  approach) 
and  the,  'ýmodification  of  markets  by  centrally  deciding  the  value  of  the  environmental 
services  and  ensuring  that  those  values  are  incorporated  into  the  prices  of  goods  and 
servicee'  (1989:  15  5;  emphasis  added).  The  state  or  regulatory  body  using  the  survey 
tools  of  neoclassical  environmental  economics  ascertains  the  'social  cost'  of  pollution, 
for  example,  and  from  there  the  'economic  price'  of  pollution  can  be  determined. 
Using  this  information,  the  market  can  be  altered  by  the  state  to  ensure  that 
environmental  externalities  such  as  pollution  are  'internalised'  by  market  actors.  2 
For  free  market  environmentalism,  following  the  Austrian  school  of  economic 
theory,  the  creation  of  actual  rather  than  hypothetical  markets  is  the  only  way  in  which 
the  'real'  or  'true'  economic  value  of  an  environmental  resource  can  be  revealed.  3 
They  therefore  argue  for  privatising  environmental  resources  and  allowing  market 
exchange  to  determine  the  level  and  organisation  of  the  material  interaction  between 
economy  and  environment.  Neoclassical  environmental  economics  on  the  other  hand 
relies  on  survey  research  and  other  techniques  such  as  contingent  valuation  exercises 
to  cost  people's  environmental  preferences  within  a  hypothetical  market  situation.  4 
From  a  free  market  environmentalist  perspective,  "Opinion  polls  and  surveys  are  used 
as  proxies,  but  they  do  not  provide  reliable  information  about  the  value  of 
environmental  amenities  because  individuals  are  not  faced  with  actual  trade-offs.  The 
respondents  bear  no  actual  coste'  (Anderson  and  Leal,  1991:  92).  The  libertarian 
2  This  state-ccntred,  bureaucratic  character  of  neoclassical  environmental  economics  has  already  been 
alluded  to  in  the  discussion  of  ecological  modernisation  in  the  last  chapter  where  it  was  suggested  that 
neoclassical  environmental  economics  functions  as  the  political  economy  of  ecological  modernisation 
(5.6). 
3  Free  market  environmentalism,  and  the  Austrian  tradition  in  economic  theory  from  which  it  comes, 
unlike  orthodox  neoclassical  economics,  is  explicitly  political.  It  is  a  libertarian  theory  which  makes 
judgements  about  the  relationship  between  a  particular  conception  of  negative  freedom,  property 
rights,  and  the  free  market  economy  (Hayek,  1976).  According  to  Mulberg  (1992),  it  is  a  normative 
political  economic  theory  not  a  positive  one  as  neoclassical  economics  understands  itself. 
4  The  reduction  of  values  to  preferences  and  assigning  monetary  amounts  to  them  within  cost-benefit 
analysis  exercises  is  something  which  has  been  criticiscd  in  chapter  4.  Also  see  O'Neill  (1993). 204 
economic  view  is  that  aggregate  data  is  useless,  since  all  costs  and  values  are  known  at 
the  individual  level  and  only  in  actual  exchange  can  they  be  disclosed.  Another  way  in 
which  we  can  distinguish  the  free  market  environmentalism  and  environmental 
economics  approaches  is  to  say  that  the  former  seeks  the  creation  of  actual  markets  for 
private  and  privatised  environmental  goods,  while  the  latter  creates  proxy  markets  for 
public  environmental  goodS.  5  Free  market  environmentalism  decomposes  the  public 
goods  dimension  of  environmental  problems  into  discrete  private  goods  problems 
which  can  be  'solved'  either  on  the  open  market  or  through  private  litigation.  As  will 
be  argued  below,  it  depoliticises  environmental  problems  as  a  consequence  of  its 
distrust  of  the  state  and  its  unbounded  faith  in  the  environmental  virtues  of  the  free 
market. 
Neoclassical  environmental  economics  has  been  criticised  on  the  grounds  that  the 
separation  of  the  economy  into  planned  and  non-planned  sectors  is  arbitrary  (Mulberg, 
1992).  If  the  economic  value  of  environmental  resources  can  be  determined  in 
-jr  hypothical  markets,  why  not  extend  this  process  to  other  sectors  of  the  economy?  If 
4% 
there  is  no  need  for  the  market  to  determine  the  appropriate  price  structure  in  respect 
of  environmental  resources,  why  not  dissolve  the  necessity  for  the  market  and 
introduce  planning  on  the  basis  of  objective  economic  valuations  in  other  areas?  The 
objectivity  of  the  neoclassical  'hypothetical  market'  approach  lies  in  the  fact  that  the 
initial  generation  of  price/monetary  value  is  centrally  decided  which  is  then  used  in 
exercises  such  as  cost-benefit  analysis  and  contingent  valuation.  The  aggregate  of 
these  individual  valuations  are  then  assumed  to  approximate  the  social  or  collective 
valuation  of  these  environmental  goods  and  bads  (See  figure  6.1).  6  Yet,  as  suggested 
in  earlier  chapters  (3.6.1  &  5.6),  the  public  goods  character  of  the  environment,  implies 
that  what  public  policy-making  requires  are  judgements  about  the  public  good,  rather 
than  private  calculation  about  it  as  if  it  were  a  private  good. 
51  owe  this  point  to  John  Proops 
6  Another  'objective'  account  of  the  value  of  the  environment  is  one  where  purely  scientific 
considerations  are  used.  Such  an  objective  valuation  of  the  environment  can  be  seen  at  the  heart  of 
the  cco-authoritarian  position,  where  cnvironmcnt-social  problems  are  considered  simply  as  technical 
dilemmas  resolvable  by  the  application  of  expert  knowledge  and  implemented  by  authoritarian 
institutions.  On  this  model,  the  organisation  of  environmcnt-social  relations  are  not  matters  of 
judgement  which  require  public  deliberation,  but  technical  matters  best  left  to  expert  determination 
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Once  this  is  done  these  objective  valuations  are  used  as  the  basis  of  enviromnental 
policy  making  by  the  state  or  its  agencies.  7  The  institutional  theory  underpinning  the 
neoclassical  model  is  one  which  leaves  the  state  and  its  agencies  in  the  pre-eminent 
position  to  both  determine  the  economy-ecology  metabolism  and  implement  the 
policies  required  to  achieve  that  chosen  rate  of  metabolic  exchange.  The  argument 
here  is  not  against  the  attempt  to  regulate  socially  environmental  resource  use,  but 
rather  the  particular  way  in  which  neoclassical  environmental  economics  conceives  of 
environmental  management,  and  picks  out  the  appropriate  decision-making  institution. 
in  short,  the  institutional  dimension  of  environmental  economics  is  very  state-centred 
with  little  meaningful  input  by  citizens  in  the  decision-making  process.  In  many 
respects  it  represents  the  economic  theory  underpinning  ecological  modernisation,  as 
suggested  in  the  last  chapter  (5.5).  11  It  is  the  state  and  its  experts,  rather  than  citizens, 
which  determine  the  content  of  environmental  management,  through  the  manipulation 
of  the  price  mechanism.  It  is  important  to  point  out  that  within  this  model  the  question 
is  about  'fine-tuning'  the  market,  the  options  available  do  not  include  questioning  the 
market  itself  as  the  most  appropriate  institution  for  managing  environmental  resources. 
In  contingent  valuation  experiments  people  are  asked  as  private  consumers  rather 
than  citizens  to  reveal  the  private  cost/benefit  to  them  of  particular  environments, 
species  or  some  environmental  amenity  (Sagoff,  1988;  Jacobs,  1996;  Keat,  1994; 
O'Neill,  1993).  The  assumption  here  as  Jacobs  (1996)  has  pointed  out  is  that 
individuals'  preferences  are  exogenous,  the  aim  of  contingent  valuation  is  to  'reveal' 
these  already  formed  and  given  preferences.  That  preferences  for  environmental  goods 
are  not  given,  but  rather  are  unformed  and  require  an  intersubjective  context  within 
which  individuals  attempt  to  value  environmental  resources  as  public  goods,  is  ruled 
7  -Mcse  exercises  are  also  objective  in  the  sense  that  the  options  open  to  respondents  are  limitecL 
Respondents  are  obliged  to  value  environmental  goods  purely  in  monetary  terms.  As  is  the  tendency 
with  neoclassical  economics,  values  are  reduced  to  prices,  via  the  reduction  of  values  to  preferences 
(O'Neill,  1993;  Keat,  1994).  See  3.6.1  &  5.6. 
8  Pearce  (1992),  defends  the  neoclassical  economic  approach  to  environmental  decision-making 
precisely  on  the  grounds  that  it  presents  environmental  issues  in  a  form  (i.  e.  in  economic  terms) 
which  existing  institutions  of  public  policy-making  can  readily  and  easily  assimilate.  As  he  puts  it, 
Defending  the  environment  means  presenting  the  arguments  in  terms  of  units  that  politicians 
understancr  (1992:  8).  This  brings  out  clearly  the  institutional  context  of  neoclassical  economics,  and 
how  one  cannot  understand  the  latter  without  being  sensitive  to  the  institutional  background  against 
which  it  takes  place. 206 
out  on  a  prioil,  methodological  grounds.  That  is,  neoclassical  enviromnental 
economics  misrepresents  how  people  think  about  environmental  issues  by  using  an 
economic  methodology  developed  for  assessing  individual  preferences  for  privately 
produced  and  consumed  goods  and  services  and  applying  it  to  a  set  of  issues  to  which 
it  is  inappropriate  (Jacobs,  1996).  Contingent  valuation  gives  us  the  wrong 
information  upon  which  to  make  environmental  decisions.  According  to  Jacobs, 
contingent  valuation  "asks  the  wrong  question.  Asking  the  personal  question  'how 
much  are  you  willing  to  pay?  '  encourages  people  into  a  self-interested  stance.  This  is 
the  appropriate  question  in  a  market  for  a  private  good"  (1996:  6).  But  since  the 
environment  and  its  services  are  not  produced  by  anyone  and  are  public  goods,  their 
social  valuation  demands  a  process  of  citizen  deliberation  rather  than  the  state  and  its 
exRSfts  u§sjgýconsumer  preferences  to  determine  environmental  values  (i.  e.  prices). 
The  neoclassical  model  of  political  economy  uses  an  objective  rather  than  an 
mtersubjective  method  to  'discover'  the  'social  valuation'  of  environmental  resources. 
Consequently  the  relationship  between  economy  and  environment  is  determined  for 
individuals  qua  consumers  (by  the  state  manipulating  the  price  mechanism  on  the  basis 
of  information  regarding  consumer  preferences)  rather  than  by  individuals  themselves 
qua  citizens. 
Attitudes  to  public  goods  can  only  be  ascertained  through  fora  rather  thn  throu  h  L 
market  or  quasi-market  techniques.  For  it  is  only  within  fora  that  individuals  can 
actually  be  said  to  formulate  their  judgements  about  the  public  good.  As  private 
consumers  they  only  need  to  consider  their  own  calculation  of  the  costs  and  benefits  to 
themselves.  However,  with  regard  to  public  goods,  decision-making  requires  a  setting 
within  which  a  variety  of  possible  calculations  concerning  the  possible  effects  (costs 
and  benefits)  on  the  collective  can  be  considered.  In  short,  decisions  about  issues  such 
as  pollution  prevention  (which  is  a  public  good),  require  political  not  market 
institutional  settings  for  public  policy-making.  Environmental  public  policy  decisions 
ought  to  be  based  on  asking  people  as  citizens  for  their  judgements  concerning  the 
public  good,  and  not  as  consumers  interested  only  in  their  own  good.  As  citizens, 
individuals  are  not  asked  to  take  a  principled  non-self-interested  stance,  rather  they  are 
asked  to  ascertain  a  wider  sense  of  self-interest  than  that  appropriate  as'consumers. 207 
The  point  is  that  it  is  simply  not  appropriate  to  ask  people  to  think  and  act  as  private 
consumers  when  dealing  with  environmental  public  goods. ý4 
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Self-interest  qua  consumer  is  not  the  same  as  self-interest  qua  citizen.  The  more  one's 
decisions  affects  others  (fellow  citizens,  nonhumans,  future  generations,  non-citizens) 
the  less  appropriate  is  a  market  or  economic  approach  to  deciding  the  fundamental 
nature  of  environmental  problems.  While  many  environmental  problems  are  also 
economic  ones,  this  does  not  exhaust  the  scope  of  human  interests  that  pertain  to  the 
issue.  Since  environmental  decision-making  does  affect  the  interests  of  those  who  are 
often  not  a  party  to  the  decision-making  process,  it  is  reasonable  that  individuals  be 
asked  to  consider  the  likely-effect"fenvironmpiitaLchange-on  the  interests  of  others.  9 
At  the  same  time  there  is  the  argument  that  it  is  not  appropriate  to  reduce 
normative  claims  or  valuations  to  monetary  values.  Here  market,  or  quasi-market 
approaches  to  environmental  public  policy-making  can  be  criticised  on  the  grounds  of 
the  incommensurability  of  valuations  one  can  make  in  respect  to  the  environment.  As 
Keat  (1994)  notes,  it  is  simply  inappropriate  to  reduce  moral  valuations  to  monetary 
SUMS.  Treating  judgements  about  what  is  right  as  individual  preferences  is 
inappropriate  (Keat,  1994:  338).  That  is,  one  cannot  reduce  moral  judgements  to 
economic  criteria.  Asking  someone  to  put  a  monetary  amount  on  their  friendships  or 
her  relationship  with  her  dog,  or  the  cash  value  of  a  landscape,  seriously  misrepresents 
the  relationship.  Evidence  suggests  that  people  do  not  find  it  easy  or  desirable  to 
express  their  views  about  environmental  issues  in  monetary  terms.  The  widespread 
phenomenon  of  'protest  bids'  within  contingent  valuation  exercises,  where  individuals 
either  refuse  to  put  a  monetary  amount  on  an  ecosystem  for  example,  or  place  an 
astronomically  high  monetary  value  on  it,  is  evidence  of  'ethical  commitment'  rather 
than  economic  calculation  (Vadnjal  &  O'Connor,  1994;  O'Neill,  1993:  chapter  7; 
Splash  &  Hanley,  1995).  Protest  bids  indicate  that  people  refuse  to  view  the 
environment  as  simply  another  commodity  to  be  consumed.  Yet  the  aim  of 
neoclassical  environmental  economics  is  to  commodify  the  environment,  so  that  its 
ceconomic  value'  may  be  discovered  and  used  by  the  public  authority  to  correct  market 
imperfections  (Pearce  et  al,  1989,1993).  The  claim  of  neoclassical  environmental 
9  in  the  next  chapter,  the  idea  that  green  citizenship  implies  considering  the  interests  of  others  will  be 
examined  (7.6  &  7.7). 210 
economics  is  that  treating  the  environment  as  'natural  capital'  provides  the  strongest 
case  for  environmental  protection.  10 
What  can  be  adduced  from  protest  bids  is  that  to  assume  the  commensurability  of 
economic  preferences  and  moral  judgements  is  to  commit  a  serious  category  mistake. 
The  normative  dimension  of  social-environmental  issues  can  be  illustrated  by 
comparing  the  argument  in  chapter  3  where  I  suggested  that  the  use  of  'rights'  within 
environmental  discourse  can  be  understood  as  a  way  in  which  the  moral  intensity  with 
which  some  individuals  feel  about  the  treatment  of  the  nonhuman  world  can  be 
communicated  (3.2.1).  This  communicative  dimension  is  crucial.  Now  whether  or  not 
one  agrees  with  those  who  argue  for  the  rights  of  animals,  ecosystems  etc.,  one  can  at 
least  be  sure  that  what  is  being  communicated  is  a  moral  argument.  One  may  not 
agree  with  those  who  use  this  particular  moral  idiom  to  argue  for  certain  treatment  of 
the  nonhuman  world,  but  one  is  at  least  sure  that  what  is  at  issue  is  a  moral  one.  In  the 
case  of  treating  moral  judgements  as  economic  preferences,  a  category  mistake  is 
committed.  The  criticism  of  aggregativelconsurner  approaches  to  environmental  public 
policy  is  simply  that  they  are  not  the  appropriate  idiom  and  do  not  provide  the 
appropriate  information,  for  dealing  with  these  issues.  Normative  questions  demand 
normative  contexts.  To  use  the  consumer/citizen  distinction,  the  point  is  not  that 
consumer  preferences  are  rejected  as  inappropriate  and  substituted  by  citizen 
judgements  when  making  environmental  decisions.  This  would,  as  Keat  (1994)  points 
out,  neglect  to  see  that  consumer  preferences  themselves  have  evaluative  significance, 
and  that  the  market/economistic  approach  to  environmental  valuation  is  not,  as 
neoclassical  economics  itself  holds,  'value-neutral'  or  'positive'.  Criticising  those  who 
simply  reject  a  'consumer'  approach  to  environmental  issues  in  favour  of  'citizen'  one, 
Keat  holds  that, 
The  impression  is  thereby  created  that  the  economistic  approach  does  not 
express  or  reply  upon  any  such  ethical  or  evaluative  principles.  Yet  this  is 
10  Holland  (1994)  rejects  this  assumption,  arguing  that  thinldng  of  nature  as  'natural  capital'  does  not 
present  the  strongest  or  most  appropriate  case  for  its  preservation. 211 
misleading.  For,  whatever  its  defects,  it  seems  clear  that  there  is  some  such 
theory  involved-  a  broadly  utilitarian  one  according  to  which  the  right  action  is 
that  which  maximises  aggregative  human  well-being,  where  the  latter  is  itself 
understood  as  consisting  in  the  satisfaction  of  preferences  (1994:  340). 
The  point  is  that  the  normative  underpinnings  of  the  neoclassical  perspective  is  what  is 
to  be  contrasted  with  alternative  normative  perspectives.  This  is  a  reason  why  it  was 
suggested  in  chapters  3  and  5  that  an  adequate  understanding  of  the  normative 
dimensions  of  social-environmental  affairs  does  not  require  the  rejection  of  economic 
valuations  of  the  environment.  What  is  required  is  the  translation  of  economic 
valuations  (preferences)  into  normative  claims.  Uneart  ng  te  normative 
of  preferences  was,  it  will  be  recalled,  the  central  aim  of  the  ethics  of 
use  (3.5.1  &  3.6).  There  it  was  argued  that  only  by  finding  the  values  which  ground 
preferences  normatively  can  the  distinction  between  'serious'  and  'non-serious'  human 
interests  be  made,  and  legitimate  human  use  of  the  environment  be  distinguished  from 
illegitimate  abuse.  Preferences  within  the  context  of  social-environmental  affairs  are 
necessary  but  insufficient  to  fully  justify  particular  human  uses  of  the  environment. 
One  way  of  looking  at  this  has  been  suggested  by  Norton  (1994).  He  suggests  that, 
"preference  models  provide  only  one  approach  to  the  valuation  problem  and  the 
usefulness  of  preference  explanations  is  actually  enhanced  if  they  are  regarded  as 
describing  only  one  aspect  of  environmental  valuation.  When  the  study  of  preferences 
is  supplemented  with  a  broader,  more  comprehensive  treatment  of  other  aspects  of 
environmental  values,  the  overall  picture  of  environmental  valuation  is  clarified" 
(Norton,  1994:  314).  Rather  than  seeking  a  single  commensurable  unit  (money  values) 
upon  which  to  base  environmental  decision-making,  we  ought  to  search  for  a  common 
framework  within  which  all  valuations  can  be  articulated.  The  information  generated 
from  this  exercise  can  then  be  used  to  make  decisions.  Rather  than  make  decisions  on 
the  basis  of  counting  and  comparing  monetised  environmental  preferences,  publicly 
comparing  options  in  terms  of  their  desirability  directly  is  often  more  appropriate.  A 
shorthand  version  of  this  for  environmental  decision-making  might  therefore  be:  'Think 212 
of  the  issue  in  terms  of  right  and  wrong  first,  and  then  in  terms  of  costs  and  benefits 
once  a  decision  has  been  made  on  the  former  question'. 
The  point  is  that  one  needs  to  be  sensitive  to  the  processes  and  contexts  within 
which  preferences  are  formed  and  re-formed;  accepting  them  as  'given'  and/or  'fixed' 
is  inappropriate.  Since  people  behave  and  value  differently  under  different  institutional 
contexts,  preferences  are  therefore  not  exogenous  but,  in  part,  formed  under  specific 
institutional  contexts.  The  root  of  the  econ,  omicmarket-based  approach  is  that  it 
assumes  we  ought  not  criticise  individual  preferences,  since  to  do  so  would  be  to 
violate  its  professed  value-neutrality.  It  is  the  positivism  of  neoclassical  economic 
theory  which  needs  to  be  criticised  as  much  as  its  assumption  of  the  commensurability 
of  values.  Reducing  values  to  prices  is  to  distort  those  values.  Whereas  according  to 
Wilde  the  "cynic  knows  the  price  of  everything  and  the  value  of  nothing',  the 
economist  knows  the  'value'  of  everything  because  she  reduces  'value'  to  the  common 
denominator  of  money. 
6.2.2  Free  Market  Environmentalism 
In  contrast  to  the  neoclassical  view,  the  free  market  environmentalist  approaches 
environmental  problems  as  stemming  fi7om  a  lack  of  clear,  enforceable  and  tradable 
property  rights.  Environmental  problems  result  from  the  'tragedy  of  the  commons', 
the  overuse  of  a  resource  which  no-one  owns  (the  seas)  or  everyone  owns  (state 
regulated  resources).  It  is  important  to  point  out  that  the  'tragedy  of  the  commons',  as 
famously  expressed  by  Hardin  (1968),  actually  represents  an  open-access  system  not  a 
commons  regime.  As  many  ecologists  have  pointed  out,  commons  regimes  do  regulate 
access  to  and  use  of  commons  resources,  but  do  so  without  recourse  to  either  the  state 
or  the  market  (Goldsmith  et  al,  1992;  Wall,  1994).  Commons  regimes  do  not 
necessarily  lead  to  resource  over-exploitation  such  that  privatising  them  is  the  only  or 
most  appropriate  solution.  The  argument  that  only  the  creation  of  a  market  in 
environmental  goods  (and  bads)  will  ensure  a  socially  optimal  level  of  environmental 
protection  and  sustainability  thus  begins  from  a  debatable  conceptualisation  of  the 
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problem.  As  mentioned  earlier,  a  problem  with  the  ftee  market  environmentalist 
approach  is  that  it  regards  environmental  problems  as  allocative  ones  relating  to 
pfivate  environmental  goods.  While  market  logic  may  be  appropriate  in  deciding 
issues  concerning  private  goods  and  services,  it  is  not  appropriate  with  regard  to  public 
goods,  such  as  environmental  quality  and  protection. 
In  terms  of  the  social  valuation  of  environmental  resources,,  the  market-based 
approach  is  the  standard  one  that  market  exchange  will  reveal  the  'true'  value  of  the 
environment.  By  aggregating  individual  preferences  for  environmental  resources,  as 
frevealed'  by  supply  and  demand  intersecting  at  the  equilibrium  price  the  'efficient' 
economy-ecology  metabolism  will  be  determined.  The  problem  with  the  free  market 
environmentalist  approach  is  that,  in  common  with  the  neoclassical  approach,  it 
misrepresents  the  issue  by  reducing  the  question  of  economy-ecology  interaction  to  a 
matter  of  market  efficient  allocation  of  environmental  resources.  Values  are  reduced 
to  preferences  and  aggregated  to  approximate  the  social  valuation  of  environmental 
resources  (understood  in  economic  terms).  That  preferences  for  environmental 
resources  may  not  be  'given'  to  be  'revealed'  in  market  exchange,  but  rather  created 
and  subject  to  how  others  value  the  environment,  is  not  considered.  However,  as 
indicated  above,  there  is  evidence  that  individuals  do  not  subjectively  value  the 
environment  in  terms  of  private  costs  and  benefits  to  them,  but  rather  perceive 
environmental  resources  as  public  goods  and  express  this  in  moral  not  economic  terms. 
in  terms  of  figure  6.1  free  market  environmentalism  is  premised  on  a  subjective 
account  of  value,  here  it  is  the  aggregative  activity  of  private  individuals  qua 
consumers  and  producers  which  determines  the  economy-ecology  metabolism.  Pure 
economic  rationality  is  assumed  to  lead  to  an  ecologically  rational  outcome.  For  many 
environmental  public  goods,  for  which  no  market  can  exist,  such  as  biodiversity 
protection  and  pollution  prevention,  it  is  clear  that  the  free  market  environmentalist 
approach  is  fundamentally  flawed.  That  is,  there  are  environmental  problems  (e.  g. 
pollution)  whose  nature  is  such  that  they  cannot  be  disaggregated  into  component 
parts  which  can  be  solved  by  exchange  on  the  open  market  between  property  holders. 
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cannot  deal  vvith  the  integrated,  interdependent  character  of  social-ecological 
problems. 
What  is  missing  from  the  free  market  environmentalist  perspective,  is  the 
intersubjective  nature  of  environmental  valuation,  based  on  the  idea  that  the 
environment  is  seen  as  a  public  goods  question  and  not  a  matter  for  private,  economic 
calculation.  It  is  important  to  point  out  that  not  only  the  institution  (the  market)  but 
also  the  language  and  type  of  information  used  within  free  market  environmentalism  to 
determine  the  economy-ecology  metabolism  that  can  be  questioned.  As  pointed  out  in 
respect  to  ecological  modernisation,  for  free  market  environmentalism,  economic 
valuations  are  the  only  admissible  forms  of  valuation,  and  prices  in  the  market  the  only 
form  of  signalling  used  to  manage  environmental  resources.  In  reducing  values  to 
preferences,  free  market  environmentalism  also  'crowds  out'  non-economic  forms  of 
environmental  valuation,  such  as  political,  cultural  or  moral  considerations  which 
require  intersubjective  and  deliberative  rather  than  subjective  and  aggregative 
institutions.  In  dealing  with  social-environmental  interaction,  the  'social'  cannot  be 
reduced  to  the  'economic'.  nor  the  'environmental'  to  the  category  of  'economic 
resource'  or  'commodity'. 
Recalling  the  argument  in  chapter  3,  free  market  environmentalism  also  displaces 
the  political-normative  question  of  determining  'use'  from  'abuse,.  It  does  this  by 
simply  assuming  that  an  environmental  good  or  service  is  a  privately-owned  resource 
without  reference  to  whether  it  may  be  a  'proscribed'  resource  or  public  resource.  An 
example  of  the  former  is  the  attempt  by  the  global  biotechnology  industry  to  establish 
exclusive  intellectual  property  rights  over  genetic  material,  within  the  international 
debate  concerning  biodiversity.  11  A  clear  example  of  the  latter  is  the  'Wise  Use' 
movement  in  America  which  has  lobbied  Congress  to  privatise  federal  land.  This 
would  transform  these  environmental  goods  from  public  goods  in  which  their  'use'  was 
limited  to  access  and  recreation,  into  private  goods  where  use  would  be  much  more 
extensive,  intrusive  and  ecologically  damaging.  'Use'  under  a  free  market 
II  For  an  overview  of  the  debate,  with  particular  reference  to  the  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and 
Trade  (GATT)  and  the  Agreement  on  Trade-Related  Aspects  of  intellectual  Property  Rights  (rRIPs), 
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environmentalist  regime,  implies  forms  of  economic  development,  such  as  mining, 
logging,  building,  hunting  and  generally,  "unrestricted  access  to  all  natural  resources 
for  [private]  economic  use,  benefit  and  profit"  (Callahan,  1992:  2).  From  a  free  market 
environmentalist  point  of  view,  objections  to  such  'abuses'  can  only  take  the  form  of 
other  private  agents,  such  as  environmental  protection  organisations,  purchasing  these 
lands  themselves  and  thus  preserving  them.  This  has  the  effect  of  making 
environmental  protection  a  function  of  wealth,  where  only  those  with  sufficient 
purchasing  power  can  afford  environmental  protection.  For  Eckersley,  the  fact  that 
free  market  environmentalists  are  not  interested  in  the  distribution  of  private 
environmental  property  rights,  "must  be  seen  as  a  thinly  disguised  endorsement  of  the 
existing  distribution  of  property  rights  and  income 
... 
Indeed,  the  long-term  consequence 
of  zealously  pursuing  the  privatisation  of  environmental  resources  ... 
is  likely  to  be  the 
intensification  of  the  already  wide  gap  between  the  propertied  and  the  propertyless, 
and  the  rich  and  the  poor,  both  within  and  between  natione'(1993b:  15). 
However,  just  as  there  are  positive  aspects  of  the  orthodox  neoclassical  solution, 
namely  the  idea  of  environmental  regulation,  likewise  there  may  be  some  positive 
aspects  that  may  be  taken  from  free  market  environmentalism.  One  is  the  notion  of 
stewardship  and  care  implicit  in  the  emphasis  on  private  property.  As  Anderson  and 
Leal  (1991:  3)  point  out  the  idea  of  having  property,  a  claim  of  ownership,  to  the  land 
or  some  environmental  resource  involves  a  commitment  to  look  after  it,  since  it  is  in 
one's  interest  to  do  so.  However,  as  pointed  out  above  with  reference  to  the  'tragedy 
of  the  commons',  the  stewardship  ideal  implicit  in  the  idea  of  property  is  not  confined 
to  private  ownership.  Common  ownership  can  also  deliver  the  virtues  of  stewardship 
and  careful  husbanding.  As  Goldsmith  at  al  (1992)  argue,  there  is  plenty  of  empirical 
evidence  from  around  the  world  that  commons  regimes  can  deliver  sustainable  levels  of 
resource  exploitation.  As  suggested  above  the  'tragedy  of  the  commons'  is  as  a  result 
of  'open  access'  to  an  environmental  resource,  a  commons  regime  is  not  a  'free-for-all' 
(Goldsmith  et  al,  1992:  127).  Indeed,  according  to  this  line  of  argument,  so-called 
environmental  tragedies  of  the  commons  are  in  fact  the  result  of  tragedies  of  enclosure 
(Bromley,  1991).  It  is  only  if  one  accepts  the  initial  argument  that  environmental 216 
problems  are  caused  by  common  ownership,  that  private  property  in  environmental 
resources  can  be  regarded  as  the  only  solution.  Commons  regimes  in  which  the 
commons  are  the  property  of  all,  or  all  members  have  an  equal  right  of  access,  is  a 
different  form  of  collective  ownership  than  state  ownership,  which  is  the  real  target  of 
free  market  environmentalism.  Under  central  state  ownership,  it  is  less  likely  that 
individuals  will  feel  they,  conjointly  with  others,  actually  own  the  resource.  Under 
these  conditions,  it  is  truer  to  say  that  the  resource  is  owned  by  nobody.  Collective 
ownership  and  regulation  of  environmental  resources  (which  is  not  the  same  as 
centralised  state  ownership  and  control)  does  not  stand  condemned  on  ecological 
grounds.  For  example,  one  could  envisage  a  hybrid  'commons-type  regime',  where 
environmental  resources  were  managed  by  a  combination  of  local  state  co-ordination 
together  with  local  community,  including  business,  participation. 
A  real-world  approximation  to  this  is  the  Local  Agenda  21  initiative,  which  on  one 
level  can  be  seen  as  an  attempt  to  include  the  local  citizens  as  'stakeholders'  in  the 
regulation  and  management  of  local  social-environmental  affairs.  Local  Agenda  21 
was  signed  at  the  Rio  Earth  Summit  (UNCED,  1992)  which  proposed  the  local 
authority  level  as  the  central  sphere  of  governance  for  the  achievement  of  sustainable 
development.  In  short,  Local  Agenda  21  proposes  that  local  authorities  consult  with 
the  various  stakeholders  within  their  jurisdiction,  industry,  trades  unions,  non- 
governmental  organisations,  the  local  community  and  by  1996  come  up  with  an 
environmental  agenda  for  the  local  area  for  the  next  century  (Gordon,  1993). 
Although  still  very  much  in  its  infancy,  Local  Agenda  21  does  exhibit  aspects  of  what 
many  regard  as  key  issues  central  to  the  achievement  of  sustainability  as  a  policy  goal. 
These  issues  are  community  environmental  education,  democratisation,  balanced 
partnerships  and  holistic  policy-making  (Agyernan  and  Evans,  1994:  20-22).  Other 
aspects  of  Agenda  21  include  the  role  of  local  government  in  mobilising  citizens,  land- 
use  planning  and  increasing  the  role  of  local  government  in  national  and  international 
environmental  policy-making  (Gordon,  1993:  152).  Stated  in  these  terms,  Local 
Agenda  21  is  close  to  some  of  the  themes  and  aims  of  collective  ecological 
management  outlined  in  chapter  5.  The  emphasis  on  bottom-up,  participatory  forms  of 217 
decision-making,  together  with  environmental  education,  does  suggest  that  Local 
Agenda  21s  can  function  as  a  form  of  democratic  ecological  governance.  The 
emphasis  in  Agenda  21  on  identifying  'stakeholders',  which  can  be  expanded  to  a 
broader  concern  with  'stakeholding'  in  which  nonhumans  and  future  generations  can 
be  considered  stakeholders  (Roddick  and  Dodds,  1993),  highlights  the  role  of  local 
citizens  together  with  the  local  authority,  as  stewards  of  the  local  environment. 
Coupling  such  local  policy  responses  to  environmental  problems  with  local  forms  of 
econonidc  activity  such  as  LETS  for  example  (discussed  below,  6.5),  is  suggestive  of  a 
rcommons-type'  regime  which  can  secure  an  ecologically  rational  form  of  collective 
ecological  management.  Making  people  aware  of  the  interconnectedness  of  human 
well-being  (including  economic  considerations)  and  the  environment,  while  also  giving 
them  a  greater  say  in  formulating  local  environmental  policy,  does  highlight  the 
connection  between  long-term  human  self-interest  and  environmental  responsibility, 
which  is  a  central  aspect  of  ecological  stewardship.  Local  Agenda  21,  in  conclusion, 
can  encourage  ecological  stewardship  since  the  virtues  of  stewardship  need  not  be  tied 
to  ownership  of,  and  direct  productive  relations  with,  the  environment.  Having  a  stake 
(qua  citizen)  in  managing  social-environmental  relations  is  a  more  realistic  way  of 
thinking  about  how  to  create  a  sense  of  ecological  stewardship  that  seeing  the  issue  in 
terms  of  actual  ownership  of  the  environment  (qua  property-holder).  Here  the 
emphasis  within  the  process  of  Local  Agenda  21  on  'empowering'  citizens  (Young, 
1993:  109)  is  as  crucial  as  educating  them.  In  the  next  chapter,  I  discuss  how  the 
greening  of  citizenship  as  ecological  stewardship  is  a  central  aspect  of  'green' 
democratic  theory  and  practice  (7.8). 
One  type  of  private  ownership  of  environmental  resources  which  might  be  seen  as 
positive  from  a  green  point  of  view  is  the  private  ownership  of  the  land  as  part  of 
farming  viewed  as  a  social  practice.  According  to  Thompson,  "Stewardship  does  not 
arise  as  a  constraint  on  the  farmer's  ownership  and  dominion  of  the  land,  but  as  a 
character  trait,  a  virtue,  that  all  farmers  would  hope  to  realise  in  service  to  the  self- 218 
interests  created  by  ownership  of  the  land"  (1995:  74).  12  However,  in  this  instance  the 
argument  for  private  ownership  of  the  land  is  not  for  the  same  reasons  as  put  forward 
by  free  market  environmentalism.  In  the  case  of  agricultural  stewardship,  private 
ownership  is  not  justified  on  the  grounds  of  economic  productivity  or  private  profit 
alone,  nor  is  its  content  determined  by  market  exchange.  Indeed,  according  to 
Thompson,  the  family-owned  farm  properly  speaking  restrains  the  productivist 
imperative  which  would  transform  agriculture  into  'agri-business'  (1995:  chapter  4). 
That  is,  private  ownership  (or  secure  tenure)  of  the  land,  within  the  context  of  farming 
as  a  way  of  life,  may  be  justified  from  a  green  point  of  view.  However,  once  the 
'biocultural'  context  within  which  fanning  was  a  social  practice  of  land  stewardship 
becomes  eroded,  the  issue  of  land  ownership  cannot  be  answered  without  raising  the 
question  of  the  ethical  status  of  the  transformative  use  of  the  land  in  terms  of  'use'  and 
'abuse'.  Private  ownership  within  the  context  of  a  social  practice  is  not  the  same  as 
private  ownership  within  the  context  of  a  market  system.  As  pointed  out  in  the  last 
chapter,  collective  ecological  management  is  understood  as  a  cultural  and  moral  as 
much  as  an  economic  or  political  process  concerning  social-environmental  interaction. 
Hence  the  green  support  for  organic  farming  is  not  simply  for  the  use  of  a  particular 
ecologically-sensitive  technique  of  agricultural  husbandry,  but  at  root  a  call  for  a  return 
to  farming  as  a  social  practice,  a  way  of  life  which  expresses  particular  biocultural 
values  and  virtues,,  inter  alia  'traditional'  forms  of  farming  knowledge  and 
techniques.  13 
12  The  political  theory  underlying  this  homesteading  model  of  environmental  management,  which 
focuses  on  the  metabolic  relationship  between  ecology  and  agriculture  (rather  than  ecology  and 
economy),  is  a  Jeffersonian-cum-Rousseauian  vision  of  agrarian  democracy.  According  to  Jcfferson, 
"cultivators  of  the  earth  are  the  most  virtuous  and  independent  of  citizens".  Adding,  in  a  statement 
which  echoes  the  anti-urbanism  and  anti-commercialism  of  some  green  thinldng,  that,  "Merchants 
have  no  country.  The  mere  spot  they  stand  on  does  not  constitute  so  strong  an  attachment  as  that 
from  which  they  draw  their  gains7  (in  Miller,  1988:  207,210-11).  As  for  some  greens,  Jefferson 
thought  that  to  dwell  in  the  country  was  to  dwell  in  virtue,  while  living  in  the  city  was  to  risk 
corruption  (Rennie-Short,  1991).  For  green  defences  of  urban  living,  see  Bookchin  (1992a),  PachIke 
(1989)  and  Ferris  (1992). 
13  However,  accepting  the  ccological  rationality  of  concentrating  human  populations  in  cities  implies 
that  returning  to  fanning  as  a  social  practice,  at  least  in  the  short  term,  will  be  difficult.  This  is 
because  of  the  almost  complete  dependence  of  urban  populations  on  industrialised  agriculture  for  their 
food  supplies.  Maldng;  cities  less  dependent  upon  industrialised  agriculture  will  be  a  crucial  aspect  of 
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One  way  of  looking  at  this  is  that  any  decision  made  on  the  economic  use  of  the 
land,  must  be  derived  from,  rather  than  independent  from,  a  prior  settling  of  the 
political-normative  issue  concerning  social-enviromnental  interaction.  In  other  words,, 
from  a  green  point  of  view,  ownership  relations  cannot  be  based  purely  on  economic 
considerations.  Within  the  context  of  collective  ecological  management,  they  must 
answer  to  political  and  moral  considerations.  There  is  nothing  particularly  novel  in 
this.  If  property  rights  and  markets  themselves  are  politically  created  and  maintained, 
they  can,  and  from  a  green  perspective  ought  to,,  be  politically  and  morally  constrained. 
Market-based  solutions  to  social-environmental  problems,  such  as  that  proposed  by 
free  market  environmentalism,,  do  not  represent  'depoliticised'  solutions.  As 
contemporary  political  debates  around  environmental  problems  demonstrates,,  and  as 
suggested  in  the  last  section,  market-based  approaches  are  as  inherently  political  and 
just  as  normative  as  any  of  the  alternatives.  14  The  fundamental  debate  is  thus  at  the 
level  of  the  moral  values  and  political  principles  of  free  market  environmentalism  and 
its  alternatives,,  environmental  economics  and  collective  ecological  management,  rather 
than  at  the  level  of  institutional  structures  alone. 
Having  raised  objections  to  both  neoclassical  environmental  economics  and  free 
market  environmentalism,  in  the  next  section  I  outline  an  alternative  'green  political 
economy'. 
production',  as  a  central  part  of  'greening  cities'.  The  principle  of  self-reliance  will  be  discussed  in 
6.5  and  6.7. 
14  At  the  end  of  the  day  one  must  conclude  that  free  market  environmentalism  is  transparently 
ideological,  the  latest  phase  of  the  right-wing  libertarian  political  project.  It  is  a  reaction  to  the 
'statist'  implications  of  neoclassical  environmental  economics  and  any  other  solution  to 
environmental  problems  in  which  the  state  has  a  central  role  or  in  which  the  market  does  not.  This 
view  is  extended  to  the  'green  movement'  as  a  whole,  which  is  perceived  as  a  bulwark  against  the 
privatisation  of  environmental  resources,  another  form  of  social  resistance  to  the  extension  of  the 
discipline  and  advantages  of  the  free  market.  For  most  free  market  environmentalists,  greens, 
whether  deep  or  shallow,  are  simply  another  pressure  group  using  the  political  process  to  undermine 
the  advance  of  market  principles.  Seen  within  the  historical  context  of  the  collapse  of  communism 
and  the  crisis  within  the  western  left,  environmentalism  is  portrayed  as  an  alternative  legitimation  for 
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6.3  Green  Political  Economy 
According  to  Mulberg's  critique  of  neoclassical  environmental  economics,  "Given  that 
the  non-traded  environmental  resources  are  not  capable  of  objective  valuation,  what 
becomes  important  is  the  process  whereby  the  subjective  valuations  are  made  knowif' 
(1992:  340).  While  agreeing  with  this,  I  wish  to  also  suggest  that  environmental 
valuation  is  a  matter  of  choosing  institutions  within  which  preference  formulation  is 
central,  rather  than  aggregating  given  preferences.  The  social  valuation  of 
environmental  resources  (including  such  basic  questions  like  what  is  to  count  as  a 
cresource')  is  thus,  at  root,  a  matter  of  choosing  an  institutional  setting  within  which 
such  valuations  are  formed. 
Recalling  the  earlier  discussion  (3.4)  of  how  being  human  carries  with  it  broad  ways 
of  viewing  and  relating  to  the  world,  green  political  economy,  unlike  traditional 
theories  of  political  economy,  introduces  debate  as  to  what  is  to  count  as  an  economic 
resource.  'Resources'  as  much  as  'preferences'  within  green  political  economy  are  not 
taken  as  exogenously  given.  This  is  a  different,  and  more  radical,  sense  of  resources 
not  being  'given',  i.  e.  infinite  in  quantity  and  always  available,  which  characterised  the 
early  'limits  to  growth'  green  movement.  Substituting  'resources'  for  'food',  Illich's 
statement  that,  "It  is  human  to  see  the  environment  made  up  of  three  kinds  of  things: 
foods,  proscribed  edibles  and  non-food"  (1981:  29),  expresses  this  normative 
dimension  of  green  political  economy.  In  this  way  one  can  view  the  radical  deep 
ecology  argument  for  'wilderness'  as  a  call  for  transforming  current  resources  into 
C  proscribed  resources'.  This  is  consistent  with  the  'ethics  of  use'  (3.5)  and  the  aim  of 
collective  ecological  management  to  find  symbiotic  as  well  as  sustainable  relations 
between  social  and  natural  systems.  Another  example  is  how  technological  and 
scientific  development  bring  what  was  previously  a  'non-resource'  into  the  realm  of  a 
possible  resource.  From  a  green  political  economy  point  of  view,  a  collective 
judgement  has  to  be  made  as  to  whether  it  is  to  count  as  a  'resource'  or  a  'proscribed 
resource".  An  obvious  example  of  this  is  biotechnology,  where  genetic  information 
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and  those  who  raise  normative  objections  to  this  development,  and  wish  to  either 
permit  the  technology  to  development  but  place  genetic  information  in  the  category  of 
'proscribed  resource',  or  abandon  the  technology  completely  and  maintain  genetic 
information  as  a  'non-resource'.  15  A  more  historical  example  is  the  movement  of  slave 
labour  from  the  category  of  'resource'  to  that  of  'proscribed  resource'.  The  same 
argument  is  used  by  contemporary  animal  rights  activists  who  in  describing  animals  as 
sslaves'  seek  to  convey  not  only  their  moral  condemnation  of  this  situation,  but  do  so 
by  tapping  into  a  well-established  and  intuitively  appealing  moral  tradition  and  idiom. 
This  is  the  idiom  of  'rights'  as  discussed  in  chapter  3  (3.3) 
Unlike  both  neoclassical  environmental  economics  and  free  market 
environmentalism,  green  political  economy  is  distinguished  by  holding  that  what 
environmental  management  requires,  initially,  is  a  political  and  deliberative  process  by 
fiwh  collective  N  1c  valuations  of  the  environment  can  be  articulated,  and  used  as  the 
; 
ýasis 
of  determining  the  economy-ecology  metabolism.  This  is  an  intersubjective  process  of 
deliberation.  What  it  ultimately  comes  down  to  is  that  institutional  settings  are 
required  in  which  individuals  are  asked  to  make  judgements  about  how  we  as  a 
collective  are  to  valueluse  the  environment,  as  opposed  to  simply  express  'willingness 
to  pay'  (neoclassical  environmental  economics)  or  private  economic  calculations  of 
environmental  resources  (free  market  environmentalism).  This  is  another  way  of 
saying  that  the  rationality  that  characterises  green  political  economy  is,  as  indicated  in 
the  last  chapter,  ecological  rationality  (5.3).  The  rationality  of  green  political  economy 
15  Ile  reason  why  green  political  economy  is  self-consciously  normative  lies  partly  in  the  fact  that  it 
is  prcmised  on  the  idea  that  humans  have  no  'natural'  niche  (5.2,5.8).  If  we  add  to  the  fact  that 
humans  create  their  own  niche,  through  their  technological  capacities,  then  it  becomes  possible  to  see 
the  moral  and  political  dilemma  that  shadows  green  politics  in  all  its  starkness.  This  dilemma 
consists  in  seeing  that  almost  everything  on  the  planet  (and  other  planets)  can  potentially  become  a 
resource.  When  science  and  technology  proceed  to  transform  previous  non-resources  into  potential 
resources,  the  moral  question  is  whether  to  place  the  latter  into  the  category  of  'proscribed  resources', 
or  forego  the  development  and  maintain  the  'non-rcsource'  status  of  the  natural  entity.  This  raises 
different  issues  from  debates  concerning  turning  current  cnvuonmental  resources  into  'proscribed 
resources',  such  as  vegetarianism  and  wflderness  protection.  Practically  speaking,  it  may  be  easier  to 
proscribe  potential  rather  than  current  resources,  since  the  former  have  yet  to  become  embedded 
within  particular  ways  of  life.  However,  it  would  be  a  mistake  to  think  that  the  only  arguments  in 
favour  of  permitting  non-resourccs  to  be  used  as  resources,  such  as  genetic  material,  are 
predominantly  economic,  although  this  charactcrises  most  cases.  There  are  also  medical,  scientific 
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in  seeking  to  establish  sustainable  and  symbiotic  social-environmental  relations  can  be 
understood  as  a  form  of  communicative  rationality  within  which  instrumental 
rationality  is  nested.  That  is,  an  instrumental  orientation  towards  the  nonhuman  world 
is  not  rejected  within  green  political  economy.  Rather  it  seeks  to  're-calibrate'  this 
orientation  according  to  the  (intra-human)  communicative  norms  of  an  ethics  of  use. 
This  as  argued  later  (6.5)  is  what  is  meant  by  green  political  economy  seeking  to  're- 
embed'  the  economy  within  society,  as  a  necessary  prelude  to  re-integrating  economy 
and  ecology. 
In  keeping  with  the  spirit  of  collective  ecological  management,  arguing  for  the 
priority  of  an  intersubjective  approach  to  environmental  valuation  does  not  mean  that 
this  institutional  structure  will  be  applied  over  the  full  range  of  economy-ecology 
affkirs.  In  other  words,  the  wholesale  politicisation  of  the  economy  is  not  envisaged. 
On  the  one  hand,  politicisation  of  economy-ecology  interaction  is  not,  pace  free  market 
environmentalism,  equated  with  state  administration.  Rather  there  are  a  range  of 
possible  institutional  designs  which  would  democratise  environmental  management 
without  meaning  that  each  citizen  has  to  vote  or  actively  participate  in  determining 
every  aspect  of  the  economy-ecology  metabolism.  The  idea  that  only  direct  democracy 
is  consistent  with  green  politics  will  be  critically  examined  in  the  next  chapter  where  a 
distinction  is  drawn  between  deliberative,  direct  and  participatory  forms  of  democracy 
(7.4.2).  The  real  issues  are  democratic  accountability  and  opportunities  for  citizen 
participation  and  input  into  the  environmental  decision-making  process. 
The  institutional  setting  for  determining  the  metabolism  ought  to  be  appropriate  to 
the  particular  issue  at  hand.  As  green  theorists  and  political  economists  have  pointed 
out,  there  needs  to  be  a  distinction  drawn  between  macro  and  micro  level  economic 
activity  (Porritt,  1984;  Daly  and  Cobb,  1990)  and,  as  pointed  out  in  the  last  chapter, 
between  decision  making  and  decision-recommending  institutions.  For  example, 
macro-economic  issues  such  as  threshold  levels  for  the  environmental  impact  of  the 
economy,  and  extra-economic,  political-normative  ones  as  to  what  is  to  count  as  a 
resource  and  how  they  are  to  be  used,  can  be  determined  politically,  not  so  much  hy 
the  state  as  through  political  institutions.  Clearly,  the  institution  should  be  appropriate 223 
to  the  type  of  social-environmental  issue  under  consideration,  as  suggested  by  the 
implementation  of  Local  Agenda  21s.  Collective  ecological  management  and  green 
political  economy  do  not  suppose  that  the  nation-state  is  the  most  appropriate 
institution  for  dealing  with  all  environmental  problems.  As  Lindblom  has  pointed  out 
(1977:  76-89),  centralised  institutions  have,  "strong  thumbs,  no  fingere't  but  as  Dryzek 
points  out,  ecological  rationality  demands  'nimble  green  fingers'  (1987:  109),  as  much 
as  regulatory  powers.  Institutional  examples  of  such  nimble  fingers  include  public 
enquiries  into  land  use  which  set  their  own  agenda,  with  powers  for  example  to  set  the 
parameters  within  which  environmental  management  is  to  take  place.  That  is,  these 
deliberative,  consultative  bodies  do  not  themselves  make  decisions  concerning  the 
actual  details  of  environmental  management,  but  are  decision-recommending  bodies, 
made  up  of  various  groups  of  'stakeholders'  (Jacobs,  1996).  At  the  same  time,  where 
there  are  already  existing  commons  regimes  or  the  possibility  of  creating  one,  these 
regimes  would  also  figure  as  another  nimble  and  green  finger  to  complement  the 
thumbs  of  central  government.  Indeed,  as  suggested  earlier,  it  may  be  possible  to 
integrate  local  state  environmental  regulation  within  a  commons  regime  as  a  form  of 
ecological  governance. 
Actual  economic  organisation  and  micro-level  decision  making  may  be  left  to  the 
market  (Jacobs,  1991),  or  non-market  institutions  (O'Neill,  1993;  Achterberg,  1996), 
including  communities  (Goldsmith  el  al,  1992;  Fairlie  et  al,  1995),  as  well  as  local  and 
national  state  institutions.  Once  the  political-normative  task  of  deciding  which 
institutions  are  appropriate  to  which  aspects  of  managing  the  economy-ecology 
metabolism,  various  institutional  settings  and  principles  at  different  levels  may  be  used. 
in  conjunction  with  the  distinction  between  macro  and  micro  levels  it  may  be  that  an 
ecologically  rational  economy-ecology  metabolism  calls  for  the  division  of  the 
economy  along  functional  and  ecological  lines  as  a  precondition  for  effective 
environmental  management.  In  terms  of  the  institutions  for  the  governance  of  the 
economy-ecology  metabolism,  it  may  be  expected  that  collective  ecological 
management  will  make  use  of  market,  state  and  sub-state  institutions  and  those 
associated  with  community,  as  well  as  combinations  of  them. 224 
Within  intersubjective  valuation  of  environmental  resources,  the  model  of  the 
relationship  between  state  and  civil  society  is  more  appropriate  than  that  between  state 
and  market.  In  other  words,  the  institutional  focus  of  collective  ecological 
management  and  green  political  economy  lies  in  the  relationship  between  state  (local 
and  national),  non-state  (market)  as  well  as  non-market  civil  institutions  (O'Neill, 
1993)  and  social  practices.  Green  political  economy,  unlike  orthodox  economic 
theory,  is  an  institutional  economic  theory  (Jacobs  1994;  Dryzek,  1996).  That  is, 
green  political  economy  rejects  the  methodological  individualism  which  underpins  the 
I  and-Ke--er  es, 
seeing 
neoclissicýi  and  free  market  =enronmentiaiist  approaches-  s  ing  as  Jacobs  suggests, 
"that  economic  behaviour  is  culturally  determined,  and  that  institutions  in  society  (such 
as  governments,  regulations  and  property  rights)  are  not  'market  imperfections'  but  the 
very  structures  which  allow  markets  to  operate'  (1994:  84).  The  Local  Agenda  21 
process  discussed  above,  and  ecological  management  at  the  level  of  the  nation-state 
discussed  in  the  last  chapter  (5.9),  are  examples  of  this  institutional  focus  of  green 
political  economy.  This  institutional  dimension  also  relates  to  the  critique  above  of  the 
neoclassical  and  free  market  environmentalism  views  of  environmental  valuation.  Both 
assume  the  market  as  the  appropriate  institutional  setting,  one  effect  of  which  is  the 
reduction  of  values  to  preferences.  In  part,  this  institutional  focus  marks  green 
political  economy  as  returning  to  the  tradition  of  classical  political  economy  via  a 
critique  of  neoclassical  economic  theory.  Other  classical  political  economy  themes 
include  its  focus  on  moral  virtue  (6.7),  the  question  of  the  relationship  between 
economic  organisation  and  the  social  order,  expanded  to  include  the  social- 
environmental  order,  as  well  as  the  explicit  attention  to  the  political-normative  context 
of  economy-ecology  relations.  Part  of  what  this  involves  is  a  reconceptualisation  of 
the  sphere  of  the  'political',  expanding  it  beyond  a  nation-state-centric  view 
(Bookchin,  1992a),  as  well  as  a  reconceptualisation  not  only  of  the  'economy'  as 
suggested  by  Mellor  (1992,1995)  and  Hayward  (1995),  but  also  the  'market'. 225 
6.4  The  'Market',  Capitalism  and  Markets 
The  political  economy  of  collective  ecological  management  is  characterised  by  an 
instrumental  valuation  of  the  state  and  market  system.  16  In  this  section  the  place  and 
conception  of  the  market  within  green  political  economy  will  be  examined. 
Following  Polanyi,  we  may  say  that  there  is  no  such  thing  as  Me  market,  rather 
there  is  a  'market  system'  by  which  he  meant  a  system  of  seý'-regulafing  markets. 
According  to  him,  'Market  economy  implies  a  self-regulating  system  of  markets;  in 
slightly  more  technical  terms,  it  is  an  economy  directed  by  market  prices  and  nothing 
but  market  prices"  (1957:  43).  In  this  way,  both  neoclassical  environmental  economics 
and  free  market  environmentalism  work  within  this  market  economy,  since  both  seek 
to  influence  economy-ecology  interaction  by  either  manipulating  the  price  mechanism 
or  extending  its  scope.  As  should  be  clear  by  now,  green  political  economy  is  sceptical 
of  the  claim  that  the  material  metabolism  between  economy  and  environment  be 
regulated  primarily  by  the  market  system  and  the  price  mechanism.  With  Polanyi  and 
Mulberg,  and  against  the  Austrian  school  of  economic  theory,  green  political  economy 
holds  that  the  market  system  is  not  an  'organic'  or  spontaneous  creation.  Rather  as 
Mulberg  points  out,  'Markets  are  simply  exchange  mechanisms  set  up  by  the  polity 
and  governed  through  the  legislature.  To  view  the  market  as  'free'  or  'natural'  is 
reification7'(1992:  340).  17 
It  is  the  self-regulating  principle  of  the  pure  'free'  market  system  which  is 
problematic  from  a  green  political  economy  point  of  view.  It  removes  political  and 
other  non-economic  considerations  from  determining  economy-ecology  relations.  As 
discussed  further  below  (6.6),  this  self-regulating,  self-referential  aspect  of  the  market 
economy  also  disembeds  the  economy  from  society.  In  the  language  of  systems 
16  The  instrumental  view  of  the  state,  outlined  in  the  last  chapter,  will  be  further  developed  in  the 
next  one.  There  I  argue  that  the  idea  of  the  state  as  separate  from,  and  instrumental  to,  civil  society 
is  a  starting  point  for  green  democratic  theory. 
17  The  new  right  can  be  viewed  as  seeking  to  set  the  market  free,  paradoxically  by  the  use  of  state 
power.  The  libertarian  view  is  not  simply  rolling  back  the  state,  but  using  the  state  to  put  in  place  the 
legal  and  legislative  infrastructure  to  permit  and  facilitate  the  extension  of  the  market  system.  Hence 
the  common  'free  market,  strong  state'  synopsis  of  its  programme. 226 
theory,  the  logic  of  the  self-regulating  market  system  is  to  separate  itself  from  the 
wider  social  and  political  systems  to  become  an  autonomous  sub-system  in  its  own 
right  (Habermas,  1974;  Offe,  1984).  The  green  suspicion  of  the  modem  market 
economy  had  been  eloquently  expressed  by  Polanyi,  "the  idea  of  a  self-adjusting 
market  implied  a  stark  utopia.  Such  an  institution  could  not  exist  for  any  length  of 
time  without  annihilating  the  human  and  natural  substance  of  society;  it  would  have 
physically  destroyed  man  and  transformed  his  surroundings  into  a  wilderness"  (1957: 
3).  A  society  in  which  a  system  of  self-regulating  markets  was  the  main  social  choice 
mechanism  would  be  not  just  ecological  irrational,  but  also  socially  destructive.  Like 
the  world  of  perfectly  competitive  markets  which  are  used  to  justify  and  explain 
orthodox  economic  theory,  a  completely  self-regulating  market  system  is  an  equally 
abstract,  if  more  dangerous,  fiction.  As  Gorz  notes,  such  a  vision,  which  he  claims  is 
at  the  heart  of  capitalism,  represents  economic  rationality  finally  set  free  of  all  restraint 
(1989:  122). 
What  I  want  to  argue  here  is  that  it  is  not  markets  per  se  that  greens  object  to,  or 
ought  to  object  to,  but  certain  features  of  the  contemporary  capitalist  market  system 
which  !  tjSý!  e  against  the  resolution  of  the  ecological  crisis  and  the  realisation  of 
green  values.  A  revised  understanding  of  the  market,  as  an  uncoerced  mechanism  of 
exchange,  can  and  does  find  a  legitimate  place  at  the  heart  of  green  political  economy 
as  one  institutional  setting  of  collective  ecological  management.  Structural  features  of 
the  globalised  capitalist  market  constitute  the  real  obstacles  to  the  integration  of  the 
economy  and  the  wider  economy  of  nature.  On  this  reading,  green  politics  is  anti- 
capitalist  in  the  sense  that  the  imperative  for  capital  accumulation  as  expressed  in  the 
imperative  for  economic  growth  and  the  operation  of  the  global  market  economy  is 
incompatible  with  the  green  assertion  of  ecological  limits  to  growth  and  the  importance 
of  socially  re-embedding  the  economy  by  democratically  managing  it.  It  is  also  anti- 
capitalist  to  the  extent  that  it  criticises  the  way  in  which  values  are  reduced  to  prices 
within  the  operation  of  the  capitalist  market.  But  although  it  may  be  anti-capitalist, 
this  does  not  necessarily  mean  that  it  is  against  the  institution  of  the  market.  The 
question  is  rather  in  what  ways  this  conceptualisation  of  the  market  as  a  social 227 
institution  for  uncoerced  economic  exchange  can  be  a  part  of  collective  ecological 
management.  That  is,  finding  ways  in  which  the  market  can  contribute  to  or  at  least 
not  compromise  an  ecologically  rational  metabolism. 
Addressing  the  global  dimensions  of  the  contemporary  market  system,  Sachs 
outlines  a  good  starting  point  for  discussion.  According  to  him,  "we  have  to  finally 
abandon  the  idea  of  a  homogeneous  unified  market  from  the  village  to  the  global  level, 
where  the  factors  of  production  can  be  freely  moved  around,  and  to  conceive  of 
restricted  markets,  where  political  norms  limit  the  scope  and  range  of  market  activities 
without  emasculating  their  potential  for  innovation  and  liberty"  (1990:  336).  Sach's 
argument  is  concerned  with  presenting  the  green  case  for  delinking  from  the  world 
economy,  discussed  below,  and  thus  largely  a  reactive  or  defensive  argument  for 
constraining  the  presently  existing  global  market.  However,  alongside  this  defensive 
argument  there  is  also  a  more  positive  sense  of  the  market  within  green  political 
economy.  This  is  a  conception  of  the  market  which  is  qualitatively  as  well  as 
quantitatively  different  from  the  present  market  economy.  At  the  same  time  this 
discussion  of  the  market  differs  from  those  like  Jacobs  (1992,1995),  Eckersley 
(1992a,  1993a)  and  de  Geus  (1996),  who  are  close  to  the  ecological  modernisation 
model  on  this  issue.  It  differs  by  not  taking  the  presently  constructed  market  system  as 
'given'  or  the  best  means  by  which  to  realise  ecological  ends.  As  will  become  clear, 
this  is  partly  to  do  with  the  idea  that  an  ecological  reconceptualisation  of  the 
ceconomy',  means  that  current  conceptions  of  the  'economy',  and  thus  the  market,  are 
incomplete  from  a  green  political  economy  viewpoint.  Here  I  follow  a  theme  within 
green  political  economy  suggested  by  writers  such  as  Illich  (1981),  Hayward  (1995) 
and  Mellor  (1995),  in  which  the  relationship  between  the  'informal'  and  'formal' 
economies,  the  spheres  of  production  and  reproduction  are  central  to  understanding 
the  relationship  between  economy  and  ecology. 
This  'green'  conceptualisation  of  the  market  draws  heavily  on  local,  community- 
based  economic  practices  and  systems  that  one  finds  throughout  the  literature  on  green 
political  economy.  The  non-capitalist  market  within  green  political  economy  is 
generally  understood  to  refer  to  the  operation  of  voluntary  exchange  primarily  at  the 228 
level  of  the  local  economy.  Examples  of  this  market  institution  include  local  forms  of 
money  systems  such  as  Local  Employment  and  Trading  Systems  [LETS]  (Greco, 
1994;  Lang,  1994;  Williams,  1995),  community  economic  development  strategies 
(Shragge  (ed.  ),  1993),  co-operatives  and  alternative  producer-consumer  relations,  and 
combinations  of  municipal  economic  and  political  governance  of  the  local  economy 
(Mellor,  1995).  What  all  these  local  economic  systems  share,  apart  from  their  shared 
identity  as  examples  of  non-capitalist  market  institutions,  is  the  decentralist  aim  of 
attempting  to  make  local  economies  as  self-reliant  and  self-determining  as  possible, 
This  aim,  to  make  local  economies  as  autonomous  as  possible,  is  most  often  expressed 
within  green  literature  as  the  idea  that  local  needs  should  be  met  locally.  18  In  this 
understanding  of  the  market  economy,  the  primary  virtue  of  the  market  rests  in  the 
voluntary  exchange  of  goods  and  services  it  facilitates,  and  its  role  in  encouraging 
innovation,  rather  than  as  facilitating  the  process  of  capital  accumulation.  A  market 
whose  primary  purpose  is  to  facilitate  trade  and  exchange  at  the  local  level,  keeping 
locally  produced  wealth  locally,  as  well  as  meeting  needs  locally  as  much  as  possible, 
while  not  completely  eroding  the  potential  for  capital  accumulation  at  this  level,  does 
make  a  significant  break  with  the  economic  logic  of  accumulation  and  extensive  trade, 
which  characterises  the  contemporary  global  capitalist  system.  However,  quite  apart 
from  the  tendency  of  unregulated  markets  to  encourage  an  economy-ecology 
metabolism  which  is  unlikely  to  be  'ecologically  rational',  in  the  narrow  sense  of 
sustainability,  the  green  stress  on  local  production  and  limiting  trade  is  also  advanced 
for  other  reasons  to  do  with  green  views  about  autonomy  and  freedom  as  argued 
below  (6.7). 
18  It  is  worth  pointing  out  that  this  has  much  in  common  with  the  bioregional  distinction  between 
a  ecosphere'  and  'biosphere'  perspectives  and  a  central  claim  of  social  ecology,  mentioned  in  chapter  4 
(4.3).  The  non-capitalist  market  as  a  central  part  of  local  economic  autonomy  and  self-reliance  can  be 
seen  as  a  decoupling  of  the  local  economy  from  the  global  economy.  That  is,  moving  from  a 
biospheric  model  of  the  relationship  between  the  economy  and  the  environment  to  an  ecospheric 
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6.5  The  Local  Market  Economy  and  Green  Political  Economy 
Local  Employment  and  Trading  Systems  [LETS]  can  be  viewed  as  a  non-capitalist 
market  economy  the  main  characteristic  of  which  is  that  the  medium  of  exchange  is 
created  and  regulated  at  the  local  rather  than  the  national  level.  It  is  geared  towards 
exchange  and  trade  rather  than  accumulation,  and  rather  than  representing  an 
alternative  currency  system,  it  is  closer  to  the  mark  to  describe  it  as  an  extended  or 
credit  barter  system.  In  a  LETSystem.  a  local  medium  of  exchange  is  created  along 
with  a  directory  of  members  offers  and  wants,  which  operates  as  an  exchange  system 
matching  wants  and  offers  facilitated  by  the  local  (nominal),  exchange  unit.  In  terms  of 
the  distinction  drawn  earlier  between  macro  and  micro-economic  levels,  the  LETS 
economy  is  a  market  economy  at  the  local  level  but  one  where  there  is  no  strict 
boundary  between  economic  and  social  spheres.  It  represents  the  so-called  'informal' 
economy  of  everyday  life,  sometimes  called  the  'social  economy',  in  which  trade  and 
exchange  is  neither  related  to  or  directly  dependent  upon  the  'formal'  market  system  or 
the  state  (Henderson  el  al,  1990;  Mich,  198  1;  Latouche,  1993).  19  In  this  section  I  wish 
to  use  LETS  as  a  way  to  present  some  of  the  key  aspects  of  green  political  economy 
and  its  conception  of  the  market. 
The  LETS  economy  is  a  type  of  market  economy  unlike  the  formal  market,  in 
which  the  benefits  of  an  uncoerced  institutional  mechanism  for  trade  and  exchange  can 
be  enjoyed  by  keeping  the  scope  of  the  market  within  socially  defined  bounds.  The 
economics  of  LETS  is  anti-accumulation  in  the  sense  that  the  main  purpose  of  the 
system  is  to  facilitate  trade  and  exchange  within  a  closed  system.  Trade  is  confined 
within  a  local  network  of  individuals,  since  the  medium  of  exchange  is  only  valid  within 
19  Although  LETS  and  other  aspects  of  what  one  might  call  the  green  local  market  economy,  have 
evolved  and  presently  exist  alongside  the  formal  market  system,  there  is  a  debate  as  to  whether  they 
supplement  or  actively  undermine  the  formal  market  economy.  The  question  of  whether  a  LETS 
economy  could  exist  without  the  formal  market  is  not  something  that  is  addressed  here.  LETS  may  be 
viewed  as  both  an  alternative  and  a  complement  to  the  current  global  market  as  the  local  economy 
becomes  more  established  in  meeting  people's  needs,  the  less  dependent  individuals  will  be  upon  the 
global  economy.  Therefore  while  it  is  not  envisaged  that  the  present  global  market  economy  will  be 
abolished,  the  logic  of  the  green  local  market  economy  is  for  the  global  economy  to  shrink  in 
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that  system.  The  LETS  local  market  economy  is  geared  to  encouraging  the  circulation 
of  local  currency  within  the  local  economy,  thus  stimulating  exchange,  employment, 
production  and  moderate  consumption,  rather  than  accumulating  wealth  in  the  form  of 
local  currency  credits  (Lang,  1994;  Greco,  1994).  It  is  a  bounded  economy,  delimited 
by  membership  and  place.  20 
Meeting  local  needs  locally,  avoids  the  ecoloýý2cý  degradation  c  used  PJobal 
patterns  of  trade  which  require  vast  transport  and  infrastructure  systems.  In  such  an 
economy  the  'externalities'  of  pollution  and  other  forms  of  ecological  degradation  may 
be  prevented  from  arising  in  the  first  place,  because  the  scale  of  the  economy  modifies 
its  environmental  impact,  while  the  move  towards  economic  self-reliance  also  increases 
the  local  economy's  dependence  upon,  and  impact  on,  the  local  environment.  While 
considerations  such  as  economies  of  scale  would  of  course  be  taken  into  consideration 
in  deciding  economic  activities,  the  point  is  that  these  economic  considerations  would 
not  automatically  trump  non-economic  considerations.  Rather,  'economies  of  scale' 
would  have  to  be  judged  relative  to  ecological  considerations  of  environmental  impact, 
long-term  sustainability  etc.,  so  that  what  seems  an  economy  (i.  e.  a  benefit)  is  not  in 
fact  an  ecological  cost.  While  it  makes  economic  sense  (in  terms  of  efficiency  and 
maximisation)  to  make  economies  of  scale  an  important  factor  in  making  economic 
decisions,  it  may  not  make  ecological  sense  (in  terms  of  sustainability  which  involves 
considerations  of  optimality  rather  than  maximisation).  It  may  be  that  many 
economies  of  scale  turn  out  to  be  ecologically  irrational.  One  reason  for  this  is  that 
although  a  free  market  economy  may  deliver  an  optimum  allocation  of  resources 
within  the  economy,  it  is  unlikely  to  result  in  an  optimum  scale  of  the  economy  relative 
to  its  environment  (Eckersley,  1991:  6).  According  to  Daly  and  Cobb,  'Tnvironmental 
degradation  must  be  shown  to  result  from  the  scale  of  the  economy  in  general,  rather 
20  One  way  of  looking  at  this  view  of  the  local  market  is  to  see  it  as  an  attempt  to  capture  some  of  the 
features  of  the  original  pre-capitalist  meaning  of  the  market.  Notwithstanding  the  nostalgia  for  a 
return  to  a  simpler,  less  complex  way  of  life  which  undoubtedly  underpins  some  arguments  for  local 
forms  of  economic  regulation  and  development,  and  also  the  many  negative  features  of  the  pre- 
capitalist  economy,  nevertheless  there  are  good  reasons  why  greens  have  and  ought  to  make  this  local 
market-bascd  economy  a  central  part  of  their  political  economy.  Strategically  speaking,  the  local 
market  economy  may  be  both  a  (short-term)  complement  to,  as  well  as  a  possible  Oong-term) 
substitute  for,  the  present  arrangement  of  national  and  global  economies. 231 
than  only  from  allocative  mistakes  that  can  be  corrected  while  throughput  continues  to 
grow  exponentially"  (1990:  368:  emphasis  added).  'Economies  of  scale'  may  increase 
the  scale  of  the  economy  beyond  that  which  the  environment  can  sustainably  support. 
The  problem  with  orthodox  economic  theory  in  this  respect  is  that  a  Pareto-optimal 
allocation  of  resources  does  not  say  anything  about  the  ecological  sustainability  of  that 
scale  of  resource  use. 
Exporting  pollution  is  less  likely  within  a  locally-based  economy,  since  the  scale  and 
type  of  technology  and  production  processes  used  are  governed  by  ecological  and  not 
just  economic  considerations.  It  is  in  the  interest  of  the  local  (human)  community  to 
ensure  that  its  economy  does  not  undermine  its  ecological  basis.  According  to  Dryzek, 
local  control  over  economy-ecology  metabolism  is  more  efficient  in  terms  of  negative 
feedback  than  non-local  control  (1987:  225).  Within  the  context  of  the  present  global 
economic  system,  the  green  local  market  economy  perspective  encourages  local  self- 
reliance  as  a  positive  benefit  to  be  gained  from  delinking  from  the  global  economy 
(Sachs,  1990;  Morris,  1990).  Thus,  this  can  be  viewed  as  a  'bioregional'  approach  of 
'greening  the  whole  by  greening  the  parts'. 
From  an  economic  point  of  view,  by  far  the  biggest  distinction  between  local 
market  economy  and  capitalist  market  economy  is  the  greater  immobility  of  capital. 
Paradoxically  this  assumption  of  capital  immobility  is  at  the  heart  of  orthodox 
economic  arguments  for  the  specialisation  of  production  and  international  trade,  -  as 
expressed  in  the  law  of  comparative  advantage.  The  problem  is  that  capital  is  mobile 
at  the  global  level,  particularly  since  the  early  1980s  deregulation  movement  across  the 
western  economies.  The  international  mobility  of  capital  mean  that,  "investment  is 
governed  by  absolute  profitability  and  not  by  comparative  advantage"  (Daly  o 
as  investment 
stay  within  the  community,  green  political  economy  simply  makes  the  assumptions  of 
orthodo  omic  theory  real  ratýher  than  abstract.  Withl-c-a-p'it-@'im-m--oFility  Uny  'trade--- 
that  does  take  place,  which  from  the  ecological  point  of  view  should  be  progressively 
minimised  as  we  move  from  local  to  regional  to  national  and  global  levels,  will  be  as  a? 
result  of  comparative  advantage.  This  concurs  with  Adam  Smith's  argument  that 232 
specialisation  of  production  is  limited  by  the  extent  of  the  market;  the  more  specialised 
is  production  the  larger  the  market  and  trade  required  to  absorb  it. 
Specialisation  within  the  contemporary  global  market  offers  an  extreme  example  of 
the  dangers  of  over-dependence  on  trade.  An  economy  which  has  placed  a  large  part 
of  its  domestic  capital  into  some  specialised  area  of  production  is  vulnerable  to  the 
vagaries  of  the  global  market  to  secure  the  goods  and  services  it  needs,  as  countless 
'developing'  countries  found  to  their  cost  in  the  1980s.  This  example  works  all  the 
way  down  from  national  economies  operating  within  the  global  market,  to  local 
economies  operating  within  national  markets.  It  is  not  specialisation  that  is  the 
problem  but  over-specialisation  that  leads  to  over-dependence  upon  imports  and/or  a 
dependence  upon  attracting  footloose  international  capital.  The  green  argument  is 
against  excessive  trade  on  both  ecological  grounds  (transport  costs),  outlined  above, 
but  also  on  the  grounds  that  trade  decreases  local  economic  self-determination, 
because  an  over-reliance  on  trade  weakens  the  ability  of  the  local  economy  to  meet  its 
own  needs  from  within.  Keynes'  thinking  on  the  location  of  production  is  close  to  the 
green  position.  According  to  him,  "Ideas,  knowledge,  science,  hospitality,  travel- 
these  are  the  things  which  should  of  their  nature  be  international.  But  let  goods  be 
homespun  whenever  it  is  reasonably  and  conveniently  possible  and,  above  all,  let 
finance  be  primarily  national"  (in  Morris,  1990:  195).  Keynes'  concern  that  the 
monetary  dimension  of  the  economy  be  localised  is  something  with  which  green 
political  economy  fully  agrees  carrying  it  further  as  in  LETS,  by  encouraging  currency 
to  be  created  and  controlled  at  the  local  level  of  the  community.  The  issue  of  money 
within  the  economy  is  dealt  with  below  (6.6.1).  The  key  to  green  political  economy  is 
its  stress  on  decreasing,  as  far  as  possible,  the  gap  between  production  and 
consumption,  decreasing  the  need  for  extensive  trade.  Part  of  the  green  argument 
against  global  trade  is  that  the  existence  of  a  global  market  with  powerful  economic 
actors  such  as  multi-nationals  and  institutions  such  as  the  World  Bank  and  the  General 
Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade,  mean  that  poor  countries  trade  under 
disadvantageous  conditions.  Green  political  economy  is  thus  not  against  trade,  rather 
it  is  against  unnecessary  and  forced  trading  relations. 233 
Increased  dependence  upon  trade  and  foreign  investment  is  the  price  to  be  paid  for 
enjoying  the  range  of  goods  and  services  that  access  to  the  global  market  offers,  given 
of  course  that  one  has  'effective  demand',  the  money,  to  purchase  these  goods.  The 
green  alternative  to  the  precarious  benefits  of  this  situation  is  increased  economic  self- 
reliance,  where  quality  of  life  conceptions  of  welfare  may  compensate  for  a  more 
limited  range  of  goods  and  where  increases  in  productivity  may  be  'cashed  out'  in 
more  leisure  time  rather  than  increased  wages.  21  And  as  argued  below,  from  the  green 
point  of  view  being  locked  into  the  global  economy  and  dependence  upon  trade  also 
implies  weakening  economic  self-determination  and  cultural  diversity. 
It  is  important  to  point  out  that  this  view  of  the  self-reliant  economy  differs  from 
arguments  for  complete  self-sufficiency  which  would  lead  to  autarky.  Extensivetra  F-"* 
gid  -excfi7a-nge-geý&iscouraged,  but,  -E  7ven_7h-e; 
sp`readT7f 
resouýrces 
on  the  planet, 
arguing  for  complete  self-sufficiency  would  leave  some  resource-poor  economies  in  a 
worse  position  than  they  need  be  in  the  absence  of  trade  and  redistribution.  At  the 
same  time,  green  political  economy  as  outlined  here  does  not  have  an  anti-materialist 
bias  in  the  way  that  some  green  theories  criticise  the  'immorality'  or  'spiritually 
corrupting'  effects  of  consumerism  and  the  consumer  society.  Martell's  view  that, 
"greens  perhaps  sometimes  undervalue  the  extent  to  which  material  acquisition  and 
consumption  can  be  a  source  of  personal  fulfilment"  and  that,  "advances  in  material 
standards  of  living  are  as  likely  as  frugality  to  further  intellectual  and  spiritual 
fulfilment"  (1994:  49-50)  is  closer  to  the  position  being  defended  here  than  the  anti- 
consumerism  of  some  green  positions.  The  case  for  decreasing  dependence  upon  trade 
is  not  an  attempt  to  smuggle  in  an  anti-materialism  at  the  level  of  green  principle. 
Rather  its  basis  is  to  found  in  the  ecological  arguments  against  trade  and,  as  argued 
below  (6.7),  in  the  erosion  of  self-determination  and  a  conception  of  liberty  as 
21  One  of  the  standard  observations  of  worker-owned  firms  and  co-operativcs  has  been  that  after  a 
threshold  income  level  has  been  reached,  increases  in  productivity  lead  to  a  reduction  in  working 
hours.  In  neoclassical  economics  this  is  known  as  the  'backward  bending  labour  supply  curve',  where 
after  some  threshold  income  level  has  been  reached,  increases  in  productivity  mean  more  leisure 
rather  than  more  production  or  income.  As  argued  later  in  chapter  7  (7.9.1),  this  economic  view  is 
premised  on  an  instrumental  view  of  work  engaged  in  for  monetary  reward.  For  an  examination  of 
the  relationship  between  worker  co-operativcs  and  green  theory,  see  Carter  (1996). 234 
independence  and  the  balance  between  the  claims  of  'autonomy'  and  those  of 
'welfare'. 
Together  with  the  argument  for  self-reliance,  not  being  geared  primarily  towards 
capital  accumulation  means  the  imperative  as  well  as  the  ability  of  the  local  economy  to 
grow  after  the  manner  of  current  national  economies  is  absent.  If  we  also  add  to  this 
the  regulative  role  of  the  state,  both  local  and  central,  in  implementing  environmental 
standards,  there  is  a  strong  case  to  be  made  that  economic  decentralisation  of  the  type 
represented  by  local  market  economies  may  play  a  central  part  in  ensuring  both  local 
and  national  economic-ecological  harmony.  If  the  economy's  ability  to  expand  is 
limited  by  the  extent  of  the  market,  in  ecological  terms  the  smaller  the  market  the  less 
likely  it  is  that  the  economy  will  expand  beyond  its  ecological  parameters.  This  is  one 
way  of  interpreting  what  would  be  entailed  by  a  move  from  a  'biosphere'  view  to  a 
more  'ecosphere'  one  discussed  in  chapter  4  (4.3).  Lessening  dependence  upon  the 
whole  world  as  one's  'ecological  hinterland'  implies  a  much  closer  link  between 
economic  activity  and  the  ecological  conditions  which  facilitate  that  activity.  That  is, 
the  dependence  of  the  economy  on  ecological  goods  and  services,  is  more  visible  due 
to  the  shortened  negative  feed-back  relations,  when  the  economy  is  embedded  in  local 
rather  than  using  the  resources  of  distant  ecosystems  or  the  biosphere  as  a  whole. 
However,  the  'ecological  basis'  of  the  human  economy  lies  somewhere  between 
'ecosystem'  and  'biosphere',  and  therefore  trade  is  not  ruled  out.  But  the  more  an 
economy  moves  from  an  ecospheric  to  a  biospheric  ecological  base,  the  less  likely  is  it 
that  'stewardship'  will  characterise  its  metabolism  with  nature. 
At  the  same  time  this  self-limiting  character  of  local  market  economies  harks  back 
to  an  earlier  tradition  of  political  economy  associated  with  Aristotle.  This  refers  to  the 
distinction  Aristotle  made  between  chrematistics  and  oikonomia  within  political 
economy.  Chrematistics  is  defined  as  that  branch  of  political  economy  relating  to  the 
manipulation  of  property,  wealth  and  currency  so  as  to  maximise  short-term  returns  to 
the  property-owner.  Chremastistics,  in  short,  mistakes  a  means  to  be  an  end,  and 
according  to  Aristotle  it  is  characteristic  of  this  form  of  acquisition  that  "there  is  no 
limit  to  the  end  it  seeks;  and  the  end  it  seeks  is  wealth  of  the  sort  we  have  mentioned 235 
[i.  e.,  wealth  in  the  form  of  currency]  and  the  mere  acquisition  of  money"  (1948: 
1257b).  Oikonomia,  by  contrast,  is,  according  to  Aristotle,  a  limited  form  of 
acquisition.  Its  central  concern  is  the  "management  of  the  household'  geared  towards 
long-term  maintenance  of  the  welfare  for  all  household  members.  The  limited  nature 
of  this  form  of  acquisition  is  given  by  Aristotle  thus:  "the  amount  of  household 
property  which  suffices  for  a  good  fife  is  not  unlimited"  (1948:  1236b).  It  is  clear  that 
what  sustainable  development  requires  is  integrating  the  'management  of  the 
household'  with  the  'economy  of  the  household';  that  is  integrating  economy  and 
ecology.  This  division  between  chrematistics  and  oikonomia  can  be  mapped  on  to  the 
distinction  being  made  here  between  the  capitalist  market  system  and  local,  non- 
capitalist  economic  organisation  in  which  market  exchange  plays  a  part.  22  This 
distinction  represents  the  separation  of  the  economy  and  the  'economic  motive' 
(economic  rationality)  from  social  relations  and  other  forms  of  rationality  (Polanyi, 
1957:  54),  most  notably  in  this  case,  ecological  rationality  (O'Neill,  1993:  169).  In  this 
distinction  lies  one  of  the  principal  origins  of  the  'disembedding'  of  the  economy  from 
the  society  its  supports  and  within  which  it  is  located. 
The  local  market  economy  is  one  which  is  not  just  quantitatively  different  (in  terms 
of  overall  ecological  impact)  but  also  qualitatively  different  from  the  contemporary 
capitalist  market  economy.  As  a  market  system  where  individual  producers  and 
consumers  meet  face-to-face,  a  LETS  economy  may  lead  to  the  sort  of  many-sided 
relations  between  community  members  of  the  type  argued  for  by  eco-anarchists  in 
chapter  4.  LETS  offers  one  way  in  which  the  local  market  system  may  re-integrate  the 
economy  and  the  wider  social  system  as  a  necessary  prelude  to  the  re-harmonisation  of 
society  and  environment.  Re-embedding  of  the  economy  within  society  is  thus  a 
necessary  step  on  the  way  to  re-integrating  the  human  economy  and  nature's  economy. 
22  it  may  be  that  as  we  move  from  global,  to  national  and  local  levels,  the  distinction  between 
'capitalist'  and  'non-capitalist'  becomes  less  acute.  T'hat  is,  once  the  self-limiting  character  and  im 
of  self-reliance  and  trade  rather  than  accumulation  constitute  the  logic  of  the  economy,  whether  the 
system  is  'capitalist'  in  other  respects,  such  as  private  property,  or  ownership  of  the  means  of 
production,  may  be  irrelevant  from  the  ecological  perspective  of  sustainability.  Of  course,  other, 
non-ecological,  standard  objections  could  be  raised  against  the  capitalist  organisation  of  the  local 
economy. 236 
The  local  economy  may  also  be  said  to  display  characteristics  of  a  'convivial 
economy'  (Illich,  1975),  a  long-standing  green  view  of  a  more  'human-scale'  and 
sustainable  economy,  in  which  'responsibly  limited  tools'  and  technology  are  used  by 
people  rather  than  vice  versa.  The  economics  of  the  local  economy  finds  a  counterpart 
in  the  'soft  technologies'  of  alternative  energy  production  and  the  organisation  of 
economic  production.  This  also  resonates  with  the  'small  is  beautiful'  philosophy 
associated  with  Schumacher  (1973),  and  his  ambition  to  create  an  'economics  as  if 
people  really  mattered'.  As  Latouche  has  pointed  out,  "One  goal  of  many  Green 
groups  is  to  recreate  a  convivial  society  through  deliberate  construction  of  small-scale 
community  and  solidarity  networks  of  all  sorte'(1993:  237).  Where  this  model  of  the 
local  economy  differs  from  Illich's  'convivial  economy'  is  that  although  the  economy 
as  presented  here  includes,  "activities  of  people  when  they  are  not  motivated  by 
thoughts  of  exchange  ...  non-market  related  activities  through  which  people  satisfy 
everyday  neede'  (1981:  57),  it  also  includes  activities  geared  towards  exchange, 
although  as  far  as  possible,  within  the  local  market  as  opposed  to  the  global 
econoMy.  23  In  terms  of  the  distinction  drawn  in  figure  6.2  between  the  shadow, 
convivial  and  formal  economies,  the  green  local  economy  and  green  political  economy 
represent  a  redefinition  of  the  'economic  sphere'.  On  one  level,  the  local  economy  can 
be  located  within  the  informal  economy,  but  between  the  convivial  and  the  shadow  or 
black  economy.  At  another  level,  it  may  be  argued  to  represent  an  alternative  formal 
economy  in  that  although  it  is  geared  towards  exchange,  it  works  with  a  different 
economic  rationality  as  well  as  a  different  currency  and  financial  substructure,  than  the 
formal  or  cash  economy. 
23  Illich  coins  the  term  'shadow  economy'  to  describe  those  activities  "výhich  support  the  formal 
economy  not  social  subsistence"  (1981:  100),  while  the  convivial  economy  comprises  activities  which 
are  geared  towards  social  subsistence.  A  fidly  convivial  economy  is  perhaps  only  possible  if  the 
economy  has  not  undergone  modcrnisation,  hence  Illich's  concern  with  warning  developing  countries 
about  the  dangers  of  what  he  calls  the  'modernisation  of  poverty'  and  the  'radical  monopolisation  of 
needs'  that  modernisation  brings. 237 
Figure  6.2.  Adaptation  of  Henderson's  model  of  the  'total  productive  system  of 
an  industrial  society'  (Henderson  et  at,  1990). 
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From  an  ecological  point  of  view,  all  purposive  human  activities  which  impactsupon 
the  environment  can  be  considered  as  particular  instances  of  the  metabolism  between 
the  human  and  the  natural  economy.  That  is,  from  a  green  political  economy 
perspective,  the  fact  that  one's  activity  does  not  command  a  price  or  is  not  registered 
within  the  formal  market  economy,  does  not  make  it  any  the  less  an  economic- 
ecological  activity.  The  logic  of  this  position  leads  to  the  reconceptualisation  of  the 
'human  economy'  within  green  politics,  i.  e.,  its  extension  to  include  all  purposive 
activity  which  impacts  upon  the  environment  as  part  of  the  metabolism  between  society 
and  nature.  Here  I  follow  Hayward's  suggestion  that,  'If  a  unified  theory  of 
economics  and  ecology  is  to  be  possible,  it  will  neither  hypostatize  (sic)  an  opposition 
between  economy  and  ecology  nor  posit  a  straightforward  identity  of  the  two"  (1995: 
116).  Green  political  economy  is  an  attempt  to  construct  a  unified  theory  of 
economics  and  ecology.  24  Its  aim  is  to  argue  that  the  resolution  of  the  ecological  crisis 
demands  a  redefinition  of  what  we  mean  by  the  'human  economy'  in  order  that  the 
latter  be  brought  into  harmony  with  the  environment. 
In  just  the  same  way  that  non-monetised  activities  are  considered  a  legitimate  part 
of  the  metabolism  between  economy  and  ecology,  it  also  follows  that  such  non- 
monetised  activities  cannot  be  viewed  as  'unproductive'  or  valueleSS.  25  As  Hayward 
(1995),  Mellor  (1992,1995)  Sallah  (1995)  and  feminist  writers  have  argued,  what  is 
missing  fi7om  orthodox  theories  of  political  economy  is  the  whole  realm  of 
24  This  search  for  a  unified  theory  which  would  integrate  economics  and  ecology  has  long  been  the 
goal  of  many  early  ecological  economists,  from  Boulding  (1966),  Daly  (1973),  to  Gcorgescu-Rocgen 
(1971,1976).  The  roots  of  this  unified  theory  may  be  found  as  much  in  the  application  of  economic 
ideas  and  concepts  such  as  production,  consumption,  exchange  and  labour  to  the  worldngs  of  the 
natural  world,  as  to  the  more  general  ecological  idea  that  the  human  economy  be  viewed  as 
dependently  embedded  within  the  wider  economy  of  nature.  In  its  early  developmcnt,  as  Worstcr 
points  out,  the  science  of  ecology  was  viewed  as  the  application  of  economic  analysis  to  nature  (1994: 
291-94).  This  one-sided  influence  of  economics  on  ecology  had  to  wait  until  the  1950s  and  1960s  for 
the  reverse,  i.  e.  the  application  of  ecological  analysis  to  economics,  to  occur. 
25  In  the  same  way  that  ecological  activity  cannot  be  viewed  as  valueless  within  the  context  of  the 
social-environment  metabolism.  Although  it  is  surely  going  too  far  as  to  demand  recognition  of 
'nature's  labour',  it  does  not  seem  inappropriate  to  talk  of  recognising  nature's  contribution  to  the 
human  economy.  The  latter  is  understood  as  going  beyond  nature  as  a  set  of  resources  to  include  a 
notion  of  nature  as  the  natural  'conditions  of  production'  (O'Connor,  1991)  without  which  human 
productive  activity  would  be  impossible.  One  way  of  honouring  'nature's  labour'  may  be  to  say  that  it 
is  intrinsically  valuable  as  well  as  instrumentally  valuable,  in  the  same  way  that  green  political 
economy  proposes  that  human  labour  is  intrinsically  as  well  as  instrumentally  valuable. 239 
'reproduction'.  Contemporary  orthodox  political  economies,  whether  liberal,  Marxist 
or  social  democratic,  identify  production  in  such  a  way  as  to  exclude  types  of  labour, 
and  forms  of  intentional  activity  which  are  vital  to  the  human  economy  as  a  whole, 
including  that  part  co-extensive  with  commodity  exchange.  Just  as  nature's  economy 
would  exist  without  the  human  economy,  indeed  it  is  the  contention  of  radical  deep 
ecologists  that  nature  would  be  better  off  without  human  activity,  so  green  political 
economy  holds  that  the  human  economy  can  exist  without  the  money/formal/market 
economy.  However,  green  political  economy  differs  from  those  for  whom  the  only 
ecologically  rational  metabolism  between  society  and  environment  is  the  complete 
rejection  of  the  market  economy  and  the  return  to  a  completely  'convivial  economy'. 
What  green  political  economy  attempts  to  highlight  is  the  desirability  (not  the 
necessity)  of  a  balance  between  the  formal  and  informal  parts  of  the  human  economy 
as  a  necesswy  part  of  creating  a  balance  between  the  economy  and  the  wider  economy 
of  nature.  The  reason  for  this  is  that  the  choice  of  a  balance  between  the  informal  and 
formal  economy,  is  a  matter  of  collective  choice  to  be  made  under  the  rubric  of 
'freedom'  rather  than  'necessity'.  That  is,  it  is  a  democratic  choice  concerning  the  sort 
of  society  we  wish  to  have.  If  the  'choice'  of  the  metabolism  is  under  the  rubric  of 
necessity,  there  is  a  greater  chance  that  this  political  choice  may  be  'technocratically 
constrained"  and  undemocratiC.  26 
While  orthodox  theories  of  political  economy  focus  almost  exclusively  on  the 
formal  or  monetised  economy,  green  political  economy  attempts  to  show  the 
relationship  between  the  'formal'  and  'informal'  sectors  of  a  society's  economy.  This 
aim  of  green  political  economy  is  concerned  with  demonstrating  how  the  formal, 
monetised  economy  is  dependent  upon  the  non-monetised  economy  which  in  turn  is 
dependent  upon  the  environment.  Henderson's  model  of  the  'total  productive  system 
of  an  industrial  society'  (Figure  6.2)  represents  the  main  thrust  of  the  green  political 
economy  perspective.  In  presenting  and  understanding  the  economy  in  this  way,  green 
26  While  accepting  the  argument  that  the  formal  economy  must  be  maintained  politically,  SO  as  to 
prevent  it  undermining  the  natural  and  social  conditions  of  the  human  economy,  it  is  not  the  case  that 
concerns  of  the  human  economy  become  co-cxtcnsive  with  politics.  There  needs  to  be  a  separation  as 
well  as  a  connection  between  economy  and  polity. 240 
political  economy  attempts  to  overcome  what  it  perceives  as  the  inadequacies  of 
contemporary  economic  thought.  These  weaknesses  include  the  model  of  the 
economy  as  a  closed  system  ecologically,  creating  the  illusion  that  the  human  economy 
is  separate  from  the  natural  world  and  self-generating,  just  as  markets  are  assumed  to 
be  self-regulating.  Another  standard  green  argument  is  the  critique  of  orthodox 
economic  measurements  of  social  welfare/wealth,  such  as  GNP  (Eckersley,  1992b, 
1993a)  in  favour  of  alternative  qualitative  indicators  or  the  radical  alternative  of 
abandoning  the  search  for  such  indicators.  27  As  such  green  political  economy 
represents  a  demand  for  the  radical  reconceptualisation  of  economic  theory.  To  some 
extent,  it  is  part  of  a  search  for  a  'post-industrial'  (but  not  necessarily  anti-industrial,  as 
argued  below  in  6.7)  political  economy,  premised  on  the  critique  of  the  industrial 
economics  of  contemporary  economic  theory.  As  such  green  political  economy  is 
consistent  within  Giarni's  view  that, 
'economics'  for  the  last  two  centuries  has  been  the  'economics  of 
industrialization'  and  not  of  the  economy,  which  includes  all  assets  and  efforts 
that  contribute  to  welfare  ...  ecological  and other  current  movements  (e.  g. 
women's  liberation  etc.  )  are  all  directed  at  the  rehabilitation  of  non-monetized 
assets  and  activities  which  contribute  to  wealth  and  welfare  and  which  have 
been  marginalized  or  left  out  of  account  in  the  traditional  economic  (and  socio- 
economic)  system.  (Giarini,  1980:  3  69) 
27  The  radical  view  of  abandoning  trying  to  construct  such  indicators  or  measures  of  social  welfare 
begins,  like  standard  green  arguments,  from  a  critique  of  orthodox  indicators  such  as  GNP.  However 
this  radical  view  rejects  GNP  because  it  is  a  form  of  social  accounting  and,  on  this  radical  view,  part 
of  a  surveillance  imperative  that  is  part  and  parcel  of  the  present  state  system.  Such  critics  point  out 
that  the  statc-centred  nature  of  GNP  can  be  seen  in  its  origins,  where  it  was  used  not  so  much  as  a 
measure  of  social  welfare,  or  even  of  aggregate  demand  in  the  economy,  but  to  enable  state  actors  to 
determine  the  war-fighting  capacity  of  society.  From  these  origins,  such  indicators  are  usually  held  to 
develop  into  central  components  of  state  welfare  policy,  such  measurements  being  used  to  weaken 
citizen  input  into  what  counted  as  welfare  and  how  it  was  to  be  achieved  (Keane,  1988),  as  well  as 
being  a  central  plank  in  the  process  of  'nation-building'  as  a  constitutive  part  of  modernisation 
(L.  atouche,  1993).  Thus  some  greens  reject  orthodox  indicators  not  just  because  they  are 
inaccurate/meaningless,  but  because  they  empower  the  state  to  determine  what  counts  as  welfare  as 
well  as  determining  how  best  to  achieve  a  given  level  of  'welfare',  disempowering  the  individual  to 
define  their  own  conception  of  welfare  (Keane,  1988;  Mich,  1973). 241 
The  integration  of  economy  and  ecology  requires  a  green  political  economy 
perspective  which  goes  beyond  the  'greening'  of  orthodox  economic  thought,  as  given 
by  neoclassical  environmental  economics.  The  latter,  while  useful,  does  not  capture 
the  full  metabolic  character  of  the  relationship  between  the  human  and  the  natural 
economies.  Green  political  economy  represents  a  move  away  from  thinking  about  the 
metabolism  with  nature  through  monetised  exchange  on  the  formal  market.  While  the 
latter  will  continue  to  be  a  major  feature  of  most  economies,  it  should  not  be  viewed  as 
the  only  or  most  appropriate  model  for  the  human  economy  when  the  latter's 
dependence  upon  ecological  conditions  increasingly  raises  questions  of  right  and 
wrong,  and  not  simply  costs  and  benefits. 
6.6  Money  and  Green  Political  Economy 
Following  the  Aristotelian  distinction  between  oikonomina  and  chrematistics,  which 
gives  rise  to  the  'household'  and  the  'market'  as  competing  models  of  political 
economy,  the  LETS  economy  highlights  a  centrally  important  aspect  of  green  political 
economy.  This  has  to  do  with  the  a  cýitique  of  money  in  economic  activity  that  has 
been  developed  by  writers  sympathetic  to  the  green  position,  such  as  O'Neill  (1993, 
1995a,  1995b,  1995c),  Lee  (1989)  and  Altvater  (1993).  According  to  Aristotle, 
chrematistic  activity  is  concerned  with  accumulating  currency,  the  means  of  exchange, 
while  "economic  acquisition,  that  of  the  household,  considers  acquisition  only  with 
respect  to  the  objects  primary  use,  as  an  object  that  satisfies  a  need"  (O'Neill,  1995: 
426).  There  is  a  limit  to  the  accumulation  of  such  goods  according  to  Aristotle.  On  a 
'householding'  view  of  the  economy,  there  are  thus  limits  to  wealth  and  property.  This 
is  not  so  with  the  acquisition  of  money  as  both  Aristotle,  Locke  and  early  theorists  of 
capitalism  understood. 
According  to  Lee  (1989),  the  development  of  the  money  economy  was  central  to 
the  modem  market  economy,  and  laid  the  basis  for  the  separation  of  the  human 
economy  from  nature's  economy.  The  separation  of  the  economy  from  its  ecological 
context  also  meant  the  increasing  separation  of  the  economy  from  wider  non-economic 242 
considerations.  In  ecological  terms,  Locke's  argument  in  defence  of  money  (and  the 
inequality  that  a  money  economy  requires  and  justifies),  permitted  the  accumulation 
process  that  is  at  the  heart  of  the  capitalist  market  system.  Until  the  creation  of  money 
and  its  widespread  acceptance,  wealth  and  accumulation  were  limited  by  natural 
constraints  (the  limits  of  a  person's  stomach  or  the  length  of  time  natural  products 
would  last  without  spoiling).  With  the  widespread  use  of  money  as  a  non-putrefying 
store  of  wealth,  limits  to  accumulation  could  be  overcome.  Locke's  proviso  that 
nobody  should  accumulate  more  than  they  could  consume,  that  is  accumulate  no  more 
than  would  not  decay,  was  easily  overcome  by  the  use  of  money  as  a  legitimate  store 
of  wealth  as  well  as  a  means  of  exchange.  As  Gorz  puts  it,  "once  you  begin  to 
measure  wealth  in  cash,  enough  doesn't  exist.  Whatever  the  sum,  it  could  always  be 
larger"  (1989:  112;  emphasis  in  original).  With  money  not  just  as  a  medium  of 
exchange  but  now  a  store  of  value,  what  Lee  calls  the  'organic'  basis  of  human  wealth 
was  overcome.  With  the  invention  of  money,  "Accumulation  of  this  non-putrefying 
object  on  the  part  of  the  individual  can  now  be  limitless  and  go  on  for  ever,  the 
accumulation  process  having  being  emancipated  from  the  workings  of  Nature'  (Lee, 
1989:  164).  28  In  terms  of  figure  6.2.,  it  is  money  which  is  at  the  root  of  the  separation 
of  the  formal  economy  from  both  the  non-money  economy  and  nature,  and  the 
separation  of  economic  from  ecological  rationality. 
While  recogrfising  the  benefits  of  money  as  a  medium  of  exchange,  the  operation  of 
LETS  seeks  to  counteract  the  transformation  of  this  medium  into  a  store  of  value. 
LETS  'currency'  is  a  medium  of  exchange.  There  is  no  benefit  to  be  gained  from 
accumulating  it,  since  the  sole  function  of  a  LETS  unit  of  exchange  is  to  facilitate  trade 
and  exchange.  The  difference  between  the  contemporary  cash  economy  and  the  LETS 
economy  is  that  in  the  latter,  currency  is  purely  a  means  of  transmitting  information  to 
enable  trade.  That  is  why  LETS  is  a  non-monetary  form  or  barter  system  of  exchange 
28  It  is  of  course  no  coincidence  that  the  Lockeian  defence  of  money  as  a  store  of  wealth  arose  at  the 
historical  transition  from  an  agrarian  economy  to  a  commercial  economy.  The  inherent  self-limiting 
features  of  an  agrarian  society,  in  terms  of  its  'organic'  conception  of  wealth  and  acquisition,  as  well 
as  its  obvious  'back  to  nature'  qualities,  may  account  for  the  predilection  for  a  return  to  this  type  of 
society  within  some  strands  of  green  political  theory.  Such  sentiments  arc  clear  in  Georgescu- 
Rocgen's  statement  thaL  "Agriculture  teaches  man  to  be  patient  -a  reason  why  peasants  have  a 
philosophical  attitude  in  life  pronouncedly  different  from  that  of  industrial  communities7  (1971:  297). 243 
but  without  the  disadvantages  of  barter.  'Wealth'  in  a  LETS  economy  is  limited  to  the 
amount  of  goods  and  services  one  can  trade  for  within  the  LETS  scheme.  Although 
the  accumulation  of  goods  bought  within  the  LETS  market  is  possible,  this  type  of 
accumulation  is  quantitatively  and  qualitatively  different  from  the  type  of  accumulation 
that  Locke  sanctioned  and  Aristotle  criticised.  The  LETS  economy  brings  out  the 
central  aspect  of  green  political  economy's  emphasis  on  'use  value'  as  constitutive  of 
wealth  in  opposition  to  accumulation  of  'exchange  value'  which  is  the  understanding  of 
wealth  within  the  money  economy  and  its  various  theories  of  political  economy.  To 
put  it  another  way,  trade  and  exchange  within  a  LETS  economy  is  geared  towards  the 
satisfaction  of  needs  and  wants  facilitated  by  a  medium  of  exchange,  and  is  not 
concerned  with  accumulating  the  means  of  exchange  and  transforming  it  into  a  store  of 
value.  The  use  of  goods  and  services  to  fulfil  needs  and  wants  is  the  principal  object  of 
those  who  engage  in  trade  in  the  LETS  economy;  trade  is  not  seen  as  a  'moment'  in 
accumulating  money.  Within  LETS,  'debit'  is  understood  as  a  promise  or  a 
ccommitment'  to  render  services  or  products  to  the  same  value  some  time  in  the  future. 
Whereas  in  the  formal  economy  one  needs  money  to  buy  the  things  one  needs,  which 
means  that  one  must  either  work  or  receive  welfare  payments;  within  a  LETS  economy 
individuals  'create  money'  in  the  act  of  buying  itself  29 
Precedents  for  the  green  critique  of  the  role  of  money  within  the  contemporary 
economy,  and  in  particular  the  disproportionate  power  of  finance  in  affecting 
production  decisions,  can  be  found  in  the  work  of  Douglas  on  'social  credit'.  Douglas' 
critique  of  production  for  production's  sake,  regardless  of  its  social  usefulness,  is  close 
to  green  concerns.  According  to  this  line  of  argument,  production  is  driven  by  the 
imperative  to  generate  enough  money  in  order  that  there  be  sufficient  monetary  means 
with  which  to  purchase  the  goods  and  services  required  to  fulfil  needs.  As  Hutchenson 
29  This  seemingly  odd  statement  brings  out  clearly  the  idea  of  LETS  as  a  'credit-barter'  system  rather 
than  as  simply  an  alternative  money  system.  One  can  write  a  cheque  in  the  local  currency  to  pay  for 
one's  purchases  without  having  to  have  'sufficient  funds'  in  one's  LETS  account.  Tliat  is,  one  can  go 
into  'commitment'  on  the  understanding  that  one  will  render  an  equivalent  value  of  goods  or  services 
in  the  future.  And  by  going  into  commitment  one  has  effectively  'created'  LETS  money,  in  the  form 
of  the  cheque  lodged  in  the  account  of  the  seller.  Essentially  one  has  'bartered'  future  goods  and 
services  that  one  intends  to  sell,  in  exchange  for  present  goods  and  services  purchased  from  other 
individuals  within  the  system. 244 
puts  it  in  explaining  the  rise  of  the  money  economy,  "Goods  are  produced  as  a  means 
to  an  end  -  to  secure  the  money  with  which  to  meet  basic  subsistence  requirements 
since  access  to  resources  as  a  right  from  the  commons  has  been  denied  through  the 
enclosures"  (1992:  6).  30  From  Douglas's  ideas  on  'social  credit'  one  can  trace  key 
aspects  of  green  arguments  for  a  guaranteed  citizens'  income.  One  of  the  main 
ecological  reasons  put  forward  for  a  citizens'  income  is  that  divorcing  income  from 
work  would  undermine  the  ecological  irrationality  of  having  to  increase  production  in 
order  to  generate  sufficient  purchasing  power  for  the  distribution  of  existing  supplies. 
Together  with  the  deregulation  of  currency  within  the  LETS  model,  the  citizens' 
income  are  two  of  the  main  financial  proposals  found  within  the  economic  policies 
proposed  by  greens. 
This  idea  of  increasing  production  in  order  to  pay  for  the  things  we  need  underpins 
some  of  the  reasoning  behind  ecological  modernisation,  discussed  in  the  last  chapter. 
Ecological  modernisation  is  consistent  with  the  view  that  financial  resources  are 
required  in  order  to  pay  for  environmental  protection,  as  well  as  holding  environmental 
standards  (not  to  be  confused  with  protection)  as  a  source  of  economic  growth. 
Hence  continued  economic  growth  is  a  necessary  prerequisite  for  achieving  ecological 
sustainabi.  lity.  Rather  than  altering  production  and  consumption  patterns  directly  to  be 
more  ecologically  rational,  ecological  modernisation  encourages  us  to  think  of  ways  to 
increase  production  and  consumption  so  as  to  generate  the  necessary  financial  revenue 
with  which  to  pay  for  environmental  improvements.  Economic  growth,  like  Achilles 
lance,  can  heal  the  environmental  wounds  it  inflicts.  Now  whether  or  not  'economic 
growth'  (however  this  is  defined)  can  be  reconciled  with  ecological  demands  is  a  moot 
question,  and  there  may  be  more  in  the  ecological  modernisation  idea  of  the  ecological 
efficiency  of  differentiated  growth  than  green  critics  allow  (Jacobs,  1995).  However, 
the  main  point  here  is  that  the  elevation  of  econon-fic  growth,  in  terms  of  increased 
production  and  consumption,  to  the  status  of  a  'given'  is  partly  to  be  understood  in 
30  The  money  economy  and  the  enclosure  of  the  commons  arc  thus  two  sides  of  the  same  coin:  they 
are,  from  a  green  point  of  view,  potentially  negative  sides  of  'modernisation'.  I  say  'potentially'  in 
order  to  distinguish  the  argument  being  defended  in  this  thesis  from  arguments  which  portray  the 
enclosure  of  common  resources  as  always  and  everywhere  counterproductive  and  morally 
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terms  of  the  central  role  of  money  within  industrialised  economic  systems.  In  other 
words,  it  is  not  just  the  consumptionist  lifestyle  that  drives  the  economic  engine,  but 
also  a  more  fundamental  relation  between  production  and  the  generation  of  sufficient 
monetary  purchasing  power  within  the  economy. 
6.7  Virtue,  Production  and  Consumption 
While  many  green  arguments  concerning  political  economy  are  articulated  in  terms  of 
economic-ecological  relationships,  there  is  also  a  moral  dimension  to  green  political 
economy.  In  this  section  I  want  to  highlight  those  aspects  of  green  political  economy 
which  pertain  to  moral  virtue. 
The  goal  of  economic  self-reliance  is  advocated  as  much  a  moral  ideal  as  it  is  a 
particular  means  by  which  a  more  ecologically  rational  economy-ecology  metabolism 
may  be  established.  Self-sufficiency  or  autarkeid,  was  a  virtue  central  to  Stoic  thought 
for  example,  where  it  was  understood  in  terms  of  detachment  from  worldly  concerns 
and  care  only  for  the  cultivation  of  individual  virtue  and  rationality  (Slote,  1993:  645). 
On  this  gloss,  to  be  self-sufficient  was  to  be  untroubled  by  temporal  matters  and  to 
devote  one's  attentions  and  energies  to  the  important  spiritual  matters  of  life. 
Although  this  spiritualised  account  of  self-sufficiency  does  find  its  defenders  within 
green  theory,  particularly  amongst  those  who  decry  the  'materialism'  and 
'consumerism'  of  modem  societies,  there  is  another  related  virtue,  that  of  self-reliance, 
which  is  a  more  attractive  ecological  virtue.  Whereas  self-sufficiency  as  a  virtue 
implies  a  notion  of  detachment,  and  an  inward-looking,  almost  contemplative 
disposition  of  inner  contentment3l,  self-reliance  does  not  imply  any  of  these  qualities, 
31  The  moral  ideal  of  self-sufficiency,  as  understood  by  the  Stoics,  is  thus  close  to  the  deep  ecology 
view  canvassed  in  chapter  two  as  'quietism'.  It  is  rather  ironic  to  think  that  the  Jainist  monks  who 
are  held  as  good  ecological  characters,  because  of  their  concern  not  to  injure  any  living  thing,  do  so 
for  reasons  which  do  not  seem  to  square  with  the  deep  ecological  reasons  for  'walking  lightly  on  the 
earth'.  That  these  monks  brush  the  path  ahead  of  them,  and  wear  surgical  masks  so  as  not  to  kill  any 
living  entity,  is  taken  by  many  deep  ecologists  as  evidence  of  a  reverence  for  the  earth  and  all  its 
entities.  Although  this  may  be  partly  true,  it  is  also  the  case  that  Jainism  expresses  a  concern  to 
minimise  contact  with  the  material  world  so  as  not  to  become  'polluted'.  Thus  their  symbolic  acts  of 
minimising  'harm'  to  the  nonhuman  world  are  motivated  not  out  of  a  reverence  for  nature,  but  rather 
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but  rather  denotes  a  sense  of  relying  on  one's  own  steam.  Self-reliance  conveys  a 
sense  of  autonomy,  independence  and  self-determination. 
Self-reliance  is  understood  both  as  a  constitutive  characteristic  of  communities  and 
as  a  character  trait  of  individuals.  On  the  community  level,  self-reliance  is  argued  to 
increase  awareness  of  the  dependency  of  the  human  economy  upon  the  nonhuman 
world  (Goldsmith  et  al,  1992;  Dryzek,  1987).  At  the  same  time,  self-reliance 
decreases  dependence  on  imports  and  trade  to  provide  those  goods  and  services  we 
think  of  as  constitutive  of  the  'good  fife'  for  us  (Allaby  and  Bubyard,  1980).  32  Thus 
the  virtue  of  economic  (and  ecological)  self-reliance  is  its  enhancement  of  the  capacity 
for  self-determination.  According  to  Benjamin  Franklin,  "The  man  who  would  trade 
independence  for  security  deserves  to  wind  upneither".  The  green  argument  is  that  je 
extensive  trade  increasingly  erodes  both  independence  and  economic  security.  This  is 
often  the  underlying  argument  of  green  arguments  against  extensive  trade,  and  is  one 
of  the  main  arguments  used  in  favour  of  delhiking  from  the  global  economy.  From  a 
green  point  of  view,  participation  in  the  global  economy  ought  to  be  presented  as  a 
choice  between  economic  welfare  through  trade,  and  independence  through  increased 
self-reliance.  It  is  not  simply  the  fact  that  extensive  global  trade  has  damaging 
environmental  effects  in  terms  of  transporting  goods,  resources  and  people,  and  the 
infrastructure  (roads  in  particular)  required  to  facilitate  it.  At  the  same  time,  such 
patterns  of  trade  within  the  global  economy  lead  to  domestic  economies,  and  the 
societies  they  support,  becoming  over-dependent  upon  trade  and  having  to  fit  into  the 
global  division  of  labour.  These  econon-&-structural  imperatives  weaken  the  capacity 
of  domestic  econon-fies  to  determine  their  own  development  path.  In  terms  of  welfare 
and  autonomy  considerations,  the  green  argument  for  self-reliance  is  an  attempt  to 
redress  the  balance  in  favour  of  autonomy  while  avoiding  the  possibly  welfare  reducing 
effects  of  complete  self-sufficiency.  What  the  argument  for  self-reliance  comes  down 
32  This  awareness  of  our  dependency,  is  from  the  green  perspective  itself  a  virtue,  which  helps  to 
mitigate  the  tendency  of  humans  thinldng  they  are  independent  of  the  natural  world.  An  added  point 
is  that  conscious  recognition  of  human  vulnerability,  and  of  our  needy  constitution,  opens  the  way  to 
feminist  contributions  to  ecological  thought.  These  relate  to  such  central  political  concepts  as 
autonomy,  the  economy,  progress  and  production,  some  of  which  are  considered  below  and  in  the 
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to  is  that  collective  self-determination  within  the  global  economy  requires  decreasing 
dependence  on  trade  to  fulfil  collective  welfare  needs.  In  this  way  the  green  argument 
for  self-reliance  is  an  argument  for  a  particular  conception  of  liberty. 
For  Windass,  "a  community  which  uses  local  materials  and  its  own  skills  in  order  to 
house  itself,  clothe  itself,  and  feed  itself..  is  'free'  in  a  much  more  radical  sense  than  a 
community  which  draws  a  large  income  from  the  industrial  treadmill  and  spends  it  all 
to  buy  necessities  from  outside'(1976:  574).  While  not  completely  agreeing  with  this, 
it  is  a  good  example  of  green  arguments  for  self-reliance  in  terms  of  a  particular 
conception  of  freedom  as  self-determination  and  autonomy.  Here,  as  in  other  aspects, 
green  political  theory  demonstrates  a  remarkable  continuity  with  earlier  classical  and 
more  modem  republican  concerns  of  the  tension  between  liberty  and  luxury.  Just  as 
writers  from  Aristotle  onwards  to  Machiavelli,  Rousseau  and  Arendt  (Whiteside, 
1994),  drew  attention  to  the  negative  impact  of  excessive  economic  wealth  on  political 
society,  encouraging  inter  alia,  atomism,  the  elevation  of  consumption  as  the  key 
component  of  the  good  life,  a  retreat  into  the  private  sphere,  and  dependence  upon 
complete  strangers  and  forces  outside  of  one's  control,  likewise  green  politics  stresses 
the  negative  impact  of  trade  within  the  context  of  a  global  market  on  both  individual 
and  collective  self-determination.  Greens  argue  for  the  moral  as  well  as  ecological 
benefits  of  self-reliance.  As  indicated  earlier,  part  of  the  green  argument  is  that  beyond 
some  threshold,  the  welfare  benefits  from  active  participation  within  the  global  market 
economy  begin  to  undermine  the  conditions  for  autonomy,  as  well  as  the  benefits 
themselves  decreasing  in  their  ability  to  deliver  utility,  or  contribute  to  human  welfare 
(Hirsch,  1977).  Rather  than  seeing  economy-ecology  problems  as  stemming  from  a 
scarcity  of  resources,  the  moral  underpinning  of  green  political  economy  seeks  to  re- 
cast  these  problems  as  stemming,  in  part,  from  excess  demand.  33  In  line  with  the 
33  One  way  of  looldng  at  this  is  to  see  that  the  modern  economy  creates  'scarcity'  where  none  existed 
before  rather  than  overcoming  scarcity.  Within  modernity,  according  to  Xcnos  (1989)  'scarcity'  is  a 
function  of  excess  demand,  and  as  such,  it  can  never  be  fully  satisfied.  In  criticising  the  possible 
liberty-reducing  effects  of  excess  demand,  the  green  position  is  close  to  Gellner's  contention  that 
Liberty  has  ridden  to  victory  on  the  back  of  consumerism  ...  But  it  would  be  folly  to  be  confident  that 
all  this  must  necessarily  continue.  There  are  dangers  ahead  for  affluence-sustained  liberty"  (1995: 
29).  While  agreeing  with  the  idea  that  beyond  some  threshold,  industrial  production  and  consumption 
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classical  view,  green  political  economy  holds  that  temperance  and  the  avoidance  of 
excess  is  a  virtue  (Clark,  1994:  119),  but  adds  that  the  satisfaction  of  those  moderated 
wants,  should  as  far  as  practicable,  be  in  a  manner  which  does  not  compromise  self- 
determination. 
Within  the  context  of  contemporary  market  economies,  what  greens  are  saying  is 
neither  complex  nor  all  that  new.  People  are  offered  a  choice.  On  the  one  hand  there 
is  the  current  system  of  international  trade,  the  global  economy  and  economic 
interdependence.  The  green  alternative  suggests  that  people  live  more  within  their 
own  local  means  and  seek  to  provide  the  necessary  goods  and  services  they  require 
without  over-depending  on  external  sources.  This,  in  part,  requires  the  moderation  of 
desires.  This  is  the  model  of  self-defined  needs:  we  choose  to  moderate  our  desires 
for  the  sake  of  autonomy  (Slote,  1993).  The  alternative  is  to  forego  self-reliance  and 
engage  in  'truck  and  barter'  on  the  open  market,  where  using  the  medium  of  money 
one  can  buy  the  goods  and  services  for  the  'commodious  life'.  Individuals  are  asked  to 
weigh  up  the  benefits  of  externally,  market  produced  commodities,  against  the  loss  in 
independence  that  follows  from  this.  This  connects  with  the  green  concern  with 
preference  transformation  and  its  relation  to  autonomy.  From  a  green  point  of  view, 
autonomy  is  not  equated  with  the  satisfaction  of  preferences,  but  is  also  about  ensuring 
autonomy  in  what  Sunstein  calls  the  "processes  of  preference  formatiore'  (1995:  205), 
which  he  claims  is  a  goal  of  democracy.  This  issue  will  be  further  discussed  in  the  next 
chapter  (7.8). 
(perhaps  lower  that  the  former?  )  increases  in  output  may  also  begin  to  decrease  welfare,  as  given  in 
Hirsch's  (1977)  'social  limits  to  growth'  thesis.  One  way  of  looldng  at  the  green  position,  both 
conceptually  and  historically,  is  to  see  it  as  woven  from  a  reaction  to  the  two  great  'moments'  of 
modernity,  namely  the  French  and  Industrial  Revolutions.  The  former  can  be  said  to  represent  the 
,  liberty'  while  the  later  represents  the  'welfare'  aspects,  values  of  the  modem  western  world.  The 
potential  tension  between  these  two  dynamics  of  modernity  is  the  arena  and  tradition  from  which 
central  strands  of  green  political  theory  comes.  While  greens  are  happy  to  place  themselves  within  a 
tradition  that  has  its  origins  in  the  romantic  reaction  against  the  industrial  revolution,  they 
conveniently  forget  that  this  often  went  hand  in  hand  with  a  conservative,  not  to  say  aristocratic, 
rejection  of  the  ideals  of  the  democratic  revolution.  Carlyle  as  much  as  Wordsworth  can  be  placed 
within  the  broad  tradition  from  which  contemporary  green  theory  developed.  This  conservative 
lineage  is  something  which  'shadows'  key  aspects  of  green  theory,  particularly  its  historical 
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Also,  as  the  classical  economists  noted,  the  scope  of  market  exchange  increases  in 
he  with  people's  desires  beyond  need-fulfilment.  The  human  capacity  for  food  may 
be  limited  by  the  capacity  of  our  stomachs,  but  the  capacity  for  luxuries  has  no  such 
gnatural  limit',  as  the  classical  economists  were  quick  to  observe.  Thus  the  more  the 
demand  for  luxuries  grows,  the  more  the  market,  that  is  the  economic  wherewithal  to 
supply  that  demand  in  terms  of  production  and  exchange,  will  grow.  It  is  here  that  we 
come  to  the  green  argument  concerning  the  inverse  relationship  between  economic 
growth  and  a  particular  view  of  democracy,  a  view  which  in  some  ways  echoes  the 
misgivings  of  those  early  commentators  on  capitalism  concerning  the  detrimental 
effects  of  luxury  on  virtue.  The  more  a  society  revolves  around  the  pursuit  of 
economic  growth,  the  less  is  given  to  active  citizen  participation  and  involvement  in 
the  democratic  life  of  the  polity.  This  observation  is  one  that  has  been  a  constant 
critique  of  capitalist  liberal  democracy  from  Smith,  Jefferson  and  Tocqueville  to 
contemporary  radical  democrats  and  greens.  It  is  also  present  in  Aristotle's  critique  of 
pleonexid,  incontinence  or  weakness  of  Will.  34 
In  this  way  green  anti-materialism  does  not  stem  from  a  moral  rejection  of 
materialistic  lifestyles  on  the  grounds  that,  'lives  in  the  growth  economy  will  tend  away 
from  the  elegant  and  towards  the  grubby  and  materialistic"  (Dobson,  1990:  88).  The 
green  critique  of  economic  growth,  materialism  and  consumerism  also  has  to  do  with 
its  conception  of  liberty  as  self-detennination.  Indeed,  the  critique  of  consumerism 
from  the  point  of  view  of  its  negative  effects  on  liberty  as  self-determination  is  stronger 
than  criticising  it  on  the  grounds  that  it  falls  short  of  a  particular,  and  rather  narrowly 
defined,  'green"  conception  of  the  good  life. 
Green  political  economy  does  not  seek  to  reject  individual  material  consumption  as 
unworthy,  or  indeed  as  necessarily  unecological.  Stretton's  argument  that  one  cannot 
enjoy  common  goods,  such  as  public  spaces,  without  some  minimal  degree  of  private, 
individual  goods  (1976:  68)  is  an  important  one.  Without  private  goods,  according  to 
34  Arendt's  view  that  the  immoderation  of  desire  as  a  result  of  the  dominance  of  economic  rationality 
and  ways  of  organising  social  life,  "harbours  the  grave  danger  that  eventually  no  object  of  the  world 
will  be  safe  from  consumption  and  annihilation  through  consumption7  (1959:  115),  concurs  with 
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him,  individuals  will  use  public  ones  inappropriately,  i.  e.  degrade  them.  35  Martell  in  his 
critical  analysis  of  green  politics  points  out  that,  "greens  perhaps  sometimes  undervalue 
the  extent  to  which  material  acquisition  and  consumption  can  be  a  source  of  personal 
fulfilment 
...  acquisition  is  not  always  the  shabby,  personally  impoverishing  behaviour 
greens  suppose  it  to  be'  (1994:  49).  Although  frugality  and  simplicity  of  lifestyle  may 
have  their  own  virtues,  a  moderately  materialistic  lifestyle  need  not  be  without  its  own 
inner  rewards,  and  ecological  virtue.  But  these  virtues  will  not  be  realised  unless 
consumption  is  integrated  as  an  integral  aspect  of  ecological  stewardship.  Material 
consumption  becomes  an  ecological  vice  where  it  orientates  itself  by  nothing  other 
than  consumption  itself  The  resolution  of  the  tension  between  frugality  and  excessive 
consumption  lies  in  a  middle  position  of  optimality  or  sufficiency.  One  can  encourage 
e  voluntary  simplicity'  on  ecological  grounds,  and  on  democratic  grounds  if  the 
particular  organisation  of  the  economy  which  provides  that  consumption  has  the 
potential  to  compromise  democratic  practice.  However,  it  needs  to  be  stressed  that  a 
reduction  in  consumption  is  not  across  the  board,  but  a  reduction  of  consumption  in 
some  areas  (such  as  private  car  use).  In  other  words,  the  green  anti-consumptionist 
argument  is  a  selective  reduction  of  consumption  within  the  context  of  reorganised 
production  and  consumption  patterns  rather  than  a  carte  blanche  rejection  material 
consumption.  36 
Al-lied  to  the  green  defence  of  economic  self-reliance  as  a  constitutive  aspect  of 
liberty  as  autonomy,  is  an  argument  which  sees  economic  activity  as  intrinsically  as 
35  This  defence  of  the  private  sphere  is  also  tied  up  with  the  argument  against  the  creation  of 
transparent  social  relations,  which  was  argued  to  be  an  aim  of  eco-anarchism  in  chapter  4.  In 
rejecting  this  as  a  central  aim  of  green  politics,  the  question  then  becomes  one  of  constructing 
institutions  and  fostering  practices  that  balance  public  and  private  spheres  which  will  encourage 
6  responsible'  use  of  the  former.  A  practical  example  of  this  would  be  the  folly  of  constructing  a 
housing  estate  without  gardens  which  may  lead  to  a  local  park/woodland/nature  reserve  being 
overused  and/or  used  inappropriately. 
36  One  reason  why  it  is  important  to  stress  the  acceptance  of  individual  consumption  as  a  'good'  on 
principle,  is  to  dispel  any  (liberal)  suspicion  of  the  erosion  of  the  private  sphere.  The  democratisation 
of  the  family  is  not  sought,  at  least  not  at  the  intimate,  micro-level.  Howcvcr,  given  the  green  concern 
with  per  capita  consumption,  macro-level  regulation  of  reproduction  is  a  legitimate  policy  area  for 
democratic  decision-malcing.  Taxes  and  subsidies,  as  well  as  the  promotion  and  spread  of  economic 
security  (as  argued  in  the  next  chapter,  7.2),  can  help  the  'demographic  transition',  and  achieve  a 
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well  as  instrumentally  valuable.  37  The  green  conception  of  liberty  is  one  which  sees 
economic  life  and  its  concerns,  not  as  a  precondition  for  autonomy,  but  rather  as  a 
potential  site  of  autonomy  in  its  own  right.  An  example  of  this  is  Allaby  and  Bunyard's 
view  of  the  moral  benefits  of  having  one's  own  power  supply.  For  them,  "The  family 
whose  power  supply  comes  from  its  own  windmill  or  water  turbine  ... 
feels  it  hasfireed 
itself  from  a  situation  in  which  the  amount,  form  and  method  of  supply  of  power  is 
decided  by  an  organization  that  presumes  to  know  better  than  they  what  it  is  that  they 
need  and  should  have.  It  is  an  escape  from  paternalism,  a  maturing"  (1980:  139; 
emphasis  added).  It  is  not  suggested  that  an  over-riding  and  immediate  green 
economic  aim  is  to  decentralise  energy  production  to  the  household  level.  Rather,  we 
should  interpret  Allaby  and  Bunyard's  position  in  terms  of  the  desirability  of  searching 
for  alternative,,  less  'disempowering'  ways  in  which  to  organise  economic  life.  This 
value  may  take  a  number  of  institutional  forms,  one  of  which  is  that  each  household  or 
community  have  its  own  (sustainable)  energy  supply.  The  main  point  is  that  economic 
self-reliance  is  a  virtue  in  the  sense  that  it  is  not  only  a  means  to  an  end  (autonomy)  but 
itself  a  part  of  that  end.  This  goes  hand  in  hand  with  the  green  rejection  of  the 
neoclassical  classification  of  'work'  as  'negative  utility'  and  engaged  in  as  a  means  of 
securing  money. 
In  the  global  context  of  the  contemporary  world  what  this  notion  of  self-reliance 
attempts  to  express  is  that  the  increase  in  the  distance  between  the  point  of  production 
and  consumption  is  a  good  indication  of  the  decrease  in  the  capacity  for  individuals  and 
collectives  to  be  self-reliant  economically.  A  dominant  principle  of  green  political 
economy  is  thus  to  decrease  the  gap  between  production  and  consumption  as  much  as 
possible.  This  virtue  of  economic  self-reliance  is  linked  to  the  bioregional  distinction 
37  Lasch's  'populist  producerism"  which  aims  for  the  "rehabilitation  of  work,  not  the  democratization 
of  consumption7  (in  Holmes,  1993:  134)  is  close  to  the  position  being  developed  here.  However,  this 
concern  with  re-valuing  work  as  intrinsically  valuable,  is  to  be  distinguished  from  the  overlap  between 
Lasch's  critique  of  contemporary  (US)  industrial  society  and  the  'deep  green'  one.  Both  share  a 
nostalgic  yearning  for  a  pre-industrial  rural  society,  where  the  'vices'  of  the  city,  of  industrial  progress 
and  affluence  are  held  in  check  by  the  virtues  of  a  society  of  independent  household  farmers  and 
independent  craft  workers.  Indeed,  many  deep  greens  take  Lasch's  complaint  about  the  'enfeebling  of 
character'  as  a  result  of  consumerism  as  an  argument  for  recapturing  the  values  of  (if  not  returning  to) 
a  hunter-gatherer  culture  (Shepard,  1993).  On  this  last  point  see  chapter  2. 252 
between  'ecosystem'  and  'biosphere'  people  (43).  Ecosystem  people  in  being  self- 
reliant  (but  not  autarkic)  are  also  ecologically  rational.  Being  dependent  upon  a  local 
ecosystem  for  the  majority  of  the  goods  and  services  one  consumes  means  that  more 
attention  will  be  paid  to  its  health  and  continuing  ability  to  supply  those  goods  and 
services,  including,  most  importantly,  environmental  goods  and  services  that  are 
essential  to  economic  activity  and  human  well-being.  An  ideal  green  economy  might 
then  be  one  where  there  was  a  market  (with  global,  regional,  national  and  local  levels), 
but  the  majority  of  the  things  people  required  were  either  produced  by  themselves  or  at 
the  local  economy  level.  Of  course  not  all  goods  and  services  can  be  produced  locally, 
but  the  principle  of  appropriateness  suggests  that  they  should  be  produced  at  the 
lowest  level  possible.  This  would  be  in  the  spirit  of  the  quote  from  Keynes  above, 
which  emphasised  not  only  the  local  production  of  goods  and  services  but  also  the 
trade  and  exchange  of  ideas  and  knowledge.  It  is  not  a  contention  of  green  political 
economy  to  locally  constrain  the  production  and  free  exchange  of  knowledge, 
information  and  science.  As  will  be  recalled,  in  chapter  5  (5.7),  science  was  presented 
as  a  key  form  of  knowledge  necessary  to  cope  with  ecological  problems,  both  locally 
and  globally. 
At  the  individual  level,  the  closing  of  the  gap  between  production  and  consumption 
can  be  understood  as  an  attempt  to  recapture  some  of  the  internal  goods  of  production 
that  are  largely  missing  from  modem  forms  of  production.  38  One  option  is  to  alter  or 
restructure  current  productive  conditions  so  as  to  allow  the  internal  goods  of  work  to 
be  realised.  This  option  includes  worker  participation  schemes,  flexi-time,  multi- 
tasking,  non-assembly  line  forms  of  production,  working  from  home.  Such  schemes 
38  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  concerns  with  the  virtues  of  self-production  arise  at  a  time  when  work 
is  disappearing  from  the  work-based  society,  in  the  same  way  that  the  origins  of  an  aesthetic 
appreciation  of  nature  arose  historically  precisely  at  the  time  when  human  ability  to  destroy  it  also 
arose.  As  Williams  has  pointed  out,  "An  artistic  reaffirmation  of  the  separateness  and  fmdWness  of 
nature  became  appropriate  at  the  point  at  which  for  the  first  time  the  prospect  of  an  cver-increasing 
control  of  it  became  obvious"  (1992:  67).  However,  the  difference  in  the  case  of  the  reaffirmation  of 
the  virtues  and  intrinsic  value  of  self-production  is  that  what  is  disappearing  is  formal  paid 
employment  not  'work'  as  a  purposive,  transformative  activity.  In  this  sense,  the  self-production 
ideal  is  a  'post-full-cmployment'  phenomenon.  On  post-full-employmcnt  as  part  of  green  sociological 
theory  see  Gorz  (1983,1989),  Keane  &  Owens  (1986),  Robertson  (1983,1985). 253 
can  provide  opportunities  for  the  realisation  of  some  internal  goods  of  work  such  as 
autonomy,  solidarity,  creativity,  education,  self-esteem  and  self-confidence. 
Another  way  to  realise  the  internal  goods  of  work  is  by  encouraging  self- 
production,  both  individually  and  collectively  through  economic  practices  such  as 
LETS.  Self-production,  in  weakening  the  link  between  money  and  production,  opens 
up  the  possibility  of  production  becoming  a  site  of  freedom  and  not  simply  a  sphere  of 
necessity.  Part  of  the  rationality  of  'own-work',  to  use  Robertson's  (1983)  term,  is  to 
permit  criteria  other  that  'maximisation'  and  'efficiency"  into  the  sphere  of  production. 
As  own-work  is  not  engaged  in  primarily  as  a  means  to  secure  money,  it  conforms  to 
the  ideal  of  a  craft  rather  than  an  industrial  mode  of  production.  While  not  wishing  to 
endorse  all  that  Lee  (1989)  says  on  this  issue,  her  basic  point  concerning  the  'internal 
goods'  of  self-production,  as  opposed  to  the  instrumental  view  of  'industrial 
production',  is  something  that  concurs  with  the  spirit  of  green  political  economy. 
According  to  her,  "The  pursuit  of  internal  goods  is  said  to  constitute  a  morality  of 
production  or  the  artistic  mode  of  production,  while  the  pursuit  of  external  material 
goods  is  said  to  constitute  a  morality  of  consumption7  (1989:  222-23).  39  The 
understanding  of  'work'  is  central  to  orthodox  political  economy  and  it  is  perhaps  no 
coincidence  that  the  common  definition  of  work  as  'disutility',  something  engaged  in 
for  monetary  remuneration,  is  most  marked  in  the  Austrian  school.  Conceiving  of 
work  as  disutility,  to  be  entered  into  for  monetary  'compensation'  in  the  form  of 
wages,  further  entrenches  the  central  role  of  money  within  economic  life.  Not  only  is 
money,  as  Chesterton  said,  like  a  sixth  sense  necessary  to  make  use  of  the  other  five, 
but  added  to  this  is  the  idea  that  money  is  the  primary  reason  for  engaging  in 
productive  activity.  Indeed,  as  pointed  out  above,  within  orthodox  economics  only 
that  which  commands  a  monetary  value,  a  price,  is  counted  as  'productive'. 
Ostorically,  the  separation  of  people  from  resources,  as  result  of  the  enclosure  of  the 
commons,  made  the  acquisition  of  money  a  prerequisite  for  fulfilling  needs.  At  the 
same  time,  the  idea  of  work  as  'disutility'  entered  into  for  monetary  reward, 
39  The  craft  ideal 
,  of  work  and  productive  activity  is  an  ideal  not  exclusive  to  greens  but  can  be  found 
in  utopian  socialism,  particular  the  strongly  'aesthetic'  versions  of  Morris,  Rusldn  and  Wilde  for 
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represented  another  act  of  enclosure.  This  enclosure  may  be  understood  as  the 
transformation  of  'work'  into  'labour':  the  aim  of  economic  efficiency  coupled  with  the 
valuation  of  work  primarily  in  monetary  terms,  implies  that  there  is  no  point  in  re- 
organising  work  which  would  permit  the  introduction  of  internal  goods.  40  This  second 
enclosure  was  the  enclosure  of  the  informal  economy  by  the  formal,  as  outlined  earlier. 
Within  green  political  economy,  self-production  as  an  organising  principle  of  the 
economic  life  of  society  is  an  opportunity  for  the  practice  of  virtue,  the  realisation  of 
internal  goods. 
At  the  same  time,  self-production  within  the  context  of  economic  self-reliance  is 
also  a  matter  of  character  formation.  Self-production  is  consistent  with  a  less 
'consumerist'  character  typical  of  contemporary  economic  views  of  'Homo 
economicus'.  Part  of  the  green  critique  of  a  consumerist  economy  is  that  in  being 
directed  towards  consumption,  it  undermines  the  internal  goods  of  production.  Roberts 
interprets  this  as  implying  that,  "Self-fulfilment  in  working  time  ... 
is  one  of  the  'goods' 
downgraded  by  consumerisnf'  (1979:  44).  On  this  view  the  'productivism',  so  often 
criticised  by  greens,  within  contemporary  forms  of  economic  thinking,  is  at  root  a 
critique  of  'consumerism',  as  Lee  (1989)  argues.  Thus  one  can  acknowledge  the 
virtues  of  consumption  but  also  reject  consumption  as  the  dominant  or  over-riding  aim 
of  economic  activity.  In  doing  so,  green  political  economy  sets  its  face  against 
orthodox  economic  theory,  which  sets  a  premium  on  consumption.  As  Hirsch  points 
out,  from  the  orthodox  view  "Economy.  growth  ... 
is  interpreted  as  growth  in  the 
capacity  of  the  economy  to  meet-individual  and  collective  consumption  demands" 
(1977:  18).  Economic  self-reliance  is  thus  tied  up  with  a  shift  to  a  less  consumption- 
orientated  economy,  on  the  grounds  that  such  an  economy  will  allow  a  space  for  the 
virtues  of  production,  including  most  importantly,  the  opportunity  for  self-production. 
While  consumption  may  have  its  own  virtues  as  suggested  above,  the  green  case  is  that 
40  Since  work  as  labour  was  conceptually  viewed  as  'disutility',  a  necessary  evil,  one  would  have 
thought  that  the  economic  aim  was  to  minimise  work  by  improving  efficiency  of  production. 
Ilistorically,  as  many  studies  have  shown,  productive  efficiency  as  a  result  of  technological 
improvements  or  changes  in  the  organisation  of  labour,  has  led  to  a  decrease  in  the  hours  worked 
much  lower  than  what  could  be  achieved  given  the  level  of  technological  and  other  productive 
improvements  (11irsch,  1977;  Gorz,  1983).  On  the  whole,  productive  improvements  have  resulted  in 
less  people  working  harder,  rather  than  less  work  per  person  (Gorz,  1983). 255 
unless  the  consumer  is  also  a  producer,  these  virtues  may  become  vices.  The  fate  of 
the  unemployed  who  consume  but  do  not  produce  is  a  case  in  point.  But,  and  this  is 
the  crux  of  the  green  argument,  the  increase  in  unemployment  itself  is  a  result  of  a 
consumption  orientated  society.  That  is,  where  production  is  primarily  regarded  as 
instrumental  to  the  process  of  consumption,  consumption  itself  may  be  said  to  be  one 
of  the  underlying  causes  of  increasing  formal  unemployment.  Ironically,  as  thinkers 
from  Arendt  to  Gorz  and  Mrsch  have  pointed  out,  the  logic  of  a  consumption-driven 
economy  is  to  produce  a  class  of  'permanent  consumers'.  These  are  excluded  from  a 
society  in  which  'production'  (understood  as  formal,  paid  work)  is  central  to  one's 
identity,  participation  and  membership.  The  green  argument  is  for  a  redefinition  of  the 
economy  away  from  an  consumption-dominated  one,  and  one  in  which  there  is  a 
balance  between  the  internal  goods  of  production  and  the  benefits  of  the  existing 
system. 
It  is  for  this  reason  that  LETS,  as  an  example  of  a  form  of  productive  economic 
activity,  offers  what  many  consider  as  an  ideal  solution  to  unemployment  in 
contemporary  industrial  societies.  Such  forms  of  activity  do  provide  consumers  with 
the  opportunity  to  become  producers,  engage  in  productive  economic  activity,  but 
without  having  to  secure  formal  'employment'.  Some  have  argued  that  one  of  the 
most  significance  advantages  of  LETS-type  activity  is  that  it  offers  the  unemployed  the 
opportunity  to  become  a  contributing  member  of  society,  a  'full  citizen'  as  it  were. 
Participating  in  such  informal  activity  helps  overcome  the  social  exclusion  and 
dependency  upon  welfare  benefits,  which  is  one  of  the  most  damaging  effects  of  formal 
unemployment.  However,  given  that  the  value  that  LETS  activity  creates  are  not 
commensurate  with  those  that  dominate  the  larger,  formal  economy,  the  contribution  it 
can  make  to  overcoming  social  exclusion  is  dependent  upon  some  other  form  of  public 
recognition  of  its  'economic  and  social  standing'.  In  part  this  is  the  reason  for 
expanding  the  notion  of  the  'economy'  to  include  such  informal  activities,  so  that  at 
least  conceptually  these  productive  and  socially  useful  activities  are  recognised  as 
integral  aspects  of  the  human  economy.  If,  as  many  predict,  the  'post-industrial'  future 
of  contemporary  societies  will  consist  in  an  accelerated  decrease  in  formal 256 
employment,  then  LETS-type  informal  economy  activity  will  become  a  key  aspect  of 
the  future  economy,  if  we  wish  to  avoid  creating  a  permanent  group  of  consumers  and 
socially  excluded  citizens.  LETS  can  thus  be  viewed  as  a  complementary  (or 
alternative)  way  of  resolving  the  standard  conflict  between  'environmental  protection' 
and  'employment'  to  that  suggested  by  ecological  modernisation.  If  the  sphere  of 
socially  valued  productive  work  is  expanded  to  the  informal  or  social  economy,  then 
unemployment  in  the  formal  sector  need  not  imply  becoming  dependent  on  the  state  to 
support  one  as  a  'compulsory  consumer'. 
In  this  re-orientation  of  the  economy,  a  different  set  of  character  traits  may  be 
fostered,  and  ones  that  can  affect  production  more  generally  and  not  just  self- 
production.  That  is,  production  within  the  context  of  self-reliance,  where  production 
is  not  engaged  in  primarily  for  reasons  of  extensive  trade  for  profit-maximisation 
within  the  global  market,  can  be  governed  by  internal  rather  than  external  criteria.  The 
organisation  of  production  within  a  global  economy,  is  different  from  the  organisation 
of  production  within  a  self-reliant  economy.  In  short,  it  is  more  likely  that  production 
as,  at  least  in  part,  a  social  practice  will  be  fostered  within  a  self-reliant  economic 
context.,  rather  than  within  a  global  economic  one. 
One  example  of  the  relationship  between  production  and  virtue  is  animal  husbandry 
discussed  in  chapter  3  (3.6.1).  As  was  suggested  there,  seeing  production  as  a  practice 
with  its  own  internal  rewards,  puts  the  focus  on  the  values  involved  in  the  relationship 
between  the  (human)  producer  and  the  animals.  Seen  from  this  point  of  view,  the 
animal  is  a  both  an  object  of  but  also  subject  within  production,  rather  than  simply  an 
object  of  consumption.  The  point  is  that  if  considerations  of  consumers  are  dominant, 
e.  g.  their  interests  in  low-cost  meat,  then  this  will  force  animal-rearing  to  adopt 
factory-fartning,  industrialised  methods.  The  mode  of  production  is  thus  set  up  so  that 
there  is  little  possibility  of  'personal  relations'  developing  between  animal  and  worker. 
As  Benton  notes,  "Intensive  stock-rearing  is  adopted  in  part  hecause  it  reduces  and  de- 
skills  human  practical  involvement,  and  the  human  labour  which  continues  to  be 
required  takes  forms  which  specifically  exclude  the  establishment  of  any  quasi- 
personal,  subject-to-subject  relationship  to  the  'processed'  animale'  (1993:  72).  In  this 257 
case,  sympathy,  as  a  virtue  internal  to  the  practice  of  animal-rearing,  the  capacity  to 
relate  to  animals  as  fellow  sentient  creatures,  with  interests,  is  systematically 
undermined,  as  a  consequence  of  de-skilling.  De-skilling  reduces  the  human 
transformative  'input'  into  the  process  to  a  crudely  instrumental  mode  of  interaction. 
De-skilling  also  de-sensitises.  Another,  more  standard  critique  of  consumerism,  which 
can  be  found  in  a  diverse  range  of  thinkers  from  Aristotle  to  Smith,  Arendt,  Marcuse 
and  Fromm,  is  that  it  promotes  a  view  of  individual  well-being  in  which  'consuming' 
rather  than  'doing'  or  'being'  is  central.  The  point  is  not  that  consumption  has  no  part 
to  play  in  cultivating  ecological  habits,  or  a  green  view  of  the  good,  but  that 
consumption  within  an  economy  simply  geared  towards  consumption,  *with  no 
recognition  of  the  internal  goods  of  production,  makes  for  the  cultivation  of 
unecological  characters.  41  Again  it  must  be  stressed  that  this  is  not  the  standard  anti- 
materialist  argument  that  is  found  in  the  many  green  critiques  of  contemporary  society. 
Rather  this  position  holds  that  consumption  can  become  an  ecological  vice  if  it  is  not 
integrated  within  a  mode  of  behaviour  which  recognises  limits  to  consumption.  The 
point  is  that  limiting  consumption  is  not  done  for  its  own  sake,  but  rather  it  forms  a 
part  of  a  mode  of  action  and  character  in  which  the  goods  of  consumption  are  not  to 
become  vices  by  being  pursued  at  the  expense  of  other  goods.  In  terms  of  character,  a 
strong  claim  is  that  consumption  of  the  world,  divorced  from  other  human  interests, 
consumes  the  world  even  as  it  fails  to  recognise  the  dependence  of  consumption  on  the 
world.  Consumption  as  a  mode  of  interaction  with  the  world,  under  modem 
conditions  where  there  is  an  increasing  gap  between  production  and  consumption  (as  a 
result  of  such  processes  as  the  social  and  global  division  of  labour  and  unemployment), 
is  a  permanent  danger  unless  it  is  integrated  within  a  wider  mode  which  can  prevent  it 
from  becoming  an  ecological  vice.  This  wider  mode  is  that  of  stewardship,  expressed 
through  the  practices  and  roles  of  ecologically  responsible  citizenship,  sustainable 
and/or  symbiotic  production  or  work  (including  self-production).  While  not  wishing  to 
41  As  discussed  in  the  next  chapter,  consumption  is  not  simply  a  private  activity,  but  also  a  social 
value  (7.6).  Thus,  the  green  position  is  not  simply  a  matter  of  rejecting  consumption  for  either 
production  or  citizenship,  but  rather  of  finding  the  balance  between  consumption  and  production,  a 
balance  which  can  only  be  created  by,  and  maintained,  but  not  exclusively,  through,  the  activity  of 
democratic  citizenship  itself 258 
return  to  the  type  of  metabolism  with  nature  that  was  criticised  in  chapter  2,  (in  which 
we  simply  'followed'  nature),  the  metabolic  character  of  social-environmental 
interaction  has  to  be  acknowledged.  A  consumption-driven  and  centred  economy, 
particularly  within  the  context  of  a  global  economy,  in  which  consumption  is  placed 
within  a  biospheric  as  opposed  to  an  ecospheric  context,  can  create  the  impression  that 
the  human  economy  is  'closed'  or  independent  from  ecological  limits,  as  suggested 
earlier  in  the  critique  of  orthodox  neoclassical  economic  models  (6.5).  Limits  on 
consumption  can  of  course  be  imposed,  but  the  prescriptive  aim  of  green  political 
economy  is  to  suggest  responsible  consumption  (not  just  'green  consumerism')  as  a 
valued  activity  and  basis  for  personal  identity  and  privacy.  Consumption  must  be 
prevented  from  being  taken  to  excess  and  becoming  an  ecological  vice.  This  requires 
that  it  is  placed  within  the  wider  metabolic  context  of  economy-ecology  interaction, 
and  not  simply  within  the  context  of  the  human  economy. 
The  virtue-based  argument  concerns  the  'incontinence'  and  immoderation  of  the 
neoclassical  view,  which  is  the  economic  analysis  underpinning  this  consumption- 
driven  and  centred  view  of  the  economy.  Neoclassical  economics  encourages  an 
immoderation  of  desires,  which  'corrupts'  consumption  and  makes  it  an  ecological 
vice.  As  was  suggested  in  6.6,  the  existence  of  money  as  a  store  of  value  within  the 
formal  economy  enables  the  immoderation  of  desires  for  material  forms  of  wealth.  The 
'value-neutrality'  of  neoclassical  economics  distorts  the  fact  that  the  institutional 
context  within  which  it  operates,  i.  e.  formal/cash  markets,  has  a  powerfiil  role  in 
preference  formation.  Since  the  formal  market  system  is  geared  towards  consumption, 
economic  preferences  reflect  this  institutional  goal.  If  preferences  are  endogenous, 
then  the  processes  by  which  they  are  formed  ought  to  be  a  legitimate  object  of 
economic  analysis  of  environmental  issues.  This  would,  as  suggested  earlier  (6.5), 
move  economic  analysis  away  from  'economics'  towards  'political  economy'.  And 
one  of  the  most  challenging  tasks  facing  the  latter  would  be  to  include  institutional 
dimensions  which  allowed  the  opportunity  for  a  more  self-reflexive  approach  to 259 
preference  formation,  as  suggested  in  chapter  3  (3.5  and  3.6).  42  The  point  is  that 
under  different  'institutional'  settings,  preferences  will  differ,  and  that  temperance 
rather  than  immoderation  will  characterise  preference  formation  under  alternative 
institutional  settings,  one  of  which  is  a  more  expansive  view  of  the  economy.  As  it 
stands,  the  only  thing  which  acts  as  a  restraint  on  desires  within  neoclassical  economics 
is  'effective  demand',  i.  e.,  sufficient  income.  From  the  point  of  view  of  the  virtue  of 
moderation,  it  may  be  better  for  individuals  to  limit  preferences.  Moderation  is  to  be 
understood  not  simply  as  placing  limits  on  desire  but  also  involves  the  education  of 
desire  in  one's  long-term  self-interest.  This  is  at  the  heart  of  the  stewardship 
argument.  Temperance  in  the  acquisition  of  material  goods  is  a  more  accurate  and 
attractive  interpretation  of  the  green  argument  against  consumerism  than  its 
condemnation  on  the  grounds  of  its  intrinsic  worthlessness.  By  couching  the  green 
argument  for  self-reliance  and  self-production  in  terms  of  moderation  one  avoids  the 
popular  parody  of  the  green  position  as  essentially  a  matter  of  ascetic  self-denial  and 
sacrifice.  It  can  also  be  used  to  supplement  the  common  green  view  that  ecological 
problems  are  as  a  result  of  supply-side  scarcities  (resources  and  sinks).  The  critique  of 
consumerism  views  the  problem  as  also  due  to  excess  demand.  Thus  the  green 
critique  of  undifferentiated  economic  growth  can  be  linked  with  Hirsch's  (1977) 
analysis  of  the  'social  limits  to  growth'  (Barry,  1990). 
Green  political  economy  does  criticise  the  excesses  that  characterise  the  consumer 
ideal,  as  well  as  the  instrumentalisation  of  production  (as  a  result  of  specialisation  and 
the  demands  of  the  division  of  labour)  that  this  ideal  requireS.  43  However,  the 
alternative  is  not  the  abolition  of  consumption  and  the  benefits  derived  from  it,  but 
rather  the  integration  of  consumption  with  production  on  the  basis  of  self-reliance  and 
moderation.  The  essential  positive  value  underlying  consumerism,  that  is,  the  desire  to 
live  a  little  better,  its  'civilising'  effects,  and  its  contribution  to  personal  identity,  needs 
42  As  I  argue  in  the  next  chapter,  part  of  this  self-refledve  process  may  involve  considering  the 
interests  of  others  affected  by  a  particular  environmental  decision  as  part  of  the  decision-maldng 
process  (7.8). 
43  A  common  observation  of  the  recent  history  of  western  economies  is  that  as  economy  grows,  the 
gnatural  rate  of  unemployment'  also  rises.  But  at  the  same  time,  as  Hirsch  points  out,  of  the  work  that 
is  available,  there  is  a  noticeable  dearth  of  falfilling,  intrinsically-rewarding  and  well-paid 
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to  be  'liberated'  from  its  current  conceptualisation  which  divorces  consumption  from 
production.  It  is  the  problems  that  arise  from  too  great  a  separation  of  consumption 
from  production,  both  in  physical  and  conceptual  terms,  that  explain  why  green 
political  economy  seeks  to  close  the  gap  by  integrating  them  as  much  as  possible. 
Decreasing  the  discontinuity  between  production  and  consumption,  increases  the 
chances  of  securing  the  virtues  of  consumption.  That  is,  the  civilising,  enriching  and 
broadening  effects  of  consumption,  noted  from  Smith  to  Marx  to  modem  liberals, 
demand  a  reciprocal  relationship  with  production,  which  in  turn  requires  a  (largely 
asymmetric)  relationship  with  the  environment.  Where  green  politics  differs  from 
other  political  theories  such  as  liberalism  or  socialism  is  that  whereas  the  latter  view 
the  link  between  production  and  consumption  in  terms  of  ensuring  full  employment  in 
the  formal  economy,  the  green  view  is  to  encourage  an  ideal  of  self-provisioning,  both 
individually  and  collectively,  within  the  informal  economy,  as  much  as  possible,  and 
restructuring  the  'formal'  productive  sphere  so  as  to  enhance  the  internal  goods  of 
work.  Clearly  not  all  needs  and  wants  can  be  satisfied  in  this  manner,  but  the  green 
argument  is  that  this  sphere  of  productive  activity  should  both  be  recognised  as 
forming  a  significant  part  of  the  human  economy  and  its  metabolism  with  nature,  and 
this  informal  economic  sphere  should  be  protected  from  the  colonising  tendencies  of 
the  formal  sphere  which  seek  to  destroy  it.  Whether  or  not  to  work  in  the  formal 
economic  sphere,  should,  on  a  radical  interpretation  of  green  political  economy,  be  a 
voluntary  not  a  compulsory  decision.  44  In  other  words,  the  choice  should  be  whether 
to  work  in  the  formal  economy  rather  than  where  to  work. 
The  ideal-type  model  for  green  political  economy  is  that  of  the  'household',  and 
informal  sectors  of  the  economy  working  in  conjunction  with  the  formal  market  or 
cash  economy.  As  O'Neill  (1993:  172)  argues,  Aristotle's  conception  of  the 
44  One  of  the  policy  suggestions  put  forward  by  greens  (but  also  endorsed  by  others,  Van  Mjis  (ed.  ) 
1992,  White,  1995),  is  the  guaranteed  basic  income  scheme  mentioned  earlier  (Eckcrslcy,  1992a:  143; 
Goodin,  1992:  197-8;  Dobsoiý-1990-.  Tf-2--3;  lke-mFaill-Cook  et  al,  1991:  19-23.  ).  The  aim  of  this  policy 
is  to  decrease  people's  dependence  upon  paid  work  in  the  formal  economy  and  to  increase  their 
opportunities  to  engage  in  informal  economic  activity  and  'ownwork'  (Robertson,  1985:  x).  This  is 
discussed  in  more  detail  in  the  next  chaptcr(7.9.1).  The  basic  income  scheme  also  fits  more  with  the 
view  of  green  politics  as  collective  ecological  management  outlined  in  chapter  5,  with  a  continuing 
role  for  administrative  state  institutions,  than  with  the  eco-anarchist  view  canvassed  in  chapter  4. 261 
household  as  the  model  for  political  economy  is  one  that  concurs  with  many  aspects  of 
green  political  economy.  In  terms  of  the  argument  about  decreasing  the  distance 
between  production  and  consumption,  the  ideal  of  householding  is  to  reverse  the 
current  situation  where,  according  to  Illich,  the  household  becomes  the  sphere  of 
"compulsory  consumptiorf'  (1981:  112).  Here  the  distinction  between  self-sufficiency 
and  self-reliance  is  particularly  important,  for  the  aim  of  green  political  economy  is  not 
to  make  the  domestic  sphere  a  site  of  'compulsory  production'.  As  such  there  will  be 
a  continuing  role  for  the  formal  economy,  but  one  in  which  it  is  not  automatically  the 
only,  or  the  dorninant/visible,  site  for  meeting  needs. 
For  green  political  economy,  the  'means  of  production'  go  beyond  the 
traditional  definition  of  industrial  plant,  machinery,  specialised  knowledge,  and  the 
division  of  labour,  to  include  the  domestic  sphere  as  a  site  of  production  as  well  as 
consumption  and  reproduction.  45  Within  green  political  economy  the  aim  is  to 
facilitate  as  many  modes  of  production  (consistent  with  ecological  modes  of 
interaction)  as  required,  rather  than  imposing  one:  the  industrial  one.  At  the  same 
time,  and  once  again  going  against  the  grain  of  radical  green  thought,  green  political 
economy  does  not  seek  to  abolish  the  industrial  mode  of  production.  Rather,  as  Mich 
argues,  what  is  aimed  for  is  'technological  maturity',  a  situation  where,  "the  industrial 
mode  of  production  complements  other  autonomous  forms  of  productiorf'  (1974:  86; 
emphasis  added).  46 
Perhaps  the  clearest  example  of  the  virtues  green  political  economy  attempts  to 
realise  is  to  be  found  in  the  agricultural  ideal  of  homesteading,  independent  farmers  as 
developed  by  Wendell  Berry  (1987,  Thompson,  1995:  78-92),  or  the  commons 
management  regimes  defended  by  others  (Wall,  1994;  Goldsmith  et  al,  1992).  What 
both  of  these  ideals  of  self-reliance  share  is  that  people,  either  individually  or 
collectively,  own  or  have  access  to  and  use  of  the  resources  to  produce  the  things  they 
45  Toffler's  (1970)  idea  of  a  'prosumer'  sphere  of  economic  activity,  where  producers  consume  what 
they  produce  and  produce  what  they  need,  fits  with  green  economic  and  moral  thinldng. 
46  Illich's  vision  of  a  convivial  economy,  in  which  engineered  artefacts  are  geared  towards  "more 
cffective  use-value  generation7,  and  where  there  is  an  equal  "right  to  access  to  raw  materials,  tools 
and  utilities"  (1977:  94,95),  is  a  radical  vcrsion  of  the  aims  of  green  political  economy:  the  creation 
of  a  socially  embeddeA  ecologically  sustainable  and  ethically  symbiotic  economy. 262 
need.  As  such  they  are  both  examples  of  the  'householding'  model  of  the  economy. 
Giving  people  direct  access  to  the  resources  they  require  to  fulfil  their  needs,  the  most 
im  Portant  of  which  is  access  to  land  to  grow  food,  would  decrease  the  necessity  for, 
and  extent  of,  current  trading  patterns  and  economic  organisation,  and  help  create  the 
practical  basis  for  a  viable  sustainable  economy.  In  terms  of  the  Leopoldian  'land 
ethic',  returning  the  land  to  the  people  would  be  a  most  effective  way  of  reuniting  the 
people  to  the  land.  However,  this  rural,  agricultural  ideal  is  largely  that,  an  ideal 
which,  at  least  within  the  context  of  industrialised  western  societies,  does  not  represent 
a  feasible  option.  Rather  what  green  political  economy  aims  for  in  the  western  context 
is  the  creation  of  forms  of  economic  activity  which  both  tend  towards  ecological 
rationality  and  honour,  if  not  fully  realise,  the  ecological  virtues  of  self-reliance, 
moderation  and  self-production  and  the  value  of  individual  and  collective  autonomy. 
Urban  forms  of  economic-ecological  social  practices,  include  LETS,  'ownwork',  and 
other  forms  of  collective  subsistence  (Mellor,  1995).  However,  these  are  not  viewed 
as  substitutes  for  formal  economic  activity,  and  the  'greening'  of  the  formal  economy, 
as  suggested  by  ecological  modernisation  for  example,  will  perhaps  be  the  main  focus 
of  attention  (at  least  in  the  industrialised  world)  in  the  movement  towards  sustainability 
and  more  responsible  collective  forms  of  ecological  stewardship. 
A  related  point  has  to  do  with  the  conception  of  'development'  within  green 
political  economy.  in  contrast  to  orthodox  political  economies,  green  political 
economy  does  not  prescribe  a  particular  view  of  'development'  or  'progress',  but 
rather  sees  this  as  one  of  the  most  important  expressions  of  communal  autonomy,  the 
right  of  communities  to  decide  their  own  understanding  of  social  and  economic 
development.  From  the  perspective  of  many  radical  and  third  world  ecologists,  a 
primary  reason  for  delinking  from  the  world  economy  is  to  prevent  the  imposition  of 
the  western  model  of  socio-economic  development  on  communities  throughout  the 
world  (Illich,  1974;  Shiva,  1988;  Sachs,  1990,1995;  Latouche,  1993).  According  to 
Latouche  the  creation  of  the  global  market  system  can  be  seen  as  the  'westernisation  of 
the  world'  (1993:  160),  the  hegemony  not  just  of  a  particular  economic  system  but 
also  of  a  particular  worldview  and  ethos.  For  many  radical  greens  cultural  autonomy  is 263 
threatened  by  the  global  market  economy.  In  the  words  of  Wolfgang  Sachs,  "No 
country  today  seems  to  be  capable  of  controlling  its  own  developmenf'  (1990:  336). 
The  same  global  economic  system  that  is  threatening  global  biodiversity  is  also  held  to 
threaten  global  cultural  diversity.  The  identification  of  the  western  model  of 
development  with  progress  signifies  an  inevitability  and  desirability  which  is  used  to 
silence  any  criticism.  Progress  is  good,  and  after  all,  you  can't  stop  progress.  A  full 
understanding  of  the  relationship  between  the  virtue  of  self-reliance  and  autonomy 
would  require  investigating  the  notion  of  self-defined  needs  at  the  individual  level,  and 
'chosen'  rather  than  'imposed'  development  paths,  at  the  collective  one.  47  Thus  the 
ecological  virtue  of  self-reliance  has  to  do  with  the  relationship  between  'autonomy' 
and  'welfare'.  in  which  welfare  considerations  relate  to  moderated  and  self-defined 
needs  being  fulfilled  as  much  as  possible  by  agents  themselves. 
Self-reliance  is  to  be  understood  as  a  virtue  because  it  stands  as  a  mean  between  full 
self-sufficiency  or  autarky,  and  complete  dependence.  Self-reliance  as  an  economic 
aim  attempts  to  acknowledge  the  positive  role  market  and  other  forms  of  exchange 
may  play  in  expanding  the  horizons  of  individuals  and  communities,  while  seeking  to 
ensure  that  trade  is  the  instrument  of  the  community  rather  than  the  other  way  round. 
6.8  Conclusion 
The  creation  of  a  market  economy  represents  the  separation  of  economic  rationality 
from  other  forms  of  rationality.  Polanyi  (1957),  in  his  study  of  the  emergence  of  the 
modem  market  economy  as  a  distinct  and  self-governing  sub-system,  reminds  us  of  the 
uniqueness  of  the  modem  economy  by  contrasting  it  with  the  role  of  the  economy 
previous  to  the  emergence  of  the  market  economy. 
47  Gorz  uses  the  language  of  rationality  to  express  the  same  point  when  he  claims  that,  "Economic 
rationality  is  not  applied  when  people  are  free  to  decide  their  own  level  of  need  and  their  own  level  of 
cffort"  (1989:  111).  When  people  are  not  free  to  decide  their  own  development  paths,  as  many  greens 
and  third  world  activists  maintain  is  the  case  within  the  context  of  the  global  economy,  (western) 
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For,  if  one  conclusion  stands  out  more  clearly  than  another  from  the  recent 
study  of  early  societies  it  is  the  changelessness  of  man  as  a  social  being.  I-Es 
natural  endowments  reappear  with  a  remarkable  constancy  in  societies  of  all 
times  and  places;  and  the  necessary  preconditions  of  the  survival  of  human 
society  to  be  immutably  the  same.  The  outstanding  discovery  of  recent 
historical  and  anthropological  research  is  that  man's  economy,  as  a  rule,  is 
submerged  in  his  social  relationships.  (1957:  46) 
This  aim  of  're-embedding'  the  economy  within  society  as  a  necessary  part  of 
reintegrating  economy  and  environrnent  is,  the  aim  of  collective  ecological 
management.  However,  as  was  argued  in  6.6,  collective  ecological  management  of  the 
economy-ecology  metabolism  requires  attention  to  be  paid  to  specifically  economic 
issues,  such  as  the  role  and  place  of  money  within  the  formal  economy.  The  material 
metabolism  between  economy  and  ecology  is  as  much  dependent  upon  the  central  role 
of  finance,  and  its  influence  over  the  production  decisions  within  the  formal  economy, 
as  upon  the  technology  of  production.  48  This  aspect  of  green  political  economy  has 
been  expressed  by  Altvater  as  implying  that,  "Today  the  further  evolution  of  society  it 
possible  only  if  the  economic  rationality  of  market  procedures  is  firmly  embedded  in  a 
complex  system  of  social,  non-market  regulation  of  money  and  nature"  (1993:  260). 
The  re-embedding  of  the  form  economy  within  nature  requires  re-embedding  it,  as  far 
as  possible,  within  parameters  set  by  social,  non-market  norms,  and  politically 
governing  it,  in  a  manner  suggested  in  the  last  chapter.  A  clear,  if  extreme,  example  of 
this  is  Latouche's  celebration  of  the  'informal  economy'  as  the,  "reinsertion  of  the 
economic  within  the  larger  social  texture  of  fife,  to  the  point  that  sometimes  the 
economic  is  completely  absorbed  within  this  texture"  (1993:  127:  emphasis  added). 
The  complete  absorption  of  the  economic  by  the  social  is  neither  necessary  nor 
desirable.  The  point  after  all  is  not  to  dissolve  economic  rationality  and  the  formal 
48  This  interconnection  between  financial  and  natural  systems  leads  Harvey  to  posit  that,  "Money  and 
commodity  movements,  for  example,  have  to  be  regarded  as  fundamental  to  contemporary 
ecosystems"  (1993:  28).  In  other  words  it  is  not  simply  energy  and  material  flows  that  affect 
ecosystem  development,  because  ecosystems  exist  in  relation  to  specific  coology-economic 
metabolisms. 265 
economy  completely,  but  to  find  their  appropriate  places  and  spheres  of  operation 
within  a  more  ecologically  rational  mode  of  production. 
Green  political  economy  differs  from  contemporary  forms  of  political  economy  in  a 
number  of  significant  ways.  Firstly,  it  includes  a  central  space  for  institutions  and 
practices  in  the  regulation  of  the  economy  and  the  behaviour  of  economic  agents,  and 
adopts  an  institutional  approach  to  economic  analysis  (6.7).  Examples  include,  non- 
money,  market  organisation  of  the  economy,  such  as  LETS,  and  commons  regimes. 
At  the  same  time,  this  institutional  economic  approach  makes  preference  formation  a 
key  area  of  economic  analysis.  The  summation  of  environmental  preferences  are 
regarded  as  an  inappropriate  way  in  which  to  gather  information  upon  which  to  base 
public  environmental  decision-making.  As  a  public  good,  environmental  valuation 
requires  public  not  private  forms  of  information  gathering  (7.2.1).  The  more 
prescriptive  aim  of  green  political  economy  is  to  encourage  self-reflexivity  in 
preference  formation,  to  base  environmental  decisions  on  'considered'  as  opposed  to 
felt  preferences.  A  final  concern  of  this  institutional  approach  is  to  focus  on  the 
immoderation  of  desires  as  a  possible  cause  of  environmental  problems,  to  focus  on 
excess  demand  as  much  as  supply-side  shortages. 
Secondly,  green  political  economy  questions  the  ends  of  development  rather  than 
simply  querying  the  means.  It  has  no  one  particular  model  of  development,  in  the  same 
way  orthodox  political  economy  has  a  particular  conception  of  'economic 
modernisation'  as  an  animating  principle.  This  is  clearly  related  to  the  critique  of 
consumerism,  and  the  argument  for  production  to  be  seen  as  more  than  an  instrumental 
stage  in  the  process  of  consumption  (6.7).  At  its  most  radical  green  political  economy 
is  a  political  economy  of  'post-development'  (Latouche,  1993),  and  as  suggested  in 
6.7,  post-  rather  than  and-  industrial.  Thirdly,  the  normative  dimension  of  green 
political  economy  extends  to  the  thorny  question  of  what  is  to  count  as  a  'resource' 
and  what  is  to  be  a  'proscribed  resource'.  What  this  expresses  is  that  within  green 
political  economy,  'resources'  are  not  exogenously  'given.  Rather  the  metabolism 
between  economy  and  ecology  is  to  be  governed  by  considerations  of  human  interests 
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Fourthly,  green  political  economy  has  a  radically  different  conception  of  the 
C  economy'.  Whereas  orthodox  political  economy  analyses  the  formal  or  money 
economy,  green  political  economy  has  a  much  wider  understanding  of  the  economy, 
one  in  which  the  informal,  non-monetised  economy  is  important  (6.6).  Thus  while 
green  politics  seeks  to  responsibly  Unfit  economic  rationality,  it  also  sees  this  as 
occurring  simultaneously  with  a  reconceptualisation  of  economic  theory.  This 
reconceptualisation  demands  not  simply  a  transformation  of  the  content  of  economic 
theory,  but  also  in  the  discipline  of  economics,  away  from  abstract  model  building  and 
its  self-perception  as  a  'hard  science',  and  a  return  to  its  roots  in  political  economy. 
A  key  part  of  this  desire  to  expand  the  'economy',  and  which  relates  to  the 
normative  concerns  of  green  political  economy,  has  to  do  with  shifting  economic 
analysis  and  organisation  away  from  a  consumption-driven,  and  consumption-centred, 
economy.  While  not  rejecting  the  consumption  of  goods  and  services  as  a  positive 
mode  of  human  activity,  my  concern  in  this  chapter  has  been  to  suggest  that  without  a 
counterbalancing  with  other  modes  such  as  production,  its  lack  of  self-limitation  leads 
to  its  tendency  to  become  an  ecological  vice.  Consumption  needs  to  be  integrated 
within  a  more  expansive  mode  of  acting  and  interacting  which  recognises  the 
dependence  of  human  productive  activity  on  the  creation  and  maintenance  of  a  stable 
metabolism  with  nature.  A  consumption-driven  economy,  key  features  of  which  are 
production  for  the  sake  of  consumption  and  the  centrality  of  money,  disembeds  the 
economy  from  its  ecological  context.  Money,  as  the  argument  in  6.6  suggests,  is  a 
crucial  part  of  the  formal  economy  by  which  production  is  at  the  service  of 
consumption. 
While  some  greens  seek  to  return  to  past  economic  arrangements  such  as  commons 
regimes,  green  political  economy  represents  a  more  feasible  approach  to  regulating 
economy-ecology  exchanges.  This  approach  includes  the  re-organisation  of  formal 
work  to  permit  internal  goods  of  production  to  be  realised,  self-production,  LETS,  the 
possible  changes  that  a  shift  fi7om  a  biosphere  to  an  ecosphere  economy  would  have  on 
production,  together  with  more  recent  developments  such  as  the  Local  Agenda  21 
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necessary  aspect  of  this  return  to  political  economy,  particularly  given  the 
normative  facets  of  green  political  economy,  is  the  role  of  democratic  decision-making 
and  democratic  accountability  in  'governing'  the  economy-ecology  metabolism.  It  is 
to  the  relationship  between  green  politics  as  collective  ecological  management  and 
democracy  and  the  delineation  of  a  green  theory  of  democracy  that  we  turn  to  next. Chapter  Seven 
DemocracY,  Citizenship  and  Stewardship 
"Our  ecologic  crisis  is  the  product  of  an  emerging,  entirely  novel,  democratic  culture.  The 
issue  is  whether  a  democratized  world  can  survive  its  own  implicatione'  (White,  1967: 
1204). 
7.1  Introduction 
This  chapter  looks  at  the  relationship  between  democracy  and  green  political  theory  in 
general  and  in  particular  green  democratic  theory  and  practice.  In  much  the  same  way  as 
Kymlicka  (1990)  argues  that  any  plausible  political  theory  embodies  a  commitment  to  the 
view  of  individuals  as  deserving  of  equal  respect  and  concern,  in  a  similar  fashion  one  can 
posit  democracy  as  a  value  to  be  considered  as  an  essential  part  of  all  acceptable  political 
theories.  In  this  respect,  green  politics  is  no  different  in  its  claim  to  be  part  of  the 
'democratic  project'.  However,  beyond  a  shared  commitment  to  democracy,  political 
theories  differ  as  to  what  they  understand  by  democracy,  the  reasons  why  they  advocate  it, 
and  how  they  envisage  its  institutionalisation.  Although  all  theories  worthy  of  respect  and 
serious  consideration  endorse  the  general  concept  of  democracy,  they  disagree  over  the 
different  possible  conceptualisations  of  democracy.  On  both  these  points,  the  concept  and 
conceptualisation  of  democracy,  questions  have  been  raised  as  to  their  necessary 
connection  to  green  politics. 
In  section  7.2  this  claim  that  the  green  commýitment  to  democracy  is  contingent  rather 
than  necessary  is  discussed  by  looking  at  eco-authoritarianism.  This  leads  onto  one  of  the 
central  aspects  of  democracy  and  green  politics,  namely  the  relationship  between  material 
affluence  and  democratic  theory  and  practice.  Some  epistemological  considerations  as  to 
the  necessary  connection  between  green  politics  and  democracy  are  raised  in  7.3,  with 
particular  attention  given  to  the  recent  work  of  Beck  (1992)  on  'risk  society',  and  the 268 
centrality  of  science  in  the  resolution  of  social-environmental  problems.  7.4  presents  two 
related  understandings  of  democracy;  an  institutional  one  which  views  democracy  as  a 
political  decision-making  procedure,  and  a  social  one  in  which  democracy  refers  both  to 
the  latter,  but  sees  democracy  as  a  particular  type  of  society.  I  argue  that  it  is  democracy 
in  the  second  sense  which  is  most  compatible  with  green  values.  In  section  7.5  the 
outlines  of  green  democratic  theory  are  sketched  in  terms  of  the  relationship  between 
'modernisation',  economic  growth  and  democracy.  That  the  most  compatible  form  of 
democracy  for  green  politics  is  a  version  of  deliberative  or  discursive  democracy  is 
discussed  in  7.6.  In  7.7  the  assumed  connection  between  direct  or  radical  demi-o-cr-ac"y"and 
green  politics  will  be  critically  examined.  Specifically  it  will  be  suggested  that  the 
democratic  project  of  green  politics  involves  representative  democratic  institutions  in 
conjunction  with  more  discursive  forms  and  not  that  the  latter  replaces  the  former.  7.8 
discusses  the  role  of  citizenship  within  green  democratic  theory  and  practice,  paying 
particular  attention  to  the  relationship  between  'citizen'  and  'consumer'  interests  and  roles 
raised  in  previous  chapters.  In  7.9  the  distinction  between  state  and  civil  society  is 
explored  as  a  central  part  of  this  green  theory  of  democracy.  The  role  of  civil  associations 
and  social  practices,  particularly  work  and  production,  are  examined  in  the  light  of  their 
contribution  to  the  creation  of  an  ecological  culture  and  the  cultivation  of  ecological 
virtues. 
However,  it  needs  to  be  pointed  out  that  in  their  practical  political  activity, 
environmental  groups  and  the  green  movement  have  been  at  the  forefront  of  efforts  to 
'democratise'  state  institutions,  and  help  create  a  more  democratic  and  accountable  form 
of  environmental  decision-making.  Examples  include  green  efforts  to  open  up  access  to 
information,  particularly  scientific  data,  and  creating  more  open  forms  of  public  policy- 
making.  This  anti-bureaucratic  strand  of  green  thought  also  calls  into  question  the 
ecological  modernisation  model,  outlined  in  chapter  5,  with  its  bureaucratic-corporatist 
overtones.  Part  of  this  green  suspicion  of  bureaucracy  is  their  concern  for  "greater 
openness  and  greater  public  involvement  in  administrative  decision  making"  (Paehlke, 
1988:  295).  In  this  respect  we  can  tentatively  conclude  that  the  practice  of 269 
environmental  politics  over  the  last  25  years  or  so,  seems  to  provide  evidence  for 
Paehlke's  argument  that,  "an  answer  to  future  economic,  environmental  and  resource 
problems  [may  be  found]  in  more  rather  than  less  democracy"  (ibid.:  294;  emphasis  in 
original).  The  green  movement's  emphasis  on  grassroots  activism,  'bottom-up' 
organisational  principles  and  what  Doherty  has  called  its  "complicated  democratic  project" 
(1992:  102),  are  further  evidence  of  the  democratic  credentials  of  green  political  practice, 
or,  at  least,  self-prioritisation.  In  a  sense  then  although  there  may  be  a  question  as  to  the 
strict  theoretical  relationship  between  green  political  theory  and  democracy,  in  practice 
this  tension  is  often  more  apparent  than  real. 
7.2  The  Eco-Authoritarian  Argument 
A  good  starting  point  for  introducing  this  issue  is  De  Tocqueville's  suggestion  that, 
"General  prosperity  is  favourable  to  the  stability  of  all  governments,  but  more  particularly 
of  a  democratic  one,  which  depends  upon  the  will  of  the  majority,  and  especially  upon  the 
will  of  that  portion  of  the  community  which  is  most  exposed  to  want.  When  the  people 
rule,  they  must  be  rendered  happy  or  they  will  overturn  the  state:  and  misery  stimulates 
them  to  those  excesses  to  which  ambition  rouses  kinge'  (1956:  129-30).  This  assumption 
of  the  positive  correlation  between  material  affluence  and  the  stability  of  a  democratic 
political  order,  is  one  which  is  closely  associated  with  'modernist'  political  traditions  such 
as  liberalism  and  Marxism.  '  In  this  section  it  is  the  negative  corollary  of  this  assumption, 
i.  e.  that  material  scarcity  creates  the  conditions  for  political  instability  and  a  shift  to 
authoritarianism  that  will  be  examined.  This  'Hobbes-Malthus'  position  underpins  the 
1  Classical  liberals  such  as  Tocqueville  assumed  a  relationship  between  an  affluent  economy  and  political 
democracy.  One  aspect  of  Tocqueville's  thought  turns  on  the  idea  that  "a  flourishing  economy  is  essential 
to  the  stability  of  democracy,  since  it  gives  defeated  politicians  an  alternative,  which  makes  them  more 
likely  to  accept  defeat  rather  than  attempt  to  illegally  to  hold  on  to  office"  (Copp  et  al,  1995:  3).  Classical 
Marxism,  on  the  other  hand,  assumed  a  connection  between  'emancipation',  a  central  aspect  of  which  was 
democratic  political,  social  and  economic  relations,  and  material  abundance.  The  roots  of  the  different 
understandings  of  the  connection  between  the  two  may  lie  in  the  inter-relationship  between  the  Industrial 
and  French  Revolutions,  understood  as  expressing  the  core  values  of  modernity,  one  relating  to  economic 
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'eco-authoritarian'  school  of  green  thought,  which  in  the  literature  is  most  closely 
associated  with  Ophuls  (1977),  Hardin  (1968,1977)  and  Heilbroner  (1980).  2  The  eco- 
authoritarian  implication  of  the  link  between  scarcity  and  political  arrangements  has  been 
forcefully  made  by  Ophuls.  He  begins  from  the  assumption  that,  "The  institution  of 
government  whether  it  takes  the  form  of  primitive  taboo  or  parliamentary  democracy 
... 
has 
its  origins  in  the  necessity  to  distribute  scarce  resources  in  an  orderly  fashion.  It  follows 
that  assumptions  about  scarcity  are  absolutely  central  to  any  economic  or  political  doctrine 
and  that  the  relative  scarcity  or  abundance  of  goods  has  a  substantial  and  direct  impact  on 
the  character  of  political,  social  and  economic  institutions"  (1977:  8).  Calling  the 
affluence  experienced  by  western  societies  over  the  last  two  hundred  years  or  so 
'abnormal',,  a  material  condition  which  has  grounded  liberty,  democracy  and  stability  (ibid: 
12),  he  concludes  that  with  the  advent  of  the  ecological  crisis,  interpreted  as  a  return  to 
scarcity,  "the  golden  age  of  individualism,  liberty  and  democracy  is  all  but  over.  In  many 
important  respects  we  shall  be  obliged  to  return  to  something  resembling  the  pre-modem 
closed  polity"  (ibid.  145).  He  interprets  this,  as  discussed  below,  in  terms  of  a  (benign) 
technocratic  and  theocratic  dictatorship.  The  justification  of  his  anti-democratic  stance  is 
basically  the  traditional  metaphor  of  'the  ship  of  state'  requiring  the  best  pilots,  and  the 
dangers  of  'rule  by  the  ignorant'  when  faced  with  such  a  complex  and  complicated  issue  as 
social-environmental  relations. 
Now  while  it  is  perhaps  true  that  democracy  does  require  some  degree  of  material 
affluence,  it  is  a  completely  different  issue  to  argue  that  a  diminution  in  general  material 
prosperity  heralds  the  end  of  democracy  and  all  its  fruits.  Additionally,  for  Ophuls  politics 
and  government  are  understood  primarily  in  terms  of  'social  survival'  rather  that  other 
social  goals  such  as  'progress'  or  flourishing.  As  such  his  understanding  of  politics  is 
quantitative  rather  than  qualitative,  politics  as  administration  or  'zoo-keeping'  in  Barber's 
memorable  term  (1984:  ch.  1).  To  this  extent  Ophuls  has  not  established  his  argument, 
namely,  that  a  return  to  material  scarcity  implies  that  societies  which  have  previously 
2  While  the  'terrible  trio'  are  routinely  wheeled  out  for  ritual  condemnation  within  the  literature 
(Eckersley,  1992a:  11-17),  other  authoritarian  aspects  of  green  thinidng,  such  as  that  which  can  be 
detected  within  aspects  of  deep  ecology,  go  unnoticed.  See  Barry  (1994:  377-8)  and  Vincent  (1993:  266). 271 
enjoyed  democratic  institutions  and  practices  must  necessarily  revert  to  authoritarian 
forms.  It  is  perhaps  more  accurate  to  say  that  what  Ophuls,  and  the  eco-authoritarian 
position  in  general,  prescribe  in  terms  of  substantive  political  theory  is  premised  and 
influenced  by  a)  a  focus  on  the  pace  of  social  change  towards  securing  b)  the  over-riding 
social  goal  of  surWval.  It  is  only  by  conceiving  of  the  ecological  crisis  as  a  'total  crisis'  of 
contemporary  societies,  in  a  manner  analogous  to  that  described  as  characteristic  of  deep 
ecology  in  chapter  2,  which  permits  these  theorists  to  construe  ecological  problems  as  a 
matter  of  social  survival.  Seen  in  these  terms  it  is  easy  to  see  how  from  this  perspective 
democratic  norms  and  institutions  are  superfluous.  The  anti-democratic  basis  of  eco- 
authoritarianism  fies  in  their  questionable  analysis  of  the  nature  of  the  ecological  crisis, 
which  leads  them  to  emphasise  rapid  and  anti-democratic  social  disruption  in  the  name  of 
the  over-riding  goal  of  species,  or  societal  survival.  In  the  eco-authoritarian  case, 
democracy  is  part  of  the  problem,  ill-suited  to  dealing  with  social  problems  which  demand 
immediate  and  widespread  social  change.  Democracy  represents  the  unleashing  of  desires, 
of  demands  that  cannot  be  satisfied  and  which  have  to  be  authoritatively  restrained. 
Otherwise  society  as  we  know  it  (and  perhaps  western  civilisation)  will  collapse,  as  have 
so  many  societies  and  civifisations  before  who  ignored  their  dependence  upon  the 
environment.  ' 
To  judge  democracy  by  its  effectiveness  in  securing  prosperity  is  another  underpinning 
assumption  of  eco-authoritarianism  which  needs  to  be  criticised.  The  idea  that  politics  in 
general  or  democracy  in  particular  is  to  be  judged  to  the  extent  that  it  makes  people 
happy,  for  example,  either  directly  or  indirectly,  is  to  attribute  to  democracy  something 
which  is  not  in  its  gift  to  deliver.  Therefore  to  assess  democracy  by  these  criteria  is  to 
commit  a  category  mistake.  Democracy  as  a  political  decision-making  system,  after  all,  is 
a  procedure  for  making  political  decisions:  that  democratic  decisions  are  to  make  people 
happy  is  not  to  judge  the  procedure  but  the  product.  '  If  democracy  is  to  be  judged  on  the 
3  An  example  of  this  is  Goldsmith's  (1988)  essay  outlining  the  ecological  causes  of  the  collapse  of  the 
Roman  Empire. 
4  As  argued  in  the  next  section,  'democracy'  can  also  be  understood  as  a  type  of  society  as  well  as 
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basis  of  its  ability  to  deliver  material  prosperity,  it  is  easy  to  see  how  this  can  become  an 
instrumental  argument  for  democracy.  '  If  it  is  material  affluence  and  the  social  and 
political  stability  which  such  affluence  supposedly  brings  that  is  valued,  it  is  always 
possible  that  a  non-democratic  form  of  political  decision-making  may  be  superior  to 
democratic  forms.  Recalling  the  distinction  between  liberty  and  welfare  arguments  in 
chapter  6  (6.7),  eco-authoritarianism  is  clearly  premised  on  prioritising  basic  welfare  i.  e. 
csocial  survival'  over  non-welfare  considerations.  The  eco-authoritarian  argument  turns 
on  the  prioritisation  of  'survival'  and  'security'  over  ecologically  unsustainable  and  crisis- 
producing  material  affluence  and  the  democratic  political  arrangements  that  affluence 
sustains.  If  the  link  between  affluence  and  democracy  were  to  be  eroded,  or  demonstrated 
to  be  weaker  than  assumed  by  the  eco-authoritarians,  one  of  the  most  serious,  and 
common,  anti-democratic  arguments  against  green  political  theory  would  be,  if  not 
undermined,.  at  least  substantially  reduced. 
This  is  precisely  the  argument  outlined  in  the  previous  chapter,  which  in  drawing  a 
distinction  between  'welfare'  and  'liberty'  concerns,  presented  green  arguments  for  social 
and  economic  changes,  where  any  sacrifices  or  trade-offs  were  to  be  limited  to  those  of 
welfare  not  liberty.  Indeed,  it  was  suggested  that  decreases  in  material  affluence  may  be 
compensated  by  an  increase  in  liberty  as  self-determination.  If,  following  standard 
deontological  arguments  for  democracy,  we  hold  that  democracy  and  libelly  are  mutually 
related,  then  the  green  argument  for  socio-economic  changes  which  would  have  as  a  by- 
product  a  diminution  in  material  standards  of  living,  is  not  inherently  anti-democratic.  In 
other  words,  the  green  critique  of  affluence  rejects  the  assumption  made  by  Tocqueville 
and  the  eco-authoritarians  that  there  is  any  necessary  connection  between  democracy  and 
material  prosperity.  Rather  it  is  economic  security  rather  than  affluence  which  is 
important  for  democracy.  ' 
,5  An  example  of  this  distinction  between  instrumental  and  intrinsic  arguments  for  democracy  is 
Eckersley's  (1996b)  discussion  of  deontological  and  utilitarian  arguments  for  democracy  within 
liberalism.  As  I  hope  to  demonstrate  in  this  chapter,  green  politics  has  an  intrinsic  rather  than  an 
instrumental  attachment  to  democracy. 
6  There  is  a  similar  argument  regarding  the  relationship  between  population  growth  and  economic 
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There  are  at  least  two  ways  in  which  this  can  be  understood.  Firstly,  against 
Tocqueville,  the  green  argument  may  be  said  to  highlight  the  difference  between  the 
relationship  of  affluence  to  the  early  development  of  democracy  (the  exact  subject  which 
Tocqueville  was  writing  about),  and  the  relationship  between  affluence  and  the  maturing 
and  later  development  of  democracy.  In  this  sense,  the  green  critique  of  consumerism,  for 
example,  can  be  seen  as  an  argument  that  beyond  a  threshold,  affluence  and  the 
institutional  arrangement  of  society  to  procure  it,  may  begin  to  'fetter'  democracy  and 
may  even  hold  back  further  democratisation.  On  this  interpretation  green  anti- 
consumerism  and  the  arguments  of  green  political  economy  in  the  last  chapter,  can  be 
understood  as  premised  on  the  idea  that  the  further  development  of  democratic  institutions 
7  and  norms,  may  require  a  less  materially  affluent  society.  Thus  the  relationship  between 
affluence  and  democracy  only  holds  for  instrumental  justifications  of  democracy.  These 
instrumental  views  are  usually  utilitarian  or  economistic  in  nature,  from  Bentham  and 
James  Mill  to  contemporary  libertarians! 
Secondly,  against  the  eco-authoritarians,  the  green  argument  for  decreased  material 
standards  of  living  may  be  interpreted  as  a  critique  of  liberal  democracy,  that  is,  a 
particular  conception  and  practice  of  democracy,  rather  than  democracy  per  se.  This  is 
related  to  the  first  interpretation.  Here  the  green  argument  is  that  the  theory  and  practice 
of  liberal  democracy,  constructs  a  particular  balance  between  'welfare'  and  'liberty' 
(premised  on  a  particular  conception  of  liberty),  which  may  be  inimical  to  the  further 
development  of  democracy.  It  is  liberal  democracy  which  fits  Tocqueville's  argument  of 
growth  as  a  result  of  economic  growth,  is  more  a  function  of  economic  security  than  growth  and  affluence. 
According  to  Sen  (1981),  it  was  not  the  wealth  of  capitalist  societies  which  caused  a  drop  in  population 
and  staved  off  famine,  but  their  welfare  systems,  which  guaranteed  all  citizens  a  minimum  bundle  of 
welfare  goods  and  services.  Similarly,  one  can  argue  that  it  is  the  distribution  of  wealth  within  society, 
not  the  absolute  level  of  wealth,  which  is  important  in  a  democratic  political  system. 
7A  similar  argument  can  be  found  in  Arendt's  (1959)  critique  of  the  rise  of  the  'social'  as  the  central 
political  category,  and  the  'productivist'  ideals  of  labour  and  work  displacing  the  political  sphere  as  a 
realm  of  public  and  collective  deliberation.  For  an  analysis  of  the  connections  between  green  critiques  of 
consumerism  and  productivism  and  Arendt's  political  thought,  see  Whiteside  (1994). 
8  An  example  of  the  libertarian  position  is Osterfeld's  rather  startling  view  that,  "Provided  that  exit  is  not 
barred,  a  large  democracy  would  be  less  responsive,  and  therefore  provide  less  utility,  to  its  citizens  than 
a  local  dictatorship 
..  the  level  ofgovernment  tends  to  be  much  more  important  than  its  type  (1989:  155; 
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the  necessary  connection  between  affluence  and  democracy.  Other  conceptions  of 
democracy  which  do  not  depend  upon  the  high  levels  of  affluence  associated  with 
contemporary  liberal  democracies  are  of  course  possible.  In  other  words,  if  green  politics 
is  anti-dernocratic,  it  is  only  anti-democratic  in  the  sense  that  it  criticises  the  prevailing 
liberal  democratic  conception  of  democracy.  As  such  green  politics  can  be  said  to  be  part 
of  a  'radical'  democratic  political  tradition,  a  tradition  that  is  not  so  much  'anti-liberal'  as 
'post-liberal'.  Rather  than  being  anti-democratic,  green  political  theory  likes  to  claim  that 
it  constitutes  an  alternative  democratic  theory  and  practice,  one  which  while  critical  of 
liberalism,  also  builds  on  some  of  its  core  insights  and  values  (Eckersley,  1992a:  30). 
A  further  justification  for  the  contingent  relationship  between  green  principles  and 
democratic  values  and  institutions  lies  in  the  'technocratic'  dimensions  of  the  eco- 
authoritarian  position.  This  is  most  obvious  in  the  authoritative  knowledge  claims  about 
the  scope,  severity  and  components  of  the  ecological  crisis  which  underpin  much  of  the 
eco-authoritarian  view.  Invoking  the  authority  of  science,  particularly  ecological  science, 
eco-authoritarianism  claims  to  offer  an  'objective'  i.  e.  scientific,  impartial,  diagnosis  of  the 
ecological  crisis  and  an  equally  'objective'  solution.  A  useful  analogy  here  is  to 
understand  eco-authoritarians  as  doctors  simply  offering  an  objective,  but  non-negotiable, 
and  authoritative,  assessment  of  the  'ecological  health'  of  society.  Since  the  ecological 
crisis  is  presented  in  terms  of  expert  knowledge,  the  implication  is  that  democratic  norms 
are  not  appropriate  to  deal  with  the  diagnosis  and  prescriptions  for  the  ecological  health  of 
society.  As  Saward  notes,  "All  principled  arguments  favouring  perpetual  government  of 
the  many  by  the  few  are  arguments  from  superior  knowledge'  (1996:  80).  In  terms  of  the 
social-environmental  metabolism  discussed  in  chapter  5,  the  eco-authoritarian  view  is  that 
this  metabolism  is  a  'technical'  matter  to  be  dealt  with  by  experts,  i.  e.  those  with  the 
appropriate  knowledge.  5'  In  other  words,  the  ecological  crisis,  Eke  the  health  of  an 
individual's  metabolism,  is  not  a  matter  to  which  democratic  decision-making  is 
9  Thus  the  oft-cited  anti-scientism  of  green  political  theory  may  have  more  to  do  with  the  undemocratic 
implications  of  decision-making  by  experts  than  anything  else.  See  O'Neill  (1993:  chapter  9),  on  the 
democratic  preconditions  for  submitting  to  the  authority  of  science.  This  issue  is further  discussed  in  the 
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appropriate.  As  a  matter  of  expert  knowledge,  not  lay  judgement,  democratic  forms  of 
decision-making  may  be  counter-productive  to  the  ecological  health  of  society.  The 
resolution  of  the  ecological  crisis  according  to  Ophuls  requires  that,  "the  steady-state 
society  will  not  only  be  more  authoritarian  and  less  democratic  than  the  industrial  societies 
oftoday  ... 
but  it  will  also  in  all  likelihood  be  much  more  oligarchic  as  well,  with  only  those 
possessing  the  ecological  and  other  competencies  necessary  to  make  prudent  decisions 
allowed  full  participation  in  the  political  procese'  (1977:  163). 
On  the  face  of  it  there  seems  to  be  little  problem,  democratically  speaking,  with 
assigning  experts  to  deal  with  the  environment  as  a  technical  problem.  The  point  is  that 
the  overall  character  of  the  'problem'  must  be  ascertained  before  its  'technical'  aspects  can 
be  identified.  That  is,  the  'technical'  and  'non-technical'  dimensions  cannot  be  made 
technically,  but  need  to  be  determined  politically,  by  the  demos  and  its  institutions.  It  is 
practical  not  instrumental  reason  which  should  determine  the  framework  within  which  the 
latter  can  contribute  to  resolving  or  coping  with  social-environmental  problems.  The 
decision  on  the  delineation  of  those  aspects  of  social-environmental  problems  which  are  to 
be  made  by  the  few  (requiring  expertise)  and  those  aspects  to  be  decided  by  the  many 
(requiring  judgement)  ought  to  be  made  by  the  many.  Depending  on  how  you  define  the 
problem,  different  solutions  will  suggest  themselves,  as  was  clear  from  the  deep  ecology 
view  of  the  'ecological  crisis'  as  a  'total  crisis'  in  chapter  2.  In  the  same  way  viewing 
environmental  problems  as  'technical'  or  'economic'  leads  to  'technical'  or  'economic' 
solutions.  But  if,  as  suggested  in  the  last  chapter,  standard  economic  approaches  are 
flawed  when  it  comes  to  providing  information  upon  which  to  base  environmental 
decisions,  and  leaves  the  determination  of  the  issue  in  the  hands  of  a  few  (6.2.1),  then 
technical  expertise  will  identify  the  'problem'  as  well  as  the  'solution'.  Ecological 
problems  are  too  important  to  be  left  up  to  economists  and  scientists  alone.  Identifying  a 
problem  as  'technical'  leaves  decision-making  in  the  hands  of  the  few  rather  than  the 
many.  This  is  not  to  deny  the  absolutely  key  role  to  be  played  by  technical  expertise  in  the 
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knowledge  alone  should  not  define  the  problem  or  possible  solutions,  or  more  worrying 
still,  to  determine  the  'language'  within  which  such  issues  are  to  be  expressed. 
The  complex  of  issues  involved  in  deciding  the  best  way  to  attain  an  ecologically 
rational  metabolism  with  the  environment  are  such  that  making  decisions  about 
environmental  policy  will  affect  more  lives  (private  and  collective,  present  and  future)  and 
to  a  greater  extent  than,  arguably,  any  other  policy  area.  The  main  reason  for  this  is  that 
the  economy-ecology  material  metabolism  is  the  most  important  aspect  of  the  social- 
environmental  metabolism,  upon  which  human  flourishing  depends.  Thus  even  if  we  allow 
that  one  can  view  the  social-environmental  problems  as  'technical'  ones,  and  that  there  is  a 
body  of  knowledge  which,  and  experts  who,  can  resolve  them,  this  does  not  'prove'  that 
experts  alone  should  deal  with  these  prbblemT.  -Ev-eýn-a"s--a--t-e-c-l-i-n-i'cal-Fro-ble-m,  Tý_e`re_ 
good  reasons  why  non-technical  considerations  ought  to  prevail  politically  in  respect  to 
environmental  issues.  Simply  by  virtue  of  the  scope  and  impact  of  policies  promoting 
ecological  sustainability  non-technical,  democratic  considerations  ought  to  apply.  Since 
central  aspects  of  environmental  policy-making  will  affect  significant  areas  of  private  and 
collective  life,  it  is  only  right  that  the  demos  as  a  whole  decide  these  questions.  This  is  not 
to  deny  the  utility  and  indeed  necessity  of  expert  knowledge.  Rather,  the  argument  is  that 
this  knowledge  should  not  be  used  to  determine,  as  opposed  to  inform,  either  the 
'problem'  or  the  'solution'.  Once  these  major  issues  have  been  democratically  decided, 
then  technical  considerations  may  be  appropriate.  Experts  ought  to  be  'on  tap,  not  on 
top',  as  it  were. 
The  argument  against  this  knowledge-based  anti-democratic  position  fies  in  rejecting 
the  assumption  that  social-environmental  problems  are  primarily  technical  or  scientific 
matters  to  be  defined,  analysed  and  resolved  by  experts  on  behalf  of,  or  in  the  interests  of, 
the  wider  society.  10  As  Saward  (1996)  argues,  the  'political  rightness'  of  an  issue  ought 
to  be  determined  by  the  views  and  deliberations  of  the  many  as  opposed  to  the  few.  As 
10  There  is  a  clear  connection  here  between  the  objectivity  of  social-environmental  solutions  within  cco- 
authoritarianism  and  the  objectivity  of  environmental  valuations  within  environmental  economics  as 
discussed  in  the  last  chapter.  Both  tend  to  leave  the  state  in  a  dominant  position  with  regard  to  regulating 
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was  pointed  out  in  chapter  5,  the  ecological  crisis  and  collective  ecological  management  in 
response  to  that  is  from  the  green  point  of  view  both  a  matter  of  scientific  and  ethical 
consideration.  As  such  the  ecological  crisis  is  not  simply  about  diagnosing  the  ecological 
health  of  society,  but  requires  placing  this  within  the  context  of  the  totality  of  social- 
environmental  metabolism.  Providing  this  context  is  the  democratic  aim  of  collective 
ecological  management.  The  technocratic  basis  of  eco-authoritarianism  comes  down  to 
privileging  scientific  knowledge  over  other  forms  of  knowledge  and  understandings  of  the 
ecological  crisis.  The  effect  of  this  privileging  is  to  reduce  the  regulation  and  assessment 
of  the  social-environmental  metabolism  to  a  matter  of  technical  or  instrumental  rationality. 
Since  the  ecological  crisis  is  not  just  a  technical  matter  but  requires  both  claims  of 
knowledge  and  ethical  judgement,  it  cannot  be  reduced  to  a  question  of  instrumental  or 
technocratic  manipulation  to  be  left  to  experts.  If  one  accepts  that  knowledge  is  power,  to 
leave  the  understanding  and  regulation  of  the  social-environmental  metabolism  as  the 
exclusive  preserve  of  one  form  of  expert  knowledge  crowds  out  democratic  forms  of 
decision-making.  This  is  of  course  an  old  anti-democratic  argument  which  can  be  traced 
back  to  Plato's  disparaging  view  of  democracy  as  'mob  rule'  by  the  ignorant.  "  Whereas 
the  democratic  decision-making  on  environmental  issues  implies  that  these  issues  be 
viewed  as  part  of  a  political-normative  process  by  the  demos  as  a  whole,  the  eco- 
authoritarian  solution  requires  viewing  the  regulation  of  the  metabolism  as  something  to 
be  objectively  'deduced'  from  scientific  principles  by  the  competent.  This  is  not  to  say 
that  green  politics  is  anti-science,  but  that  scientific  or  technocratic  assessments  of  social- 
environmental  relations  be  placed  within  the  wider  political-normative  context  of  those 
relations.  The  ecological  crisis  is  not  simply  a  combination  of  technical  problems  to  be 
'solved',  but  also,  as  chapters  2,3  and  5  have  suggested,  a  set  of  collective  moral 
dilemmas  that  require  it  to  be  placed  within  a  political-normative  context. 
A  variation  on  this  theme  can  be  found  in  those  analyses  of  ecological  issues  where 
solutions  must  partake  of  some  definitive  'truth'  in  respect  to  social-environmental 
11  Democratic  green  citizenship,  as  discussed  later  (7.8),  is  proposed  as  a  way  in  which  to  make  people 
less  ignorant.  At  the  same  time,  recalling  Hume's  statement  to  create  institutions  for  knaves  (5.2),  green 
citizenship  is  also  concerned  with  making  people  less  knavish  (read  'unecological'). 278 
relations.  From  such  perspectives  a  'proper'  social-environmental  metabolism  is  derived 
not  from  objective  scientific  principles,  as  in  the  technocratic-authoritarian  argument 
above,  but  from  the  revealed  truth  of  some  metaphysical  or  spiritual  system  of  belief  As 
outlined  in  chapter  2,  this  analysis  of  the  ecological  crisis  in  terms  of  truth  can  be  seen  in 
the  deep  ecology  position.  Whereas  the  technocratic  anti-democratic  view  prioritised  the 
technical  aspects  of  social-environmental  relations  over  their  normative  context,  a 
religious  outlook  on  the  ecological  crisis  views  the  normative  context  in  religious  terms. 
While  not  wishing  to  claim  that  deep  ecological  views  are  inherently  anti-democratic,  there 
is  a  potential  tension  between  its  spiritual/metaphysical  view  of  the  ecological  crisis  and  its 
commitment  to  democratic  forms  of  decision  making.  If  the  ecological  crisis  is  a  religious 
crisis,  then  the  search  for  a  solution  must  be  a  search  for  the  'true'  solution  which  can  only 
be  deduced  by  revelation.  In  a  manner  similar  to  technocratic  solutions  to  social- 
environmental  relations,  spiritual  perspectives  also  see  the  resolution  of  ecological 
problems  in  terms  of  'discovery'  rather  than  'creation'.  It  is  not  surprising  to  find  that 
technocratic  and  spiritual  views  are  often  fused  together  in  eco-authoritarian  arguments. 
A  good  example  of  this  is  Ophuls'  argument  for  a  'priesthood  of  responsible 
technologists'  (1977:  159)  to  take  charge  of  regulating  the  ecological  health  of  society. 
From  a  deep  ecological  viewpoint,  Devall's  call  for  a  spiritually-enthused  'eco-warriors' 
(1988:  196-302)  to  take  care  of  degraded  landscapes  is  also  close  to  the  fusion  of  spiritual 
and  technocratic  arguments  which  can  underwrite  non-democratic  forms  of  resolving 
social-environmental  problems.  What  both  the  spiritual  and  technocratic  non-democratic 
perspectives  share  is  a  view  of  the  ecological  crisis  in  terms  of  a  particular  form  of 
'objective'  knowledge.  In  the  spiritual  case  the  resolution  of  the  ecological  crisis  as  an 
issue  of  'faith'  is  not  open  to  democratic  deliberation.  As  indicated  in  chapter  2,  this 
spiritual  dimension  to  deep  ecology  can  be  readily  seen  in  its  view  of  the  resolution  of  the 
ecological  crisis  in  terms  of  'redemption'  (2.3.1).  In  the  technocratic  case,  it  is  the 
authority  of  science  which  makes  democratic  decision-making  either  inappropriate  or 
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The  general  point  to  be  taken  from  this  overview  of  eco-authoritarianism  is  that  there  is 
a  potential  tension  between  green  politics  and  democracy  if  there  is  an  constitutive 
relationship  between  democracy  and  material  affluence  or  if  the  ecological  crisis  is  viewed 
primarily  as  either  a  matter  of  'survival'  or  'salvation'.  In  both  cases  democratic  forms  of 
decision-making  are  superfluous,  counter-productive  or  in  some  way  inappropriate  to 
dealing  with  problems  within  the  social-environmental  metabolism.  The  next  section 
discusses  the  issue  of  the  role  of  science  in  democratic  environmental  decision-making  in 
more  detail. 
7.3  Science,  Knowledge  and  Democracy 
To  adequately  address  the  technological  and  scientific  roots  of  the  ecological  crisis 
demands  that  democratic  norms  and  institutions  be  extended  to  what  Beck  calls  "techno- 
economic  sub-politics"  (1992:  229).  For  Beck  the  resolution  as  opposed  to  the 
displacement  of  ecological  problems  calls  for  a  proactive,  ex  ante  perspective,  as  outlined 
in  chapter  5.  He  interprets  this  ex  wite  position  to  imply  the  democratic  regulation  of 
technological  development.  12  As  he  puts  it,  "The  demand  is  that  the  consequences  and 
organizational  freedom  of  action  of  microelectronics  or  genetic  technology  belong  in 
parliament  before  the  fundamental  decisions  on  their  application  have  been  taken"  (ibid. 
229).  This  argument  does  not  imply  either  a  rejection  of  science  and  technology  or  that 
they  are  the  sole  causes  of  the  ecological  crisis  as  some  early  green  critics  such  as 
Commoner  (1971)  did.  Rather,  in  a  manner  analogous  to  Gorz's  claim  that  the  ecological 
crisis  requires  the  democratic  limitation  of  economic  rationality  (1989:  111-27),  Beck's 
analysis  calls  for  the  democratic  regulation  of  scientific  and  technological  practice.  In 
other  words,  one  may  interpret  the  green  suspicion  of  technology  and  scientific  knowledge 
as  motivated  from  democratic  concerns  about  expert-centred  forrns  of  decision-making. 
12  A  similar  argument  was  outlined  in  the  last  chapter  where  the  normative  dimension  of  green  political 
economy  was  held  to  consist  in  the  political-normative  determination  of  'resources'  and  'proscribed 
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Central  aspects  of  the  green  critique  are  thus  not  anti-science  in  the  manner  some 
observers  have  maintained  (Yearley,  1991;  O'Neill,  1993:  148-155).  Rather,  the  green 
critique  of  science  and  expert  forms  of  knowledge  and  practices,  ought  to  be  interpreted 
as  claiming  that  expert  knowledge  is  a  necessary  but  not  a  sufficient  condition  for 
environmental  decision-making  (ONeill,  1993:  147).  Effective  collective  decision-making 
with  regard  to  the  determination  and  regulation  of  a  social-environmental  metabolism 
requires  both  expert  knowledge  and  lay  judgement.  This  point  is  further  developed  below 
(section  7.8),  in  terms  of  the  lay  and  expert  composition  of  the  deliberative  'decision- 
recommending'  bodies  increasingly  used  to  help  make  environmental  policy.  It  was  also 
explicit  in  the  claim  that  one  of  the  distinctions  between  ecological  modernisation  and 
collective  ecological  management  was  the  greater  opportunities  for  democratic 
involvement  in  environmental  decision-making,  and  democratic  accountability,  in  the  latter 
relative  to  the  former  (5.6). 
The  imputed  anti-scientific  outlook  of  green  political  theory  which  is  often  used  as 
evidence  of  its  regressive,  anti-modem  stance  is  thus  more  apparent  than  real.  While 
greens  may  be  suspicious  of  an  exclusive  reliance  on  scientific  knowledge  on  the  basis  that 
such  forms  of  decision-making  can  lead  to  non-democratic  results,  as  indicated  above 
(7.2),  science  and  technology  are  essential  to  the  green  position,  as  argued  in  chapter  3. 
Just  as  there  are  democratic  reasons  which  can  be  advanced  for  the  green  critique  of 
economic  growth,  likewise  there  are  democratic  considerations  in  the  green  critique  of 
science  and  technology,  as  well  as  moral  considerations  as  suggested  in  6.7.  The  question 
to  be  addressed  is  the  place  of  science  within  a  democratic  society  and  the  place  of  science 
as  part  of  the  democratic  political  process  of  collective  ecological  management.  Whereas 
techno-optimistic  arguments  are  largely  prefaced  on  the  assumption  that  experts  will  find 
solutions  to  ecological  problems  with  little  or  no  input  from  the  non-expert  population,  the 
incorporation  of  science  within  green  politics  assumes  that  the  application  of  science  is 
within  rather  than  beyond  democratic  regulation.  This  has  to  do  with  the  fact  that 
scientific  knowledge  and  its  technological  application  can  have  effects  on  individuals  and 
that  those  affected  ought  to  have  some  say  in  how  science  is  used.  On  this  account  the 281 
green  democratic  argument  is  for  people  to  have  more  say  in  more  and  more  areas  of  their 
lives.  Within  the  context  of  contemporary  societies  Beck  (1992)  uses  the  revealing 
metaphor  of  the  'experimental  society'  to  describe  how  an  unregulated,  unaccountable 
technological  and  scientific  establishment  turns  society  into  a  laboratory  without  the 
consent  of,  and  often  unbeknown  to,  the  individuals  its  products  affect.  In  Beck's 
terminology  the  'risk  society'  is  a  society  in  which  scientific  experiments  are  carried  out  on 
society. 
Democracy  can  also  be  defended  as  the  most  appropriate  collective  decision-making 
procedure  under  conditions  of  uncertainty.  Given  the  often  high  levels  of  uncertainty  and 
risk  that  social-environmental  interactions  display  it  would  seem  that  ecological  rationality 
requires  that  institutions  regulating  these  interactions  be  as  self-reflexive  and  open-ended 
as  possible.  As  Hayward  points  out,  "Given  the  likelihood  of  uncertainty  and 
disagreement  about  knowledge  of  means,  let  alone  ends,  it  would  therefore  seem 
important  that  a  degree  of  democracy  be  allowed  into  scientific  processes  in  general;  and 
this  point  would  apply  a  fortiori  to  processes  of  policy-making"  (1995:  186).  While 
having  doubts  about  the  desirability  of  insisting  on  democratic  norms  within  the 
production  of  scientific  knowledge  itself,  I  endorse  Hayward's  point  that  democracy  can 
be  justified  on  the  grounds  of  uncertainty  when  such  knowledge  is  used  in  policy-making. 
In  contrast  to  the  eco-authoritarian  argument  based  on  expert  knowledge  and  certainty, 
general  uncertainty  and  disagreement  about  the  causes,  extent  and  possible  remedies  for 
social-environmental  problems  underwrites  the  necessity  for  democratic,  open-ended 
decision-making  procedures.  One  aspect  of  this  is  the  necessity  for  public  debate  and 
discussion  based  on  the  fullest  information  available,  for  it  is  only  by  such  debate  that 
possible  solutions  will  emerge,  since  there  is  no  expert  system  of  knowledge  which  can  be 
guaranteed  to  yield  an  ecologically  rational  social-environmental  material  metabolism. 
The  argument  for  a  democratic  as  opposed  to  a  non  or  anti-democratic  context  for 
deciding  the  equilibrium  social-environmental  metabolism  can  be  readily  seen  when  one 
thinks  of  the  disagreement  within  science  itself  about  key  environmental  issues  such  as 
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depletion.  Only  a  democratic,  'open  society'  can  hope  to  make  good  (as  opposed  to 
'true')  decisions  regarding  the  material  interaction  between  society  and  its  environment 
which  can  command  widespread  support.  Hayward's  suggestion  for  a  'degree  of 
democracy'  within  science  itself  is  perhaps  best  understood  as  an  argument  for  the 
desirability  of  the  free  flow  of  information  and  informed  debate  within  science,  and  not 
that  scientific  judgements  are  to  be  made  on  the  basis  of  majority  rule.  However,  the 
necessity  for  democratic  norms  when  science  is  used  in  policy-making  are  clear.  As  Beck 
has  argued,  "Only  when  medicine  opposes  medicine,  nuclear  physics  opposes  nuclear 
physics  ...  can  the  future  that  is  being  brewed  up  in  the  test-tube  become  intelligible  and 
evaluable  for  the  outside  world"  (1992:  234).  For  Beck,  following  Popper  to  some  extent, 
democratic  decision-making  is  a  form  of  institutionalised  self-criticism  which  he  sees  as, 
"the  only  way  that  the  mistakes  that  would  sooner  or  later  destroy  our  world  can  be 
detected  in  advanc6"  (1992:  234:  emphasis  in  original).  Hence  the  green  stress  on 
freedom  of  information  to  permit  citizens  to  make  informed  choices,  and  also  to  combat 
the  anti-democratic  possibilities  of  'scientism',  i.  e.  science  as  ideology.  This  is  discussed 
later  in  terms  of  the  necessity  for  a  new  science-policy  relationship  or  culture  (7.7) 
This  argument  for  democracy  qua  decision-making  under  uncertainty,  greatly  alters 
Saward's  (1993)  suggestion  that  it  is  the  imperative,  end-orientated  nature  of  green 
politics  which  implies  an  instrumental  attachment  to  democracy.  As  indicated  in  chapter 
2,  one  of  the  central  arguments  of  this  thesis  is  that  green  political  theory  is  not  geared 
towards  the  discovery  of  some  scientific  or  metaphysical  truth  regarding  social- 
environmental  relations,  but  rather  is  concerned  with  the  creation  of  agreement  in  respect 
to  those  relations.  The  connection  between  the  experimental  nature  of  social- 
environmental  harmony  and  democracy  also  serves  to  underwrite  a  non-monistic  view  of 
ecological  management.  According  to  Norton,  "Since  we  do  not  yet  know  what  activities 
are  consistent  with  protecting  the  complexity  and  energy  flow  in  natural  systems,  and  since 
these  will  vary  from  system  to  system,  we  do  not  have  a  single  'ideal'  to  guide 
management  ... 
Conservation  biology  becomes  a  part  of  a  social  experiment,  a  part  of  the 
search  for  a  viable  concept  of  the  good  life  for  human  inhabitants  of  the  landscape"  (199  1: 283 
147-8).  Ecological  management  must  be  rooted  in  a  democratic,  open  and  free  society  in 
which  new  forms  of  social-environmental  adaptation,  knowledge,  can  be  developed.  Thus 
Beck's  argument  for  a  democratic  'self-reflexive'  society,  may  be  seen  as  an  ecologically 
updated  version  of  Popper's  'open  society'.  Democracy,  therefore,  is  accepted  on 
principle  as  the  best  procedure  for  making  decisions  under  conditions  of  often  radical 
uncertainty.  In  other  words,  this  conception  of  green  politics  does,  "embrace  uncertainty 
and  ...  the  need  for  constant self-inteffogation7'  (Saward,  1993:  77)  as  non-negotiable 
values.  " 
This  need  for  self-interrogation  which  underpins  democratic  decision-making  is  at  the 
heart  of  Beck's  ecological  argument  for  'reflexive  modernisation'  and  a 
reconceptualisation  of  social  progress.  In  Beck's  analysis,  'social  progress'  (1992:  203) 
ought  to  be  understood  as  institutionalised  self-criticism  (reflexivity).  A  major  aspect  of 
this  involves  increasing  opportunities  for  citizens  to  deliberate  and  recalibrate  the 
regulative  principles  of  modernisation,  and  not  just  specific  policies  associated  with  it,  or 
the  means  to  achieve  some  'given'  conception  of  modernisation.  The  latter  was  the  case 
made  against  ecological  modernisation  in  chapter  5  (5.6).  In  other  words,  ELen 
arguments  for  democracy  can  be  understood  as  arguments  for  a  different  type  of  social 
progress.  This  can  be  readily  seen  even  within  'reformist'  conceptions  of  'sustainable 
development',  where  it  is  explicitly  linked  to  improved  democratic  arrangements  and  the 
promotion  of  basic  human  rights.  This  is  another  example  of  how  in  practice  green 
politics  is  not  just  compatible  with  but  actively  promotes  democratic  forms  of  decision- 
making.  The  tension  between  modernisation  and  democratisation  outlined  below  (7.5) 
can,  from  a  green  perspective,  be  lessened  if  modernisation  itself  is  partly  understood  as  a 
process  of  democratisation  as  opposed  to  being  mainly  viewed  in  terms  of  increased 
material  wealth.  A  good  example  of  this  revised  understanding  of  social  progress 
13  This  acceptance  of  uncertainty  can  also  be  seen  as  underwriting  prudence  as  an  ecological  virtue.  Ile 
persistence  of  uncertainty  as  a  background  condition,  particularly  within  expert  systems  of  knowledge, 
may  be  taken  as  a  breakdown  in  the  'arrogance'  of  humanism  discussed  in  chapters  2  and  3,  and  may 
indicate 
, 
the  emergence  of  a  more  humble  Oess  'arrogant')  conception  of  the  relationship  between  humans 
and  nature.  Accepting  uncertainty  as  a  permanent  feature  of  social-,  environmental  relations  is  one  way  of 
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concerns  the  green  suspicion  of  technologically-led  economic  growth  which  is  largely 
beyond  democratic  control  but  which  has  great  and  far-reaching  effects  on  the  citizens  of 
the  demos  and  indeed  non-citizens  (both  human  and  nonhuman).  A  green  commitment  to 
democracy  can  be  understood  as  expressing  a  desire  that technological  and  scientific 
development  be  subject  to  the  ultimate  authority  of  the  demos.  Although  the  search  for 
the  truth  is  a  good,  it  is  not  the  only  or  the  highest  good.  As  O'Neill  puts  it,  "A  proper 
understanding  of  the  value  of  scientific  knowledge  involves  the  acknowledgement  of  limits 
in  the  means  to  and  objects  of  knowledge"  (1993:  165). 
An  obvious  example  that  green  politics  is  concerned  with  matters  of  science  as  well  as 
political  and  ethical  issues  is  found  in  the  ideas  of  sustainability  and  sustainable 
development.  Both  sustainability  and  sustainable  development  share  a  fundamental 
characteristic  of  having  normative  and  scientific  dimensions,  as  well  as  political  and 
economic  implications.  That  sustainability  is  a  normative  concept  should  be  obvious.  It 
embodies  a  particular  moral  attitude  to  the  future,  expressing  for  example,  how  much  the 
present  generation  care  for  and  are  willing  to  make  sacrifices  for  descendants  and  how, 
and  to  what  degree,  nonhumans  figure  in  this  process.  Making  sustainability  a  co- 
ordinating  social  value  and  practice  cannot  be  left  up  to  'specialists',  since  it  is  not  simply 
a  matter  of  expertise  but  one  that  requires  ethical  consideration.  Sustainability  calls  for 
judgernent  rather  than  uncovering  any  ex  cathe&a  'true'  account  of  social-environmental 
relations.  Arguments  from  sustainability  usually  propose  wide-ranging  changes  in  the 
present  organisation  of  society,  particularly  the  economy-ecology  relationship,  in  the  name 
of  those  yet  to  be  born.  The  consequences  of  realising  sustainability  in  social  practices  are 
so  widespread,  and  the  issues  raised  so  important  that  it  deserves  democratic  rather  than 
non-democratic  articulation,  as  indicated  in  the  last  section.  Even  if  there  is  agreement  on 
a  general  outline  of  sustainability  that  ought  (for  moral  as  well  as  prudential  reasons)  to  be 
socially  instantiated,  we  have  only  begun  the  fleshing  out  process.  For  a  start,  as  it  stands 
it  is  far  too  abstract,  being  silent  on  many  things.  How  far  in  the  future  must  we  look? 
One,  three  or  fifty  generations  hence?  What  are  we  to  pass  on?  What  sacrifices  are  ruled 
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Such  questions  cannot  be  answered  purely  scientifically  or  metaphysically  (that  is 
objectively  given),  but  because  of  their  normative  content  they  can  only  be  articulated 
politically  (that  is  intersubjectively  created).  And  for  traditional  reasons  we  can  say  that 
this  political  process  ought  to  be  a  democratic  one.  In  one  sense  greens  can  ask  why  they 
should  find  new  grounds  for  their  adherence  to  democracy  that  are  Merent  from  those 
advanced  by  socialists  or  liberals?  The  indeterminacies  thrown  up  by  sustainability  require 
political  adjudication,  and  given  that  the  policies  flowing  from  any  conception  of 
sustainability  are  likely  to  have  a  widespread  social  impact,  leaving  few  citizens'  lives 
untouched,  it  is  uncontroversial  to  hold  that  they  should  have  some  say  in  its  articulation 
and  formulation.  That  is  to  say  the  indeterminacy  of  the  principle  calls  for  citizen 
deliberation,  while  its  translation  into  policies  and  laws  call  for  their  consent,  and  equally 
important,  their  participation,  in  achieving  it. 
7.4  Democratic  Institutions  and  Democratic  Society 
While  democracy  can  be  understood  in  terms  of  certain  types  of  institutions,  such  as 
representative  government,  and  certain  institutional  arrangements,  such  as  the  division  of 
powers  and  constitutional  checks  and  balances,  this  focus  on  the  institutional  or 
procedural  understanding  of  democracy  does  not  capture  the  full  normative  force  of  what 
democracy  is.  As  Macpherson  notes,  'Democracy  is  to  be  understood  as  a  quality 
pervading  the  whole  of  common  life-a  kind  of  society"  (1973:  15-16).  This  is  also  one  of 
the  understandings  of  democracy  in  Tocqueville's  thought.  According  to  Holmes,  for 
Tocqueville,  democracy  specifies  "on  the  one  hand,  a  social  arrangement  and,  on  the  other 
hand,  a  political  systea'  (1995:  23).  Democracy  can  thus  be  viewed  as  a  society  of 
equals,  a  type  of  social  life  in  which  there  is  an  absence  of  legally  maintained  class 
hierarchies:  a  political  decision-making  procedure  as  well  as  a  type  of  society.  The  two  of 
course  are  related.  It  would  be  difficult  to  establish  and  maintain  a  democratic  society 286 
without  democratic  political  institutions.  14  Examples  of  accounts  of  democracy  which 
embrace  both  democracy  as  a  political  and  a  social  system  include  the  classical  liberal 
writings  of  Mill,  as  well  as  the  more  radical  democratic  tradition  of  Rousseau,  Paine  and 
Marx.  One  implication  of  democracy  as  a  society  is  that  it  calls  for  virtues  and  values  such 
as  independence,  openness,  tolerance,  reasonableness  and  equality  to  be  spread  over  a 
wider  range  of  issues  and  spheres  of  social  life  than  is  required  within  democracy  viewed 
purely  as  an  institutionalised  decision-making  procedure.  15  As  will  be  argued  below  (7.3), 
the  link  between  green  politics  and  democracy  cannot  be  a  purely  institutional  matter. 
Green  democratic  theory  is  thereby  concerned  with  the  creation  of  a  democratic  society 
and  not  just  a  more  democratic  political  system.  Evidence  of  this  can  be  found  in  the 
green  strategy  of  'marching  through  the  institutions",  where  a  green  party  taking  over  the 
reins  of  the  state  is  seen  as  a  necessary  but  not  sufficient  condition  for  creating  a  more 
democratic  or  green  society.  As  Doherty  puts  it,  "The  greens  have  responded  to  new 
conditions  and  issues  with  a  distinctively  modem  strategy  based  on  accepting  the  limits  of 
the  state  in  guaranteeing  social  and  political  change"  (1992:  102).  However,  as  indicated 
in  chapter  5  (5.7),  a  green  view  would  also  voice  concerns  over  the  desirability,  and  not 
just  the  possibility,  of  overly  state-centred  social  and  political  change. 
Offe  and  Preuss  (1991)  bring  out  this  distinction  between  democracy  as  an  institutional 
arrangement  and  as  a  conception  of  society  in  their  discussion  of  the  distinction  between 
the  American  and  French  revolutions.  The  American  democratic  model  was  a  classic 
example  of  what  they  refer  to  as  a  'political  revolution',  while  the  French  revolution  and 
its  model  of  democracy  was  rooted  in  a  more  fundamental  'social  revolution.  The 
American  democratic  model  is  the  template  'liberal  democratic  model'  in  the  sense  that  it 
14  Notice  that  this  'holistic'  (dare  one  use  the  term)  view  of  democracy  reinforces  the  critique  of  eco- 
authoritarianism  above.  That  is,  while  it  may  be  possible  to  destroy  democratic  institutions  through  a 
return  to  scarcity  and  a  politics  of  social  survival,  in  a  well-established  and  long-standing  democracy  it  is 
not  likely  that  the  democratic  spirit  of  a  society  will  be  defeated  by  the  destruction  of  democratic 
institutions.  This  is  because  it  has  not  been  shown  that  the  maturation  and  further  development  of 
democracy  requires  a  materially  productive  and  growth  orientated  economic  system. 
15  While  recent  liberal  theory  has  moved  some  way  in  this  direction,  putting  forward  the  case  for  'liberal 
virtues'  (Macedo,  1990;  Galston,  1991),  for  many  radical  democrats  this  beefed-up  liberalism,  still  falls 
short  of  creating  the  basis  for  a  vibrant  democratic  society.  Whether  it  does  or  not  is  not  a  concern  here. 287 
relieved  the  sovereign  people  from  the  heavy  burden  of  a  nearly  sacred  task  to 
define  and  implement  the  common  good.  Instead,  the  model  restricted  itself  to  the 
task  of  devising  institutions  (such  as  the  natural  right  to  private  property  and  the 
division  of  powers)  which  (a)  allowed  the  individuals  to  pursue  their  diverse 
interests  and  the  their  particular  notions  of  happiness,  thereby  at  the  same  time  (b) 
avoiding  the  danger  of  an  omnipotent  government  imposing  its  notion  of  collective 
happiness  upon  the  people.  (1991:  149) 
This  model  of  democracy  they  point  out,  echoing  other  critical  analyses  of  liberal 
democracy  (Pateman,  1970,1985;  Barber,  1984;  Macpherson,  1973),  makes  little 
demands  upon  individuals.  Unlike  the  French  or  'republican'  vision  of  democracy,  the 
liberal  model  is  argued  not  to  "enable  citizens  to  be  'good'  citizens,  i.  e.  citizens  committed 
to  the  common  good"  (Offe  and  Preuss,  1991:  153),  but  rather  enable  them  to  fulfil  their 
individual  interests.  16  Democratic  politics  conceived  instrumentally  as  a  method  for  the 
pursuit  of  individual  self-interest,  cashed  out  (to  use  an  appropriate  term)  as  material 
consumption,  may  represent  a  danger  to  democracy.  To  some  extent,  democratic  politics 
loses  a  lot  when  it  becomes  overwhelmingly  concerned  with  'managing  the  economy',  and 
the  securing  of  ever  increasing  levels  of  economic  growth,  to  be  privately  consumed.  The 
problems  with  an  overly  constitutional  approach  has  been  recognised  by  Kymlicka  and 
Norman  who  argue  that  "it  has  become  clear  that  procedural-institutional  mechanisms  to 
balance  self-interest  are  not  enough,  and  that  some  level  of  civic  virtue  and  public- 
spiritedness  is  required"  (1994:  360).  To  paraphrase  Clauswitz,  democratic  politics  as 
economics  by  other  means,  is  bad  for  the  democratic  health  of  society.  17  In  this  sense  the 
16  Tocqueville  also  noted  this  lack  of  a  common  purpose  within  US  democracy,  when  he  noted  that,  "The 
first  thing  that  strikes  the  observer  is  an  innumerable  multitude  of  men  all  equal  and  all  alike,  incessantly 
cndeavouring  to  procure  the  petty  and  paltry  pleasures  with  which  they  glut  themselves.  Each  of  them, 
living  apart,  is  as  a  stranger  to  the  fate  of  all  the  rest  ... 
Above  this  race  of  men  stands  an  immense  and 
titulary  power,  which  takes  upon  itself  alone  to  secure  their  gratifications,  and  to  watch  over  their  fate' 
(quoted  in  Dahl,  1985:  32-3). 
17  The  danger  of  course,  as  liberals  are  right  to  point  out,  is  that  rejecting  representative  democracy  as 
I  economic  management  for  individual  gain',  may  lead  to  a  politics  as  'morality  by  other  means'.  The 288 
recent  green  concern  with  consumerism  has  roots  in  older  debates  around  the  dangers  of 
commercial  society  to  political  democracy.  Just  as  Mill  and  Tocqueville  saw  the  dangers 
of  commercial  society  for  democracy  in  terms  of  its  individualism  and  the  elevation  of 
private  concerns  over  public  ones,  likewise  contemporary  greens  inveigh  against 
cconsumer  society',  for  similar  reasons.  If  the  resolution  of  environmental  problems 
requires  a  (moderate  to  strong)  sense  of  collective  purpose  as  green  politics  suggests 
(Achterberg,  1996),  then  liberal  democracy  may  fall  short  of  producing  an  ecologically 
rational  social-environmental  metabolism.  This  is  a  moot  point,  and  although  not  a  direct 
concern  here,  the  critique  of  ecological  modernisation  in  chapter  5  can  be  seen  as  partly 
stemming  from  a  sense  that  it  is  too  tied  to  an  institutional  democratic  approach  to  social- 
environmental  issues.  The  ecological  deficits  of  liberal  democracy  does  not  underwrite  the 
ecological  superiority  of  anti-democratic  approaches,  as  indicated  above,  nor  non- 
democratic,  economic  approaches,  as  argued  in  the  last  chapter.  In  other  words, 
democracy  is  not  condemned  on  ecological  grounds  simply  because  of  liberal  democracy's 
imputed  ecological  failings. 
Green  politics  as  collective  ecological  management  rests  on  the  'greening'  of  the 
democratic  culture  of  liberal  democratic  societies.  Thus  collective  ecological  management 
can  be  seen  as  a  development  from  and  complement  to  ecological  modernisation  which 
works  at  the  level  of  'greening'  the  nation-state  and  the  formal  economy.  This  'greening' 
of  the  democratic  culture  implies  tapping  into  the  energy  of  a  democratic  society  and  using 
it  in  the  service  of  ecological  goals.  This  energy  stems  in  part  from  the  free  and  open 
nature  of  democratic  society,  discussed  below  in  7.9.2  in  terms  of  'the  spirit  of 
association'  and  experimentation,  as  mentioned  in  7.3.  As  Paehlke  notes,  "Democracy, 
participation,  and  open  administration  carry  not  only  a  danger  of  division  and  conflict,  but 
question  of  how  cultural  pluralism  is  to  fit  into  any  'post-hberal'  democratic  theory  has  yet  to  be 
adequately  addressed.  It  is  difficult  to  see  how  sustainability  can  exist  without  some  common  cultural 
bacldng-  It  was  for  this  reason  that  collective  ecological  management  turns  on  cultural  as  well  as  political 
aspects.  The  issue  seems  to  be  whether  sustainability  can  find  support  as  a  public  culture  which  is 
compatible  with  a  (limited)  variety  of  private  ones.  It  was  partly  for  this  reason  that  nationhood  was 
examined  in  chapter  5,  as  a  possible  public  cultural  basis  for  green  politics,  since  it  is  a  public  culture 
within  which  a  number  of  'private'  ones  can  co-exist.  This  is  also  consistent  with  Thompson's  view  of 
the  nation  as  a  "community  of  interlocidng  communitiee'  (1992:  180). 289 
as  well  perhaps  the  best  means  of  mobilizing  educated  and  prosperous  populations  in 
difficult  times"  (1988:  294-5).  In  this  way  green  politics  seeks  to  transform  not  just  the 
institutional  structure  of  presently  existing  liberal  democracies  but  also  transforming  the 
wider  cultural  context  within  which  those  institutions  are  both  situated  and  also  help 
create  and  sustain.  As  indicated  in  chapter  2,  and  outlined  in  the  elaboration  of  green 
politics  as  collective  ecological  management  (chapter  5),  one  of  the  defining  aims  of  green 
politics  is  that  it  sees  its  'political  project'  as  involving  wider  cultural  transformation. 
What  is  suggested  here  is  that  green  democratic  theory  and  practice  is  a  central  location 
from  where  this  wider  cultural  transformation  begins.  In  other  words,  the  green  focus  on 
democracy  has  to  do  with  the  'greening'  of  the  existing  democratic  political  culture  as  the 
starting  point  for  the  wider  cultural  transformation  that  green  politics  ultimately  desires. 
Institutional  restructuring  from  a  green  point  of  view  must  be  understood  as  part  of  a 
deeper  process  of  cultural  transformation.  At  the  same  time  political  democracy  provides 
a  procedure  within  which  cultural  contradictions  can  be  publicly  raised  and  possibly 
resolved. 
7.5  Modernisation  and  Democracy 
For  many  greens,  economic  modernisation,  whether  in  state  or  market  form,  has 
historically  been  associated  with  non-  or  anti-democratic  political  results.  According  to 
one  version  of  this  argument  modernisation  is  premised  on  the  enclosure  of  the  commons 
in  their  various  forms  (Wall,  1994;  Goldsmith  et  al,  1992).  The  green  argument  is  that 
economic  modernisation,  the  industrialisation  of  society  and  economy,  which  is  typically 
equated  with  'progress',  is  not  unambiguously  a  positive  development.  There  are  serious 
costs  which  are  either  under-  or  misrepresented,  and/or  unjustly  distributed.  This  neglect 
of  the  various  social  and  ecological  costs  of  industrial  progress  is  the  key  to  understanding 
the  green  critique  of  contemporary  industrial  societies.  "  The  green  analysis  of  progress 
18  In  the  eighteenth  centuty  market-led  economic  modernisation  was  defended  and  promoted  on  the 
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also  serves  as  a  major  guide  to  the  green  attitude  toward,  and  assessment,  of  'modernity'. 
If  we  understand  modernity  in  terms  of  its  industrial  and  democratic  components,  then  the 
green  democratic  position  can  be  viewed  as  suggesting  that  there  is  a  contradiction 
between  the  industrial  modernisation  of  society  and  democratic  modernisation.  '9 
A  less  materially-orientated  politics  does  seem  to  call  for  a  major  change  in  the  role  of 
the  state.  According  to  Weber  (1968),  there  is  a  positive  correlation  between 
'modernisation'  of  the  socio-economic  system,  which  calls  for  an  increasing  complex 
social  division  of  labour,  the  growth  of  the  state  and  an  attendant  increase  in  political 
centralisation  and  bureaucratisation.  That  is,  economic  modernisation  has  historically  been 
associated  with  both  market  and  state  institutions  regulating  social  affairs  in  general 
(Polanyi,  1957;  Tilly,  1992),  and  social-environmental  affairs  in  particular  (Walker,  1989). 
The  analysis  outlined  in  the  last  chapter  where  modernisation  was  portrayed  in  terms  of 
the  'disembedding'  of  economic  relations  from  social  relations  (6.5,6.6)  is  consistent  with 
the  Weberian  thesis.  What  these  perspectives  on  industrial  modernisation  point  to  is  the 
dominant  position  of  the  state  in  relation  to  civil  society  within  the  context  of  a 
'modernising'  society.  Clearly  the  opposite  seems  to  hold,  that  is,  'de-modemisation'  or 
"re-modernisation'  suggests  a  reduced  role  for  the  state  and  its  bureaucracies.  As  Doherty 
puts  it,  "Once  the  faith  in  technological  and  unlimited  growth  has  been  challenged,  the 
need  for  state-directed  maximisation  of  productive  potential  falls  away"  (1992:  101). 
Equally,  as  suggested  earlier  in  the  critique  of  free  market  environmentalism  (6.2),  this 
would  also  diminish  the  need  for  free-market  maximisation  of  production  and 
consumption.  "  This  line  of  argument  is  of  course  related  to  the  argument  in  the  last 
chapter  concerning  increased  economic  self-reliance  as  a  central  principle  for  the  re- 
modernisation,  particularly  in  its  present  globalised  form,  may  actually  have  a  'barbarising'  cffcct  on 
social  relations,  and  an  unsustainable  and  unsymbiotic  cffect  on  social-cnvironmental  relations.  Also  see 
6.7. 
19  As  outlined  in  chapter  5,  a  tension  may  also  exists  between  'ecological  modernisation'  and  popular 
sovereignty  in  environmental  decision-maldng. 
20  An  alternative  argument  for  de-modernisation  has  been  proposed  by  Lee  (1993a),  who  argues  that  it  is 
rational  to  argue  for  de-industrialisation  on  the  grounds  that  it  is  not  only  ecologically  beneficial  in  terms 
of  sustaimbility  but  also  positive  in  terms  of  restoring  the  worth  of  nonhuman  world,  the  dignity  of  labour 
by  permitting  a  more  'artistic'  mode  of  production.  See  6.7. 291 
organisation  of  the  economy.  The  more  people  do  things  for  themselves,  the  less  there  is 
need  for  extensive  state  involvement  or  extensive  market  relations.  It  is  important  to  point 
out  that  this  does  not  lead  to  a  rejection  of  the  state  or  the  market  . 
As  suggested  in 
chapter  4,  the  conception  of  green  politics  being  defended  here,  does  not  aim  to  create 
transparent  social  relations.  So  long  as  macro  institutions  such  as  the  nation-state  and 
impersonal  market  exist,  social  relations  and  social-environmental  relations  cannot  be 
transparent.  All  that  is  being  suggested  here  is  that  the  green  critique  of  material 
econon-fic  development  can  be  understood  and  defended  on  democratic  grounds.  The 
latter  has  to  do  with  the  re-definition  of  the  division  and  relationship  between  state  and 
civil  society,  consistent  with  what  was  suggested  in  chapter  5  as  regards  the  role  of  the 
state  within  collective  ecological  management. 
A  central  element  of  this  has  to  do  with  the  re-constitution  of  the  state  as  an  enabling 
state  within  the  context  of  this  reformed  relationship,  and  the  distinction  between  capitalist 
economic  organisation  and  a  local  market  economy  as  indicated  in  the  last  chapter  (6.4, 
6-5).  A  re-definition  of  these  relationships  is  a  necessary  but  not  sufficient  condition  for 
green  democratic  arguments.  This  re-definition  partly  requires  a  'simplification'  of 
economic  life  which  would  enhance  the  prospects  for  democratic  decision-making  and 
democratic  norms  throughout  society  as  a  whole.  The  less  complex  social  life  becomes 
the  less  there  is  a  need  for  large-scale  organisations  such  as  current  state  agencies  and 
economic  units.  At  the  same  time  a  less  complex  social  fife  is  consistent  with  a  material 
basis  which  is  not  as  damaging  and  extensive  as  one  which  supports  a  complex  one.  While 
this  should  not  be  taken  as  an  argument  for  rendering  the  whole  of  social  life  transparent 
through  simplification,  the  creation  of  a  less  complex  web  of  social  relations  has  the 
potential  to  contribute  to  enhanced  democratic  practice  through  decentralisation  and  the 
development  of  more  'human-scale'  organisations.  This  calls  for  a  re-arrangement  of  the 
relationship  between  state  and  civil  society  and  within  civil  society  rather  than  a  return  to 
the  gemeinschaiftfich  vision  criticised  in  chapter  4.  Social  complexity  cannot  be  eliminated 
completely  without extensive  social  restructurin  which  would  FeMnt  5Z-UreU-_up-  79f 
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the  deconstruction  of  nation-states  is  more  in  keeping  with  the  green  political  project  of 
collective  ecological  management. 
An  additional  factor  is  that  although  such  an  anarchistic  arrangement  may  be 
ecologically  rational  in  the  sense  of  improving  the  sustainability  of  social-environmental 
material  exchanges  at  some  established  metabolic  rate,  it  is  less  likely  that  the 
establishment  of  this  same  social  arrangement  would  be  inherently  superior  to 
, 
the 
presently  existing  system  of  nation-states  in  effecting  ameliorative  and  restorative 
environmental  changes.  This  is  because  many  environmental  problems  are  large-scale  and 
inter-related  and  cannot  be  decomposed  into  smaller  components  (Martell,  1994;  Goodin, 
1992;  Dryzek,  1987).  Now  while  this  issue  of  scale  and  complexity  does  not  of  itself 
indicate  that  large-scale  arrangements  necessarily  require  anti-democratic  forms  of 
collective  decision-making  as  suggested  by  eco-authoritarianism,  the  question  of  scale  and 
complexity  does  indicate  that  the  form  democracy  takes  will  be  different.  This  is  related 
to  the  status  of  direct  democracy  within  green  political  theory  which  is  discussed  in  section 
7.7.  which  suggests  the  ecological  advantages  of  representative  democratic  institutions. 
The  net  effect  of  an  eco-anarchist  deconstruction  of  the  system  of  nation-states  and  the 
creation  of  small-scale,  bioregional  units,  is  that  the  democratic  'rule  of  the  people'  with 
regard  to  social-environmental  interaction  may  not  be  improved.  The  democratic 
character  of  green  political  theory  may  in  fact  be  better  preserved  by  retaining,  but 
transforming,  the  nation-state  as  the  basic  'management  unit'  rather  than  opting  for  a 
multiplicity  of  autonomous  bioregional  units.  As  was  suggested  in  chapter  5,  the 
democratisation  of  the  nation-state  may  support  green  democratic  arguments  better  than 
its  abolition.  21 
That  a  democratic  political  system  has  no  necessary  connection  with  ever  increasing 
levels  of  material  consumption  is  a  touchstone  of  green  democratic  arguments.  More 
important  to  a  democratic  polity  is  a  well  developed  'democratic  culture',  a  shared  sense 
of  citizenship,  plurality  and  political  equality.  Plurality  and  equality  are  more  significant 
21  One  way  of  looking  at  this  is  to  saY  that  collective  ecological  management  while  being  state-based,  is 
not  state-centred,  as  it  requires  non-state  institutions,  such  as  the  (local)  formal  and  informal  market  (6.5). 293 
than  prosperity  as  preconditions  for  an  ongoing  and  vibrant  democracy.  The  advent  of 
scarcity  and  limits  is  taken  as  an  opportunity  by  green  theory  to  redefine  basic  political 
concepts.  It  asks  us  to  consider  the  possibility  that  human  freedom  and  the  good  polity 
does  not  depend,  in  any  fundamental  sense,  on  increasing  levels  of  material  affluence. 
Indeed,  there  may  be  a  trade-off  between  democracy  and  material  well-being.  22  Beyond  a 
certain  threshold,  greater  increases  in  the  latter  may  be  accompanied  by  decreases  in  the 
former.  This  is  the  logic  of  the  prescient  quote  from  Toqueville  above.  A  less  materially 
affluent  lifestyle  may  be  consistent  with  enhanced  democratic  practice  since  the  decrease  in 
complexity,  social  division  of  labour,  inequality  and  hierarchy,  allows  the  possibility  of 
greater  participation  by  individuals  in  the  decisions  that  affect  their  lives  and  that  of  their 
communities.  For  example,  a  shift  away  from  economic  growth  as  a  central  social  goal 
would  undermine  the  justification  of  socio-economic  inequalities  on  the  grounds  that  they 
are  necessary  'incentives'  to  achieve  economic  growth.  At  the  same  time,  as  early 
proponents  of  the  steady-state  economy  pointed  out,  the  shift  from  a  society  geared 
towards  economic  growth,  to  a  society  where  material  growth  is  not  a  priority  may  lead  to 
more  extensive  redistributive  measures  (Daly,  1973).  This  redistributive  aspect  to  the 
green  critique  of  excessive  material  development  echoes  the  socialist  critique  of  the 
disparity  between  political  equality  and  socio-econornic  inequality  within  capitalism.  ' 
22According  to  Lauber  (1978)  there  is  evidence  to  show  that  the  relatively  liberal,  and  consequently  less 
powerful,  British  state  was  an  important  determinant  of  the  stagnation  and  decline  of  its  economy  since 
the  second  world  war.  Relying  on  the  comparative  studies  of  Schonfield  (1965),  he  states  that,  "the 
governments  that  have  been  most  successftd  in  the  pursuit  of  the  new  [economic]  goals  have  been  those 
which  had  few  doubts  about  the  extensive  use  of  non-elected  authority,  for  example,  France.  The  more 
'timid'  governments  were  less  successful"  (1978:  209).  Having  'modernisation'  as  one's  highest  goal 
may  lead  to  non-democratic,  illiberal  forms  of  state  action.  However  limited  its  democratic  credentials 
may  be,  ecological  modcrnisation  does  at  least  differ  from  previous  forms  of  state-centred.  modernisation, 
in  being  committed  to  democratic  as  opposed  to  authoritarian  forms  of  implementation. 
23  In  the  last  chapter  I  argued  for  a  green  conception  of  liberty  qua  self-determination,  part  of  which 
involved  self-reliance  and  self-provisioning.  Here  the  green  conception  of  equality,  and  equal  liberty,  may 
be  thought  of  as  requiring  a  distribution  of  the  resources,  and  means  of  production,  such  that  individuals 
(in  communities?,  families?  )  can,  in  part,  satisfy  their  own  needs.  This  may  explain  the  green  stress  on 
returning  the  land  to  the  people.  In  other  words,  there  are  'non-romantic'  reasons  why  many  greens  arc 
attracted  to  the  Jeffcrsonian  ideal  of  a  rural-based  democracy  of  independent  farming  homesteads,  or  a 
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Unlike  the  socialist  critique  the  green  argument  is  against  economic  growth  per  se 
rather  than  simply  against  the  capitalist  organisation  of  an  economy  geared  towards 
growth.  One  of  the  reasons  for  this  is  the  green  argument  that  economic  growth  and 
modernisation  demands  the  creation  of  organisations,  institutions  and  forms  of  social 
relations  which  may  be  inimical  to  democratic  practice.  Much  of  the  green  critique  of 
contemporary  society  has  to  do  with  the  contention  that  large-scale  organisation  and  non- 
democratic  forms  of  social  relations  are  part  and  parcel  of  the  modernisation  process.  The 
modernising  imperative,  whether  it  takes  a  socialist  or  capitalist  form,  has  non-  and 
potentially  anti-democratic  costs.  Large-scale  forms  of  production,  mass  consumption, 
individualism  and  a  break-down  in  social  solidarity  as  effects  and  conditions  of 
modernisation  sap  the  democratic  vigour  of  a  society  even  while  maintaining  democratic 
institutions.  Modernisation  in  producing  a  mass  society  produces  a  limited  and 
constrained  form  of  democracy  in  which  periodic  elections  become  'beauty  contests' 
between  different  political  parties,  or  elites,  who  are  judged  on  their  ability  to  produce 
economic  growth.  This  'protective'  view  of  democracy  is  of  course  to  be  preferred  to  the 
authoritarian  paths  to  modernisation  taken  by  communist,  fascist  and  other  anti- 
democratic  regimes.  24  At  the  same  time  protective  democracy  has  its  advantages  as  a 
procedural  conception  of  democracy.  The  point  however,  is  that  such  protective  forms  of 
democracy  fall  short  of  creating  a  more  democratic  society  and  enhanced  democratic 
institutions.  If  the  most  democratic  system  economic  modernisation  permits,  or  is 
compatible  with,  is  a  liberal  pluralist  system,  then  those  wishing  to  democratise  the  state 
and  civil  society,  such  as  the  green  movement,  have  good  reason  to  see  modernisation  as  a 
fetter.  If  one  accepts  that  selective  de-modernisation  may  lead  to  popular  pressure  for 
more  egalitarian  distribution  this  in  turn  may  strengthen  the  equality  that  is  at  the  heart  of 
democracy.  In  other  words,  the  green  democratic  argument  is  that  a  well  established 
democratic  culture  can  provide  a  basis  for  the  democratisation  of  political  democratic 
institutions. 
24more  recent  examples  of  non-dcmocratic  paths  to  economic  modernisation  can  be  seen  in  the  Southeast 
Asian  'Tiger'  economics  which  combine  capitalist  economic  organisation  with  authoritarian  and  non- 
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To  return  to  the  eco-authoritarian  argument  above,  there  is  no  necessary  reason  to 
suppose  that  a  less  materially  affluent  society  must  lead  to  a  non-democratic  politics.  It  is 
only  if  the  present  unequal  distribution  of  socially  produced  wealth  is  maintained  in  the 
face  of  greater  pressurefor  a  more  egalitarian  distributioti  that  this  is  so.  One  reason  for 
greater  pressure  for  a  more  egalitarian  distribution  of  wealth  is  that,  apart  from  an 
acknowledgement  of  social  and  ecological  limits  to  growth,  in  an  ecologically  de- 
modernising  society,  wealth  production  and  distribution  are  more  fransparent  than  in  an 
economically  modemising  society.  25  In  societies,  such  as  the  welfare  states  of  the  west, 
their  legitimacy  is,  in  part,  on  a  commitment  to  lessen  inequalities  via  redistributive 
measures.  At  the  same  time,  providing  'environmental  quality'  or  'environmental  security' 
is  also  proving  to  be  a  key  feature  in  securing  legitimacy.  Now  in  a  non-growing 
economy,  it  is  highly  unlikely  that  the  majority  of  citizens  will  accept  as  legitimate  the 
unequal  distribution  of  a  static  economic  pie.  The  justification  of  an  unequal  distribution 
of  socially  produced  wealth  cannot  be  that  they  are  required  for  procuring  greater  wealth 
production.  In  short,  with  the  shift  to  a  less  growth  orientated  society, 
ihe  normative  basis 
for  social  co-operation  needs  to  be  re-negotiated.  Within  an  ecologically  re-modernising 
society,  'social  progress'  is  explicitly  political.  As  Beck  points  out,  within  what  he  calls 
'industrial  society',  "'Progress'  can  be  understood  as  legitimate  social  change  without 
democratic  political  legitimatiorf'  (1992:  214).  Within  'post-industrial'  society,  such  as 
the  type  of  society  green  politics  is  concerned  with,  'progress'  may  be  more  open  to 
democratic  deliberation  in  a  way  which  is  not  possible  in  a  society  geared  towards 
economic  growth. 
While  not  doubting  the  social  disruption  and  problems  that  a  drop  in  material  standards 
of  living  may  bring,  social  solidarity  and  order  need  not  be  threatened  by  this  so  long  as 
the  costs  are  shared  equitably  throughout  the  whole  society.  In  all  likelihood  it  is  only  if 
some  members  of  society  are  forced  to  accept  lower  material  standards  relative  to  others 
25  In  terms  of  the  discussion  of  ecological  modernisation  in  chapter  5,  its  ambiguous  position  may  be 
viewed  as  relating  to  its  potential  to  either  be  part  of  the  ftuther  economic  modernisation  of  society,  but 
one  which  takes  on  board  ecological  considerations,  or  become  radicalised  as  part  of  an  ecological  re- 
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that  severe  social  disharmony  will  emerge.  As  theorists  of  taxation  have  noted,  it  is  not  so 
much  the  imposition  of  a  collective  burden  on  a  people  that  rankles  them  as  the  spread  of 
the  burden  throughout  society.  At  the  same  time,  denying  people  the  opportunity  to  make 
fundamental  decisions  regarding  the  content  as  well  as  distribution  of  these  burdens  would 
also  make  for  social  disharmony  and  a  possible  authoritarian  reaction.  26  Demanding 
loyalty  and  compliance  without  'voice'  is  not  possible  within  a  democracy,  and  as 
suggested  later,  compliance  with  laws  and  regulations  will  be  enhanced  if  people 
themselves  are  the  ones  who  shaped  and/or  agreed  to  them. 
Ecological  re-modemisation  in  depending  for  its  success  on  creating  a  greater  sense  of 
common  purpose,  will  clearly  be  strengthened  by  tapping  into  existing  resources  of  shared 
identity,  such  as  nationhood.  As  was  argued  in  chapter  5,  collective  ecological 
management  is  compatible  with  a  sense  of  nationhood  which  is  partly  constituted  by 
particular  national  attachments  to  and  relations  with  the  'national  environment'.  The 
premise  of  green  democrats  is  the  idea  that  those  affected  should  be  considered  as  the 
relevant  demos.  One  could  say  that  a  green  democracy  needs  to  be  issue-sensitive  and 
boundary-indifferent.  The  boundaries  refer  to  the  demarcation  of  the  different  interests 
that  green  democratic  theory  seeks  to  include.  27  The  challenge  suggested  by  green  politics 
for  contemporary  democratic  nations  is  whether  they  have  the  foresight  and  courage  to 
make  the  further  extension  of  democratic  norms  and  procedures  a  matter  of  necessity,  as 
much  as  a  matter  of  desirability,  in  the  face  of  the  ecological  dilemmas  facing  them. 
26  One  of  the  famous  slogans  of  the  American  revolution  'No  taxation  without  representation'  aptly 
expresses  this  latter  condition. 
27  Although  beyond  this  chapter,  there  is  reason  to  think  that  as  well  as  different  democratic  institutions, 
there  may  be  different  democratic  decision  criteria  that  a  comprehensive  account  of  the  democratic 
regulation  of  social-cnvironmental  relations  would  have  to  address,  For  example,  it  might  be  that  simple 
majorities  will  not  be  acceptable  for  deciding  a  referendum  on  a  national  'sustainability  plan,  where  a  two 
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7.6  Discursive  Democracy 
There  is  a  good  deal  of  support  in  the  literature  that  the  view  of  democracy  which  best  fits 
with  green  politics  is  a  communicative  or  deliberative  model  (Saward,  1993;  Dobson, 
1996a;  Eckersley,  1996;  Jacobs,  1996;  Barry,  1996a).  Green  arguments  for  democracy 
can  be  said  to  rest  partly  upon  the  integrative  function  of  democracy.  This  refers  to  the 
manner  in  which  democratic  decision-making  allows  the  (always  provisional) 
determination  of  the  social-environmental  metabolism  to  be  affected  by  arguments  drawn 
from  various  sources  of  knowledge.  As  argued  in  chapter  5,  green  politics  as  collective 
ecological  management  is  about  the  collective  judgement  of  the  totality  of  relations  which 
constitute  a  society's  metabolism  with  its  environment.  Only  an  open-ended 
communicative  process  such  as  democracy  can  call  forth  and  possibly  integrate  the  various 
forms  of  knowledge  that  an  ecological  rational  metabolism  will  require  to  command 
widespread  support.  And  the  choice  of  deliberative  democracy  is  that  it  offers  a 
procedural  rule  for  democratic  decision-making,  that  of  communicative  as  opposed  to 
instrumental  rationality  (Dryzek,  1990:  54).  In  its  operation  its  advocates  also  claim  that 
it  will  increase  the  'democratic'  character  of  society  in  general.  Here,  the  choice  of 
deliberative  democracy  for  deciding  social-environmental  problems  is  that  it  will  lead  to 
policies  which  are  made  up  of  that  combination  of  both  communicative  (understood  as 
ethical)  and  instrumental  (understood  as  scientific/technical)  rationality  that  together 
constitute  ecological  rationality  in  the  sense  defined  in  chapter  3.  In  dealing  with  social- 
environmental  relations,  as  suggested  in  previous  chapters,  both  instrumental  and 
communicative  rationality  are  appropriate.  However,  as  the  ethics  of  use  argument 
demonstrates,,  it  is  communicative  rationality  which  has  priority  and  sets  the  parameters 
for  the  operation  of  instrumental  rationality.  This  was  the  position  in  7.2  and  7.3  where  I 
argued  that  the  technical  dimensions  of  environmental  problems  requiring  expert 
knowledge  were  to  be  determined  by  non-technical,  democratic  forms  of  decision-making. 
The  key  to  understanding  the  place  of  deliberative  democracy  within  green  political 
theory  is  that  as  a  form  of  collective  decision-making  it  stresses  the  'community'  over  the 298 
'market'  or  the  'state'  as  the  appropriate  location  for  first-order  decisions  concerning 
social-environmental  relations  . 
28  That  is,  as  indicated  in  the  last  chapter,  a  political 
decision-making  procedure  is  often  more  appropriate  than  a  non-political  one  i.  e.  the 
market,  in  collective  decisions  regarding  the  regulation  of  the  social-environmental 
metabolism.  At  the  same  time  a  deliberative  democratic  decision-making  process  is  to  be 
preferred  over  the  administrative  state  making  social-environmental  decisions  for  society 
as  a  whole  (Dryzek,  1995).  After  all,  it  is  social-environmental  relations,  not  state- 
environmental  relations,  that  is  the  subject  of  collective  ecological  management.  Once  the 
major  decisions  concerning  social-environmental  relations  have  been  made  democratically 
(via  representative  and  deliberative  institutions),  then  state  or  market  institutions  may  be 
used  to  carry  out  those  decisions.  Discursive  democracy  in  this  sense  attempts  to 
transform  the  relationship  between  state,  market  and  community,  by  seeking,  as  far  as 
possible,  to  make  both  the  state  and  the  market  instrumental  to  the  democratic  decisions 
of  the  community. 
The  choice  of  a  discursive  form  of  democracy  within  green  political  theory  is  closely 
associated  with  the  public  goods  character  of  social-environmental  issues.  As  Jacobs 
notes,  environmental  goods  are  not  private,  'Torming  attitudes  to  them  is  therefore  a 
different  kind  of  process  from  forming  attitudes  (preferences)  towards  private  goods.  It 
involves  reasoning  about  other  people's  interests  and  values  (as  well  as  one's  own)" 
(1996:  8).  This  is  at  the  heart  of  the  green  democratic  argument,  that  only  a  deliberative 
or  discursive  political  process  will  reflect  the  range  of  human  interests  and  values  in 
respect  to  social-environmental  relations.  Deliberative  institutions  reflect  the  public 
goods  nature  of  environmental  problems  where  individuals  do,  or  ought  to,  think  in  terms 
of  the  'Public  good'.  Examples  of  deliberative  institutions  include  citizens  juries,  'Round 
Tables',  public  inquiries,  and  the  Agenda  21  process  as  described  in  the  last  chapter. 
Citizens  juries'  are  groups  of  citizens  selected  to  represent  the  general  public  rather  than  a 
sectional  interest,  brought  together  to  deliberate  on  some  matter  of  public  concern. 
28  This  distinction  between  market  state  and  community  as  three  possible  mechanisms  for  the  regulation 
of  collective  life  is  taken  from  Taylor  (1982:  59). 299 
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Round  Tables  are  a  Canadian  experiment  in  which  the  government  chooses  representatives 
from  interest  groups  to  try  and  come  to  some  agreement  on  social  or  environmental 
issues,  and  to  make  recommendations  (Gordon,  1994).  Dryzek  also  lists  "participatory 
models  of  planning,  right-to-know  legislation,  public  hearings 
...  regulatory  negotiation  and 
environmental  mediation"  (1995:  188)  as  examples  of  'incipient  discursive  designs'.  For 
him  these  are  approximations  of  ideal  deliberative  institutions,  because  they  are  not 
autonomous  'public  spheres'  of  free  discourse  since  they  are  associated  with  the  state. 
The  point  about  these  institutions  in  environmental  public  policy-making  is  that  they  are 
held  to  be  more  appropriate  as  representing  the  interests  and  values  of  the  public  on 
environmental  public  goods  or  bads. 
These  institutions  are  considered  as  supplements  to,  rather  than  substitutes  for,  existing 
environmental  public  policy-making  institutions.  Firstly,  deliberative  democratic 
institutions  are  compatible  with  existing  liberal  democratic  institutions.  While  deliberative 
democracy  does  suggest  a  more  participatory  form  of  democratic  decision-making,  it  is 
compatible  with  representative  government,  indeed  some  aspects  of  it  are  representative 
themselves.  Secondly,  they  are  confined  to  environmental  policy-making,  though  most  of 
the  advocates  of  deliberative  democracy  believe  that  their  widespread  use  will  create  an 
impetus  for  the  democratisation  of  the  state  and  other  areas  of  policy-making  (Dryzek, 
1995;  Christoff,  1996).  Thirdly,  in  its  real-world  approximation,  there  is  no  reason  to 
suppose  that  pure  communicative  rationality  is  the  only  or  main  procedural  standard. 
Jacobs  (1996)  suggests  that  within  deliberative  decision-making  there  may  be  certain 
desired  or  proscribed  outcomes.  According  to  him,  "society  can  constrain  the  deliberative 
process  by  imposing  on  it  the  requirement  to  fulfil  particular  end-values;  that  is,  particular 
broad  conceptions  of  the  public  good  ... 
Certain  values  (such  as  racism)  could  be  ruled 
inadmissible;  or  the  deliberative  process  could  be  asked  to  come  to  a  decision  in  pursuit  of 
particular  ende'  (1996:  17).  Again  this  can  be  taken  as  evidence  of  the  supplementary  role 
that  deliberative  democratic  institutions  can  play  as  part  of  the  range  of  democratic 
institutions  which  constitute  a  democratic  political  system.  Finally,  the  deliberative 
process  could  be  required  to  decide  using  a  range  of  decision-making  procedures.  For 300 
some  issues,  consensus  may  be  appropriate,  for  others  simple  majority  rule,  and  for  others 
a  two-thirds  majority  rule  may  be  suitable.  As  TannsJo,  in  a  different  context,  notes  "In 
situations  where  we  want  to  find  out  what  to  consider  morally  right  or  wrong,  or  where 
we  want  to  reach  a  decision  as  to  what  we  are  to  take  as  a  matter  of  fact,  majority 
democracy  may  seem  appropriate,  while  in  situations  where  we  have  to  divide  up  between 
us  (equals)  some  amount  of  money  or  other  economic  resources,  it  may  seem  appropriate 
to  practice  unanimous  democracy"  (1992:  43). 
The  essence  of  the  deliberative  view  of  democratic  decision-making  is  its 
communicative  character.  It  is  not  voting  in  private  booths,  but  debate  and  discussion 
i6  - 
within  something  approaching  a  'public  sphere',  which  marks  deliberative  democracy. 
Since  according  to  Jacobs,  &-fbrmati6rf-t6Wdrds  public  goods  is 
...  essentially  a 
public  not  a  private  activity"  (1996:  8),  it  follows  that  a  public  and  deliberative  procedure 
is  required  in  order  that  these  attitudes/preferences  towards  environmental  public  goods  be 
created.  The  point  is  that  policy-making  based  on  aggregating  privately4ormed 
preferences  will  not  be  based  on  the  appropriate  information.  This  information  can  only 
be  created  within  deliberative  not  aggregative  contexts. 
Within  a  deliberative  rather  than  a  aggregative  context,  participants  are  more  likely  to 
engage  in  'public  good  thinking'.  Jacobs  (1996:  8-9)  suggests  three  reasons  why 
deliberative  institutions  are  likely  to  encourage  this.  The  first  is  that  arguments  must  be 
put  in  terms  of  the  public  good.  Arguments  in  terms  of  private  or  sectional  interests  are 
unlikely  to  produce  majority  agreement.  The  second  is  that  deliberative  institutions 
expose  participants  to  a  wider  range  of  perspectives  tha;  is  likely  with  private 
contemplation.  Here  the  representativeness  of  the  participants  is  Crucial,  and  the  standard 
of  communicative  rationality  which  allows  all  arguments/points  that  participants  wish  to 
raise  to  be  raised.  The  third  is  that  the  act  of  deliberation  tends  to  create  a  community 
amongst  participants.  Communication  and  contact  with  others  under  conditions  of  respect 
and  equality  invites  participants  to  a  greater  sense  of  mutuality,  solidarity  and  sympathy. 
One  may  add  that  in  cases  of  conflict,  a  deliberative  setting  may  foster  toleration  and 
understanding  if  not  agreement.  Thus,  one  should  not  judge  deliberative  democracy  solely 301 
by  its  capacity  to  produce  agreement  (or  consensus  in  Habermas's  abstract  account  of  the 
'ideal  speech  situation').  Deliberative  institutions  may  not  themselves  solve  social- 
environmental  problems  in  the  sense  of  producing  agreement  on  the  right  course  of  action, 
or  policy  to  be  implemented.  However,  their  widespread  use  may  create  the  conditions 
which  result  in  agreement.  At  the  same  time,  it  is  not  proposed  that  deliberative 
democratic  institutions  replace  existing  representative  ones.  Rather  the  appeal  to 
deliberative  democracy  is  to  suggest  a  supplement  to  existing  democratic  institutions.  The 
discursive  claim  is  that  certain  environmental  problems,  for  example,  major  land-use 
proposals  where  'preservation'  conflicts  with  'development',  lend  themselves  to  a 
deliberative  rather  than  an  aggregative  democratic  solution.  Thus  in  the  case  of  a  public 
inquiry  into  a  proposed  development  project,  the  remit  of  the  inquiry  should  permit  the 
possibility  of  suggesting  that  the  development  not  proceed.  In  other  words,  unlike  the 
position  described  in  5.6  where  such  participatory  forms  of  public  involvement  are  often 
limited  to  influencing  how  development  proceeds;  there  ought  to  be  the  opportunity  to 
influence  the  inquiry's  findings  based  on  arguments  over  whether  it  should  go  ahead. 
The  advantages  of  a  deliberative  approach  can  be  seen  by  looking  at  the  distinction 
made  between  the  different  environmental  attitudes  people  have  as  citizens  and  as 
consumers  made  in  chapters  3,5  and  6.  One  way  of  viewing  this  distinction  is  Sagofrs 
(1988)  argument  that  individuals  as  consumers  are  guided  mainly  by  considerations  of 
their  own  interests,  whereas  as  citizens  they  have  to,  or  ought  to,  place  the  latter  within 
the  context  of  a  common  good,  which  accommodates  the  interests  of  others  as  well  as 
their  own.  While  Sagoffs  position  brings  out  the  public/private  dilemma  within 
environmental  issues,,  it  is  based,  as  Keat  (1994)  points  out,  on  an  overly  restricted 
conception  of  consumption  as  a  purely  private  activity.  According  to  Keat, 
consumption  ... 
is  not  merely  something  that  we  pursue  as  individuals:  it  is  also  a 
major  element  of  the  shared  values  of  the  local  culture.  So  when,  as  citizens, 
people  debate  the  nature  and  implications  of  their  conception  of  the  good  society, 
they  will  find  than  a  central  element  in  that  conception  itself  concerns  the  value 302 
attributed  to  consumption-Hence  what  Sagoff  represents  as  a  tension  within 
individuals  between  their  roles  as  consumers  and  citizens  might  better  be  seen  as  a 
tension  within  the  culture  between  the  values  of  consumption  and  of  nature-  one 
that  they  have  to  address  as  citizens.  (1994:  343-4) 
Sagoff  seeks  to  replace  consumer  interests  with  those  of  the  citizen,  that  is,  replace 
economistic  valuations  of  the  environment  with  political-normative  ones.  However  if 
consumption  is  itself  a  social  value  and  not  simply  a  private  activity,  then,  as  Keat 
suggests,  the  resolution  of  social-environmental  problems  requires  a  wider  cultural 
context.  The  green  democratic  argument  is  that  this  cultural  contradiction  can  only  be 
resolved  democratically.  And  this  is  more  likely  to  be  achieved  when  deliberative 
democratic  settings  and  institutions  supplement  existing  representative  ones.  The  point 
about  deliberative  democratic  institutions  is  that  they  can  bring  out  the  intersubjective 
character  of  environmental  values,  and  articulate  publicly  the  different  forms  of  human 
valuing  and  bring  them  to  bear  in  the  making  of  social-environmental  decisions.  The 
problem  with  economistic  forms  of  valuing  the  environment  is  not  that  they  are  necessarily 
wrong  per  se,  or  that  they  are  non-moral,  29  but  rather  they  are  wrong  when  they 
monopolise  the  debate,  'crowd  out'  other  forms  of  valuing,  and  human  interests  in  nature, 
and  are  standardly  used  as  the  primary  form  of  information  upon  which  to  make 
environmental  decisions.  Green  political  theory  does  not  seek  to  abandon  instrumental 
social-environmental  interaction.  The  legitimacy  of  instrumental  social-environmental 
relations,  is,  it  will  be  recalled,  at  the  heart  of  the  argument  in  chapter  3  for  an  'ethics  of 
use'.  There  it  was  argued  that  the  normative  basis  of  green  politics  cannot  be  abstracted 
from  the  existential  fact  of  human  manipulation  and  use  of  the  environment.  It  is  the 
manner  of  this  interaction  with  which  the  ethics  of  use  as  a  central  normative  aspect  of 
collective  ecological  management  is  concerned.  Such  a  public  ethic  is  the  desired  outcome 
of  the  deliberative  democratic  process  reflecting,  as  accurately  as  possible,  the  collectively 
I  As  indicated  in  chapter  3  (3.5-1),  even  a  crude  instrumentalist  anthropocentrism  is  not  incompatible 
with  the  imposition  of  some  ethical  limits  on  social-cnviromnental  exchanges. 303 
agreed  set  of  public  and  binding  norms  that  are  to  regulate  social-environmental  affairs. 
These  norms  are  the  outcome  of  a  deliberative  process  within  which  questions  concerning 
both  ends  and  means  pertaining  to  them  can  and  ought  to  be  raised. 
It  is  the  normative  indeterminacy  and  epistemological  uncertainty  associated  with 
social-environmental  interaction  that  calls  for  democratic  political  deliberation.  It  is 
important  to  bear  in  mind  that  this  indeterminacy  and  uncertainty  applies  to  both  ends  and 
means  within  the  green  political  project.  If  green  politics  is  concerned  with  securing 
normative  agreement  around  an  ecologically  rational  social-environmental  metabolism,  this 
implies,  as  indicated  above,  that  green  politics  cannot  guide  itself  by  seeking  to  discover 
some  'true'  social-environmental  metabolism.  30  Any  such  notion  of  one  'true  path'  is  both 
dangerous  and  potentially  undemocratic  since  it  can  function  as  a  way  to  close  debate  and 
discussion.  While  green  politics  is  ultimately  presaged  on  a  belief  that  there  is  a  rational 
harmony  between  human  and  non-human  interests,  it  is  not  supposed  that  there  is  only  one 
equilibrium  pattern.  Rather,  as  indicated  in  chapter  5,  there  are  a  (limited)  number  of  such 
patterns  which  may  secure  an  ecologically  rational  social-environmental  metabolism. 
Choosing  which  pattern  and  rate  can  only  be  legitimate  if  it  is  democratic  and  involves  not 
just  questions  about  means  but  more  fundamentally  about  the  ends  of  social-environmental 
relations.  In  choosing  a  particular  metabolism  one  is  also  choosing  a  particular  pattern  of 
social-environmental  relations,  a  certain  mode  of  collective  being,  and  thus  a  particular 
type  of  society.  Just  as  a  virtue  ethics  view  of  social-environmental  relations  asks  the 
question  'what  sort  of  person  should  I  becomeT  (3.6),  the  political  analogue  of  this  sees 
the  choice  of  social-environmental  metabolism  as  choosing  to  five  in  a  different  sort  of 
society. 
30  It  must  be  said  however  that  other  conceptions  of  green  political  theory  which  stress  the  superiority  of 
the  'natural'  over  the  'unnatural'  or  'artefactual'  do  seem  to  orientate  themselves  towards  discovering 
some  objective  truth  of  human-natural  relations,  the  'proof  of  which  is  to  be  found  in  the  infinitely 
sustainable  character  of  the  metabolic  relation  which  follows  from  that  'truth'.  This  was  discussed  in 
respect  to  deep  ecology  in  chapter  2,  and  its  submissive  attitude  to  nature.  For  an  example  of  a  conception 
of  green  politics  in  which  the  value  of  the  'natural'  is  central  see  Goodin  (1992). 304 
7.7  Institutions  and  Principles  for  Collective  Ecological  Management 
In  this  section  the  focus  is  on  assessing  the  common  perception  that  green  democratic 
theory  must  be  some  variation  of  direct  democracy.  With  the  state  and  citizen  playing 
such  a  central  role,  representative  forms  of  democracy  are  perhaps  more  central  to  green 
concerns  than  is  usually  thought.  Highlighting  the  role  of  representative  institutions  is  also 
another  way  of  expressing  the  'post-liberal'  complexion  of  green  democratic  theory. 
One  of  the  arguments  in  favour  of  representative  democracy  is  that  unlike  participatory 
or  direct  forms,  the  'politicisation  of  everyday  life'  is  not  one  of  its  goals.  The  disputes 
that  occur  within  representative  democracy  do  not  share  the  same  intensity  as  those  that 
may  occur  in  the  face-to-face  context  of  'strong  democracy'  (Barber,  1984),  or  the  small- 
scale,  decentralised,  self-sufficient  communities  that  pepper  the  green  political  literature. 
In  such  a  context  it  is  often  difficult  to  distinguish  a  fellow  citizen's  opinions  from  her  as  an 
individual,  and  while  respect  should  always  be  shown  to  the  individual  independent  of  her 
particular  views,  under  direct  democratic  conditions  this  important  distinction  may  become 
blurred  or  even  broken.  Maintaining  a  central  place  for  representative  institutions  within 
green  democratic  theory  entails  rejecting  the  attempt  to  create  transparent  social  relations. 
It  also  relates  to  the  defence  of  the  private  sphere  mentioned  in  6.7. 
For  example,  the  private  sphere  of  the  family,  as  the  primary  site  of  consumption  as 
well  as  the  site  of  decisions  concerning  procreation,  is  of  central  significance  in  influencing 
social-environmental  relations.  However,  it  is  not  part  of  the  theory  of  green  politics 
being  defended  here  that  the  familial  sphere  be  democratised,  by,  for  example,  the 
abolition  of  the  family  and  the  creation  of  communal  or  state-controlled  child-rearing 
institutions.  Given  the  importance  of  population  in  affecting  social-environmental 
relations,  it  is  clear  that  it  may  be  necessary  to  regulate  population  growth.  This  means 
that  the  decision  to  have  children  cannot  be  left  to  individual  choice  alone  but  has  to  be 
taken  within  the  context  of  how  it  may  affect  social-environmental  relations.  However, 
there  is  a  world  of  a  difference  between  the  democratic  regulation  of  private  decisions 305 
concerning  procreation,  which  is  only  one  constitutive  aspect  of  the  family,  and  the 
abolition  of  the  family  as  a  social  institution.  31 
Another  reason  for  greens  to  endorse  representative  democratic  institutions  has  to  do 
with  the  green  concern  to  give  'voice'  to  the  interests  of  previously  excluded  others. 
Three  different  classes  of  affected  interests,  who  do  not  at  present  have  any  direct 
democratic  representation  within  the  decision-maldng  process,  have  been  identified  by 
green  theorists  and  commentators.  These  are  the  interests  of  future  generations,  affected 
foreign  nationals,  and  (parts  oo  the  nonhuman  world  (Kavka  and  Warren,  1983;  Goodin, 
1996;  Dobson,  1996b).  Although  democracy  is  necessarily  by  the  people  and  of  the 
people,  it  does  not  necessarily  have  to  befor  the  people,  where  the  'people'  is  understood 
as  a  human  community  presently  living  within  a  nation-state.  On  the  face  of  it,  if,  and  of 
course  this  is  a  moot  point,  but  if  the  political  exclusion  of  the  interests  of  these  three 
classes  of  non-citizens  is  held  to  constitute  a  defect  in  democratic  practice,  then  it  is  clear 
that  representative  institutions  offer  the  most  defensible  and  practical  way  of  including 
them  in  the  democratic  process. 
The  appropriateness  of  representative  over  direct  democratic  forms  is  most  obvious  in 
the  cases  of  the  interests  of  future  generations  and  those  of  the  nonhuman  world.  These 
groups  cannot  themselves  express  and  publicly  defend  their  interests,  either  because  they 
do  not  exist  or  cannot  communicate  their  interests.  It  is  therefore  uncontroversial  to 
31  The  underlying  rationale  is  that  the  decision  to  have  children  cannot  be  taken  to  be  a  purely  private 
matter,  but  bemuse  of  the  social-environmental  impact  of  population  growth  it  must  be  seen  as  a  private 
act  which  will  have  public  effects.  As  such  the  decision  to  have  children  can  be  viewed  as  a  potential 
externality  which  raises  issues  concerning  the  balance  between  the  protection  of  the  individual  from  social 
coercion  and  the  protection  of  the  public  good  of  a  sustainable  social-environmental  metabolism. 
Although  there  are  many  precedents  for  the  democratic  regulation  of  ostensibly  private  behaviour,  such  as 
laws  concerning  driving  and  the  production  and  consumption  of  certain  goods  and  services,  the  regulation 
of  population  increases  does  pose  some  especially  difficult  problems.  Being  denied  the  right  to  drive  as 
fast  as  one  can  is  not  the  same  as  being  denied  the  right  to  have  as  many  children  as  one  wishes.  While 
the  political  regulation  of  private  decisions  concerning  procreation  win  form  a  part  of  any  green 
democracy,  this  need  not  be  as  large  a  problem  as  it  seems  if  one  views  production  and  consumption 
decisions  as  having  a  greater  or  equal  weight  in  affecting  the  environmental  impact  of  social  relations. 
On  this  account,  it  is  ecologically  rational,  not  to  say  more  politically  acceptable,  to  regulate  production 
and  consumption  rather  than  population.  However,  as  suggested  in  the  last  chapter  (6.7),  the  aim  of 
ecological  stewardship  as  an  ideal  or  virtue  is  to  integrate  one's  role  as  parent,  producer,  consumer  and 
citizen  into  a  mode  of  character,  of  acting  in  the  world,  in  which  decisions  to  have  children  will  be  based 
on  interests  other  than  one's  own.  This  is  discussed  in  the  next  section. 306 
suggest  that  the  only  sensible  form  that  their  inclusion  in  the  democratic  process  can  take 
is  a  representative  rather  than  any  direct  form.  It  is  only  in  the  case  of  affected  foreigners, 
that  it  is  theoretically  possible  for  their  interests  to  be  directly  expressed  and  brought  to 
bear  in  any  direct  democratic  decision-making  procedure.  However  it  is  important  to  bear 
in  mind  that  in  respect  to  these  three  classes  of  interests  it  is  not  true  to  say  that  they  have 
no  influence  on  the  democratic  decision-making  process.  Even  without  separate 
representative  measures,  the  interests  of  these  groups  can  be  brought  to  bear  if  there  are 
citizens  who  incorporate  and  consider  their  interests  in  making  decisions  and/or  are  willing 
to  defend  these  interests  publicly  in  an  attempt  to  persuade  fellow  citizens  to  think 
likewise.  To  a  greater  or  lesser  degree,  it  is  possible  that  any  interest  can  be  brought  to 
bear  and  have  an  effect  on  the  democratic  process.  The  only  stipulation  is  that  there 
should  4  some  citizens  who  incorporate  these  various  interests  and/or  publicly  represent 
them,  seeking  to  persuade  their  fellow  citizens  of  the  propriety  or  prudence  of  taking  these 
interests  into  account.  In  many  respects  the  argument  for  the  democratic  representation  of 
the  interests  of  nonhumans;  for  example  is  a  reflection  of  the  failure  of  these  interests  to  be 
reflected  within  the  interests  of  citizens.  In  other  words,  the  creation  of  democratic 
institutions  to  represent  nonhuman  interests  arises  partly  from  the  lack  of  'green 
citizenship'  and  a  wider  green  culture.  If  as  a  matter  of  course  citizens  took  the  interests 
of  nonhumans  into  account  when  making  social-enviromnental  decisions  there  would  be 
less  need  for  these  interests  to  be  directly  democratically  represented  since  they  would 
already  be  incorporated  by  citizens  themselves.  Hence  a  public  'ethics  of  use'  can  be 
argued  to  function  as  a  way  in  which  the  interests  of  nonhumans  are  taken  into  account, 
while  acknowledging  the  human  interest  in  transforming  and  using  the  nonhuman  world. 
Whatever  interests  are  to  be  democratically  considered  what  needs  to  be  remembered 
is  that  it  is  not  the  interests  per  se,  of  the  future,  nonhumans  and  foreigners  that  is  at  stake. 
Rather  what  is  being  considered  are  these  interests  as  perceived  by  democratic  actors  in 
the  course  of  democratic  decision-making.  To  suppose  otherwise  would  be  to  presume  an 
infallibility  and  omnipotence  which  cannot  be  sustained.  Even  the  most  diligent  ecologist 
cannot  be  said  to  be  infallible  in  determining  what  is in  the  interests  of  nonhumans,  or 307 
indeed  what  their  interests  are.  This  leads  to  the  question  of  who  is  best  placed  to 
represent  the  interests  of  nonhumans.  Deep  or  shallow  ecologists,  economists,  lay 
citizens,  environmental  managers?  The  democratic  point  is  that  no  one  group  of  citizens 
can  be  assumed  to  be  the  'true  representatives'  of  nonhumans.  Rather  there  needs  to  be  a 
democratic  debate  about  what  are  their  interests  and  how  do  they  weigh  against  the 
interests  of  humans.  Such  issues  are  clearly  the  essence  of  normative  debates  once  a 
particular  use  or  development  of  nature  has  been  sanctioned.  That  is,  they  are  side- 
constraints  on  how  we  use  the  nonhuman  world,  rather  than  whether  to  use  it.  The 
question  is  not  'why  take  the  interests  of  nonhumans  into  account?,  but  rather  'why  not?  ' 
and  'how?  ' 
To  a  greater  or  lesser  extent  it  is  true  to  say  that  the  interests  of  all  three  classes  are 
incorporated  by  citizens  in  democratic  societies.  This  is  particularly  so  with  the  interests 
of  future  generations.  Consistent  with  the  naturalistic  moral  perspective  presented  in 
chapter  3  (3.4.3),  is  the  postulate  that  humans  do  care  about  their  descendants, 
particularly  proximate  ones.  In  other  words,  the  interests  of  future  generations  are  already 
incorporated  within  the  extended  interests  and  considerations  of  the  present  generation.  If 
this  is  the  case,  it  may  be  that  the  interests  of  future  generations  can  be  brought  to  bear  on 
the  democratic  deliberations  of  the  present  one  by  a  procedural  rule  which  makes  it 
mandatory  that  decisions  be  made  with  the  interests  of  the  future  in  mind.  "  And  as  many 
writers  have  sought  to  demonstrate,  making  environmental  decisions  which  take  the 
interests  of  future  human  generations  into  account,  does  go  a  long  way  in  securing  the 
types  of  policies  proposed  by  those  wishing  to  preserve  and  protect  the  nonhuman  world 
for  its  own  sake  (de  Shalit,  1995;  Norton,  1991).  For  Norton  this  'convergence  thesis' 
undercuts  much  of  the  deep  ecology  position.  He  argues  that, 
32  The  incorporatation  of  the  interests  of  the  future  would  be  akin  to  interests  of  children  being  entrusted 
to  parents.  Another  model  is  that  of  many  aboriginal  peoples  for  whom  each  major  social  decision  was  to 
be  assessed  in  the  light  of  how  it  would  affect  future  generations.  Such  sentiments  arc  expressed  in  the 
Native  American  saying  "We  do  not  inherit  the  earth  from  our  parents,  but  borrow  it  from  our  children". 308 
introducing  the  idea  that  other  species  have  intrinsic  value,  that  humans  should  be 
'fair'  to  all  other  species,  provides  no  operationally  recognizable  constraints  on 
human  behaviour  that  are  not  already  implicit  in  the  generalized,  cross-temporal 
obligations  to  protect  a  healthy,  complex,  and  autonomously  functioning  systems 
for  the  benefit  of  future  generations  of  humans.  Deep  ecologists,  who  cluster 
around  the  principle  that  nature  has  independent  value,  should  therefore  not  differ 
from  long-sighted  anthropocentrists  in  their  policy  goals  for  the  protection  of 
biological  diversity.  (1991:  226-7) 
Lýqg-sighted  anthropocentrism  is  of  course  a  kke 
, 
Aspect  of  ecol  giR  stewardship,  which 
J_y 
as  argued  in  the  next  section  forms  the  core  of  'green  citizenship'.  The  point  here  is  that 
taking  the  interests  of  future  generations  into  account  will,  as  Norton  suggests,  converge 
with  non-anthropocentrists  on  environmental  policy  goals.  Policy  agreement  need  not 
depend  upon  substantive  normative  agreement.  As  was  suggested  in  2.5,  differences  at 
the  level  of  pure  ethics  can  be  compatible  with  agreement  at  the  level  of  applied  ethics,  or 
in  this  case,  policy  goals.  Insisting  on  agreement  on  the  reasons  for  action  can  often  be 
counter-productive.  In  terms  of  normative  underpinning  of  environmental  policy,  contra 
deep  ecology,  consensus  on  the  reasons  for  action  are  not  as  important  as  agreement  for 
the  action  itself 
Whatever  form  it  takes,  the  representation  of  the  interests  of  these  classes  may  act  as  a 
side-constraint  on  policy  decisions  that  the  present  generation  may  take.  33  In  giving  voice 
to  their  interests  there  is  no  obligation  on  behalf  of  a  green  democracy  to  promote  or 
positively  enhance  these  interests.  That  the  interests  of  these  excluded  groups  were 
equally  considered,  publicly  registered,  and  thus  included  in  the  democratic  decision- 
making  process,  is  enough.  Equal  consideration  of  interests  does  not  guarantee  that  those 
33  The  difference  between  the  various  classes  is  fiulher  highlighted  when  one  comes  to  consider  the  model 
of  representation  that  is  appropriate  in  each  case.  In  respect  to  the  interests  of  future  generations  and  the 
nonhuman  world  a  non-delegate  model  of  representation  is  the  only  practicable  one.  What  the 
representatives  of  these  two  classes  arc  required  to  do  is  to  interpret  both  what  their  interests  are  as  well  as 
determining  how  they  are  best  protected.  In  the  case  of  affected  foreigners  it  is  possible  that  a  delegate 
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interests  be  equally  satisfied  or  protected.  As  suggested  earlier  in  the  critique  of  eco- 
authoritarianism  (7.2),  the  justification  of  democracy  should  not  be  based  on  its  ability  to 
secure  the  satisfaction  of  welfare  interestS.  34  However,  in  the  case  of  future  generations, 
viewed  as  descendants  of  the  present  generation  and  not  as  future  generations  of  humanity 
as  a  whole,  it  is  likely  that  decisions  will  attempt  to  promote  and  improve  their  situation. 
While  democratic  theory  does  not  demand  that  their  interests  be  positively  secured  as 
opposed  to  represented,  it  is  likely  that  citizens  will  seek  to  promote  and  protect  the 
interests  of  descendants  and  future  citizens. 
That  these  previously  excluded  interests  are  given  'voice'  in  the  democratic  process  is 
sufficient  to  satisfy  the  demands  of  green  democracy.  The  process  of  representing  the 
interests  of  the  nonhuman  world,  that  they  count  for  something,  is  a  necessary  aspect  of 
the  democratic  determination  of  legitimate  'use'  from  illegitimate  'abuse'  in  respect  to 
social  interaction  with  the  environment.  At  the  same  time  the  consideration  of  the 
interests  of  others  is  supplemented  by  citizens  being  encouraged  to  re-assess,  re-evaluate 
and  perhaps  alter  their  own  interests  in  the  light  of  democratic  debate  and  deliberation. 
This  last  point  is  discussed  below.  This  argument  for  considering  the  interests  of  others  in 
the  determination  of  social-environmental  affairs  underwrites  the  argument  in  chapter  2 
that  there  is  not  a  priori  disposition  in  favour  of  'preservation'  as  opposed  to 
'development'  (2.8).  What  green  democratic  theory  requires  is  that  the  interests  of  the 
nonhuman  world,  for  instance,  are  considered,  not  that  they  automatically  'trump'  those  of 
humans.  Going  against  the  grain  of  much  green  moral  theory,  the  position  defended  here 
is  that  humans  have  no  presumptive  'right'  to  development  and  nonhumans  have  no 
presumptive  'right'  to  preservation. 
From  a  green  view,  representative  democracy  may  be  improved  by  institutional 
changes  to  its  operation  as  well  supplementing  it  with  more  institutionalised  opportunities 
34  Recalling  the  distinction  made  in  the  last  chapter  between  'welfare'  and  'liberty'  considerations, 
democracy  from  a  green  perspective  is  justified  on  the  grounds  that  it  can  secure  basic  liberty  interests, 
particularly  that  of  autonomy.  In  other  words,  green  democracy  is  defended  on  deontological  rather  than 
utilitarian  grounds.  As  such,  democracy  within  green  politics  is  conceived  as  an  intrinsic  rather  than  an 
instrumental  practice.  That  is,  it  is  valued  as  a  procedure  for  malcing  political  decisions,  including  social- 
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for  citizen  participation.  It  is  clear  that  Beck's  (1992)  argument  for  'institutionalised  self- 
criticism',  will  involve  both  changes  to  the  workings  of  existing  representative  institutions 
as  well  as  creating  new  forms  of  democratic  participation.  However,  it  is  not  the  case  that 
the  latter  requires  creating  democratic  institutions  in  order  to  make  social  relations 
transparent.  While  the  eco-anarchist  position  is  generally  marked  by  a  desire  to  make 
social  relations  transparent  to  the  individual  by  breaking  society  into  smaller  units  and  then 
constructing  direct  forms  of  democracy,  it  is  fair  to  say  that  the  retention  of  state 
institutions  does  imply  a  degree  of  opaqueness  in  social  relations.  The  point  however  is 
that  the  institutional  arrangements  being  suggested  here,  in  conjunction  with  the 
arguments  in  the  last  chapter  for  self-reliance  and  reduced  complexity,  will  create  the 
conditions  to  make  existing  social  arrangements  less  opaque  and  more  open  to  democratic 
scrutiny  and  accountability. 
Additional  procedural  demands  o  en  politics  is  that  democratic  environmental 
decision-making  be  regulated  by  principles  of  reflexivity,  openness  and  precaution.  These 
can  be  taken  as  meaning  that  ,  when  faced  with  large-scale  environmental  decisions,  no 
decision  be  taken,  the  effects  of  which  cannot  be  reversed  in  the  future.  This  is  one  way  in 
which  to  understand  the  idea  that  the  social-environmental  problems  of  democracy  cannot 
be  assumed  to  be  solved  simply  by  more  democracy.  What  is  required  is  'better' 
democracy,  which  in  part  has  to  do  with  better  informed  democratic  decision-making 
procedures.  And  one  principle  that  has  been  a  constant  demand  within  the  green 
movement  is  the  demand  for  greater  openness  in  environmental  decision-making  and 
greater  freedom  of  and  access  to  environmental  information  (Paehlke,  1988,  Beck, 
1995a).  So  while  it  is  no  part  of  green  democratic  theory  to  make  all  social  relations 
transparent,  a  central  aspect  of  it  is  to  make  environmental  decision-making  open  to 
democratic  scrutiny.  For  Beck  this  is  one  aspect  of  what  he  calls  the  "secret  elective 
affinity  between  the  ecologization  and  democratization  of  society  ... 
The  long-term  policy 
towards  threats  should  be  slowing  down,  revisability,  accountability,  and,  therefore,  the 
ability  for  consent  as  well;  that  is  to  say  the  expansion  of  democracy  into  previously 311 
walled-off  areas  of  science,  technology,  and  industry 
...  What  is  important  is  to  exploit  and 
develop  the  superiority  of  doubt  against  industrial  dogmatism"  (1995  a:  17). 
The  significance  of  the  precautionary  principle  lies  in  what  commentators  have  called 
its  challenge  to  "the  established  scientific  method  ...  the  application  of  cost-benefit 
analysis  ...  established  legal  principles  and  practices  such  as  liability 
...  politicians  to  begin 
thinking  through  longer  time  frames  than  the  next  election  or  economic  recession" 
(O'Riordan  and  Jordan,  1995:  193).  This  principle  carries  with  it  notions  of  best  practice 
in  environmental  management  and  good  husbandry,  values  which  are  clearly  compatible 
with  ecological  stewardship.  As  a  procedural  standard,  the  precautionary  principle  can  be 
viewed  as  simply  asserting  that  decision-makers  should  act  to  protect  the  environment  in 
advance  of  scientific  certainty  on  the  issue  (ibid.:  194).  As  mentioned  earlier,  prudence 
and  precaution  are  rational  procedural  standards  to  adopt  when  makingdecisions  under 
conditions  of  uncertainty.  One  way  of  looking  at  the  application  of  the  precautionary 
principle  on  democratic  decision-making  is  to  see  it  as  specifying  a  range  of  outcomes 
which  are  impermissible,  those  that  cannot  be  altered  in  the  future.  Thus  applying  this 
principle  would  require  ruling  out  irreversible  environmental  changes  for  example.  Not  all 
options  are  available  as  potential  comparators  for  environmental  decision-making  under 
conditions  of  uncertainty.  In  situations  of  uncertainty  the  onus  of  proof  is  on  the  risk 
creator,  those  who  propose  development  rather  than  those  who  oppose  it.  The  point  is 
that  democratic  environmental  decision-making  where  uncertainty  and  ecological 
vulnerability  are  high  calls  for  prudence  and  self-limitation.  This  self-limiting  aspect  of  the 
precautionary  principle  can  be  viewed  as  an  additional  self-binding  character  of 
democracy.  It  can  also  be  viewed  as  a  rational  decision-making  procedure  for  long-term 
collective  interest.  Thus  the  application  of  the  precautionary  principle  can  be  viewed  as 
the  institutionalisation  of  the  ecological  virtue  of  prudence  under  uncertain  conditions.  To 
relate  this  to  the  points  made  earlier  in  reference  to  the  authority  of  science,  the 
precautionary  principle  works  without  the  assumption  that  science  will  or  can  determine 312 
or  provide  an  agreed  conceptualisation  of  the  environmental  issue  at  hand.  "  It  is  precisely 
because  environmental  problems  are  disputed  (for  example,  global  warming)  within  the 
scientific  community,  that  the  precautionary  principle  holds  that  decisions  ought  to  be 
made  in  advance  of  scientific  proof  (consensus  within  the  scientific  community),  which 
may  not  be  forthcoming  anyway.  The  significance  of  the  precautionary  principle  has 
already  been  stressed  in  chapter  5  where  it  was  argued  to  be  a  key  feature  of  ecological 
modernisation  upon  which  collective  ecological  management  seeks  to  build.  What  the 
application  of  this  principle  indicates  is  a  challenge  to  the  accepted  relationship  between 
science  and  policy-making,  or  what  O'Riordan  and  Jordan  call  the  'science-policy  culture' 
(1995:  208).  It  calls  for  a  more  communicative,  sensitive  relationship  between  the  two, 
and  shifts  environmental  decision-making  away  from  technical  or  expert  determination 
based  on  known  'facts',  and  towards  making  public  judgements  in  the  face  of  uncertainty 
and  controversy  (Barry,  1996a). 
7.8  Green  Democracy,  Citizenship  and  Stewardship 
One  of  the  questions  green  politics  addresses,  and  upon  which  its  practical  success 
depends,  is  expressed  in  Elster's  statement  that,  "the  central  concern  of  politics  should  be 
the  transformation  of  preferences  rather  than  their  aggregation!  '  (1983:  35).  This  was 
raised  earlier  in  chapters  5  (5.6)  and  6  (6.2.1),  where  it  was  suggested  that  collective 
ecological  management  requires  that  individual  environmental  preferences  cannot  be  taken 
as  the  basis  for  collective  ecological  decision-making.  36  This  has  to  do  with  the  problem 
35  One  political  implication  of  the  precautionary  principle  for  O'Riordan  and  Jordan  is  the  necessity  for  a 
"'civic  science'  or  the  science  of  open  public  debate  about  determining  uncertain  futures"  (1995:  207)  as  a 
crucial  dimension  of  a  'greener'  scicncc-policy  culture.  This  is  also  echoed  in  Beck's  call  for  a  greater 
organisation  of  what  he  calls  'public  experiential  science'  (1995a:  16),  as  a  response  to  ecological 
problems.  Also  see  Lee  (1993). 
36  Part  of  the  reasoning  behind  this  is  that  behavioural  changes  motivated  by  the  internalisation  of  norms 
is  more  effective  and  longer-lasting  than  behavioural,  changes  based  on  external  or  coercive  imposition. 
This  suggests  a  critique  of  the  eco-authoritarian  position  on  the  grounds  of  effectivencss,  premised  on  the 
assumption  that  change  motivated  by  an  acceptance  of  its  moral  rightness  is  more  effective  in  sustaining 
that  change  than  if  that  change  is  grounded  in  fear  or  coercion.  The  state  cannot  do  everything.  As 
Cairns  and  Williams  suggest  in  another  conteA  "What  the  state  needs  from  the  citizenry  cannot  be 313 
of  endogenous  preference,  the  fact  that  preferences  are  not  'given'  or  fixed,  but  unstable 
and  malleable.  Endogenous  preferences  highlight  the  institutional  and  contextual  nature  of 
preference  origination  and  formation.  According  to  Sunstein  "The  phenomenon  of 
endogenous  preferences  casts  doubt  on  the  notion  that  a  democratic  government  ought  to 
respect  private  desires  and  beliefs  in  all  or  almost  all  contexte'  (1995:  197).  The 
institutional  context  within  which  preferences  are  formed  was  at  the  heart  of  the  argument 
in  the  last  chapter  where  green  political  economy  was  argued  to  be  part  of  the  tradition  of 
institutional  economics.  It  was  also  an  argument  that  environmental  preferences  as 
preferences  for  a  public  good  demand  a  public  rather  than  a  private  institutional  setting. 
To  get  the  appropriate  information  as  regards  people's  environmental  preferences  one 
needs  to  pay  attention  to  the  context  within  which  preferences  are  formed.  The  green 
emphasis  on  preference  formation,  which  was  argued  to  be  a  central  concern  of  the  green 
conception  of  autonomy  in  the  last  chapter  (6.7)  37 
, 
is  thus  related  to  preference 
transformation.  Under  different  institutional  conditions,  information  or  rules,  preferences 
will  be  different.  However,  the  main  point  is  that,  "if  the  rules  of  allocation  have 
preference  shaping  effects,  it  is  hard  to  see  how  a  government  might  even  attempt  to  take 
preferences  'as  give'  in  any  global  sense,  or  as  the  basis  for  social  choice.  When 
preferences  are  a  function  of  legal  rules,  the  rules  cannot  be  justified  by  references  to  the 
preferencee'  (Sunstein,  1995:  202).  One  way  of  looking  at  the  lack  of  any  pre-political  or 
pre-institutional  preferences  is  to  say  that  since  preference  formation  is  already  political,  to 
make  it  explicit  rather  than  imp  liCit.  3'  Environmental  preferences,  as  Jacobs  (1996) 
suggested  in  the  last  chapter,  are  'political'  in  this  way,  unlike  preferences  for  private 
secured  by  coercion,  but  only  by  co-operation  and  restraint  in  the  exercise  of  private  power"  (1985:  43). 
Responsible  citizenship  in  other  words. 
37  This  concern  with  autonomy  in  preference  formation  is  of  course  a  central  notion  in  classical  liberal 
thought,  from  Mll  to  Dewey,  where  it  is  expressed  in  terms  of  creating  social  institutions  conducive  to  the 
development  of  'individuality'. 
38  One  example  frequently  given  to  demonstrate  that  the  process  of  aggregating  preferences  cannot  be 
extended  to  political  decision-maldng  is  the  widespread  phenomenon  of  individuals  supporting 
institutional  forms  from  which  they  may  receive  no  personal  benefit.  For  example,  many  people  support 
non-cntcrtainmcnt  public  broadcasting,  the  pubic  support  of  so-called  'high  culture',  even  though  they 
will  never  enjoy  these  experiences,  or  they  support  strict  environmental  standards  or  the  protection  of 
species,  despite  the  fact  that  they  may  not  derive  any  benefit  from  such  legislation.  Such  examples  are 
evidence  of  'public  good  thinicing'  discussed  in  7.6. 314 
goodS.  39  Part  of  what  this  means  is  that  existing  environmental  preferences  cannot  be 
taken  as  'given'  since  they  are  the  product  of,  for  the  most  part,  unecological  background 
conditions.  If  it  is  accepted  that  preferences  are  in  part  'created'  by  institutions,  and  if 
those  institutions  can  be  shown  to  have  developed  at  a  time  when  ecological 
considerations  were  neither  important  or  known,  then  there  is  a  case  to  be  made  that  those 
institutions  may  not  be  appropriate  in  the  face  of  altered  environmental  conditions.  At  the 
same  time,  preferences  partly  created  by  the  latter  cannot  be  taken  as  justification  for 
environmental  policy-making.  4'  Are  we  obliged  to  satisfy  a  collective  desire  that  may  be 
based  on  faulty  and  mistaken  information?  If  preferences  are  adapted,  why  not  create  a 
more  extensive  'adaptive  context'  and  opportunities  for  preference  formation  and 
transformation,  rather  than  aggregating  them? 
One  implication  for  this  is  that  the  state's  adoption  of  particular  institutions  through 
which  to  implement  policy  will  be  important  (Jansen  and  Osland,  1994).  If  it  chooses 
market  instruments  such  as  those  suggested  by  neo-classical  environmental  economics,  it 
addresses  individuals  and  groups  in  society  as  consumers,  and  the  environmental  problem 
is  viewed  in  economic  terms.  If  however  the  state  uses  legal  instruments,  the 
environmental  problem  is  viewed  in  terms  of  right  and  wrong,  permissible  and 
impermissible,  rather  than  costs  and  benefits.  And  individuals  are  addressed  as  democratic 
citizens  under  the  law.  According  to  Jansen  and  Osland,  "in  the  case  of  laws  against 
pollution,  the  citizens  ...  are  encouraged  to  take  a  stand  on  the  values  the  imperative  is 
supposed  to  promote.  The  citizens  may  of  course  act  according  to  the  law,  and  still 
disagree  with  the  law  and  the  values  that  law  represents  ... 
But  in  doing  so,  they  have  to 
reflect  on  the  discrepancy  between  their  private  preferences  and  interests,  and  the  societal 
valuee'  (1994:  13).  The  point  is  that  in  choosing  an  institution  for  environmental  policy- 
35)  Although  even  in  the  latter  case  private  consumption  is  partly  influenced  by  consumption  as  a  collective 
rather  than  a  purely  individual  activity  and  good. 
I  This  critique  of  justifying  action  on  the  basis  of  endogenous  preferences  underlies  the  frequent  radical 
green  claim  of  the  addiction  to  'economic  growth'  or  'consumerism'  (Irvine  and  Ponton,  1988:  62-5),  and 
the  claim  that  we  need  to  'abandon  affluence'  (Trainer,  1985).  It  also  underpins  the  argument  that 
consumer  culture  itself  is  a  preference-shaping  institution  which  'causes'  adaptive  preferences  such  as 
drug  and  alcohol  addition  (Goldsmith,  1988).  This  is  also  the  position  of  the  psychological  turn  of  deep 
ecology  which  sees  the  'ecological  crisis'  in  terms  of  psychological  pathology  (2.4.1). 315 
making  one  chooses  a  particular  way  of  presenting  the  problem  and  addresses  individuals 
in  a  particular  role  or  identity.  The  point  about  political-legal  approaches  is  that  they 
encourage  people  to  act  and  think  as  citizens,  to  see  the  environmental  problem  in 
normative  terms  and  to  assume  responsibility  for  one's  actions  in  terms  of  doing  what  is 
right.  This  attempt  to  construct  the  pattern  of  rights  and  duties  between  citizen  and  state 
has  been  made  by  Weale  in  reference  to  the  Dutch  National  Environmental  Policy  Plan 
(1992:  150-1),  and  one  may  extend  this  argument  to  suggest  that  adopting  a  political 
approach  to  environmental  problems  implies,  in  part,  encouraging  citizens  to  become 
9  ecological  stewards',  responsible  partners,  along  with  the  state,  for  the  wise  management 
of  the  environment. 
The  centrality  of  citizenship  to  green  arguments  for  democracy  comes  from  the  belief 
that  the  achievement  of  sustainability  will  require  more  than  institutional  restructuring  of 
contemporary  Western  liberal  democracies  (Achterberg,  1996).  Such  institutional  changes 
are  necessary,  but  not  sufficient,  from  a  green  point  of  view.  The  green  contention  is  that 
macro  level  reorganisation  needs  to  be  supplemented  with  changes  in  general  values  and 
practices.  In  short,  institutional  change  must  be  complemented  by  wider  cultural-level 
changes.  Deliberative  forms  of  democratic  decision-making  are  preferred,  because  a 
deliberative  conception  of  citizenship  is  more  likely  to  result  in  political  cultural  change  for 
which  greens  argue.  Citizenship  is  understood  as  a  mediating  practice  which  connects  the 
individual  and  the  institutional  levels  of  society,  as  wen  as  constituting  a  common  identity 
which  links  otherwise  disparate  individuals  as  members  of  a  political  entity.  Within  green 
democratic  theory,  citizenship  is  a  practice  within  which  ecological  virtues  such  as  self- 
reliance  and  self-restraint  can  be  learnt.  Although  green  citizenship  is  politically  based,  the 
activities,  values  and  principles  it  embodies  are  not  confined  to  the  political  sphere  as 
conventionally  understood.  The  virtues  one  would  expect  to  be  embodied  in  this  green 
form  of  responsible  citizenship,  as  a  form  of  moral  character,  would  be  operative  in  other 
spheres  of  human  action  and  roles. 
The  green  claim  to  a  principled  as  opposed  to  an  instrumental  adherence  to  democracy, 
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sustainable  and  symbiotic  human  interests  motivating  social-environmental  relations.  In 
this  sense  green  democratic  citizenship  may  be  understood  as  a  form  of  social  learning, 
with  democratic  deliberation  as  a  public  form  of  pedagogy.  However  unlike  the 
epistemological  arguments  which  underpinned  some  arguments  for  the  non-democratic 
determination  of  social-environmental  relations,  the  pedagogic  nature  of  deliberative 
democracy  is  not  about  the  internalisation  by  the  populace  of  some  given  truth  as 
determined  by  experts.  Rather,  the  pedagogic  effects  of  deliberative  democracy  is  a 
process  of  mutual  learning,  the  bringing  together  of  various  forms  of  knowledge  (both 
expert  and  vernacular)  and  arguments  (moral  and  non-moral)  before  citizens  so  that  their 
deliberations  can  be  as  informed  as  possible.  This  view  of  citizenship  as  a  form  of  social 
learning  turns  on  the  view  of  democracy  as  a  communicative  process.  It  is  also  related  to 
such  practices  as  LETS,  discussed  in  the  last  chapter,  which  can  be  regarded  as  forms  of 
social  learning  and  adaptation  to  changed  ecological  and socio-economic  conditions 
(Barry  and  Proops,  1995),,  as  well  as  the  ecological  restructuring  of  the  state  and  economy 
described  in  chapter  5. 
It  is  also  related  to  the  claims  of  the  last  section  where  green  democracy  was  identified 
as  extending  the  range  of  interests  to  be  included  within  the  democratic  process.  Part  of 
the  green  argument  for  deliberative  forms  of  democracy  is  that  the  latter  provides  perhaps 
the  best  way  in  which  citizens  can  be  persuaded  to  take  the  interests  of  non-citizens  into 
account.  In  other  words,  deliberative  citizenship  as  a  practice  within  which  argument, 
debate  and  deliberation  are  central,  may  achieve  by  persuasion  what  the  direct  democratic 
representation  of  the  interests  of  excluded  classes  may  not.  The  working  of  the 
deliberative  model  of  democracy  within  which  green  arguments  could  convince  sufficient 
numbers  of  citizens  of  the  normative  rightness  or  prudence  of  considering  the  interests  of 
non-humans,  foreigners  or  future  generations  may  obviate  the  need  for  separate 
institutional  representation  of  their  interests.  This  is  the  logic  of  deliberative  democracy. 
rather  than  the  individual  being  concerned  with  her  own  interests,  she  is  encouraged  to 
consider  the  interests  of  all  those  potentially  affected  by  the  democratic  process.  As 
Goodin  suggests,  "It  might  be  empirically  more  realistic,  as  well  as  being  morally  and 317 
politically  preferable,  to  think  ...  of  democracy  as  a  process  in  which  we  all  come  to 
internalize  the  interests  of  each  other  and  indeed  of  the  larger  world  around  ue'  (1996: 
18).  This  view  of  democracy  as  a  process  within  which  we  recognise  that  we  are,  to  a 
greater  or  lesser  extent,  each  other's  keeper,  is  clearly  compatible  with  the  ecological  view 
which  holds  that  the  determination  of  social-environmental  relations  within  one  human 
society  has  effects  which  transcend  that  society,  and  species.  41  It  is  also  in  keeping  with 
the  view  that  with  the  technological  power  at  the  disposal  of  the  currently  existing 
generation  comes  responsibility.  It  is  appropriate  that  the  democratic  regulation  of 
ecological  risk  be  effected  through  internalising  the  interests  of  others.  The  internalisation 
of  the  interests  of  others  (both  fellow  citizens  and  the  classes  of  non-citizens  identified 
above),  as  well  as  the  transformation  of  preferences,  as  a  result  of  democratic  deliberation, 
will  be  indispensable  to  the  achievement  of  an  ecologically  rational  metabolism.  The  need 
for  a  deliberative  democratic  form  within  which  the  interests  of  others  may  be  considered 
is  that  it  is  the  interests  of  these  silent  others  as  perceived  by  fellow  citizens  that  is 
internalised.  It  is  only  by  encouraging  the  presentation  of  all  possible  interpretations  of  the 
interests  of  others  that  citizens  may  agree  on  a  considered  delimitation  of  what  it  is  that 
they  collectively  owe  the  future,  foreigners,  nonhumans  or  each  other.  While  it  may  be 
going  too  far  to  expect  the  internalisation  of  the  interests  of  others,  as  Goodin  (1996) 
suggests,  the  least  we  can  expect  from  a  green  democracy  is  the  consideration  of  the 
interests  of  others.  42 
The  introduction  of  communicative  rationality  to  the  co-ordination  of  individual  action 
makes  it  less  likely  that  the  collective  result  will  be  ecologically  irrational.  Enhanced 
41  It  also  echoes  Barber's  view  that  democratic  citizenship  is  "the  only  legitimate  form  our  natural 
dependency  can  take"  (1984:  104).  On  this  view  the  green  argument  is  that  democracy  is  the  only 
defensible  form  our  (human)  dependence  upon  the  nonhuman  world  can  take. 
42  Intcrnalising  the  interests  of  others  is  central  to  deep  ecological  arguments  for  the  'Big  Self,  where 
self-realisation  is  the  realisation  of  the  interests  of  the  world,  as  discussed  in  chapter  2.  It  was  because  of 
the  problems  with  this  view  that  an  ethics  of  use  was  suggested  as  a  way  in  which  an  expanded  range  of 
human  interests  in  the  world  can  be  realised,  while  also  giving  due  consideration  to  the  interests  of  that 
world.  A  rather  extreme  way  in  which  to  consider  the  interests  of  nonhumans;  is  the  'council  of  all  beings' 
favoured  by  deep  ecology  (Seed  el  al,  1988).  As  its  name  suggests,  the  aim  of  the  council  is  for  humans  to 
represent  some  part  of  the  nonhuman  world  by  'becoming'  (as  best  they  can)  that  part  of  the  nonhuman 
world.  For  a  critical  analysis  see  Barry  (1993b). 318 
democratic  institutions  which  stress  citizen  participation  and  deliberation  on  collective 
issues,  are  more  likely  to  avoid  prisoners'  dilemma  in  regard  to  environmental  public 
goods  and  bads.  The  famous  formulation  of  the  paradigmatic  ecological  problem  as  the 
'tragedy  of  the  commons'  can  be  criticised  for  not  allowing  purposeful  communication 
between  individual  users  of  the  commons.  It  simply  assumes  a  prisoner's  dilemma 
scenario  with  mutually  disinterested  and  non-communicating  'rational  individuals'. 
However,  by  introducing  a  communicative  dimension,  an  intersubjective  realm  is  created 
which  permits  the  co-ordination  of  individual  activity  in  such  a  way  that  the  aggregate 
effect  of  individual  behaviour  is  not,  as  in  the  tragedy  scenario,  both  collectively  and 
individually  undesirable.  Democracy  understood  as  communication  (Dryzek,  1990), 
together  with  democratic  citizenship  as  part  of  a  self-reflexive,  social  learning  process 
(Beck,  1992),  provides  some  evidence  that  they  can  deliver  enhanced  environmental  public 
goods  and  avoid  or  limit  environmental  public  bads  (Paehlke,  1988).  This  is  because 
deliberative  or  discursive  democracy  is  based  on  preferences,  expectations  and  behaviour 
being  altered  as  a  result  of  debate  and  persuasion,  and  as  binding  individual  behaviour  to 
conform  to  publicly  agreed  decisions.  Democratic  citizenship  in  short  permits  the 
possibility  of  the  voluntary  creation  and  maintenance  of  an  ecologically  rational  social- 
nature  interaction,  informed  by  moral  as  well  as  scientific  considerations.  This  is  because 
communicative  as  well  as  instrumental  rationality  characterises  ecological  rationality,  as 
defined  in  chapter  5. 
Citizenship  as  a  practice  can  also  be  used  to  cleave  representative  and  more 
participatory  democratic  institutions.  An  invigorated,  active  citizenship  is  possible  within 
a  democratic  system  made  up  of  both  representative  and  participatory  institutions.  Unlike 
the  demand  for  direct  democracy  which  does  require  the  transcendence  of  representative 
institutions,  the  demand  for  deliberative  or  participatory  democracy  does  not.  This  has  to 
do  with  the  argument  suggested  above  that  green  democratic  theory  and  practice  does  not 
require  transparent  social  relations.  It  also  has  to  do  with  an  acceptance  of  the  idea  that 
the  problems  of  democracy  (including  ecological  ones)  cannot  be  solved  simply  by  more 
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Citizenship,  as  viewed  by  green  democratic  theory,  emphasises  the  duty  of  citizens  to 
take  responsibility  for  their  actions  and  choices;  the  obligation  to  'do  one's  bit'  in  the 
collective  enterprise  of  achieving  sustainability.  There  is  thus  a  notion  of  'civic  virtue'  at 
the  heart  of  this  green  conception  of  citizenship.  A  part  of  this  notion  of  civic  virtue  refers 
to  consideration  of  the  interests  of  others  and  an  openness  to  debate  and  deliberation. 
This  implies  that  the  duties  of  being  a  citizen  go  beyond  the  formal  political  realm, 
including,  for  example,  such  activities  as  recycling  and  energy  conservation.  In  these  cases 
there  are  roles  for  both  the  formal  institutions  of  local  and  central  government,  the 
constitution,  the  judiciary,  as  well  as  more  informal  institutions  of  community,  the 
opinions  of  fellow  citizens,  to  prevent  'free-riding'  by  individuals  and  groups.  That  is  to 
say  a  green  democratic  society  will  also  need  to  encourage  a  'sustainability  culture', 
resources  for  which  are  already  present  in  the  'bioculture'  of,  and  conceptions  of 
'nationhood'  within,  contemporary  liberal  societies,  as  argued  in  chapter  5  (5.7). 
The  notion  of  human  stewardship  in  relation  to  the  nonhuman  world  which  was 
introduced  earlier  in  chapter  2  is  central  to  green  citizenship.  Recalling  the  discussion  in 
chapter  3  about  the  importance  of  establishing  when  legitimate  human  use  of  the 
environment  becomes  unjustifiable  abuse,  green  citizenship  can  be  viewed  as  the  practice 
of  ecological  stewardship.  That  is,  green  citizenship  is  a  collective  practice  determining  an 
'ethics  of  use'  which  expresses  a  particular  understanding  of  the  stewardship  ideal.  43  One 
may  say  that  the  'good'  green  citizen  is  one  who  most  approaches  the  ideal  of  the 
'ecological  steward',  a  central  part  of  which  involves  considering  the  interests  of  fellow 
citizens,  nonhumans,  foreigners  and  future  generations.  For  example,  it  may  be  in  the 
interests  of  a  particular  collection  of  nonhumans  that  their  habitat  be  preserved  while  it 
may  be  in  the  interests  of  citizens  that  it  be  developed.  To  be  a  good  green  citizen  does 
not  entail  an  obligation  to  actively  promote  the  interests  of  nonhumans  or  others  over 
one"s  own,  but  rather  to  justify  and  assess  one's  interests  in  the  light  of  the  interests  of 
43  This  account  of  green  citizenship  differs  somewhat  from  that  proposed  by  Christoff  (1996).  For  him  it 
is  an  "cmancipatory  project  which  is  shaped  by  -and  in  turn  constitutes-  ecological  citizens"  (1996:  162). 
Now  while  not  ruling  out  this  possibility,  green  citizenship  as  developed  here,  has  to  do  with  the  human- 
centrcd  concerns  of  ecological  stewardship,  not  the  emancipation  of  nature. 320 
others.  In  practice  this  implies  that  a  virtue  of  responsible  green  citizenship  is  a 
willingness  to  accommodate  the  interests  of  otherswithin  an  expanded  conception  of  the 
t-ecological  common  good',  a  common  good  within  which  one's  own  good  is  located. 
When  faced  with  social-environmental  problems  good  ecological  citizens  are  motivated  to 
seek  solutions  in  which  human  and  nonhuman  interests  are  rendered  as  compatible  as 
possible.  In  order  to  satisfy  as  many  interests  as  possible  of  course  requires  that  there  be  a 
willingness  to  compromise  as  well  as  an  openness  to  persuasion  through  public  debate.  44 
Celerisparibus,  the  good  of  satisfying  as  many  interests  as  possible  is  a  key  goal  of  green 
politics  and  ecological  stewardship. 
However,  responsible  citizenship  as  Held  points  out,  in  reference  to  socialism  and  the 
democratic  empowerment  of  citizens,  cannot  be  reduced  to  the  problems  of  democratic 
participation  (1991:  23).  That  is,  simply  increasing  he  participation  of  citizens  in 
democratic  decision-making  is  no  guarantee  that  they  will  act  responsibly,  motivated  by  a 
concern  for  the  ecological  common  good.  While  there  is  a  greater  chance  that  the  quality 
of  social-environmental  decisions  will  be  better  in  terms  of  ecological  rationality  under 
deliberative  democratic  conditions  than  under  liberal  democracy,  as  Dryzek  (1987;  1992) 
and  others  argue  (Dobson,  1996a;  Christoff,  1996)  there  is  no  guarantee  of  this.  Just  as 
the  problems  of  democracy  cannot  be  solved  simply  by  more  democracy,  the  question 
concerning  citizenship  cannot  be  dissolved  into  those  of  democratic  participation  itself  4' 
As  Held  notes  elsewhere,  "while  the  evidence  certainly  indicates  that  we  learn  to 
participate  by  participating,  and  that  participation  does  help  foster  -  as  Rousseau, 
Wollstonecraft  and  J.  S.  Mill  0  contended  -  an  active  and  knowledgeable  citizenry,  the 
evidence  is  by  no  means  conclusive  that  increased  participation  per  se  will  trigger  a  new 
44  This  virtue  of  green  citizenship  is  close  to  the  liberal  virtue  of  what  Galston  calls  'the  virtue  of  public 
discourse'  which  he  defines  as  including  "the  willingness  to  listen  seriously  to  a  range  of  views  ... 
The 
virtue  of  public  discourse  also  includes  the  willingness  to  set  forth  one's  own  views  intelligibly  and 
candidly  as  a  basis  for  a  politics  of  persuasion  rather  than  manipulation  or  coercion7  (1991:  227).  As  it 
stands  Galston's  defence  of  liberal  political  theory,  which  in  many  ways  harks  back  to  the  'social  liberal' 
tradition  and  a  'developmental'  view  of  democracy,  stands  at  odds  with  contemporary  liberal  democratic 
practice  which  is  mainly  concerned  with  the  aggregation  of  individual  preferences. 
45  At  the  Same  time,  the  issue  of  responsible  citizenship  for  the  maintenance  of  a  democratic  order  cannot 
be  deposed  of  by  stressing  how  political  institutions,  such  as  the  division  of  powers,  checks  and  balances, 
and  constitutional  provisions  alone  can  underpin  a  democratic  social  order. 321 
renaissance  in  human  development"  (1987:  280;  emphasis  added).  In  this  sense  we  may 
say  that  citizen  participation  and  deliberation,  while  necessary,  are  by  no  means  a  panacea 
for  solving  social-environmental  problems.  Given  the  uncertainty  which  surrounds  the 
latter,  there  is  nothing  which  can  guarantee  their  resolution,  although  the  possibility  of 
transforming  unecological  preferences  in  the  light  of  debate  is  a  necessary  condition. 
Hence  the  concern  with  seeing  'green  citizenship'  as  a  form  of  moral  character  rather  than 
purely  a  political  role  composed  of  a  particular  complex  of  rights  and  duties.  As  a  form  of 
moral  character  green  citizenship  becomes  a  responsible  mode  of  acting  which  goes 
beyond  the  political  sphere  of  relations  between  state  and  citizen. 
As  outlined  in  the  next  section,  green  citizenship  is  related  to  what  Tocqueville  called 
the  'spirit  of  association',  those  associations  in  civil  society  within  which  the  virtues 
necessary  for  green  citizenship  can  be  learnt.  It  is  also  the  case  that  responsible  citizens 
need  to  be  socialised  not  just  within  the  associations  of  civil  society  but  also  within  the 
public  education  system  as  Gutmann  (1987),  from  a  liberal  perspective,  argues.  The 
virtues  of  green  citizenship  may  be  learnt  and  fostered  within  the  public  system  of 
education.  In  the  latter  case  a  green  state  promotes,  through  public  institutions,  a  green 
conception  of  citizenship,  just  as  a  liberal  state  promotes  a  liberal  conception  of 
citizenship.  Other  state-based  forums  for  socialising  green  citizens  include  compulsory 
public  service,  as  opposed  to  n-filitary  service,  which  could  include  environmental  projects 
as  is  the  case  in  some  European  countries.  Such  republican  type  proposals  would  seek  to 
create  responsible  citizens  in  a  way  in  which  public  education  can  only  encourage.  In 
other  words,  there  is  a  degree  of  compulsion  within  republican  arguments  for  responsible 
citizenship  which  is  greater  than  that  found  within  liberal  arguments.  This  is  brought  out 
clearly  in  Oldfield's  frank  admission  that,  from  a  republican  viewpoint,  "The  moral 
character  which  is  appropriate  for  genuine  citizenship  does  not  generate  itself,  it  has  to  be 
authoritatively  inculcated'  (1990:  164;  emphasis  added).  Whether  green  politics  goes  as 
far  as  this  is  a  contentious  point,  dependent  upon  empirical  conditions.  One  of  the  most 
salient  of  the  latter  include  the  general  social  perception  of  the  severity  of  social- 
environmental  relations.  It  is  easy  to  see  how  a  general  perception  that  these  relations 322 
have  reached  a  point  which  threatens  social  survival  may  underpin  eco-authoritarian 
arguments  for  the  forcible  creation  of  green  citizens.  The  green  democratic  defence  of 
responsible  citizenship  lies,  as  indicated  above,  in  the  normative  indeterminacy  and 
epistemological  uncertainty  which  characterises  social-environmental  relations,  and  not 
just  in  the  necessity  for  citizens  to  fulfil  duties  relating  to  those  relations.  Green 
citizenship  refers  to  the  fact  that  citizen  activism,  deliberation,  participation,  compliance 
and  agreement  are  required  and  possible  at  both  the  'input'  and  'output'  stage  of  the 
public  policy  process.  The  possibility  of  more  citizen  involvement  in  making  decisions  is 
related  to  the  argument  mentioned  earlier  concerning  the  diminished  but  still  important 
role  of  the  state  within  the  context  of  an  ecological  re-definition  of  modernisation.  Less 
complex  social  organisation  as  a  necessary  consequence  of  selective  de-modernisation, 
implies  less  need  for  a  centralised  state  with  large  bureaucracies  and  of  increased 
opportunities  for  citizens  to  take  responsibility  for  their  own  affairs.  6 
To  combat  the  'arrogance'  of  an  excessive  anthropocentrism,  green  citizenship  seeks 
to  undermine  the  presumption  that  an  appeal  to  human  interests  is  sufficient  to  justify  any 
environmental  decision.  That  such  decisions  may  affect  the  interests  of  nonhumans  must, 
from  a  green  democratic  viewpoint,  be  taken  into  account.  The  point  is  not  that  green 
citizenship  demands  that  humans  give  up  their  interests  in  deference  to  those  of 
nonhumans.  Rather,  green  citizenship  is  concerned  with  separating  'serious'  from  'trivial' 
interests,  and  then  to  specify  the  agreed  limits  within  which  those  interests  may  be  realised. 
Thus  an  ethics  of  use  is  to  be  distinguished  from  'strong  anthropocentrism'  which  was 
defined  as  the  claim  that  human-nature  relations  can  be  justified  by  references  to  human 
preferences  alone.  This  point  was  made  in  chapter  3  (3.5.1)  where  it  was  argued  that  the 
problem  with  strong  anthropocentrism  is  that  it  insulates  preferences  from  critical 
appraisal.  Green  citizenship,  by  contrast,  is  the  praxis  of  citizens  critically  evaluating 
'A  general  reconfiguration  of  modcrnisation  (Beck,  1992)  or  more  radically  a  wholesale  process  of  de- 
industrialisation  (Lee,  1993a),  which  would  undermine  arguments  for  the  necessity  for  a  centraliscd, 
highly  bureaucratic  state,  does  not,  as  Carter  (1993)  argues,  lead  to  the  abolition  of  the  nation-state  and 
the  establishment  of  an  cco-anarchist  political  structure.  An  alternative,  and  one  that  will  be  canvassed  in 
the  section  on  civil  society  below,  is  that  such  an  ecological  rc-oricntation  of  contemporary  society  heralds 
a  new  relationship  between  state  and  civil  society. 323 
preferences  and  attempting  to  come  to  agreement  on  limits  within  which  particular  social- 
47 
environmental  relations  may  be  pursued  . 
Thus  citizenship  within  the  context  of  green 
democratic  theory  and  practice,  is  centrally  concerned  with  the  elaboration  and 
internalisation  of  a  publicly  agreed  'ethic  of  use'  for  the  environment,  as  opposed  to  a 
putative  'environmental  ethic'.  48  This  idea  of  green  citizenship  differs  from  that  of 
Christoff  who  argues  that,  "To  become  ecological  rather  than  narrowly  anthropocentric 
citizens,  existing  humans  must  assume  responsibility  for  fiýiure  humans  and  other  species, 
and  'represent'  their  rights  and  potential  choices  according  to  the  duties  of  environmental 
stewardship"  (1996:  159).  The  emphasis  on  the  rights  of  nonhumans  would  seem  to  imply 
that  Christoff  s  theory  assumes  an  agreed  environmental  ethic  which  specifies  the  rights  of 
nonhumans.  Green  citizenship  on  his  understanding  is  partly  constituted  by  the 
discharging  of  human  duties  related  to  those  nonhuman  rights.  The  view  of  green 
citizenship  developed  here,  while  stressing  the  importance  of  duties  and  obligations,  is  not 
premised  on  nonhumans  having  rights.  Indeed  within  this  conception  of  green  politics, 
although  anthropocentnc,,  frere  'i`s"7n*"o  tight  to  development  which  may  clash  with  any 
attributed  rights  of  nonhurnans.  As  suggested  in  chapter  3  (3.3).  the  emphasis  on  rights- 
talk  within  green  moral  theory  expresses  a  proprietarian  view  of  morality  which  is 
problematic.  However,  the  appeal  to  rights  in  social-environmental  moral  deliberation 
may  be  taken  as  an  indication  of  the  seriousness  with  which  certain  views  are  held,  and  as 
such  need  to  be  taken  seriously.  That  is,  the  use  of  the  moral  idiom  of  rights  may  indfcate 
rather  than  itself  demonstrate  or  prove  the  seriousness  of  the  moral  case  under 
consideration.  At  the  same  time,  it  is  not  to  say  that  rights  and  duties  play  no  part  within 
the  green  conception  of  citizenship.  As  indicated  in  chapter  5,  collective  ecological 
47  Although  green  citizenship  as  a  form  of  ecological  stewardship  appears  close  to  deep  ecological  notions 
of  'ecological  selfhood',  particularly  with  regard  to  the  internalisation  of  the  interests  of  nonhumans,  there 
are  significant  and  important  differences.  Ecological  stewardship  lics  in  the  public,  collective 
determination  of  the  rights,  duties  and  personal  qualities  of  citizens  with  respect  to  the  achievement  of  an 
ecologically  rational  social-environment  metabolism.  Ecological  scIffiood,  as  discussed  in  chapter  2,,  Iics 
in  the  largely  private  sphere  of  intuition  and  revelation.  It  has  little  or  no  'political'  and  by  implication 
'democratic'  dimension,  either  in  its  determination  or  expression  unlike  ecological  stewardship.  The 
standards  or  virtues  of  stewardship  arc  intcrsubjectivcly  created  not  objectively  given. 
48  On  this  distinction  see  chapter  3  (3.5). 324 
management  does,  in  building  upon  key  aspects  of  ecological  modernisation,  require  a 
transformed  ensemble  of  rights  and  duties  between  citizen  and  state  (Weale,  1992:  150). 
Viewed  in  this  way  the  emphasis  on  deliberative  citizenship  here,  can  be  seen  as  a 
necessary  and  desirable  complement  to  the  'green  state'  outlined  in  that  chapter. 
The  deliberative  character  of  green  citizenship  can  be  understood  as  relating  to  the 
variety  of  forms  of  human  valuing  in  relation  to  the  environment,  and  the  multiplicity  of 
values  that  mark  human-natural  relations.  The  deliberative,,  communicative  understanding 
of  democracy  and  citizenship  within  green  politics  can  be  taken  as  a  necessary 
consequence  of  its  refusal  to  accept  that  one  form  of  human  valuing  (such  as  an  economic 
one)  can  regulate  any  social-environmental  metabolism.  It  was  partly  for  this  reason  that 
economistic  views  of  social-environmental  relations  were  criticised  in  chapter  3  (3.5.1), 
and  the  last  chapter  (6.2),  since  they  narrow  the  range  of  human  interests  in  the  world,  and 
simply  assume  preferences  to  be  both  unchanging  and  'given'.  49 
This  is  not  to  say  that  economistic  reasoning  and  valuing  is  to  be  excluded  from  the 
determination  of  social-environmental  interaction.  In  the  case  of  nonhumans,  the 
deliberative  democratic  process  allows  the  representation  of  their  interests  as  perceived  by 
citizens  or  political  institutions.  Economistic  forms  of  valuing  typically  narrow  human 
interests  in  social-environmental  affairs  while  also  denying  the  interests  of  nonhumans  to 
have  any  bearing  on  decision-making.  As  indicated  in  chapter  3,  econornistic  forms  of 
valuing  in  practice  demoralise  social-environmental  interaction,  seeing  the  latter  purely  in 
terms  of  a  material-cum-econornic  transaction  with  the  satisfaction  of  a  narrow  set  of 
human  interests  as  the  only  justification  needed.  Green  citizenship  is  to  be  understood  as 
a  corrective  practice  to  the  'vices'  of  an  arrogant  anthropocentrism.  At  the  same  time 
green  democratic  citizenship  may  also  be  considered  as  part  of  the  process  through  which 
an  expansion  and  re-definition  of  the  'economic'  can  be  effected,  as  indicated  in  the  last 
chapter.  Green  citizenship  qua  ecological  stewardship  cannot  be  confined  to  the  'political 
sphere',  narrowly  understood  as  referring  to  the  nation-state.  It  denotes  a  particular 
"  The  same  holds  for  metaphysical  and  spiritual  delin-dtations  of  'proper'  human  interests  in  the 
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constellation  of  rights  and  duties  which  range  over  spheres  of  social  and  private  life  which 
impacts  on  the  environment.  Just  as  the  conception  of  the  'economic'  which  is  the  main 
subject  of  analysis  for  green  political  economy  is,  as  indicated  in  the  last  chapter,  much 
broader  than  that  given  by  'formal'  economic  transactions,  so  green  citizenship  while 
based  within  the  formal  political  sphere  is  not  confined  to  that  sphere.  Being  a  good 
citizen  from  a  green  point  of  view  does  not  consist  merely  in  considering  the  interests  of 
non-citizens  in  making  environmental  choices,  but  also  in  acting  in  a  manner  which 
promotes  ecological  stewardship. 
As  a  practice,  green  citizenship  is  the  ethical  core  of  collective  ecological  management, 
the  broad  institutional  framework  that  regulates  social-environmental  relations.  And 
although  the  primary  locus  of  green  citizenship  may  be  territorially  defined  within  the 
nation-state,  the  latter  does  not  delimit  its  scope.  Given  the  transnational  character  of 
environmental  problems,  green  citizenship  is  guided  by  the  green  slogan  of  'act  locally, 
think  globally'.  The  ethical  and  prudential  dimensions  of  stewardship  are  not  and  often 
cannot  be  expressed  at  the  local  level  but  demand  an  integrated  approach  which  combines 
local,  regional  and  global  dimensions.  The  challenge  that  green  political  theory  proposes 
for  the  contemporary  arrangement  of  the  global  human  community  is  to  institutionalise 
politically  the  moral  concerns  expressed  by  ecological  stewardship.  This  is  related  to  the 
argument  in  chapter  3  where  the  idea  of  'citizen-in-society-in-environment'  was  used  as  a 
way  of  expressing  the  shift  in  perspective  registered  by  green  politics.  Since  the 
environment  not  only  includes,  but  also  transcends  the  nation-state,  green  citizenship 
opens  out  new  arenas  for  citizen  activism.  As  Christoff  notes,  "The  citizen's  political 
community  (which,  for  many  other  issues  may  remain  that  of  the  nation-state)  is 
profoundly  reshaped  by  an  ecological  emphasis  which  generates  additional  and 
occasionally  alternative  transnational  allegiances  ranging  from  the  bio-regional  to  the 
global,  as  well  as  to  other  species  and  the  survival  of  ecosysteme'  (1996:  159).  The 
transnational  character  of  green  citizenship  can  be  taken  as  a  political  expression  of  the 
increased  ecologically-based  interdependence  that  creates  new  relationships  between 
otherwise  unconnected  individuals.  While  green  citizenship  is  nation-state  based,  its 326 
ecological  stewardship  aspects  mean  that  it  cannot  be  confined  to  the  nation-state.  To  be 
a  good  green  citizen  requires  one  to  place  allegiance  to  one's  nation  within  an  ecological 
context  which  sometimes  requires  expanding  one's  sphere  of  action  to  transnational  and 
even  global  levels. 
7.9  Civil  Society  and  Green  Democratic  Theory 
In  this  section  I  discuss  the  place  of  civil  society  within  green  democratic  theory.  The 
incorporation  of  the  concept  of  civil  society  into  green  political  theory  further 
distinguishes  the  conception  of  green  theory  being  developed  here  from  the  eco-anarchist 
position.  Firstly,  the  adoption  of  the  state-civil  society  perspective  explicitly  rejects  the 
retreat  into  gemeinschaft  that  typifies  bioregional  politics  (chapter  4).  To  adopt  a  state- 
civil  society  perspective  is  to  have  an  understanding  of  society  as  geselIschaft,  society  as 
ccorporate  association'  rather  than  as  'community'  in  the  bioregional.  sense.  Secondly,  the 
concept  of  civil  society  stresses  the  organisation  and  regulation  of  the  economy  as  central 
to  determining  the  character  of  the  connection  between  state  and  civil  society.  This  was  a 
central  aspect  of  both  ecological  modernisation  and  collective  ecological  management, 
discussed  in  chapters  5  and  6.  Regardless  of  which  interpretation  of  civil  society  one 
takes,  both  'liberal'  and  'post-liberal'  conceptions  (outlined  below)  regard  the  organisation 
of  the  economy  as  of  central  political  significance.  The  centrality  of  the  economy  to  the 
green  analysis  is  obvious,  as  it  is  within  the  economy  that  the  material  exchange  between 
society  and  its  environment  occurs,  and  within  which  one  can  find  the  origins  of  most 
environmental  problems.  The  material  metabolism  between  economy  and  environment  can 
thus  be  regarded  as  the  primary  site  of  the  cultural  contradiction  that  is  the  'ecological 
crisis'. 
The  concept  of  'civil  society',  Eke  many  other  popularly  used  terms  within  political 
discourse,  has  a  high  level  of  usage  but  a  marked  level  of  disagreement  as  to  its  precise 
understanding.  For  present  purposes,  following  O'Neill  (1993:  177),  we  can  outline  two 
senses  of  civil  society.  On  the  one  hand  there  is  what  one  may  call  the  'traditional  liberal' 327 
understanding  of  civil  society  which  identifies  it  with  the  market  society  that  first  emerged 
in  the  18th  century  and  developed  throughout  the  industrial  period  of  western  societies. 
In  this  understanding  of  civil  society,  the  market  order  is  regarded  as  a  key  basis  upon 
which  the  freedoms  of  civil  society  can  be  secured.  An  economy  regulated  by  the  market 
is  seen  not  simply  as  the  most  efficient  organisation  of  the  economy,  but  also  as  a 
necessary  bulwark  against  excessive  state  interference  and  totalitarianism.  On  this  view,  a 
planned  economy  expresses  a  collectivist  totalitarianism,  the  negation  of  the  liberal  order 
and  individual  liberty  (Hayek,  1976).  The  other  conception  of  civil  society,  which  may  be 
called  a  'post-liberal'  view,  regards  it  as  referring  to  associations  that  are  independent  of 
the  state  and  the  market  economy  (Keane,  1988).  On  this  view,  the  freedom  of  civil 
society  is  to  be  found  in  the  autonomous  practices  of  individuals  and  groups  within  civil 
associations,  non-market  institutions  such  as  professional  bodies,  voluntary  associations, 
clubs  and  societies,  as  well  as  institutions  that  are  funded  by  the  state  but  are  not  of  the 
state  such  as  universities,  schools  and  hospitals  (O'Neill,  1993:  179).  On  this  view 
totalitarianism  does  not  come  about  as  the  result  of  a  planned  economy,  rather  it  is  the 
state's  abolition  of  civil  associations  and  the  'public  sphere'  which  secures  totalitarianism. 
There  is  a  presumption  that  such  a  conception  of  civil  society  needs  to  be  protected  not 
just  from  the  state,  but  also  from  the  corrosive  effects  of  the  market  economy  (O'Neill, 
1993:  181).  It  is  this  second  understanding  of  civil  society  that  is  closest  to  green 
concerns.  This  can  be  seen  in  the  emphasis  laid  on  the  'public  sphere'  within  many 
discussions  of  green  politics  (Christoff,  1996;  Eckersley,  1996;  Dryzek,  1993;  Dobson, 
1996),  the  green  movement's  association  with  the  'new  politics'  of  civil  society  (Doherty, 
1992;  Melucci,  1989),  and  the  critique  of  the  market  developed  in  the  last  chapter,  and  the 
critique  of  overly  statist,  administrative,  approaches  in  chapter  5. 
Green  democratic  theory  is  concerned  with  the  relationship  between  a  democratic 
society  and  its  political  system  a  central  aspect  of  which  turns  on  the  separation  of  the 
state  and  civil  society.  This  is  expressed  by  Keane  as  implying  that,  "the  separation  of  the 
state  and  civil  society  must  be  a  permanent  feature  of  a  fully  democratic  social  and 
political  order"  (1988:  13).  Without  this  division  democracy  is  impossible  and  without 328 
democracy  this  division  becomes  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  sustain.  The 
institutionalised  separation  of  the  state  and  civil  society  is  therefore  a  constitutive  part  of 
any  defensible  democratic  political  order,  green  or  otherwise.  Since  the  separation  of  state 
and  civil  society  is,  as  Held  notes,  a  "fundamental  liberal  notion7'  (1987:  281),  the 
acceptance  of  this  division  by  greens  is  further  evidence  of  the  'post-liberal'  complexion  of 
green  democratic  theory. 
Part  of  the  new  pattern  of  relationships  between  state  and  civil  society  that  concur  with 
green  thinking  include  suggestions  for  the  state  to,  "'lease  back'  institutions  of  social 
policy  to  the  community"  (Held,  1987:  288;  Keane,  1988).  The  institutions  of  collective 
ecological  management  are  obviously  open  to  such  an  option.  Other  welfare  institutions 
which  if  leased  back  would  concur  with  the  central  aims  of  green  democratic  theory 
include  institutions  of  medicine,  housing  and  education.  Before  the  New  Right  and  non- 
statist  socialists  adopted  it,  green  theorists  such  as  Mich  (1971;  1973;  1974;  1975), 
Goldsmith  et  al  (1972),  Robertson  (1983)  and  Gorz  (1983),  had  articulated  a  critique  of 
the  contemporary  welfare  state  on  the  grounds  that  it  undermined  individual  and  collective 
autonomy  and  self-reliance.  Illich's  arguments  concerning  the  'radical  monopolisation'  of 
core  areas  of  personal  and  social  life  by  professional  agencies  was  at  root  a  critique  of  the 
expropriation  of  the  definition  of  needs  as  part  and  parcel  of  the  process  of  economic 
modernisation.  Together  with  Gorz,  Mich  has  been  at  the  forefront  of  developing  green 
arguments  for  the  autonomy  of  civil  society  from  both  the  market  and  the  state  and  the 
restructuring  of  relations  between  them.  A  central  part  of  this  restructuring  process  from 
a  green  perspective  involves  shifting  decision-making  power  in  regard  to  'social  welfare' 
away  from  the  market  and  the  state  and  returning  it  to  individuals  and  communities.  This 
fundamental  restructuring  of  the  definition  (ends)  as  well as  the  institutions  (means)  of 
welfare  is  at  the  heart  of  the  green  aim  to  place  the  market  and  the  state  at  the  service  of 
civil  society  rather  than  vice  versa.  Thus  the  position  outlined  in  the  last  chapter  which 
stressed  the  significance  of  economic  self-reliance,  the  local  economy  and  definitions  of 
welfare,  can  be  regarded  as  the  political  economy  underlying  the  restructuring  of  relations 
between  state,  market  and  civil  society.  This  aspect  of  green  theory  could  be  viewed  as 329 
shifting  from  a  'politics  of  social  welfare'  in  which  the  market  and  the  state  define  and 
administer  to  the  imputed  needs  of  civil  society,  to  a  'politics  of  well-being'  in  which 
individuals  within  civil  society,  define  their  own  needs  to  a  greater  extent.  Social  well- 
being,  from  a  green  perspective,  is  concerned  with  individuals  not  as  consumers  or  clients 
but  as  social  beings,  whether  this  sociality  is  expressed  through  membership  of,  and 
participation  in,  communities  or  civil  associations.  What  is  meant  by  this  is  that  a  green 
conception  of  individual.  well-being  sees  it  not  simply  as  set  within  a  social  context,  but 
within  social  practices.  In  other  words,  human  well-being  consists  in  doing  rather  than 
consuming  or  having,  as  indicated  in  chapter  2  (2.7.1)  and  chapter  6  (6.7) 
. 
50  And  while 
social  practices  do  of  course  have  a  material  impact  on  the  environment,  it  is  clear  that  a 
view  of  human  well-being  in  which  the  emphasis  is  on  social  (which  can  include  political) 
interaction  as  a  major,  though  not  the  sole,  component  of  the  good  life,  will  make  less 
demands  on  the  envirom-nent. 
7.9.1  Work  as  Social  Practice  and  Economic  Activity 
An  example  of  the  practice-based  view  of  the  good  life  is  the  green  argument  for  work  to 
be  transformed  into  an  intrinsically  valuable  social  activity,  done,  as  far  as  possible,  for  its 
intrinsic  benefits  rather  than  individual  monetary  remuneration  and  capital  accumulation. 
This  implies  a  restructuring  of  the  economy  which  would  transform  the  regulative  goal  of 
the  economy  away  from  narrow  economic  efficiency  and  accumulation,  and  seek  to 
integrate  these  'economic'  goals  within  wider  social,  moral  and  ecological  considerations. 
Part  of  this,  as  suggested  in  6.7,  would  involve  permitting  internal  goods  of  work  to  be 
realised,  as  well  as  expanding  the  'economy'  beyond  the  formal  economy.  According  to 
Gorz  (1989),  the  destruction  of  work  as  a  social  practice  is  tied  up  with  the  economic 
rationalisation  of  labour  under  capitalism.  For  him, 
50  This  is  the  underlying  argument  of  green  critiques  of  contemporary  mis-measurements  of  human  well- 
being  which  attempt  to  quantify  the  irreducibly  qualitative  components  and  goods  of  the  latter.  See  6.5. 330 
The  economic  rationalization  of  labour 
...  was  a  revolution,  a  subversion  of  a  way  of 
life,  the  values,  the  social  relations  and  relations  to  Nature)  the  invention  in  the  full 
sense  of  the  word  of  something  which  had  never  existed  before.  Productive 
activity  was  cut  off  from  its  meanings,  its  motivations  and  its  objects  became 
simply  a  meam  of  earning  a  wage.  It  ceased  to  be  a  part  of  life  and  became  the 
meatLs  of  'earning  a  living'  (1989:  21-22). 
In  this  way,  reversing  this  process  and  viewing  work  as  a  social  practice,  rather  than 
simply  as  the  use  of  the  factor  of  production  'labour'  in  the  formal  economy  for  the 
production  of  commodities,  would  contribute  towards  the  creation  of  a  more  sustainable 
economy-ecology  metabolism.  This  transformation  of  work  is  similar  to  Lee's  arguments 
for  a  less  productivist  and  more  aesthetic  or  craft  mode  of  labour  (1989:  chapter  8)  within 
what  she  calls  a  necessary  and  desirable  'de-industrialising'  process  (1993a).  Italsodraws 
upon  Robertson's  (1983)  'post-industrial'  prediction  of  a  future  in  which  the  proportion  of 
economic  activity  made  up  of  'ownwork'  will  increase.  This  is  because  the  prevailing 
definition  of  work  as  paid  employment  in  the  formal  economy  has  now  come  to  an  end, 
and  'full  employment'  a  thing  of  the  past.  Both  Lee  and  Robertson  provide  arguments  for 
the  position  outlined  in  the  last  chapter  for  the  green  ideal  of  self-reliant,  'prosuming': 
defining,  producing  and  consuming  what  one  needs  outside  the  market  and  the  state  as 
much  as  possible,  while  not  rejecting  the  opportunities  for  trade  that  the  market  affords,  or 
the  meeting  of  needs  that  the  state  can  provide. 
This  re-definition  of  work  is  thus  one  important  aspect  of  the  green  aim  to  're-embed' 
the  economy  within  society  as  a  necessary  step  in  the  creation  of  an  ecologically  rational 
sustainable  economy-ecology  metabolism,  as  discussed  in  the  last  chapter  (6.7).  Recalling 
that  ecological  rationality  has  normative  as  well  as  material  dimensions  (5.3),  this 
reconceptualisation  of  work  concurs  with  the  general  green  aim  to  're-moralise'  human- 
nonhuman  interaction  within  the  context  of  an  ethics  of  use.  This  can  be  most  clearly  seen 
in  relation  to  work  which  involves  human  interaction  with  animals.  Here  the  green 
argument  for  the  creation  of  more  'human  scale'  and  personal  forms  of  economic  practice, 331 
which  is  an  underlying  aim  of  the  green  restructuring  of  work,  converges  with  the 
normative  aim  of  re-moralising  human-non-human  relations.  Supplementing  and 
supporting  the  critique  of  intensive  livestock  rearing  in  chapter  3  on  the  grounds  that  it 
privileg  es  economic  over  other-human  interests  in  the  environment,,  we  now  have  the 
argument  that  less  'industrial'  forms  of  the  human  use  of  animals  can  permit  moral 
considerations  to  regulate  that  usage. 
While  of  course  there  is  no  guarantee  that  less  industrial  and  large-scale  human  use  of 
animals  will  result  in  a  more  'humane'  metabolism,  or  that  this  re-configuration  of  human- 
nature  practices  can  be  extended  to  other  human  uses  of  the  nonhuman  world,  the  green 
argument  is  that  such  a  re-configuration  is  a  necessary  feature  of  the  re-moralisation  of 
human-nonhuman  interaction.  The  green  contention  is  that  returning  work  to  the  category 
of  a  'practice'  which  stresses  the  internal  goods  associated  with  itl  may,  in  the  case  of 
G_ým_a_nuse  _of"ainýmai_s,  -pe_n_nMtthe-p5`sM  =ere@ris-afi_o3n-of  'ecological  virtues'  associated 
with  stewardship  as  discussed  above  and  in  chapter  2.  In  other  words,  viewing  work  as  a 
practice  would  constitute  the  necessary  social  re-embedding  of  economic  activity  required 
for  the  latter's  integration  within  its  ecological  context,  as  concluded  in  the  last  chapter. 
The  more  social-environmental  purposive,  transformative  relations  approach  the  ideal  of  a 
social  practice,  the  more  that  use  realises  the  goods  of  stewardship  rather  than 
exploitation. 
At  the  same  time,  this  view  of  work  re-casts  it  as  a  central  site  for  the  cultivation  of 
ecological  virtue.  That  is,  work  is  no  longer  an  'impersonal'  activity  in  two  senses. 
Firstly,  this  reconceptualisation  of  work  is  one  form  the  'repersonalisation'  of  human- 
animal  productive  relations  that  Benton  seeks  can  take.  Secondly,  work  is  conceived  as  a 
site  of  character  formation,  within  which  habits  and  virtues  can  be  cultivated,  and  not  just 
an  activity  engaged  in  for  monetary  remuneration.  Thirdly,  in  keeping  with  the  argument 
in  6.7.  work  is  to  be  regarded  as  a  way  in  which  citizens  are  socialised,  or  given  a  stake  in 
society,  and  included  as  valued  members  of,  and  contributors  to,  society.  In  redefining  the 
institutional  boundaries  of  the  relationships  between  market,  state  and  civil  society,  the 
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protect,  as  far  as  possible,  the  practice  of  work,  its  internal  goods,  and  virtues,  from 
institutional  distortion  in  the  form  of  market  or  state  imposed  external  goals.  As 
mentioned  above,  a  principal  external  goal  that  greens  are  keen  to  restrict  and  reformulate 
is  the  imposition  policies  aimed  at  economic  modernisation,  whether  they  be  state  or 
market-based.  In  short,  under  economic  modernisation  'work'  as  a  social  activity  loses 
its  internal  goods,  as  a  result  of  changes  in  scale,  technology,  de-skilling,  the  division  of 
labour  etc.,  and  increasingly  becomes  an  economic  activity.  This  distinction  between  work 
as  a  social  practice  and  as  an  economic  market-regulated  activity,  and  the  tension  between 
them  is  related  to  the  issue  raised  earlier  concerning  whether  a  goal  of  green  politics  was 
social  transparency.  While  it  is  obvious  that  some  versions  of  green  political  theory  seek 
the  transparency  of  social  relations,  particularly  eco-anarchism,  the  conception  of  green 
politics  in  this  thesis  does  not.  Rather,  it  accepts  that  there  will  be  social-environmental 
productive  relations  within  which  the  ideals  of  work  as  a  social  practice  Will  be 
compromised  by  work  as  an  economic-institutional  activity.  One  way  of  looking  at  this  is 
to  see  that  those  productive-transformative  relations  mark  the  sphere  of  social- 
environmental  exchanges  within  which  external  goods  and  criteria,  such  as  productivity 
and  efficiency  may  be  legitimately  pursued  without  violating  the  ethics  of  use.  As  argued 
in  chapter  3,  human  productive  use  of  the  environment  beyond  basic  need-fulfilment  is 
legitimate.  However,  such  productive  relations  may  mark  the  limits  of  acceptable 
instrumentality,  for  example,  luxuries  seem  to  occupy  a  permanent  position  on  the  border 
between  'use'  and  'abuse. 
This  re-defining  of  work  as  a  social  practice  embodying  the  purposive  human 
transformation  of  the  nonhuman  world  can  also  be  seen  as  compatible  with  the  argument 
outlined  in  the  last  chapter  concerning  how  the  gap  between  production  and  consumption, 
can  be  overcome  by  increasing  the  'prosuming'  sphere.  The  underlying  normative 
justification  of  the  re-conceptualisation  of  'work'  is  that  such  a  re-conceptualisation  is  the 
key-stone  in  the  re-orientation  of  social-environmental  relations.  Work,  perhaps  along 
with  eating  and  food  production  more  generally,  is  the  activity  which  expresses  the  central 
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within  which  this  core  social-environmental  practice  takes  place  is  thus  a,  if  not  the, 
central  political-normative  goal  of  green  politics,  one  that  would  have  cultural  as  well  as 
political  and  economic  repercussions.  That  is  the  'greening  of  work'  is  a  keystone  issue 
for  green  politics  in  that  it  is  not  only  central  to  the  creation  of  an  ecologically  rational 
economy-environment  metabolism  (the  'greening  of  the  economy').  Also,  given  the 
significance  of  work  culturally  and  politically,  it  is,  and  will  continue  to  be,  a  central  aspect 
in  the  'greening  of  society'. 
7.10  Conclusion 
In  terms  of  the  quote  which  fronts  this  chapter,  I  conclude  that  a  "democratized  world  can 
survive  its  own  implicatione'.  Contra  the  eco-authoritarian  position,  green  politics  is  not 
necessarily,  however  regrettably,  convinced  of  the  necessity  of  an  anti-democratic  stance. 
At  the  same  time,  this  chapter  has  also  sought  to  establish  that  the  complexity  and 
difficulties  associated  with  social-environmental  problems  does  suggest  that  those  greens 
who  place  their  faith  in  direct  democracy  are  equally  mistaken.  It  is  not  the  case  that  the 
ecological  problems  of  democracy  can  be  solved  simply  by  more  democracy.  Better 
democracy  may  be  a  necessary  condition  for  enhanced  ecological  rationality,  but  even  this 
is  insufficient  to  guarantee  a  sustainable  economy-ecology  metabolism,  never  mind  a 
symbiotic  social-environmental  one.  Better  democracy  is  to  be  understood  as  having  to 
do  with  the  importance  of  democratically  constructing  a  more  ecologically  rational  culture 
which  is  partly  constituted  by  green  citizenship  and  'work'  as  a  social  practice.  Green 
citizenship  views  citizens  as  sharing  responsibility  for  environmental  protection,  together 
with  the  state.  At  the  same  time,  these  duties  are  balanced  by  citizen  rights  with  regard  to 
environmental  decision-making  and  the  democratic  accountability  of  the  policy-making 
process.  Only  such  a  cultural  transformation  can  provide  anything  approaching  a 
'guarantee'  of  sustainable  and  symbiotic  social-environmental  relations,  which  while  aiding 
the  transition  from  ecologically  irrational  modes  of  interaction,  attempts  to  sustain  the 
positive  gains  associated  with  those  modes.  The  aim  is  not  to  save  the  world  above  all 334 
else,  or  secure  the  infinite  continuation  of  the  human  species,  but  rather  to  stop  and  reflect 
upon  what  it  is  we  are  doing  to  both  ourselves  and  the  world,  and  to  search  for  a  new  way 
forward.  The  point  is  that  our  dependence  upon  the  earth  (and  to  an  growing  extent  'its' 
dependence  upon  us)  is  both  increasingly  obvious  and  makes  a  new,  updated  version  of 
stewardship  the  most  defensible  form  that  dependence  can  take.  The  challenge  is  to 
achieve  this  while  maintaining  and  adapting  democracy  as  the  most  defensible  form  our 
dependence  on  each  other  can  take. Chapter  Eight 
Conclusion: 
Nature,  Virtue  and  Progress 
It  has  been  my  aim  in  this  thesis  to  outline  the  contours  of  a  green  political  theory  which 
while  being  consistent  with  the  values  and  principles  of  green  ideology,  explores  them  in  a 
broader,  less  constraining,  context.  In  keeping  with  the  critical-reconstructive  approach,  I 
hope  to  have  suggested  a  conception  of  green  political  theory  with  which  greens  can 
identify,  if  not  fully  endorse.  While  by  no  means  presenting  a  fully  fledged,  complete 
account  of  green  political  theory,  this  thesis  is  intended  as  a  contribution  to  the  'theoretical 
consolidation'  of  green  politics  mentioned  in  the  introduction. 
One  thing  which  this  analysis  demonstrates  is  how  much  more  difficult  it  is  when  the 
centre  of  gravity  of  green  politics  moves  from  a  rejection  of  the  status  quo  in  terms  of  a 
future  social  order,  to  a  critique  based  on  an  analysis  of  the  principles  underlying  the  status 
quo  and  working  through  their  implications  from  a  green  perspective.  Part  of  this  shift 
within  green  theory  requires  an  engagement  with  standard  topics  and  themes  within 
political  theory,  such  as  democracy  (chapter  7),  equality  (chapters  6&  7),  autonomy 
(chapter  6)  and  the  nation-state  (chapters  4&  5).  It  also  has  to  do  with  the  character  of 
green  political  theory  being  tied  up  with  distinctively  'green'  political  issues  such  as 
ecological  sustainability.  That  is,  green  political  theory  suggests  legitimate  new  concerns 
for  political  theory,  as  well as  reviving  older  ones,  such  as  animal  welfare,  and  giving  them 
a  new  relevance. 
As  a  nascent  perspective  within  political  theory,  green  political  theory  can  be  forgiven 
for  not  having  answers  to  every  or  the  majority  of  standard  issues  and  debates  within 
political  theory.  Although  on  a  very  steep  learning  curve,  the  green  approach  to  the  art  of 
political  theory,  has  many  issues,  central  to  the  latter,  with  which  to  grapple.  Of  these,  the 
issue  of  distributive  justice,  is  clearly  the  most  important.  While  distributive  justice  was 336 
not  directly  addressed  in  the  thesis,  some  of  the  parameters,  if  not  the  principles,  of  a 
putative  green  theory  ofjustice  can  be  gleaned  from  the  analysis.  These  parameters  relate 
to  the  extremely  broad  scope  of  a  green  theory  of  justice  in  terms  of  the  recipients  of 
justice.  Three  classes  of  recipients  are  central  to  a  green  theory  of  justice.  These  are  the 
three  classes  indicated  in  the  last  chapter  nonhumans,  future  generations  and  foreigners. 
We  can  sketch  the  outlines  of  a  putative  green  theory  of  justice  in  a  negative  manner.  A 
green  theory  ofjustice  is  one  which  is  characterised  by  not  being  limited  to  the  distribution 
of  socially  produced  benefits  and  burdens  within  the  presently  existing  human  population 
of  nation-states.  More  positively,  it  is  concerned  with  justice  between  species,  between 
generations  and  within  the  present  human  generation  considered  globally.  It  is  clear  that  a 
green  theory  of  justice  would  have  to  address  the  extremely  contentious  issue  of  whether 
the  human  treatment  of  nonhumans  ought  to  be  considered  under  the  category  of  justice. 
While  the  'ethics  of  use'  position  developed  in  chapter  3  could  be  interpreted  as  arguing 
for  the  extension  ofjustice  to  our  treatment  of  nonhumans,  I  suggested  that  this  would  be 
Oficult  to  sustain,  and  indeed  unnecessary.  While  we  ought  to  include  our  relations  with 
nonhumans  under  the  rubric  of  morality,  this  is  not  co-extensive  with  including  these 
relations  under  the  rubric  ofjustice. 
The  intergenerational  dimension  of  a  green  account  of  distributive  justice  is  explicit  in 
the  idea  of  ecological  stewardship,  and  its  naturalistic  anthropocentric  basis.  The  global 
dimension  can  be-found  in  the  distinction  between  'ecosphere'  and  'biosphere'  views  of 
the  economy-ecology  metabolism  (chapters  4&  6).  Further  'seeds'  can  be  found  in  the 
green  critique  of  economic  growth  (chapter  7)  from  the  point  of  view  of  sanctioning 
economic  inequalities,  and  the  dominance  of  the  Pareto-optimality  criterion  within 
economic  thought  (chapter  6).  However,  having  uncovered  some  seeds  of  a  green  theory 
of  distributive  justice,  I  am  happy  to  leave  it  to  a  later  time  (and  to  others)  to  plant  and 
harvest  whatever  grows  from  them.  I  will  be  more  than  satisfied  if  this  thesis  has  also 
helped  prepare  the  soil  for  this  next  stage  in  the  evolution  of  green  political  theory. 337 
In  the  rest  of  this  conclusion  I  want  to  focus  on  two  aspects  of  the  thesis  which  deserve 
to  be  highlighted.  These  are  the  question  of  'progress'  and  ecological  stewardship  within 
green  political  theory. 
8.1  Green  Political  Theory  and  Progress 
One  of  the  defining  themes  of  green  political  theory,  and  one  which  is  so  obvious  that  it 
often  goes  unremarked,  is its  attitude  towards  and  concern  with  'progress'.  One  way  to 
view  green  politics  is  to  see  it  as  a  critical  reaction  to  modernity.  More  specifically,  one 
can  view  green  politics  in  terms  of  its  attitude  to  the  two  revolutions  at  the  heart  of 
modernity,  namely  the  Industrial  and  French  revolutions.  It  is  the  dialectic  between  these 
two  that  forms  the  historical  origins  and  the  theoretical  dynamic  of  green  political  theory. 
In  standard  ideological  accounts,  green  politics  criticises  and/or  rejects  the  Industrial 
revolution  and  seeks  to  extend  the  'democratic  project'  initiated  by  the  French  revolution. 
A  full  examination  of  this  dialectic  within  green  political  theory  would  require  a  full 
investigation  of  its  conservative  historical  antecedents  and  present  intimations.  The 
conservative  reaction  to  the  Enlightenment  is  a  skeleton  which  would  have  to  be  brought 
out  into  the  open  and  addressed  as  a  central  part  of  the  continuing  attempt  to  get  the 
green  theoretical  house  in  order,  as  it  were.  As  suggested  in  the  introduction,  this  thesis  is 
to  be  viewed  as  a  contribution  to  this  process.  However,  as  a  political  theory  concerned 
with  the  relationship  between  the  Industrial  and  French  revolutions,  the  question  of 
progress  is  one  that  green  political  theory  cannot  avoid  addressing.  This  is  not  simply  in 
terms  of  substantiating  its  'progressive'  self-understanding.  It  is  a  key  issue  within  the 
process  of  rounding  and  fleshing  out  the  character  of  green  political  theory  itself 
The  whole  tenor  of  early  and  ideological  accounts  of  green  politics  resonate  with  a 
perception  that  the  costs  of  modernity,  the  modem  view  of  'progress'  and  economic 
modernisation,  outweigh  the  benefits,  which  are  themselves  suggested  to  be  of 
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politics  can  be  advanced.  On  the  one  hand,  green  politics  constitutes  a  rejection  of 
modernity's  legacy  of  progress  in  both  the  socio-economic  and  political  spheres,  that  is,  it 
is  both  anti-industrial  society  and  anti-democratic.  On  the  other,  green  politics  implies  a 
rejection  of  industrial  progress  but  the  acceptance  and  radicalisation  of  'democratic 
progress'.  This  more  popular  view  of  green  politics  sees  it  as  anti-industrial,  but  pro- 
democracy.  Now  while  the  latter  has  obviously  more  to  commend  it  than  the  former,  I 
have  sought  in  the  thesis  to  suggest  that  the  anti-industrial  tenor  of  green  politics,  within 
which  is  subsumed  the  common  rejection  of  consumerism,  materialism,  science, 
technology,  and  the  market  economy  that  marks  much  green  writing,  needs  to  be 
questioned.  Gowdy  (1994)  represents  the  type  of  green  view  of  progress  which  I  wish  to 
criticise!  According  to  him,  "there  is  no  convincing  evidence  that  past  economic  growth 
has  led  to  unambiguous  improvement  in  the  human  condition.  Once  we  give  up  the  idea 
of  progress,  we  can  concentrate  on  the  making  do  with  what  we  have  rather  than  placing 
our  hopes  on  some  future  material  or  ethical  utopia7'  (1994:  55).  His  injunction  to 
abandon  the  idea  of  progress  would  be  a  retrograde  step.  It  is  only  if  one  equates 
progress  with  undifferentiated  material  economic  growth  that  it  makes  sense  from  a  green 
position  to  talk  of  abandoning  progress.  But  progress  does  not  necessarily  equate  with 
economic  growth,  as  writers  from  M11  to  more  sensible  contemporary  green  critics,  have 
emphasised.  Green  politics,  as  argued  in  this  thesis,  is  concerned  with  re-defining,  re- 
calibrating  and  re-appropriating,  rather  than  rejecting,  the  politically  powerful  idea  of 
progress.  Gowdy's  6xtremely  pessimistic  advice  to  greens  is  that  when  they  are  accused 
of  being  'anti-progress',  to  turn  the  tables  on  their  opponents  by  rejecting  the  assumption 
"that  progress  has  taken  place'  (1994:  55).  This  is  not  only  foolish  but  dangerous  advice; 
to  claim  that  no  progress  has  taken  place  since  the  Enlightenment  is  to  throw  the  baby  out 
with  the  bathwater,  to  say  the  least.  Progress  has  taken  place,  albeit  unevenly, 
unreflexively  and,  up  until  now,  largely  without  concerns  for  sustainability  or  symbiotic 
moral  relations  with  the  nonhuman  world.  This  rejection  of  progress  is  neither  necessary 
1A  more  extreme  version  of  this  position  can  be  found  in  Lasch's  (199  1)  recent  work,  The  True  and  Only 
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nor  desirable  for  green  arguments,  and  highlights  the  stark  gulf  between  those  who  see  the 
ecological  crisis  as  a  'total  crisis'  and  those  who  see  it  as  a  contradiction  within 
contemporary  advanced  societies. 
Against  this  view,  I  have  sought  to  show  that  green  political  theory  is  premised  on  the 
re-definition  of  progress,  that  it  is  an  immanent  critique  of  modernity,  not  a  politics 
seeking  to  either  return  to  a  romanticised  pre-modem  social  order  or  a  post-modem 
rejection  of  the  present.  While  rightly  highlighting  the  costs  associated  with  the  Industrial 
revolution  and  its  legacy,  to  reject  its  benefits  as  'false'  would  be  churlish,  not  to  say 
foolish.  Thus  while  accepting  the  democratic  claims  of  green  theory,  I  have  also  sought 
to  deepen  the  immanence  (and  relevance)  of  the  green  critique  by  seeking  to  present  it  as  a 
critique  of  modernity's  legacy  of  human  progress  in  both  the  political  and  social  spheres. 
Thus,  I  have  argued  that  consumption,  materialism,  science  and  the  market  economy  can, 
and  ought,  to  have  a  place  within  green  political  theory.  Particularly  in  respect  to  science, 
green  political  theory  cannot  consistently  reject  the  Industrial  revolution  since  modem 
science  from  ecology,  conservation  biology,  to  thermodynamics,  have  played,  and 
continue  to  play,  a  central  role  in  its  evolution  and  development.  While  there  may  be 
genuine  debates  about  the  necessity  or  utility  of  enclosing  the  commons  today,  green 
political  theory  does  not  need  to  base  this  on  an  a  priori  rejection  of  enclosure  whenever 
and  wherever  it  occurs.  The  green  point  is  that  while  progress  was  premised  historically 
on  enclosing  the  commons,  arguments  that  future  social  progress  necessitates  either 
further  enclosure  or  the  continuation  of  the  current  pattern  of  social  interaction  with  the 
environmental  commons  are  debatable,  to  say  the  least.  As  I  hope  to  have  demonstrated, 
an  important  aspect  of  the  theoretical  consolidation  of  green  political  theory  requires 
focusing  on  matters  of  institutional  design.  A  central  part  of  this  requires  seeing 
commons-type  regimes  as  one  institutional  choice  alongside  other  distinctively  'modem' 
institutional  forms,,  namely  those  of  the  (formal)  market  and  the  nation-state  (including 
transnational  forms  of  political  authority).  There  are  alternatives,  as  I  have  suggested,  to 
the  idea  that  returning  people  to  the  land  (and  the  land  to  the  people)  is  the  only  or  most 
appropriate  manner  in  which  to  create  and  maintain  an  ecologically  rational  social- 340 
environmental  metabolism.  While  one  can  justify  (ex  post)  the  enclosures  as  a  necessary 
precondition  for  the  Industrial  revolution,  green  political  theory  can  be  read  as  suggesting 
that  further  progress  cannot  be-b-ased  on  the  patterns  of  past  social  development. 
It  is  within  this  context  that  the  green  political  economy  argument  in  favour  of  a  "post- 
development'  perspective  in  chapter  6  ought  to  be  read.  Green  political  theory  can  thus 
be  understood  as  based  on  a  critique  of  the  linear,  one-dimensional  versions  of  social 
progress  which  equates  it  with  'economic  modernisation'  after  the  model  of  western 
industrial  societies.  Progress,  can  no  longer  be  simply  (and  simplisticly)  equated  with  ever 
increasing  material  affluence,  the  multiplication  of  desires  or  market-based  economic 
organisation.  This  is  the  point  about  the  green  political  economy  concern  with  sustainable 
development,  and  how  it  differs  from  ecological  modernisation.  Unlike  the  latter  it 
proposes  a  different  type  of  progress,  a  view  of  development  which  emphasises  qualitative 
as  well  as  quantitative  indicators  or  criteria  for  judging  social  progress.  Ecological 
modernisation  is  a  positive  step  in  the  direction  of  this  re-calibration  of  progress,  but  as 
argued  in  chapters  5  and  6  is  still  within  the  quantitative  framework  of  'economic 
modernisation'.  Perhaps  most  importantly,  ecological  modernisation's  emphasis  on  state 
regulation  of  the  market  can  be  read  as  indicative  of  the  type  of  institutional  innovation 
required  if  we  are  to  map  out  the  parameters  of  a  new  course  for  social  progress.  In  this 
way  one  can  view  its  contribution  to  the  development  of  collective  ecological  management 
and  ecological  stewardship  in  terms  of  a  shift  from  'ecological  modemisation'  to 
something  approaching  'ecological  enfightenmem'. 
What  I  mean  by  this  distinction  is  that  progress  under  ecological  modernisation 
follows,  in  essence,  the  past  patterns  of  economic  development,  particularly  the  equation 
of  economic  growth  with  social  progress.  Now  the  point  about  the  latter  'orthodox' 
model  of  progress  is  that  while  state-directed  econornic  modernisation  has  always  played  a 
greater  or  lesser  part,  by  and  large  the  assumption  of  this  model  is  that  progress  is  the 
unintended  outcome  of  social  interaction  between  individuals  and  groups  with  different 
purposes.  This  has  been  the  model  of  social  progress  which  has  held  sway  from  the  18th 
century  to  the  present  day.  As  Ferguson  noted,  it  is  the  fact  that  man  (sic)  is  a  scheming 341 
and  planning  animal  that  the  progress  of  civilisation  does  not  proceed  according  to  a  single 
plan  (1966:  122).  Now  this  'invisible  hand'  type  theory  of  social  progress  is  something 
that  green  political  theory  seeks  to  call  into  question,  but  not  in  the  sense  of  implementing 
a  single  plan  for  social  progress.  Rather  the  green  case  rests  on  the  observation  that  the 
various  social  and  ecological  problems  associated  with  this  view  of  social  progress  stem 
partly  from  the  fact  that  progress  is,  increasingly,  'imposed'  rather  than  a  spontaneous 
outcome.  Posing  the  issue  of  social  progress  as  the  outcome  of  either  a  'single  plan' 
versus  a  market  (invisible  hand)  approach  is  a  false  dichotomy,  which  suggests  that  the 
two  are  mutually  exclusive.  The  correct  antonym  to  an  invisible  hand  view  is  not  a  single 
plan  but  a  deliberative  approach  to  social  progress  in  which  the  parameters  of  progress  can 
be  decided  democratically.  The  green  argument  is  that  the  invisible  hand  approach  is  no 
longer  appropriate  to  our  current  situation.  In  terms  of  the  relationship  between  the 
Industrial  and  French  revolutions  mentioned  above,  green  political  theory  holds  that  social 
progress  both  requires,  and  is  constituted  by,  the  management  of  the  former  by  the  latter. 
That  does  not  imply  the  imposition  of  a  single  plan,  but  rather  relates  to  the  issue  of 
finding  democratic  means  by  which  we  can  choose  which  forms  of  social  progress  we 
want  and  which  forms  we  do  not.  Choosing  forms  of  social  progress  on  this  view  does 
not  consist  in  collectively  picking  one  form  from  amongst  a  set  of  possible  options. 
Rather  the  green  argument  is  that  we  ought  to  create  democratic  and  democratically 
accountable  institutions  which  function  to  rule  out  certain  forms  of  progress.  This  is 
particularly  important  in  the  field  of  technological  innovation  as  suggested  in  chapter  6, 
where  technological  developments  increasingly  raise  moral  issues  concerning  the 
distinction  between  'permissible'  and  'impermissible'  resources.  This  negative  injunction 
is  also  evident  in  the  emphasis  on  the  'coffective'  dimension  of  the  ecological  virtue  of 
stewardship  as  a  mode  of  human  interaction  which  charts  a  course  between  ecological 
vices  of  an  arrogant  anthropocentrism  and  a  submissive  ecocentrism.  Social  progress  then 
is,  on  the  green  view,  concerned  with  establishing  the  (shifting)  parameters  of  a  process 
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What  the  green  critique  of  progress  represents  is  a  questioning  of  what  one  can  call  the 
'Augustinian'  view  of  progress  as  somehow  inevitable  or  necessary  (Nisbet,  1991).  The 
history  and  future  of  the  human  species  as  a  linear  and  ever-continuing  ascent  from 
poverty,  ignorance  and  fear  to  affluence,  enlightenment  and  civilisation,  cannot  be  taken 
for  granted.  Perhaps  more  than  anything  else  green  political  theory  raises  fundamental 
questions  concerning  the  belief  in  progress  understood  as  the  idea  that  things  will 
inevitably  be  better  in  the  future.  When  'nature'  can  no  longer  be  taken  for  granted,  in  the 
sense  of  an  independent  order  and  basis  for  human  flourishing,  neither  can  progress. 
However,  not  taking  it  for  granted  is  not  the  same  as  abandoning  it  as  a  worthy  social 
goal. 
8.2  Ecological  Stewardship  and  Citizenship 
The  emphasis  of  this  thesis  has  been  on  defending  a  conception  of  green  politics,  the  moral 
basis  of  which  is  characterised  by  an  'ethics  of  use'  for  the  environment  rather  than  an 
'environmental  ethic'.  This  basis  is  explicitly  anthropocentric,  seeing  the  fulfilment  of 
human  interests  (particularly  human  productive  or  transforniZive  interests)  as  central  and 
legitimate,  if  green  policy  arguments  are  to  have  any  chance  of  persuading  democratic 
populations.  One  of  the  main  claims  I  have  made  concerns  the  connection  between  a 
particular  conception  of  citizenship  as  a  constitutive  aspect  of  a  political  process  which  I 
have  termed  collective  ecological  management,  and  the  cultivation  of  a  'stewardship  ethic' 
which  consists  in  the  cultivation  of  ecological  virtues  and  the  avoidance  of  ecological 
vices.  Stewardship  as  a  moral  ideal,  a  form  of  human  excellence,  is  most  clearly  expressed 
within  the  agricultural  context  within  which  this  ethical  tradition  developed.  Agricultural 
stewardship,  as  suggested  in  chapter  2  (2.7.2),  represents  a  set  of  interconnected  character 
traits  that  'good  farmers'  would  hope  to  cultivate.  Stewardship  as  'wise  use'  is  not 
against  human  interests,  but  rather  constitutes  a  mode  of  action  in  which  future,  long-term 
interests  can  be  safeguarded  against  the  'temptation'  of  immediate,  short-term  ones. 343 
Within  the  family-farm  social  milieu,  in  which  this  version  of  stewardship  originates, 
relations  between  humans  and  nature  are  characterised  by  sustainable  and  symbiotic  modes 
of  interaction.  While  the  land  is  used  and  animals  consumed,  the  former  is  not  'mined'  or 
'exploited'  for  short-term  profit,  nor  are  the  latter  treated  purely  as  'food  resources'.  In 
contrast  to  modem  factory-farming,  'personal'  as  well  as  'productive'  relations  exist 
between  animals  and  humans  within  the  context  of  agricultural  stewardship.  As  an  ideal 
one  can  see  why  it  has  appealed  to  many  radical  green  critics  of  modem,  urban  life,  who 
see  in  this  ideal  a  way  of  directly  're-connecting'  the  people  and  the  'land',  which  itself  is 
seen  as  a  necessary  condition  for  resolving  the  'ecological  crisis.  Arguments  for  returning 
'back  to  the  land'  have  characterised  green  politics  since  its  origins  in  the  romantic 
backlash  against  the  industrial  revolution. 
While  seeking  inspiration  from  this  agricultural  stewardship  tradition,  the  realities  of 
contemporary  western  societies  are  such  that  it  is  insufficient.  Indeed  it  would  be  an 
ecological  disaster  if  urban  populations  were  to  return  to  the  land  en  mass.  However,  a 
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of  rural  areas  ould  bFe7esirable  for  two  main 
reasons,,  one  social  the  other  ecological.  Firstly,  such  a  policy  would  help  to  maintain 
farming  as  a  form  of  stewardship  and  farming  as  a  valuable  way  of  life.  Secondly,  it  would 
be  a  necessary  component  of  encouraging  less  industrialised,  oil-based  forms  of  food  and 
fibre  production.  That  said,  it  is  naive  to  suggest,  as  many  greens  do,  that  our  ecological 
problems  would  be  solved  if  only  we  were  to  move  out  of  the  cities.  Starting  from  a 
position  in  which  the  majority  of  western  populations  are  concentrated  in  cities  and  urban 
areas  (those  to  whom  green  policy  and  institutional  recommendations  must  be  acceptable) 
the  task  facing  green  politics  is  how  to  translate  or  adapt  the  moral  virtues  of  a 
stewardship  ethic  to  a  mode  of  life  that,  on  the  face  of  it,  could  not  be  more  removed  from 
an  agricultural  setting.  The  problem  is  this:  if  we  reject  ecocentrism,  but  the  only 
acceptable  form  of  an  ethics  of  use  is  based  on  modes  of  human  interaction  and  ways  of 
life  which  are  not  the  lived  experiences  of  the  majority,  how  can  green  politics  be 
advanced  in  a  manner  which  is  not  (a)  a  return  to  a  'pre-modem',  agricultural  stage  of 
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Since  the  agricultural  setting  within  which  stewardship  developed  is  no  longer 
available  to  most  people,  it  is  clear  that  virtues  and  character  traits  based  on  it  Will  be 
difficult  to  cultivate,  to  use  an  appropriate  term,  within  a  different,  urban  mode  of  life. 
However,  just  because  agricultural  stewardship  can  only  be  experienced  by  a  minority 
within  an  industrial  or  post-industrial  society,  it  does  not  mean  that  it  is  unimportant  in 
terms  of  green  aims  of  creating  an  ecologically  rational  metabolism  between  society  and 
environment.  Two  issues  can  be  mentioned.  On  the  one  hand,  although  the  numbers  of 
those  working  on  the  land  have  steadily  decreased,  along  with  farming  as  a  proportion  of 
land-use,  fanning  still  accounts  for  a  large  proportion  of  land-use.  Therefore,  any 
movemqnt  to  an  ecologically  rational  form  of  ecological  management,  would  have  to  take 
this  fact  into  account.  Farmers  are,  and  will  continue  to  be,  de  facto  'ecological 
stakeholders',  if  not  dejure  'agricultural  stewards',  and  thus  an  important  constituency 
and  interest  group,  as  environmental  policies  from  Agenda  21  to  EU  environmental 
programmes  have  acknowledged.  On  the  other  hand,  while  we  can  think  of  a  'post- 
industrial'  society,  understood  as  a  stage  of  societal  development  coming  after  an 
industrial  phase,  the  idea  of  a  'post-agricultural'  society  is,  on  the  face  of  it,  impossible. 
While  it  is  of  course  possible  to  imagine  future  social  stages  where  we  can  synthesise 
protein  from  rocks  or  genetically  create  food  and  fibre  products  in  laboratories,  for  the 
foreseeable  future,  agriculture,  as  a  mode  of  human-productive  relations  with  the  natural 
world  which  requires  direct  contact  with  nature,  is  here  to  stay.  A  focus  on  agriculture  is 
thus  not  simply  for  inspirational  reasons  or  finding  resources  for  a  modem  stewardship 
ethic,  but  also  for  reasons  of  practicality  in  terms  of  environmental  policy. 
But  even  given  the  disproportional  importance  of  farmers  and  agriculture  in  terms  of 
social-environmental  relations,  the  fact  remains  that  the  'many'  who  have  to  accept  and 
consent  to  environmental  policies,  if  those  policies  are  to  be  democratic,  live  in  cities.  The 
roles  of  individuals  within  urban  modes  of  living  are  clearly  different  (in  kind  and  degree) 
from  those  modes  within  the  idealised  agricultural  setting  of  stewardship.  Firstly,  urban 
dwellers  are  consumers  of  goods  and  services,  including  those  not  made  by  humans,  or  as 
a  result  of  human  management  of  natural  processes  (e.  g.,  air,  water,  sunlight).  Secondly, 345 
they  are  producers,  making  goods  and  services,  some  of  which  require  natural  raw 
materials,  but  mostly  based  on  already  processed  natural  inputs.  They  are  also  producers 
of  pollution,  understood  as  waste  products  which  cannot  be,  or  are  not,  part  of  the 
metabolic  cycle  between  the  human  and  natural  economy.  Pollution  is  therefore  a  (wrong) 
substance  in  the  wrong  place,  either  because  its  made  up  of  inorganic  material  which 
cannot  be  broken  down  naturally  (wrong  substance),  or  it  is  organic  material  in  the 
cwrong'  ecological  place,  such  as  animal  manure  in  a  river  (wrong  place).  Finally,  they  are 
citizens,  parents,  members  of  various  civil  associations,  clubs,  groups  etc. 
Given  the  urban  nature  of  contemporary  life,  and  discounting  green  arguments  which 
turn  on  the  'unnaturalness'  or  urban  living,  an  ecological  rather  than  an  agricultural  form, 
is  the  most  appropriate  form  stewardship  can  take.  While  the  majority  of  people  in 
modem  society  have  not  direct,  transformative  experiences  of  nature,  this  does  not  mean 
that  the  dispositions  and  attitudes  constitutive  of  stewardship  as  a  mode  of  action,  are 
impossible  to  cultivate  in  an  urban  setting.  While  ecological  management  within 
agricultural  stewardship  takes  place  within  the  context  of  farming  as  a  social  practice, 
urban-based  forms  of  management  must  necessarily  be  mediated  by  social  institutions  and 
forms  of  knowledge  not  necessarily  based  on  direct  experience  of  the  environment.  The 
most  important  of  these  social  institutions  are  the  (formal)  market  economy  and  the 
nation-state,  while  scientific  knowledge  is  the  most  important  form  of  knowledge  for 
ecological  stewardship.  As  such  these  institutions  will,  and  are,  central  in  effecting  urban 
forms  of  environmental  management.  Ecological  modernisation,  discussed  in  chapter  5,  is 
a  good  example  of  an  urban  based  form  of  environmental  management.  Because  of  the 
existence  of  this  institutional  dimension,  the  're-embedding'  of  the  economy  in  society 
cannot  be  complete  (chapter  6).  Transparency  in  economic  life,  while  it  can  be  enhanced 
by  turning  to  non-formal  economic  spheres  such  as  LETS  or  commons  regimes,  is  simply 
impossible  to  achieve  within  a  modem  market  society.  Does  this  then  mean  that  the  're- 
integration'  of  the  human  into  the  natural  economy  is  also  impossible?  Transparency  in 
economic  or  social  fife  is  not  a  precondition  for  an  ecologically  rational  metabolism 
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bioregional  communities  do  have  a  lot  to  offer  by  way  of  ecological  rationality,  they  are 
not  the  only  form  of  ecologically  rational  social-environmental  metabolism.  We  can 
establish  a  degree  of  harmony  with  nature  and  avoid  ecological  risks,  without  'dropping 
out'  of,  or  abandoning,  contemporary  society.  Institutional  (re)design  and  (re)orientation 
can  deliver  ecologically  rational  forms  of  social-environmental  interaction,  especially  when 
institutional  innovation  is  viewed  as  a  necessary  rather  than  as  a  sufficient  condition. 
Now  while  accepting  the  place  of  institutions  in  any  feasible  form  of  modem,  urbanised 
environmental  management,  this  neither  counts  against  the  desirability  or  necessity  for 
institutions  to  be  supplemented  by  social  practices,  nor  for  a  division  of  management 
powers  in  favour  of  institutional  office  holders,  rather  than  citizens.  As  far  as  modem 
forms  of  environmental  management  are  concerned,  the  real  issue  concerns  the  choice  of 
institution,  its  level,  procedures,  management  issue,  and  most  importantly,  its  democratic 
accountability.  While  the  institutional  framework  is  a  necessary  condition  for  modem 
environmental  management,  from  a  green  perspective  this  needs  to  be  supplemented  with 
a  focus  on  the  individual's  role  in  this  process.  A  key  aspect  of  the  individual's  role  is  a 
view  of  green  citizenship  as  an  integrating  mode  of  human  interaction.  While  green 
citizenship  suggests  a  new  combination  of  rights  and  duties,  its  integrative  role  relates  to 
its  function  to  integrate  other  modes  of  human  interaction,  particularly  those  of 
consumption  and  production,  which  together  constitute  'ecological  stewardship'  as  an 
overarching  mode  of  interaction  with  the  environment. 
it  is here  that  the  idea  of  'green  citizenship'  is  vital  to  the  green  democratic  position. 
On  the  one  hand,  green  citizenship  is  argued  to  be  a  necessary  and  desirable  feature  of 
what  I  term  collective  ecological  management  (chapter  5).  The  nation-state  and  formal 
market  cannot  do  all  that  is  required  for  an  ecologically  rational  form  of  environmental 
management,  so  citizenship  is  viewed  as  an  activity,  a  particular  mode  of  action  in  which 
the  possible  ecological  vices  of  consumption  may  be  mitigated  or  avoided.  Citizenship  as 
a  mode  of  character  thus  transcends  the  purely  'political'  or  formal  status  and  legal 
standing  of  citizenship,  and  comes  to  denote  a  way  of  acting  which  tends  towards 
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ecological  management  becomes  a  way  of  transforming  urban  dwellers  into  ecological 
stewards,  giving  those  who  may  have  no  direct  experience  of  nature  some  responsibility 
for  managing  the  metabolism  between  society  and  the  environment.  One  of  the  most 
important  aspects  of  green  citizenship  in  this  respect  is  to  educate  individuals  of  the 
dependence  of  society  (which  includes  them)  on  the  environment,  and  also  the 
environment's  dependence  upon  and  vulnerability  to  society  (including  their  actions).  In 
this  educative  process,  scientific  knowledge  of  the  world  is  essential.  The  'ethic  of  use'  is 
thus  a  particular  way  of  acting  in  the  world,  which  while  being  respectful  of  the  nonhuman 
world,  does  not  lapse  into  a  submissive  'quietism.  On  this  reading,  the  emphasis  on 
science  within  green  politics  is  part  of  its  pedagogic  role  in  shaping  this  mode  of 
interaction  which  hitegrates  rather  than  rejects  material  consumption.  The  'good' 
towards  which  the  ecological  virtues  are  orientated  is  pluralistic  not  singular.  Thus  the 
types  of  lives  that  are  compatible  with  stewardship  can  (within  limits)  take  many  forms.  2 
Ecological  stewardship  seeks  to  promote  modes  of  human  life  which  avoid  the  extremes 
(vices)  of  a  'submissive  ecocentrism'  and  an  'arrogant  anthropocentrism'. 
In  reference  to  the  critique  of  a  consumption-based  economy,  the  task  of  green 
citizenship  is  to  integrate  consumption  (of  formal  market  commodities)  within  a 
stewardship  mode  of  human  action,  such  that  it  does  not  become  an  ecological  vice  (6.7). 
Consumption  is  not  rejected  outright,  as  it  is  in  many  conceptions  of  green  ideology,  but 
rather  seen  as  only  one  role  and activity  amongst  others  (such  as  production  and 
citizenship),  of  an  ecologically  rational  character.  As  argued  in  chapter  7,  consumption  is 
not  simply  an  individual  activity  but  a  shared  social  value  and  human  mode  of  action.  In 
raising  questions  about  the  status  of  this  social  value  and  its  relationship  to  other  social 
values,  such  as  environmental  protection,  or  a  concern  for  future  generations,  one  is  also 
raising  issues  about  the  place  of  material  consumption  in  human  life.  This  is  of  course  a 
central  issue  in  the  green  critique  of  'progress'.  Consumption,  particularly  within  an  urban 
2  Though  tempting  I  eschew  an  argument  that  can  be  advanced  in  favour  of  ecological  limits  on  likstyles 
which  follows  the  liberal  view  of  not  tolerating  the  intolerant.  The  ecological  version  would  be  not  to 
sustain  the  unsustainable.  The  interesting  point  about  this  is  that  ecological  sustainability  is  in  part  a 
measure  of  ecological  tolerance. 348 
context,  divorces  the  product  from  the  ecological  processes  which  have  helped  to  create 
it.  The  connection  between  human  consumption  and  the  natural  basis  of  that  consumption 
becomes  less  clear,  as  the  gap  between  production  and  consumption  increases.  The  point 
is  that  what  needs  to  be  ascertained  is  that  while  consumption  as  a  valued  mode  of  human 
action  is  unproblematic  within  human  social  relations  (critiques  of  materialism, 
notwithstanding),  the  green  point  is  that  we  cannot  pass  judgement  on  it  without  seeing 
how  it  functions  as  a  mode  of  human  interaction  with  the  world.  This  requires  it  to  be 
harmonised  and  balanced  within  a  more  expansive  mode  of  interaction  denoted  by  an  ethic 
of  use,  or  stewardship,  in  which  human  productive  and  consumptive  interests  can  be 
realised  without  compron-dsing  long-term  ecological  sustainability.  Green  politics  argues 
that  we  should  perhaps  consume  less  rather  than  simply  in  a  'greener'  manner.  It  is 
important  to  remember  that  'consumption'  here  refers  to  consumption  of  commodities  in 
the  formal  market.  As  was  suggested  in  chapter  6,  one  way  of  consuming  less,  is  to 
engage  in  ownwork,  or  LETS-type  informal  productive  activity.  Restructuring  work  so  as 
to  allow  its  internal  goods  to  be  realised,  is  a  key  policy  area  for  green  politics  in  creating 
a  less  consumption-driven  economy  and  society  (6.7  &  7.9.1). 
Stewardship  within  modem  age  cannot  refer,  as  it  once  did,  to  knowledge  of  the  world 
gained  from  direct,  productive  experience  of  an  engagement  with  the  world.  As  a  mode  of 
interaction,  modem  ecological  stewardship  is  premised  on  the  assumption  that  sufficient 
knowledge  of  the  world  can  emerge  from  the  experience  of  being  involved  in  the 
management  of  the  environment.  A  key  aspect  of  this  knowledge,  stressed  throughout  the 
thesis,  is  scientific  knowledge,  both  as  a  possible  metaphysical  basis  for  agreement,  but 
also  as  the  basis  for  policy  agreement.  At  the  same  time,  in  keeping  with  the  self-reflexive 
nature  of  stewardship,  there  is  also  an  awareness  of  the  limits  to  that  knowledge. 
Knowledge  is  power,  but  green  political  theory  argues  that  with  power  (potentially  over 
all  fife  on  earth)  comes  responsibility.  Power  without  responsibility  leads  to  an  arrogant, 
self-centred  humanism,  while  responsibility  without  power  leads  to  a  submissive  timidity  in 
the  face  of  the  immensity  of  the  natural  order. 349 
Our  situation  is  not  so  drastic  that  we  require  either  a  new  ecocentric  consciousness,  or 
anti-democratic  forms  of  environmental  regulation;  both  are  equally  alien  to  our  culture. 
Talk  of  'ecological  crisis'  and  'saving  the  earth',  while  clearly  motivated  by  a  strong  sense 
of  the  urgency  and  magnitude  of  our  current  and  near-future  ecological  predicament,  are 
over-reactions.  They  fail  to  focus  our  attention  on  the  resources  within  our  culture, 
political,  institutional,  and  moral  with  which  we  can  seek  to  cope  with  environmental  risks. 
Without  tapping  into  these  resources,  as  I  hope  this  thesis  has  shown,  limits  to  green 
political  theory  will  quickly  assert  themselves,  and  green  politics  will  become  a  voice  in  the 
wilderness,  unable  to  propose  convincing  political  arguments  as  to  why  it  should  be 
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